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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with a number of phenomena in ancient oratory
and rhetoric connected to limits of speech: being silent, pausing, not treating
a topic. All of this can happen either as a matter of incapacity or failure—or
deliberately.
Research in this particular area is scarce. A first desideratum is therefore
a phenomenology, or typology, of these limits of speech in antiquity, both as
they occur and are dealt with in practical oratory, and as they are discussed
in rhetorical theory. This thesis focuses on Cicero, in whose works both sides
can be studied, but also considers earlier and later authors.
A comprehensive typology of the large area of omissions of topics, facts,
opinions, and even words and styles, from a speech leads especially to the
phenomenon of explicit omission, usually termed praeteritio. This figure,
widely used in practice but quite underrated in (ancient) theory, is the most
prominent example of ancient oratory making use of its limits.
Similar observation are made in other areas: the issue of structural pauses
within a speech is closely related to prose rhythm; less studied, but equally
interesting are longer pauses used to leave time for something else, especially
for interaction with the audience or individuals, or enforced when the orator
is interrupted by the audience.
Another reason for interruptions is the orator’s own incapacity: memory
failure, voice failure, or other health issues. The rhetorical writings provide
some instruction for prevention and remedies; but also in practice, orators
not only avoided or handled possible failures, but turned the issue around
into a rhetorical device, employable to their advantage.
All these aspects provide a fresh perspective on the (ancient) principle of
artem arte celare and contribute to a new view on oratorical practice and rhetor-
ical theory: although the gap between theory and practice has been seen and
stated in research often enough, the point of this thesis is the rarely observed
influence (or rather lack of influence) of practice on theory: the fact that or-
atorical practice develops far beyond the theoretical instructions, and yet
no rhetorician reintegrates these developments fully and systematically into
rhetorical theory. The explanation suggested here is that written rhetorical
theory separated itself from oratorical practice quite early on and developed
an independent existence of its own throughout antiquity, and that this is
especially evident in the oratorical use of limits of speech.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Approach
This thesis is concerned with a number of phenomena in ancient oratory
and rhetoric connected to limits of speech: being silent, pausing, not treating
a topic. All of this can happen either as a matter of incapacity or failure, or
deliberately, with a specific rhetorical purpose.
In spite of the vast literature on ancient oratory and rhetoric, research in
this particular area is scarce.1 While the topic of silence has been considered
for other (ancient) literary genres, in particular drama2 and epic,3 as well as
in sociology4 and other subject areas, “gibt es bislang jedoch keinen Ansatz,
der das Thema [Schweigen] aus einer konsequent rhetorischen Perspektive
behandeln würde”.5 This is true not only for silence and pauses, but also for
omissions (which in German may be included in the term (Ver-)Schweigen),
and failure.
A first desideratum has therefore been a phenomenology, or typology, of
these limits of speech in antiquity, in two different but connected areas: on
the one hand, silence and omission as they occurred and were dealt with
and used in practical oratory, i.e. actual speeches; on the other, silence and
omission as they were discussed in rhetorical theory. Throughout this typol-
1 Some aspects relevant to my topic have indeed been covered thoroughly in modern re-
search: e.g. prose rhythm (see section 3.2.2); rhetorical figures, including praeteritio and
its variants, in particular by Lausberg (1990); procedures in court and political assemblies
(see in particular sections 2.5.2 “External time limits” and 3.4 “Interruption by the audi-
ence”).
2 E.g. Taplin (1972), Taplin (1978), Clay (1982), Aélion (1983), Thalmann (1985), Buxton
(1987), Jäkel and Timonen (2001) (with contributions on Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides,
Aristophanes, Menander, Plautus, and others), Chong-Gossard (2004), Foucher (2007),
Chong-Gossard (2008), Poochigian (2007), Rood (2010).
3 E.g. Cramer (1976), Foley (1995), Anzinger (2007).
4 E.g. Bellebaum (1992).
5 Mayer (2007, c. 686).
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ogy, I will consider the relationship between these two areas, and how they
interacted, i.e. how the handling of silence and omission in practice was re-
flected in theory, and how the rules and claims of theory were applied in
practice.6 It is not surprising that both areas do not correspond completely:
in any relationship of theory and practice, one will find that some theoretical
rules are rarely or never followed in practice, and that some issues found
in practice are not thoroughly or not at all treated in theory. Furthermore,
it must be taken into account for each theoretical work whether its purpose
is rather prescriptive or descriptive (or somewhere in between): a descriptive
treatise is by definition intended to cover all issues and devices occurring in
practice (even if not in every detail), with or without judging these; whereas
a prescriptive treatise is likely to be quite selective, i.e. to cover only those phe-
nomena observed in practice which the author deems “correct”, or worthy
(and suitable) to be taught.
Consequently, the observation that some topic or device is used in practice
but not treated in a prescriptive treatise need not be remarkable in itself, and
the question why it is not treated in the theoretical work is hard to approach:
the author may have considered it as insignificant, or as not suited for writ-
ten instruction, or he may have disapproved of it or even not have noticed
its use in practice.
On the other hand, there is more room for conclusion if some topic or de-
vice is used in practice but not treated in a descriptive treatise: provided that
the phenomenon is frequent enough in practice, a comprehensive descrip-
tive work on the subject should have something to say about it.
Therefore, when looking at discrepancies between theory and practice
in the area of silence and omission in ancient oratory and rhetoric, signif-
icant observations are most likely in comparison of descriptive theoretical
works and (contemporaneous or earlier) examples of oratorical practice (i.e.
speeches), preferably those speeches which are actually analysed in the the-
6 Of course we have only limited access to the speeches as they were delivered, and our
only reliable source are the written versions as we have them. However, if we accept that
Cicero’s and other orators’ written speeches “must at least be plausible and procedurally
correct reconstructions” (Powell, 2010, p. 35), we can examine them as authentic examples
of Greek or Roman oratory, and of what might have been said in a trial or assembly,
regardless of whether it actually was.
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oretical work(s). Among the extant ancient rhetorical treatises, it is therefore
the Institutio oratoria by Quintilian which lends itself most to further inves-
tigation: although it is indubitably written in a prescriptive mood, aiming
at the training of an “ideal orator”, it is the most comprehensive of its kind
(not least by its sheer length) and does discuss a large number of examples
from practical oratory, and not only examples for what Quintilian considers
“good” oratory but negative examples as well. Consequently, although it is
by no means an exhaustive description of oratorical practice, it has a decid-
edly descriptive side. Besides, it is all the more suited for examination by us
today as the great majority of the examples in Quintilian’s Institutio is taken
from Cicero’s speeches, which are avaible to us for analysis.
On this basis, I intend to show that the area of silence and omission pro-
vides a valuable perspective for the investigation of the relationship between
theory and practice in ancient rhetoric.
1.2 Sources
As my work focuses in particular on the relationship of oratorical practice
and rhetorical theory, a particularly important author must be Marcus Tul-
lius Cicero (106–43 BC) as the only ancient author of extant works in both
genres, i.e. speeches as examples of practical oratory as well as theoretical
treatises on rhetoric. Since I am primarily interested in theory’s reaction to
practice, Quintilian (Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, 35 – ca. 96 AD) comes into
view next, who analysed the corpus of Ciceronian speeches (much as we do
today) for his extensive treatise Institutio oratoria. In order to examine how
Quintilian’s theoretical work reacts to Cicero’s practical oratory, we need to
take into account that Quintilian also drew on earlier rhetorical theory, es-
pecially Greek, and although much of his sources are lost, we can see some
lines of development by analysing the extant treatises. For the development
of oratorical practice up to Cicero, his Greek predecessors are to be consid-
ered, i.e. the so-called Attic Orators.
My main ancient sources therefore concerning the practical side are a se-
lection of speeches by Lysias, Demosthenes, and Aeschines (which represent
9
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Attic oratory as it took place in Athenian courts and assemblies) and all of
the 58 extant speeches by Cicero.
For the theoretical side, Cicero’s and Quintilian’s rhetorica are considered:
Cicero’s De inventione, De oratore, Orator, Brutus, Partitiones oratoriae, and
Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria. Additionally, the earlier theoretical treatises
are used: the ῾Ρητορική (or [Ars] Rhetorica) by Aristotle (384–322 BC), the
Pseudo-Aristotelian ῾Ρητορική piρὸς Α᾿λέξανδρον (or Rhetorica ad Alexandrum),
and the Pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herennium.
For all ancient texts, their historical context and their intention must be
taken into view. For the speeches, this regards especially the type of speech
(forensic, political etc.), the historical circumstances, and the relationship be-
tween the extant written version and the speech as it was actually given (as
far as this can be determined).
For the rhetorical treatises, the main distinction can be drawn (in a very
generalising way) between “technical” and “philosophical” works: on the
one hand, we have the rather technical “manuals” or “textbooks” of the ars
rhetorica, of which the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, the Rhetorica ad Herennium,
and Cicero’s De inventione and Partitiones oratoriae are the only extant exam-
ples in classical antiquity (although many more were written especially in
Hellenistic times7). On the other hand, there are those treatises which have a
more “philosophical” approach, combining technical instruction with ethical
considerations. Aristotle’s Rhetoric is to be named here: “[i]m Vordergrund
steht der Gedanke, dass die zu entwickelnde Rhetorik an die philosophische
Disziplin der Dialektik anknüpfen kann”; such a rhetoric “bemüht sich an-
ders als die konventionellen Anleitungen nicht darum, den Hörer abzulen-
ken und zu verwirren, sondern ist um den rhetorischen Beweis zentriert”.8
An even broader approach is used in Cicero’s De oratore, which belongs in the
genre of philosophical dialogue9 (together with De re publica and De legibus)
and discusses the traditional five officia oratoris, but “the subject is the ideal
orator”,10 which comprises much more than oratorical techniques: not least,
7 Vanderspoel (2007, p. 124).
8 Rapp (2002, p. 172–173).
9 Wisse (2002).
10 Wisse (2002, p. 378).
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universal knowledge. Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria has, beyond its thorough
and systematic treatment of oratorical procedures and devices, even an over-
arching ethical approach, visible e.g. in the formula of the vir bonus dicendi
peritus borrowed from Cato,11 its emphasis on early education, and its advice
to the orator in matters of career tactics.
Two works are difficult to place in this division: Cicero’s Orator contains
both a rather philosophical discussion of the “ideal orator” and many tech-
nical details on prose rhythm.12 Cicero’s Brutus is a history of Roman oratory
and thus belongs to a different genre altogether, all the same containing some
enlightening remarks on rhetorical theory and oratorical practice.
1.3 Outline
A search within the considerable corpus of oratorical and rhetorical text for
phenomena of, or related to, silence and omissions produces a collection of
widely differing topics. While all of these share the point that they have,
obviously, something to do with silence, their role within the entire area of
oratory and rhetoric sets some of them far apart. This is in itself a result of
this study—that phenomena of silence and omission occur all over oratory
and rhetoric, in various forms and on various levels—but beyond this, I set
out to show that many of these phenomena share a peculiarity in their treat-
ment in the relationship between oratorical practice and rhetorical theory.
Three broad categories have proved reasonably suitable to organise the
findings. The richest material can be found in the area of (intentional) omis-
sion or avoidance of topics, facts, opinions, and even words and styles, from a
speech (chapter 2). The question of what is omitted overlaps with the ques-
tion of why: the advice to omit something appears most natural for facts or
notions detrimental to one’s case; the same advice is at least plausible for su-
perfluous material and topics outside the case, as well as for matters already
known to the audience and a number of other points. A full typology of
omissions, as provided in chapter 2, not only gives an overview of the topic
but leads to the third question (after what? and why?): i.e. how something is
11 Quint. Inst. 12.1.1.
12 Cf. Narducci (2002).
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omitted, and especially the phenomenon of explicit omission (usually termed
praeteritio in modern research).
Silence within a speech, i.e. pauses, is the second major manifestion of lim-
its of speech (chapter 3). The issue of structural pauses within a speech is
most closely related to the topic of prose rhythm, which has been studied
intensely in ancient and modern scholarship. Less studied but equally inter-
esting are longer pauses which are not used to structure a speech into κῶλα
and piερίοδοι but occur in situations of a dialogical character: intentional in-
teraction with the audience or opponent (fictitious or real), deliberate inter-
ruptions by other persons, the figure of prosopopoeia in which another person
is imagined speaking (to whom the orator “yields the stage”), and pauses in
the speech for procedural reasons.
On the other hand, the orator may be interrupted in his speech by the audi-
ence: here not only the phenomenon of θόρυβος (uproar) comes into view,13
but audience applause and laughter as well, and thus even the question of
audience silence, which can be (perceived as, and/or presented as) attentive,
hostile, or ambiguous.
Another reason for interruptions of the speech is the orator’s own incapac-
ity (chapter 4): mainly memory failure and voice failure, but also the more
personality-related problems of nervousness and lack of talent. At first sight,
these issues are mainly obstacles to the orator’s purpose which need to be
avoided or overcome, but beyond this they can also be employed as rhetori-
cal devices, when the orator anticipates or simulates a possible failure.
I will suggest that many of these aspects contribute to a differentiated view
on oratorical practice and rhetorical theory (chapter 5): while the gap between
theory and practice has been observed and stated in research often enough,
it is usually seen to indicate that oratorical practice goes beyond and around
the rules stated by the writers of rhetorical theory. In contrast to this, I am
going to focus in particular on the inverse influence: how oratorical practice
is reflected in theory. (Since practical oratory naturally came into existence
before rhetorical theory, this influence may indeed be considered the more
original one.) The topics outlined above lead to the question of how the
13 Which has been studied e.g. by Bers (1985).
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theoretical instructions of rhetoric developed under the influence of and in
response to oratorical practice. I intend to demonstrate a significant gap be-
tween theory and practice, and attempt a cautious explanation.
13
2 Limits of content: omissions
2.1 Introduction
The first phenomenon I shall consider is silence within a speech about something,
i.e. omission of a fact, an opinion etc. Omissions in extant speeches are most
prominent when announced as such by the speaker, producing a praeteritio,
so that occurrences of this figure form a major part of the material discussed
here. Otherwise omissions can be traced if a topic is announced for a later
part of the speech, but never spoken about; if some point is to be expected
due to the circumstances of the speech, but not covered (provided that we
know enough about the circumstances, preferably from sources independent
of the speech itself); or if some point is to be expected from the inner logic of
the speech, or from comparison to similar speeches.
Omissions can be categorised according to what is omitted (e.g. adverse,
superfluous, or obvious points, names, or even stylistic elements), why (e.g.
due to a time limit, or for strategical reasons), and how (e.g. explicitly in one
of many forms of praeteritio, or quietly). It is unavoidable that the resulting
groups of omissions overlap and that some instances of omission will ap-
pear in more than one category, thus the structure of this chapter can only
be an imcomplete attempt to identify, analyse and assess common features
of various classes of omissions; the categories employed will therefore be
somewhat artificial at times and not always on the same level. The most
prominent case of how something is omitted is the praeteritio; I shall show
that it appears throughout all categories of what is omitted and why, and is
employed to achieve a range of rhetorical purposes, depending on the ar-
gumentative structure and the circumstances of a speech. Therefore, in the
first sections of this chapter, I shall discuss various types of omission (sec-
tions 2.2 to 2.6) and from there provide a typology of praeteritiones (section
Chapter 2 Limits of content: omissions
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2.7), and examine their use in Cicero’s speeches and their consideration in
the theoretical works.
Silent omissions in speeches (i.e. omissions which are not announced ex-
plicitly by the speaker) are rhetorically relevant only if there is an undeniable
gap in the speech, i.e. if the omitted point is a necessary component of the
case or subject of the speech. There is a discussion in ancient rhetorical the-
ory on this question which I shall therefore focus on in the following section
(2.8): the question whether or not to include points which are adverse to
one’s case. This leads to the question whether the orator should rather lie
about an uncomfortable point or avoid it altogether, and thus to the general
question of using or avoiding lies in oratory (section 2.9).
Related to the issue of omission is the avoidance of inappropriate language
and topics in a speech, which I shall discuss in the next section of this chap-
ter (2.10). The last section (before some concluding remarks) deals with the
advice that an orator must, sometimes, artem arte celare, i.e. in some way ban
rhetoric itself from his oratory (section 2.11).
2.2 Omission of the “superfluous”
2.2.1 Introduction
atque ut aliquando de rebus ab isto cognitis iudicatisque et de
iudiciis datis dicere desistamus, et, quoniam facta istius in his
generibus infinita sunt, nos modum aliquem et finem orationi
nostrae criminibusque faciamus, pauca ex aliis generibus sume-
mus.1
This statement from Cicero’s actio secunda against Verres is a rarity, as Ci-
cero seldom ever admits that there must be modus aliqui et finis to his speech.
This concept that any speech has a “natural time limit”,2 beyond which ad-
ditional material can only render the speech longer, but not better (i.e. more
likely to achieve its purpose), is not spelt out as playing any important role
in the ancient rhetorical writings. However, this may partly be a problem of
1 Cic. Verr. 2.2.118.
2 As opposed to an external time limit, set by a law or a person.
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transmission: among the extant works, only Quintilian mentions iudicium,
the decision on what to include in a speech and what to omit, as an offi-
cium oratoris3—this officium points to an awareness that a considerable part
of the topics found in the inventio must be dismissed, just because they are
superfluous to the speech. But Quintilian refers here to quidam, i.e. a certain
minor tradition in rhetorical theory (apparently not transmitted), where the
iudicium was an established officium oratoris. Quintilian goes on to say that
Cicero treated iudicium as a part of inventio, and that he himself regards it as
belonging to the first three officia (inventio, dispositio, elocutio), not as a sepa-
rate officium, i.e. not as a vital step in the development of a speech, rather a
minor operation.4 Nevertheless, while there is no concept of a “natural time
limit” made explicit, most of the rhetorical treatises discuss the topic of iudi-
cium, i.e. choosing from possible arguments, in some way, thereby implying
that the orator may be well advised to omit some of the points that present
themselves as useful for his case; for details see below section 2.2.3.
The Attic Orators apparently had some concept of a “natural end” to a
speech or a section of a speech (though not necessarily as a defined rhetor-
ical feature), as we find repeatedly variants of “I have said enough on the
matter”.5 Usually it is said or implied that the orator could find more ma-
terial to speak about, if he really wanted or had a good reason, but that this
would, as matters stand, not be likely to help the case, i.e. that any additional
material would be superfluous.
This figure is nowhere to be found in Cicero’s speeches, and one might
conclude that Cicero would generally think it useful to add more arguments
to his case, as long as he can think of anything to speak about. By this con-
trast to the Attic Orators, D. Berry’s statement that the Roman orators over-
3 Quint. Inst. 3.3.5 “his adiecerunt quidam sextam partem, ita ut inventioni iudicium sub-
necterent, quia primum esset invenire, deinde iudicare. ego porro ne invenisse quidem
credo eum qui non iudicavit; neque enim contraria communia stulta invenisse dicitur
quisquam, sed non vitasse.” Cf. 6.5.5 “nam quid dicendum, quid tacendum, quid differ-
endum sit exigere consilii est”; 9.2.4 “quae delectatio aut quod mediocriter saltem docti
hominis indicium nisi alia repetitione, alia commoratione infigere, digredi a re et redire
ad propositum suum scierit, removere a se, in alium traicere, quae relinquenda, quae con-
temnenda sint iudicare?”
4 On iudicium in De oratore cf. Wisse (1989, p. 205–206).
5 E.g. Lys. or. 10.31 (peroration), 22.22, 29.8; Dem. or. 3.36, 4.13, 6.37, 10.75 (peroration), 34.52,
36.62; Aischin. Tim. 196 (peroration), leg. 183, 184 (peroration), Ctes. 24.
16
Chapter 2 Limits of content: omissions
Section 2.2 Omission of the “superfluous”
all “seem to have found it advantageous to make use of every argument at
their disposal, not merely the decisive ones”,6 however generalised, may be
justified. On the other hand it has been shown for Cicero’s speeches by D.
Mack that Cicero employs a very careful choice of arguments, and especially
according to the audience:7 at the beginning of the two speeches post redi-
tum, given before the senate and the people respectively, Cicero lists in both
cases the things he has regained by his return, but in the senate it is but a
short list, with ordo and dignitas coming first after his brother and children,
while in the contio his closest family is given more space than in the senate
speech and then followed by res familiaris [. . . ], fortunae [. . . ], amicitiae, con-
suetudines, vicinitates, clientelae, ludi denique et dies festi, with honos, dignitas,
locus, ordo, beneficia coming only afterwards.8 Later in the speech before the
people Cicero argues that even the gods had wished his return, as shown by
the decreased grain prices; in the corresponding passage in the senate speech
he makes the connection to the grain, but not to the gods.9 Similarly, in Phil.
4 (a contio), Cicero has the gods’ consent, shown in prodigies, as a strong ar-
gument against Antonius,10 while in the corresponding senate speech Phil. 3
the gods are mentioned, but not employed in argumentation.
In contrast, Cicero does not mention these specific strategies of using an
argument in one context but not in another as being of general importance
in his rhetorical writings (although he does discuss adapting speeches to au-
6 Berry (2004, p. 301).
7 Mack (1937, p. 75) (in conclusion to the analysis of Cic. Post red. and Phil. 3/4) “daß der
Redner in der [Senatsrede] die möglichen Argumente auf ihre Beweiskraft hin prüft und
darauf eine Auswahl trifft, während er sich vorm Volk auf eine möglichst große Zahl in
ihrem Wert oft recht zweifelhafter Gründe zu stützen sucht.” The following after Mack
(1937, p. 21, 43, 57).
8 Cic. p. red. in sen. 1; p. red. ad Quir. 2–4.
9 Cic. p. red. ad Quir. 18 “dis denique immortalibus frugum ubertate, copia, vilitate redi-
tum meum comprobantibus mihi”, p. red. in sen. 34 “mecum leges, mecum quaestiones,
mecum iura magistratuum, mecum senatus auctoritas, mecum libertas, mecum etiam
frugum ubertas, mecum deorum et hominum sanetitates omnes et religiones afuerunt.
quae si semper abessent, magis vestras fortunas lugerem, quam desiderarem meas; sin
aliquando revocarentur, intellegebam mihi cum illis una esse redeundum.” Mack (1937,
p. 43) “Im Senat kann Cicero so nicht sprechen; denn die Höhe der Getreidepreise ist ja
durchaus abhängig von der jeweiligen politischen Lage.”
10 Cic. Phil. 4.10 “iam enim non solum homines, sed etiam deos immortales ad rem publi-
cam conservandam arbitror consensisse. sive enim prodigiis atque portentis di immor-
tales nobis futura praedicunt, ita sunt aperte pronuntiata, ut et illi poena et nobis libertas
adpropinquet”.
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diences, e.g. Orat. 123); he comes closest in a remark that often being silent on
something will bring the orator no applause, just spare him from protest.11
While the concept of a “natural time limit” is thus rarely recognisable di-
rectly in the ancient speeches and rhetorical writings, it very often plays its
part in the background of oratorical actions, to be observed only indirectly.
It is plausible that it lies behind the most common occurrence of omission
in ancient speeches (i.e. by the Attic Orators and Cicero), and probably in
speeches in general: the omission of superfluous points, i.e. points which may
come up in connection with the matter at hand (especially during the or-
ator’s procedure of inventio), but which are deemed not important enough
to be included in the speech itself. Anyone preparing a speech and think-
ing freely about what might be said on a particular issue is likely to come
up with quite some material which does not support the argumentation and
which is thus easily dismissed—but it would not be dismissed in a world
where a speech were always the longer the better.
Most of these omissions during inventio leave no trace in the speech it-
self; but sometimes the omission is made explicit. The explicit omission of a
point from a speech, usually termed praeteritio in modern research,12 is used
widely throughout oratory and other genres;13 and while it can take various
forms and structures (which I shall show below) its simplest form, the plain
statement “I shall not talk about . . . ”, implies in most cases that the omit-
ted point is “superfluous”, or not relevant (enough) to the matter at hand,
even though it may inherently belong to the case or some aspects of it, or be
interesting in itself.
2.2.2 Practice
It is in the area of the superfluous that some of the most common types of
praeteritio are found (although the phenomenon is present in almost all as-
11 Cic. De orat. 2.301 “homines enim imperiti facilius quod stulte dixeris reprehendere quam
quod sapienter tacueris laudare possunt”.
12 The term praeteritio is first attested in the 3rd c. AD rhetor Aquila Rhetor (Lausberg, 1990,
§ 885). The most usual Greek term was piαράλειψις; Cicero has no fixed term for the figure,
he describes it with the words “ut aliquid reticere se dicat” (Cic. Orat. 138). Further terms
are occultatio, omissio, praetermissio (Rowe, 1997, p. 149).
13 Praeteritio is used already in Homer (however rarely, e.g. Od. 12.450–453); in Latin litera-
ture it is found as early as in Ennius’s Medea, cf. Manuwald (2013, p. 283–284).
18
Chapter 2 Limits of content: omissions
Section 2.2 Omission of the “superfluous”
pects of omission and avoidance)—types where both the value of a “natu-
ral time limit” and the classification of a topic as not necessary for the case
are not expressed in words, but implied as the most general reasons to omit
something from the speech. These are the types which I propose to call “stan-
dard praeteritio”, “praeteritio of the rest”, and “praeteritio of argument”, which
are related to the classification of something as superfluous, and which I shall
cover here.
The most basic (though not most frequent) type is the “standard praeteri-
tio” where one or more facts or aspects are simply stated to be left out: “I pass
over . . . ”, “I shall not speak about . . . ”, or words to that effect. This is quite
rarely found in the Attic Orators;14 in Cicero’s speeches, examples abound,
using variants of praetereo / praeteream, praetermitto/praetermittam, non dico /
nihil dicam etc.15 Sometimes this praeteritio is phrased in a question, mostly
in the standard form quid dicam? or quid multa?,16 sometimes in a more elab-
14 E.g. Dem. or. 18.99 “ἀλλ’ οὔpiω piερὶ τούτων”, 18.146 “ἐῶ γὰρ τοῦτό γε”, 24.145 “οὐ γὰρ
ἐρῶ ὅτι αὐτὸς Α᾿νδροτίων . . . ”
15 Examples are: Cic. Q. Rosc. 44 “quid exspectas quam mox ego [. . . ] dicam [. . . ] ? non
faciam”; Cic. Div. in Caec. 29 “nec ea dico, quae si dicam tamen infirmare non possis”,
“sunt et haec et alia in te falsi accusatoris signa permulta, quibus ego nunc non utor”; Cic.
Verr. 2.1.33 “omne illud tempus quod fuit antequam iste ad magistratus remque publi-
cam accessit, habeat per me solutum ac liberum. sileatur de nocturnis eius bacchationibus
ac vigiliis; lenonum, aleatorum, perductorum nulla mentio fiat; damna, dedecora, quae
res patris eius, aetas ipsius pertulit, praetereantur; lucretur indicia veteris infamiae; pa-
tiatur eius vita reliqua me hanc tantam iacturam criminum facere”, 2.1.43 “in quibus illud
tempus Sullanarum proscriptionum ac rapinarum praetermittam”, 2.4.7 “non loquor de
integris, innocentibus, religiosis”, 2.4.56 “nihil nimium vetus proferam”, 2.5.20–22 “nihil
de hominis frugalitate, virtute, diligentia dicam; [. . . ] omnia tibi ista concedam et remit-
tam”, 2.5.38 “mitto enim et praetereo quid tum sit actum”; Cic. Cluent. 99 “non dico hoc
tempore, iudices, id quod nescio an dici oporteat, illum maiestatis esse condemnatum”;
Cic. Sull. 75 “mitto rem publicam, quae fuit semper Sullae carissima”, 82 “neque ego prae-
cipue de consularibus disputo”; Cic. Flacc. 7 “praetereo illa quae praetereunda non sunt”,
12 “sed non dilatabo orationem meam”, 14 “sed ut hanc vim omittam”; Cic. Sest. 104
“quae cum omnia atque etiam multo alia maiora, quae consulto praetereo, accidissent”;
Cic. Prov. cons. 40 “ac primum illud tempus familiaritatis et consuetudinis, quae mihi cum
illo, quae fratri meo, quae C. Varroni, consobrino nostro, ab omnium nostrum adulescen-
tia fuit, praetermitto.”; Cic. Phil. 1.3 “multa praetereo, eaque praeclara; ad singulare enim
M. Antoni factum festinat oratio.”, 2.39 “sed omittatur bellum illud, in quo tu nimium fe-
lix fuisti.”, 2.53 “omitto, quam haec falsa, quam levia, praesertim cum omnino nulla causa
iusta cuiquam esse possit contra patriam arma capiendi. sed nihil de Caesare”; 2.63 “sed
haec, quae robustioris improbitatis sunt, omittamus”; 2.70 “sed omitto ea peccata, quae
non sunt earum partium propria”.
16 Cic. Verr. 2.4.149 “quid multa?”; Cic. Sull. 64 “sed quid ego de hoc plura disputem?”; Cic.
Har. 41 “nam quid ego de Sulpicio loquar? cuius tanta in dicendo gravitas, tanta iucun-
ditas, tanta brevitas fuit, ut posset vel ut prudentes errarent, vel ut boni minus bene sen-
tirent perficere dicendo.” (cf. 42 “tam multa”); Cic. Sest. 95 “nam quid ego de aedili ipso
loquar, qui etc.”; Cic. Mil. 75 “quid enim ego de . . . dicam?”; Cic. Lig. 33 “quid de fratribus
dicam?”; Cic. Phil. 2.62 “quid ego istius decreta, quid rapinas, quid hereditatum posses-
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orate manner;17 the question can also be combined with a reference to the
evidence that makes the elaboration of the point superfluous.18
All of these examples, different though they may be in phrasing and word-
ing, have in common that they are simple statements of omission, without a
reason given. A particular reason can be implied (e.g. in Verr. 2, where Ci-
cero does not want to go into detail about the political background of Sulla’s
proscriptions19), but most examples appear to dismiss a point as not neces-
sary or not relevant, giving the audience the impression that the orator has
considered the point, but has more important things to say, thus implying a
strong bargaining position.20 Put as a rhetorical question, the same notion
is conveyed in a less patronising way, reducing the distance between orator
and audience.
The most frequent type of praeteritio (both in the speeches by the Attic Ora-
tors and Cicero) concerns a group of similar points, some of which are treated
in the speech, while the rest is expressly left out; again, usually no explicit
reason is given for the omission. Examples for this type abound both in the
Attic Orators and in Cicero’s speeches. This praeteritio appears in four sub-
types, although the boundaries can be blurred:
 in the first sub-type the orator, after presenting some of the points, de-
clares to omit the rest.21
siones datas, quid ereptas proferam?”, 2.97 “quid ego de commentariis infinitis, quid de
innumerabilibus chirographis loquar?”, 2.101 “quid iam querar de agro Leontino?”, 2.107
“quid ego illas istius minas contumeliasque commemorem, quibus etc.”, 3.26 “quid ego
de L. Cinna loquar?”, 7.22 “nam quid ego de universo populo Romano dicam?”, 11.6
“quid loquar de caede civium Romanorum, de direptione fanorum?”, 11.13 “quid dicam
de Apulo Domitio?”, 11.33 “quid de patre dicam?”, 11.34 “quid de Cn. Pompeio loquar?”,
13.2 “nam quid ego de proximo dicam, cuius acta defendimus, auctorem ipsum iure cae-
sum fatemur?”
17 Cic. Verr. 2.1.154 “quaerimus etiam quid iste in ultima Phrygia, quid in extremis Pam-
phyliae partibus fecerit, qualis in bello praedonum praedo ipse fuerit qui in foro populi
Romani pirata nefarius reperiatur? dubitamus quid iste in hostium praeda molitus sit, qui
manubias sibi tantas ex L. Metelli manubiis fecerit, qui maiore pecunia quattuor colum-
nas dealbandas quam ille omnis aedificandas locaverit? exspectemus quid dicant ex Sicilia
testes?”
18 Cic. Verr. 2.2.104 “quid a nobis, iudices, exspectatis argumenta huius criminis? nihil
dicimus; tabulae sunt in medio, quae se corruptas atque interlitas esse clamant.”
19 Cic. Verr. 2.1.33, see note 15.
20 This implication is perhaps most obvious in two of Lysias’ speeches which end in a varia-
tion of “I could say much more; but I will not.” (Lys. or. 12.95, 31.34) This statement in the
peroration is found nowhere else in the Attic Orators or in Cicero.
21 Attic Orators: e.g. Dem. or. 1.13, 9.25, 10.10, 20.13, 18.50, 18.138, 18.296, 18.313, 20.163,
22.14–15, 22.68, 23.63, 36.30; Aischin. Tim. 157; Cicero: Cic. Verr. 2.3.92 “hic Venerius quem
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 Secondly, the orator claims from the beginning that it is not possible
or not advisable to enumerate all instances of some kind;22 this type is
less frequent than the other three in Cicero’s speeches.
 This sometimes coincides with the third sub-type, where the orator
starts out with the intent to give an example and leaves out the rest.23
ad modum aratores eluserit, ex una pactione hominis honesti gratiosique cognoscite; in
eodem enim genere sunt cetera”, 2.3.103 “non versabor in uno genere diutius, et ita cetera
de oratione mea tollam ut in causa tamen relinquam”, 2.5.166 “hoc teneo, hic haereo,
iudices, hoc sum contentus uno, omitto ac neglego cetera”; Cic. Leg. agr. 2.90 “multae
in hac re publica seditiones domesticae quas praetermitto”; Cic. Sull. 73 “quid reliquae
constantiam vitae commemorem, dignitatem, liberalitatem, moderationem in privatis re-
bus, splendorem in publicis?”; Cic. Flacc. 66 “equidem mihi iam satis superque dixisse
videor de Asiatico genere testium; sed tamen vestrum est, iudices, omnia quae dici pos-
sunt in hominum levitatem, inconstantiam, cupiditatem, etiam si a me minus dicuntur,
vestris animis et cogitatione comprendere”, 79–80 “mitto quod aliena, mitto quod pos-
sessa per vim, mitto quod convicta ab Apollonidensibus, mitto quod a Pergamenis re-
pudiata, mitto etiam quod a nostris magistratibus in integrum restituta, mitto quod nullo
iure neque re neque possessione tua; [80] illud quaero sintne ista praedia censui censendo,
habeant ius civile, sint necne sint mancipi, subsignari apud aerarium aut apud censorem
possint.”; Cic. Har. 40 “sed quoniam de iis omnibus quae haruspices commissa esse di-
cunt satis est dictum”; Cic. Lig. 9 (after a series of questions) “nimis urgeo; commoveri
videtur adulescens”; Cic. Deiot. 37 “quid de virtute eius dicam? de magnitudine animi,
gravitate, constantia?”; Cic. Phil. 1.22 “sed quid plura de lege disputo?”, 2.27 “longum
est persequi ceteros, idque rei publicae praeclarum, fuisse tam multos, ipsis gloriosum.”,
2.56 “sed omitto ceteros”, 10.2 “itaque mihi, qui plurimis officiis sum cum Bruto et max-
ima familiaritate coniunctus, minus multa de illo dicenda sunt. quas enim ipse mihi par-
tis sumpseram, eas praecepit oratio tua. sed mihi, patres conscripti, necessitatem attulit
paulo plura dicendi sententia eius, qui rogatus est ante me”.
22 Attic Orators: e.g. Lys. or. 3.45, 13.67, 14.28; Dem. or. 8.52, 10.54, 18.69–70, 18.100, 18.110,
19.145, 19.276, 19.288, 20.33, 20.52, 20.107, 21.182, 23.111, 24.51, 24.61, 24.177, 24.194, 27.58;
Aischin. Tim. 43, 81, 106, 170; Cicero: Cic. Verr. 2.2.156 “enumerare omnis non est necesse”,
2.3.53 “etenim quoniam summam ac numerum iniuriarum vobis, iudices, non possum
expromere, singillatim autem de unius cuiusque incommodo dicere infinitum est, genera
ipsa iniuriarum, quaeso, cognoscite”, 2.3.58 “genera iam dudum innumerabilium iniuri-
arum, iudices, singulis nominibus profero, infinitam multitudinem iniuriarum praeter-
mitto”, 2.4.49 “neque ego nunc istius facta omnia enumerare conor, neque opus est nec
fieri ullo modo potest”, 2.4.59 “iam enim non libet omnia criminari”; Cic. Prov. cons. 21
“atque, ut vetera, quae sunt innumerabilia, mittam”, 22 “multa praetereo”; Cic. Planc. 74
“quod omnes enumerari nullo modo possent, scelus autem esset quemquam praeteriri”;
Cic. Deiot. 12 “itaque Cn. Pompeii bella, victorias, triumphos, consulatus admirantes nu-
merabamus: tuos enumerare non possumus.”
23 Attic Orators: e.g. Dem. or. 5.9, 9.26, 9.59, 20.58, 21.116, 24.107; Aischin. leg. 71; Cicero:
Cic. S. Rosc. 87 “quam sis audax, ut alia obliviscar, hinc omnes intellegere potuerunt quod
etc.”; Cic. Verr. 2.1.96 “consistam in uno nomine; multa enim sunt ex eodem genere”, 2.2.1
“multa mihi necessario, iudices, praetermittenda sunt, ut possim aliquo modo aliquando
de his rebus quae meae fidei commissae sunt dicere”, 2.2.82 “dixi iam ante me non om-
nia istius quae in hoc genere essent enumeraturum, sed electurum ea quae maxime ex-
cellerent”, 2.2.125 “nolite exspectare dum omnis obeam oratione mea civitates: hoc uno
complector omnia”, 2.3.104 “horum ego agrorum missos faciam quaestus trienni; unum
annum eligam, quo facilius id quod institui explicare possim”, 2.4.102 “immo vero alia
complura; ex quibus eligam spoliationem nobilissimi atque antiquissimi fani”, 2.4.104 “ne
multis morer”, 2.4.105 “nimium mihi diu videor in uno genere versari criminum; sen-
tio, iudices, occurrendum esse satietati aurium animorumque vestrorum. quam ob rem
multa praetermittam; ad ea autem quae dicturus sum reficite vos, quaeso, iudices, per
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 This again blends into the fourth sub-type, where from a number of
similar arguments only the strongest24 are chosen.25
All these “praeteritiones of the rest” support a particular argument rather
than the whole case, as the omitted items provide additional backing to the
point which is explicitly made. Yet by using them frequently within a speech
(like in Verr. 2 or Phil. 2, which together provide about half of the examples
from Cicero’s speeches) the orator can also convey a sense of abundance of
evidence, but without being under pressure to prove it.
However, this argument is sound only if the instances the orator leaves out
are sufficiently analogous to the example he has given, in the respect relevant
to the matter at hand. In fact, Cicero rarely claims explicitly that this is the
case—a claim which would open the argumentation to closer examination
by the opposing party. In a few cases of the third sub-type (i.e. announcing a
single example out of a larger number) he does say that the examples he will
deos immortalis—eos ipsos de quorum religione iam diu dicimus,—dum id eius facinus
commemoro et profero quo provincia tota commota est”, 2.5.34 “omnia vetera praeter-
mittam, duo sola recentia sine cuiusquam infamia ponam, ex quibus coniecturam facere
de omnibus possitis”, 2.5.141 “quasi enim ulla possit esse causa cur hoc cuiquam civi Ro-
mano iure accidat, ita quaero quae in Servilio causa fuerit. ignoscite in hoc uno, iudices;
in ceteris enim non magnopere causas requiram”; Cic. Font. 12 “ut vetera mittam”; Cic.
Leg. agr. 2.24 “ne cum P. Rullo—taceo de ceteris—”; Cic. Sull. 70 “ut alia mittamus”, 71
“omitto ceteros, ne sit infinitum”; Cic. Phil. 2.38 “spe victoriae elati obstitissent, ut alia
omittam”, 2.47 “sed reliquum vitae cursum videte; quem quidem celeriter perstringam”,
“etsi incidamus, opinor, media ne nimis sero ad extrema veniamus.”, 12.12 “ut media
praeteream”, 13.2 “exempli causa paucos nominavi; genus infinitum inmanitatemque
ipsi cernitis reliquorum”, 13.42 “omitto alia; ’fidem Dolabellae’, sanctissimi viri, deserere
homo pius non potest.”
24 Cf. p. 33 on the omission of weak arguments.
25 Attic Orators: e.g. Lys. or. 3.5, 31.20; Dem. or. 19.205, 21.15, 21.129 (with post-praeteritio
131), 36.12, 36.22; Aischin. Tim. 109, Aischin. Ctes. 165; Cicero: Cic. S. Rosc. 123 “quae
praeteriri nullo modo poterant, ea leviter, iudices, attigi, quae posita sunt in suspicionibus
de quibus, si coepero dicere, pluribus verbis sit disserendum, ea vestris ingeniis coniec-
turaeque committo”; Cic. Div. in Caec. 33 “atque ego haec quae in medio posita sunt com-
memoro: sunt alia magis occulta furta, quae ille, ut istius, credo, animos atque impetus
retardaret, benignissime cum quaestore suo communicavit”; Cic. Verr. 2.1.62 “sed ego om-
nia quae negari poterunt praetermittam; etiam haec quae certissima sunt et clarissima re-
linquam; unum aliquod de nefariis istius factis eligam, quo facilius ad Siciliam possim ali-
quando, quae mihi hoc oneris negotique imposuit, pervenire”, 2.4.97 “iam enim mihi non
modo breviter de uno quoque dicendum, sed etiam praetereunda videntur esse permulta,
ut ad maiora istius et inlustriora in hoc genere furta et scelera veniamus”, 2.4.131 “iam
illa quae leviora videbuntur ideo praeteribo”; Cic. Leg. agr. 2.78 “at videmus, ut longinqua
mittamus, agrum Praenestinum a paucis possideri”; Cic. Sest. 7 “rei publicae dignitas,
quae me ad sese rapit, haec minora relinquere hortatur”; Cic. Phil. 2.2 “quid enim plenius,
quid uberius quam mihi et pro me et contra Antonium dicere?”, 2.112 “sed praeterita
omittamus: hunc unum diem, unum, inquam, hodiernum diem, hoc punctum temporis,
quo loquor, defende, si potes.”, 7.24 “ut omittam multitudinem”.
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pass over are of the same or a similar kind as the one he is about to discuss in
detail;26 conversely, in the fourth sub-type (i.e. announcing the strongest out
of a number of examples) he concedes from the beginning that the instances
left out are not fully equivalent to the one he treats in detail. But as can be
inferred from the vast majority of cases, a certain vagueness is a dominating
characteristic of the “praeteritio of the rest”, making it at least slightly a de-
ceptive device. It is more than likely, at any rate, that Cicero, when choosing
one supportive example from a larger number, chose the strongest example
much more often than in the explicit cases classifiable as the “fourth sub-
type” above; the vague allusion to further, similar examples would rather
work in his favour.
Conversely, the orator can leave out an entire argument explicitly (imply-
ing that stronger ones are available), which results in the type of “praeteri-
tio of argument”. This can be done directly in the form “I shall not claim
that . . . ”;27 the more sophisticated form (which is much more frequently em-
ployed by Cicero) presents a fact but then takes the form “I shall not use this
fact to argue that . . . but to show that . . . ”, e.g. “non mehercule augendi cri-
minis causa, iudices, dicam, sed, quem ipse accepi oculis animoque sensum,
hunc vere apud vos et, ut potero, planissime exponam”.28 In this latter case,
26 Cic. Verr. 2.1.96 “consistam in uno nomine; multa enim sunt ex eodem genere”, 2.2.125
“nolite exspectare dum omnis obeam oratione mea civitates: hoc uno complector omnia”
(with a particularly clear conclusion towards the entirety of the examples), 2.5.34 “omnia
vetera praetermittam, duo sola recentia sine cuiusquam infamia ponam, ex quibus coniec-
turam facere de omnibus possitis”; Cic. Phil. 13.2 “exempli causa paucos nominavi; genus
infinitum inmanitatemque ipsi cernitis reliquorum”.
27 Examples: Attic Orators: e.g. Dem. or. 1.19, 5.11, 5.15, 10.65, 9.73, 18.111, 18.120, 18.206,
18.293, 19.157, 21.25–28, 21.122; Cicero: Cic. S. Rosc. 75 “praetereo illud quod mihi max-
imo argumento ad huius innocentiam poterat esse, in rusticis moribus, in victu arido, in
hac horrida incultaque vita istius modi maleficia gigni non solere”, 106 “non enim ego
ita disputabo”; Cic. Verr. 2.5.7 “durum hoc fortasse videatur, neque ego ullam in partem
disputo”, 2.5.46 “nunc non modo te hoc crimine non arguo, sed ne illa quidem communi
vituperatione reprehendo”, 2.5.133 “etiam illud praecidas licet”; Cic. Cluent. 103 “non nu-
mero hanc absolutionem”; the examples for ἀντίφρασις in Quintilian (Quint. Inst. 9.2.47)
belong here, too.
28 Attic Orators: e.g. Lys. or. 19.56; Dem. or. 3.36, 4.27, 21.8, 21.143, 24.200; Aischin. Tim.
41, Aischin. Ctes. 26; Cicero: Cic. Verr. 2.3.46; further examples: Cic. Quinct. 30 “decernit—
quam aequum, nihil dico, unum hoc dico, novum; et hoc ipsum tacuisse mallem, quoniam
utrumque quivis intellegere potuit—sed iubet [. . . ]”; Cic. Verr. 2.5.154 “sed non licet me
isto tanto bono, iudices, uti, non licet”, 2.5.4 “non agam summo iure tecum, non dicam
id quod debeam forsitan obtinere, cum iudicium certa lege sit—non quid in re militari
fortiter feceris, sed quem ad modum manus ab alienis pecuniis abstinueris abs te doceri
oportere; non, inquam, sic agam, sed ita quaeram, quem ad modum te velle intellego,
quae tua opera et quanta fuerit in bello”, 2.5.19 “non agam ista ratione; tua sequar iudicia,
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the orator insinuates that a certain way of argumentation is open to him,
and that his audience might expect him to use it; he then distances himself
from this way of argumentation, most frequently for moral reasons. He thus
strengthens his own moral position, more than by simply not using this par-
ticular way of argumentation—especially since he cannot be certain that this
possible argumentation would indeed have occurred to his audience with-
out his first mentioning it. Even when it is probable that the audience would
not have thought of this point by themselves (when therefore no distancing
is needed), the orator still makes a moral point.
Sometimes the argumentation which is waved aside concerns the aim of
the entire speech, i.e. the praeteritio takes the form of “I speak to you not in
order to . . . , but to . . . ”. This is, quite naturally, most often the case in pros-
ecution speeches in public trials, where the orator must avoid the suspicion
of pursuing private and/or base motives. This type is therefore found more
frequently in the Attic Orators than in Cicero’s speeches.29
tuam defendam auctoritatem, quoad tu voles”; Cic. Leg. agr. 3.4 “caput est legis XL de
quo ego consulto, Quirites, neque apud vos ante feci mentionem, ne aut refricare obduc-
tam iam rei publicae cicatricem viderer aut aliquid alienissimo tempore novae dissensio-
nis commovere, neque vero nunc ideo disputabo quod hunc statum rei publicae non magno
opere defendendum putem, praesertim qui oti et concordiae patronum me in hunc annum
populo Romano professus sim, sed ut doceam Rullum posthac in eis saltem tacere rebus in
quibus de se et de suis factis taceri velit”; Cic. Sull. 9 “qua re necesse est, quod mihi consuli
praecipuum fuit praeter alios, id iam privato cum ceteris esse commune. neque ego hoc
partiendae invidiae, sed communicandae laudis causa loquor; oneris mei partem nemini
impertio, gloriae bonis omnibus.”, 14 “sed ego nondum utor hac voce ad hunc defenden-
dum; ad purgandum me potius utar, ut mirari Torquatus desinat me qui Autronio non ad-
fuerim Sullam defendere”; Cic. Sull. 85 “non dico id quod grave est, dico illud quod in his
causis coniurationis non auctoritati adsumam, sed pudori meo”; Cic. Planc. 93“ego autem
Cn. Pompeium non dico auctorem, ducem, defensorem salutis meae—nam haec privatim
fortasse officiorum memoriam et gratiam quaerunt—sed dico hoc quod ad salutem rei
publicae pertinet: [. . . ]”; Cic. Scaur. 31–32 “hic ego Appium Claudium, consulem fortissi-
mum atque ornatissimum virum mecumque, ut spero, fideli in gratiam reditu firmoque
coniunctum, nullo loco, iudices, vituperabo. fuerint enim eae partes aut eius quem id
facere dolor et suspicio sua coegit, aut eius qui has sibi partis depoposcit, quod aut non
animadvertebat quem violaret, aut facilem sibi fore in gratiam reditum arbitrabatur; [32]
ego tantum dicam quod et causae satis et in illum minime durum aut asperum possit
esse”, 39 “neque ego Sardorum querelis moveri nos numquam 〈dico〉 oportere”; Cic. Phil.
14.17 “haec interposui, patres conscripti, non tam ut pro me dixerim (male enim mecum
ageretur, si parum vobis essem sine defensione purgatus)”.
29 Attic Orators: e.g. Lys. or. 12.2, 26.15, 31.2, 33.3; Dem. or. 3.21–32, 9.1–5, 19.102, 23.1;
Aischin. Tim. 1–2; Cicero: Cic. Sull. 89 “nuper is homo fuit in civitate P. Sulla ut nemo
ei se neque honore neque gratia neque fortunis anteferret, nunc spoliatus omni dignitate
quae erepta sunt non repetit; quod fortuna in malis reliqui fecit, ut cum parente, cum
liberis, cum fratre, cum his necessariis lugere suam calamitatem liceat, id sibi ne eripi-
atis vos, iudices, obtestatur.” In Cicero’s only prosecution trial, he does not phrase it this
way, but the point is still present; cf. Tempest (2007, p. 22), referring to Cic. Div. Caec. 2:
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Another variant of the “praeteritio of argument” can be observed where
the praeteritio circles around a single word: “non condicio, non sponsio, non
denique ulla umquam intercessit postulatio, mitto aequa, verum ante hoc tem-
pus ne fando quidem audita”,30 i.e. Cicero ostentatiously backs aways from
the term aequa, which would carry further implications, and settles with a
less risky word—but of course these implications still stick with the audi-
ence. In another case, the contrast is not between different conclusions from
a fact but between different audiences the argument is aimed at.31 Related
to the latter variant is the choice not to use particular stylistic devices before
a particular audience: e.g. the common crowd surrounding a criminal court
(corona) is well served with some rough jokes, which would be inappropriate
in a philosophical discussion among learned men, like in De finibus (Cicero
speaking to Cato): “non ego tecum iam ita iocabor, ut isdem his de rebus,
cum L. Murenam te accusante defenderem. apud imperitos tum illa dicta
sunt, aliquid etiam coronae datum; nunc agendum est subtilius.”32
Especially in the passages where a fact is mentioned but then explicitly
not used for a particular argumentation, the underlying concept of a “nat-
ural time limit” is present only very faintly; here the praeteritio announces
rather a substitution than an omission, by which the speech does not de-
crease in length. Instead, the orator plays with the audience’s expectation:
he presents a particular fact or consideration (which, in some cases, he might
“The topos of the reluctant prosecutor, deployed here by Cicero, had its roots firmly in the
ideology of the Athenian democracy”.
30 Cic. Quinct. 71.
31 Cic. Rab. Post. 13 “hic ego nunc non vos prius implorabo, equites Romani, quorum ius
iudicio temptatur, quam vos, senatores, quorum agitur fides in hunc ordinem”; Cic. Flacc.
66 “sequitur auri illa invidia Iudaici. hoc nimirum est illud quod non longe a gradibus
Aureliis haec causa dicitur. ob hoc crimen hic locus abs te, Laeli, atque illa turba quaesita
est; scis quanta sit manus, quanta concordia, quantum valeat in contionibus. sic submissa
voce agam tantum ut iudices audiant; neque enim desunt qui istos in me atque in opti-
mum quemque incitent; quos ego, quo id facilius faciant, non adiuvabo.”
32 Cic. Fin. 4.74; cf. van der Wal (2007, p. 189).
The concept of different expectations and reactions from different audiences is also used
in other ways, e.g. “si haec apud Scythas dicerem, non hic in tanta multitudine civium
Romanorum, non apud senatores, lectissimos civitatis, non in foro populi Romani de tot
et tam acerbis suppliciis civium Romanorum, tamen animos etiam barbarorum hominum
permoverem” (Cic. Verr. 2.5.150); “si haec non ad civis Romanos, non ad aliquos ami-
cos nostrae civitatis, non ad eos qui populi Romani nomen audissent, denique si non ad
homines verum ad bestias, aut etiam, ut longius progrediar, si in aliqua desertissima soli-
tudine ad saxa et ad scopulos haec conqueri ac deplorare vellem, tamen omnia muta atque
inanima tanta et tam indigna rerum acerbitate commoverentur” (Cic. Verr. 2.5.171).
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have wanted to avoid altogether, but cannot do so) and connects it with a
particular argumentation that is somehow adverse to his case. The audience
may have made the connection themselves, and thus expected this particu-
lar argumentation, or they may not—whether they actually did, and whether
the connection is even plausible, is irrelevant eventually: the orator implies
that the connection could have easily been made, and at the same time re-
jects it in favour of another connection to another line of argumentation. He
thus creates a moment of favourable surprise in his audience, if they agree
that they expected (or might have expected) otherwise, and of affirmation
if they reject the suggested connection by themselves. The argument thus
gains both emphasis and acceptance with the audience.
2.2.3 Theory
As shown in the preceding sections, the Attic Orators and Cicero were in
their practical work obviously aware of good reasons and of a variety of
suitable ways to omit superfluous topics from their speeches.33 The signif-
icance of the issue is not fully reflected by the ancient writers of rhetorical
theory, as they recognise, in varying degrees, the value of omitting superflu-
ous material, but overall fail to treat the opportunities of explicit omission,
i.e. praeteritio.
The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum shows a differentiated and practical approach
to the topic. In the first chapter, common topics of oratory are listed (which
might be seen as advice on εὕρησις / inventio), under the categories of justice,
legality, expediency, honour, pleasure, facility, practicability and necessity, of
which the first three are then further illustrated. In these further instructions,
the orator is advised to use any argument available, most directly under the
heading of expediency.34 In a more special discussion on exhortation to war,
33 A different attitude is expressed one and a half centuries later in Pliny’s letter on Regulus:
“et hercule ut aliae bonae res ita bonus liber melior est quisque quo maior; [. . . ] idem ora-
tionibus evenit” (Plin. minor Epist. 1.20.4–5). Pliny, however, was (unlike Cicero) subject
to set time limits for court speeches, and accustomed to an overall different position of
oratory in society; without ever actually having the freedom to speak for as long as he
wished, he was prone to seeing exactly this as an ideal to aspire to.
34 Rhet. Alex. 1422b26–28 “τὸ δὲ συμφέρον αὐτὸ μὲν οἷόν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς piρότερον ὥρισται,
δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν εἰς τοὺς λόγους 〈ὡς ἐκ〉 τῶν piροειρημένων καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συμφέροντος, ἂν
ὑpiάρχῃ τι”, cf. Rhet. Alex. 1423a12–13 “καὶ piερὶ μὲν τούτων ἐντεῦθεν εὐpiορήσομεν.”, and
many more similar passages.
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the orator is even told to use as many arguments as possible.35 In contrast,
the thought of a careful choice among available arguments occurs only in a
rather special context of different types of trial;36 the Auctor does not pro-
pose in general that the orator has to choose between available arguments,
discarding some. However, beyond the collection of arguments, there is re-
peated advice that as soon as an argument, or the whole argumentation, is
accepted by the audience (or likely to be), any further elaboration or general
comment is superfluous and should be omitted or kept short37 (while, con-
versely, the συντομία required in the narratio is achieved by omitting τὰ μὴ
ἀναγκαῖα38). The same practical approach as for arguments is used again for
proofs: the orator should, in general, use all available proofs,39 but none at
all if the statement is convincing in itself or is conceded (by the opponent or
the audience).40
Aristotle in his Rhetoric, in the section on the canonical parts of a (forensic)
speech, refutes the common view that every speech must contain all of these
parts, arguing that any of the parts can be deemed superfluous, or does not
35 Rhet. Alex. 1425a17–20 “ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἐpiὶ τὸ piολεμεῖν piαρακαλῶμεν, τούτων τε τῶν
piροφάσεων ὅτι piλείστας συνακτέον καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα δεικτέον, [ὡς] ἐξ ὧν ἔστι piεριγενέσθαι
τῷ piολέμῳ, τούτων ὅτι piλεῖστα τοῖς piαρακαλουμένοις ὑpiάρχοντά ἐστι.”, cf. on exhorta-
tion Rhet. Alex. 1439a32–33 “ὅταν δὲ piάντα διέλθῃς, ἐξ ὧν ἐνδέχεταί σοι βεβαιῶσαι τὴν
piροτροpiήν κτλ.”
36 Rhet. Alex. 1426b37–1427a3 “δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο piαρατηρεῖν τοὺς κατηγοροῦντας, ἐpiὶ piοίοις
τῶν ἀδικημάτων οἱ νόμοι τὰς τιμωρίας τάττουσι καὶ piερὶ ἃ τῶν ἀδικημάτων οἱ δικασταὶ τὰς
ζημίας τιμῶσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ὁ νόμος διωρικὼς ᾖ, τοῦτο δεῖ μόνον σκοpiεῖν τὸν κατήγορον,
ὅpiως ἐpiιδείξῃ τὸ piρᾶγμα γεγενημένον. ὅταν δὲ οἱ δικασταὶ τιμῶσιν, αὐξητέον ἐστὶ τὰ τοῦ
ἐναντίου ἀδικήματα κτλ.”; similarly 1427b1–8 “δεῖ δὲ τὸν ἀpiολογούμενον piάλιν θεωρεῖν,
ἐφ’ οἷς τῶν ἀδικημάτων οἵ τε νόμοι τὰς τιμωρίας ἔταξαν καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς οἱ δικασταὶ τὰς ζημίας
τιμῶσι· καὶ ὅταν ὁ νόμος ὁρίζῃ τὰς τιμωρίας, δεικτέον, ὡς οὐκ ἐpiοίησε τὸ piαράpiαν, ἢ ὡς
ἔννομα καὶ δίκαια ἐpiοίησεν· ὅτε δὲ οἱ δικασταὶ καθεστήκασι τιμηταὶ τῆς ζημίας, ὁμοίως
piάλιν οὐ φατέον, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐκ ἐpiοίησεν, ἀλλὰ μικρὰ βεβλαμμένον τὸν ἐναντίον καὶ ἀκούσια
ἀpiοφαίνειν piειρατέον.” This may be seen as a precursor of stasis theory in specific context
of ἀγῶνες τιμητοί vs. ἀγῶνες ἀτιμητοί.
37 Rhet. Alex. 1431b23–26 “ὅταν μὲν οὖν τὸ μαρτυρούμενον ᾖ piιθανὸν καὶ ὁ μάρτυς ἀληθινός,
οὐδὲν δέονται αἱ μαρτυρίαι ἐpiιλόγων, ἐὰν μὴ βούλῃ γνώμην ἢ ἐνθύμημα συντόμως εἰpiεῖν τοῦ
ἀστείου ἕνεκεν·”; Rhet. Alex. 1436b19–22 “ἐὰν μὲν οὖν εὖνοι τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες, piερίεργον
λέγειν piερὶ εὐνοίας· ἂν δὲ piάντως βουλώμεθα, χρὴ συντόμως μετ’ εἰρωνείας εἰpiεῖν τοῦτον
τὸν τρόpiον· κτλ.”
38 Rhet. Alex. 1438a38–1438b1 “συντόμως δέ [δηλώσομεν], ἐὰν ἀpiὸ τῶν piραγμάτων καὶ τῶν
ὀνομάτων piεριαιρῶμεν τὰ μὴ ἀναγκαῖα ῥηθῆναι, ταῦτα μόνα καταλείpiοντες, ὧν ἀφαι-
ρεθέντων ἀσαφὴς ἔσται ὁ λόγος.”
39 Rhet. Alex. 1438b35–36 (after a list of sources for proofs) “χρηστέον δὲ καὶ ἄν τις τῶν ἄλλων
piίστεων piαρεμpiέσῃ.”
40 Rhet. Alex. 1439a8–9 “ἐὰν δὲ piιστεύηται τὰ piράγματα εὐθέως ῥηθέντα, τὰς μὲν piίστεις piαρα-
λειpiτέον”; Rhet. Alex. 1443a3–4 “ἐὰν δὲ ὁμολογῆται τὰ piράγματα, τὰς μὲν piίστεις ἐατέον”.
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even make sense, in some speaking situation.41 Remarkably, this—parts of
a speech—is the only point where he uses this selective approach; he does
not apply it when he presents his rich repertories of possible arguments for
all sorts of speaking occasions, which make up large parts of the first two
books.
Quintilian names an earlier author named Hermagoras42 who counted iu-
dicium (usually identified with the Greek term κρίσις43) as a major task of
the orator,44 but does not give any details on how or to which purpose Her-
magoras wanted the iudicium to be exercised.
The Rhetorica ad Herennium provides, in the section on narratio, a list of in-
structions how to achieve brevitas, which can be summarised as “leave out
everything which is not strictly necessary”.45 In another section, it gives
advice similar to that in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum: that the orator must
avoid to speak diutius, quam satis sit, however not by choice of arguments
but in their elaboration (i.e. elocutio).46 Another interesting passage47 deals
with argumentatio, the line of reasoning which in its most complete form con-
sists of five steps (propositio, ratio, rationis confirmatio, exornatio, conplexio);
here the Auctor states that in some cases not all five steps are necessary,
and he enumerates which of the five steps can be left out, and under which
circumstances—but he does not explicitly recommend to omit superfluous
41 Aristot. Rhet. 1414a37–b7 νῦν δὲ διαιροῦσι γελοίως· διήγησις γάρ piου τοῦ δικανικοῦ μόνου
λόγου ἐστίν, ἐpiιδεικτικοῦ δὲ καὶ δημηγορικοῦ piῶς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι διήγησιν οἵαν λέγουσιν,
ἢ τὰ piρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον, ἢ ἐpiίλογον τῶν ἀpiοδεικτικῶν; piροοίμιον δὲ καὶ ἀντιpiαραβολὴ καὶ
ἐpiάνοδος ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις τότε γίνεται ὅταν ἀντιλογία ᾖ. καὶ γὰρ ἡ κατηγορία καὶ ἡ
ἀpiολογία piολλάκις, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡ συμβουλή· ἀλλ’ ὁ ἐpiίλογος ἔτι οὐδὲ δικανικοῦ piαντός, οἷον
ἐὰν μικρὸς ὁ λόγος ἢ τὸ piρᾶγμα εὐμνημόνευτον· συμβαίνει γὰρ τοῦ μήκους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.
42 The recent Budé edition (Woerther, 2012, 205–208) prefers an identification with Hermago-
ras, disciple of Theodoros of Gadara, instead of the usual attribution to Hermagoras of
Temnos.
43 Matthes (1958, p. 187–188). The term is also thought to be referred to in Dionysios’ of
Halicarnassos praise of Lysias as κριτικός (Dion. Hal. Lys. 15).
44 Quint. Inst. 3.3.9.
45 Rhet. Her. 1.14 “rem breviter narrare poterimus, si inde incipiemus narrare, unde necesse
erit; et si non ab ultimo initio repetere volemus; et si summatim, non particulatim narra-
bimus; et si non ad extremum, sed usque eo, quo opus erit, persequemur; et si transition-
ibus nullis utemur, et si non deerrabimus ab eo, quod coeperimus exponere; et si exitus
rerum ita ponemus, ut ante quoque quae facta sint, scire possint, tametsi nos reticuer-
imus”.
46 Rhet. Her. 2.27 “nam fere non difficile est invenire, quid sit causae adiumento, difficilli-
mum vero est inventum expolire et expedite pronuntiare. haec enim res facit, ut neque
diutius, quam satis sit, in eisdem locis commoremur”.
47 Rhet. Her. 2.28–30.
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steps,48 even though the full five-step type is rarely used in practical ora-
tory.49
In Cicero’s De Inventione, we also find a definition of brevitas for the narra-
tio, providing even more detailed instructions on how to cut off the super-
fluous (an instruction itself so lengthy and tautological as to yield a certain
unintended irony).50 Though he is not partial to brevitas in general, at least in
his later works (cf. p. 68), Cicero does regard it as important in the narratio,
and apart from the (fairly self-evident) advice of cutting out unrelated parts,
unnecessary details, self-evident facts and duplicates, the most important bit
seems to me to lie in a point which the orator might not have in mind from
the outset when working on his inventio: it is not enough to sort the facts,
evidence and arguments into positives and negatives, but there is a third
category of neutral material, and this the orator must not use (in the narratio,
that is—by implication there is no restriction for this kind of material in other
parts).
Yet this would still imply that all the supportive material, even if a vast
amount, should be used (even in the narratio), as long as it belongs to and is
indeed supportive of the case. Some thirty years later, in De oratore, we find
that Cicero’s opinion has somewhat shifted: first he gives, in the section on
48 E.g. Rhet. Her. 2.30 “ergo absolutissima est argumentatio ea, quae ex quinque partibus
constat; sed ea non semper necesse est uti.”
49 An extensive example is found in Cic. Quinct. 37–60: propositio, first sentence of 37 (there
was no reason for Naevius to submit a request for transfer of ownership); ratio, rest of 37
(Quinctius did not owe anything); rationis confirmatio, 38–41 (further reasoning about the
question of debt); exornatio, 42–59 (wide-stretching account of Quintius’ character and his
present situation under trial); conplexio, 60 (claim that the propositio has been thoroughly
proven).
50 Cic. Inv. 1.28 “oportet igitur [narratio] tres habere res: ut brevis, ut aperta, ut probabilis sit.
brevis erit, 1. si, unde necesse est, inde initium sumetur et non ab ultimo repetetur, 2. et si,
cuius rei satis erit summam dixisse, eius partes non dicentur—nam saepe satis est, quid
factum sit, dicere, ut ne narres, quemadmodum sit factum—, 3. et si non longius, quam
quo opus est, in narrando procedetur, 4. et si nullam in rem aliam transibitur, 5. et si ita
dicetur, ut nonnumquam ex eo, quod dictum est, id, quod non est dictum intellegatur, 6. et
si non modo id, quod obest, verum etiam id, quod nec obest nec adiuvat, praeteribitur, 7.
et si semel unum quicque dicetur, 8. et si non ab eo, quo in proxime desitum erit, deinceps
incipietur.” It is obvious that these rules do not apply to De Inventione itself (which is no
contradiction, since it is not a narratio): no 2 would violate itself (the quid factum sit and
quemadmodum factum sit constitute, at least as an example, the partes of the summa); if the
reader can be entrusted with this elaboration, no 2 would also violate no 5; unless the
whole enumeration is strictly necessary for the reader, the entire passage would violate
no 5; no 7 and 8 are not identical, but similar enough so that together they would violate
no 7.
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“pathos”, the advice not to put exaggerated effort into nugae or into points
by which the audience cannot be effectively influenced (i.e. this advice aims
at omission of aspects which are not simply “too much” but rejected because
they cannot be brought to practical relevance for the speech).51 Later a more
restrictive point is made (by Iulius Caesar Strabo speaking in the dialogue):
“memoria teneo dixisse me cum ceteris tuis [i.e. Antonii] laudibus hanc esse
vel maximam quod non solum quod opus esset diceres, sed etiam quod non
opus esset non diceres”.52 Although this is presented not as a rule, but as a
praiseworthy habit, it implies that it can be better not to say quod non opus sit,
even if it is a favourable argument in itself: i.e., that a positive argument can
be detrimental just by being superfluous to the speech or case. This is also in
line with the advice to discard weak arguments (see below p. 33). Another,
similar passage is not quite as precise: here Crassus praises Cotta, saying
that he “haeret in causa semper et quid iudici probandum sit cum acutis-
sime vidit, omissis ceteris argumentis in eo mentem orationemque defigit”;53
this could mean omission of arguments favourable to the case itself, but less
useful than others for persuading a particular group of judges. Finally, an-
other decade later, the Orator contains the most articulate and succinct advice
to the point (and this refers, as already the passages from De oratore, not only
to the narratio, but to oratory in general): “faciet igitur hic noster [. . . ] ut,
quoniam loci certi traduntur, percurrat omnis, utatur aptis, generatim dicat
[. . . ]. nec vero utetur imprudenter hac copia, sed omnia expendet et seliget
[. . . ]. iudicium igitur adhibebit nec inveniet solum quid dicat sed etiam ex-
pendet”.54 Here the advice is clearly not to use the whole copia of favourable
arguments, but to examine (expendere) them and choose some of them, dis-
carding the others (seligere).
Quintilian’s approach to (omission of) superfluous points is guided by
practical considerations (perhaps influenced by the official time limits for
court speeches which became usual in the Empire, cf. p. 59). The point of
51 Cic. De orat. 2.205 “nam neque parvis in rebus adhibendae sunt hae dicendi faces neque
ita animatis hominibus, ut nihil ad eorum mentis oratione flectendas proficere possimus,
ne aut inrisione aut odio digni putemur, si aut tragoedias agamus in nugis aut convellere
adoriamur ea, quae non possint commoveri.”
52 Cic. De orat. 2.296.
53 Cic. De orat. 3.31.
54 Cic. Orat. 47–48.
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carefully choosing from available arguments is also present in his Institutio,
though only in the special context of the suasoria,55 and the instructions on
achieving brevitas in the narratio are also in line with the tradition (though
put much more succinctly here).56 But he does not in general recommend
cutting off anything just because it may be “too much”; the statement “vi-
tium est ubique quod nimium est”,57 though phrased very generally, is in its
context clearly related to ornatus.
More direct advice is given by Quintilian when it comes to omitting inef-
fective parts of the speech: in general, arguments on points which the orator
cannot influence;58 furthermore, particular parts or aspects of a speech can in
certain cases be superfluous and must therefore be omitted: the prooemium,59
especially in the genus deliberativum,60 and the narratio in private orationes de-
liberativae;61 a less promising status, if a stronger one is available;62 invective
if it has no argumentative value;63 and arguments used by the opponent, if
55 Quint. Inst. 3.8.26 “quas partes [i.e. honestum, utile, possibile] non omnes in omnem
cadere suasoriam manifestius est quam ut docendum dum sit.”
56 Quint. Inst. 4.2.40 “brevis erit narratio ante omnia si inde coeperimus rem exponere unde
ad iudicem pertinet, deinde si nihil extra causam dixerimus, tum etiam si reciderimus
omnia quibus sublatis neque cognitioni quicquam neque utilitati detrahatur”.
57 Quint. Inst. 8.3.42.
58 Quint. Inst. 6.4.15 “nocet etiam diu pugnare in iis quae optinere non possis.” Cf. n. 51.
59 Quint. Inst. 4.1.72 “nam et supervacuum aliquando [prooemium] est, si sit praeparatus
satis etiam sine hoc iudex aut si res praeparatione non egeat.”
60 Quint. Inst. 3.8.6 “prohoemio quale est in iudicialibus non ubique eget [oratio delibera-
tiva], quia conciliatus est ei quisque quem consulit.”
61 Quint. Inst. 3.8.10 “narrationem vero numquam exigit privata deliberatio, eius dumtaxat
rei de qua dicenda sententia est, quia nemo ignorat id de quo consulit.”
62 Quint. Inst. 3.6.8 “namque et illud frequens est, ut ea quibus minus confidimus, cum trac-
tata sunt, omittamus, interim sponte nostra velut donantes, interim ad ea quae sunt po-
tentiora gradum ex iis fecisse contenti.” Cf. Quint. Inst. 3.11.10 “causa facti non in omnis
controversias cadit; nam quae fuerit causa faciendi ubi factum negatur?”; an exception is
the status of competence/responsibility: Quint. Inst. 7.5.3 “cum ex praescriptione lis pen-
det, de ipsa re quaeri non est necesse. [. . . ] quotiens tamen poterimus, efficiendum est ut
de re quoque iudex bene sentiat; sic enim iuri nostro libentius indulgebit”.
63 Quint. Inst. 12.9.8 “at quidam, etiam si forte susceperunt negotia paulo ad a dicendum
tenuiora, extrinsecus adductis ea rebus circumlinunt, ac si defecerunt alia conviciis im-
plent vacua causarum, si contingit, veris, si minus, fictis, modo sit materia ingenii merea-
turque clamorem dum dicitur. quod ego adeo longe puto ab oratore perfecto ut eum ne
vera quidem obiecturum nisi id causa exiget credam.”
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they are plainly false64 or too insignificant.65 Besides, Quintilian ist the only
one to mention the figure of “praeteritio of argument”, even if only in a list
of figures which are sub-types of piρόληψις, with an example from Cicero, but
without further comment.66
In case of ornatus and everything related to emotion, the question “how
much is too much” depends on the audience.67 Quintilian implies here as
elsewhere that on most “real” speaking occasions (as opposed to declama-
tion and to the concept of an “ideal” orator) the audience will need more
emotional appeal than would be strictly necessary for the argumentation,
i.e. some ornatus may be superfluous in argumentative logic, but still rhetor-
ically valuable.68
And in general the audience is Quintilian’s most important point of ref-
erence here: with regard to the laudatio he advises to choose arguments ac-
cording to what the audience values most;69 and he instructs the orator not
to burden the judge with weaker arguments if there is a strong one,70 al-
64 Quint. Inst. 5.13.15–17 “id autem quod erit ab adversario dictum, quo modo refutari de-
beat, intuendum est. nam si erit palam falsum, negare satis est, ut pro Cluentio Cicero
eum, quem dixerat accusator epoto poculo concidisse, negat eodem die mortuum. [16]
palam etiam contraria et supervacua et stulta reprendere nullius est artis, ideoque nec
rationem eorum nec exempla tradere necesse est. id quoque (obscurum vocant), quod
secreto et sine teste aut argumento dicitur factum, satis natura sua infirmum est (sufficit
enim, quod adversarius non probat), item si ad causam non pertinet. [17] sed tamen in-
terim oratoris est efficere, ut quid aut contrarium esse aut a causa diversum aut incredibile
aut supervacuum aut nostrae potius causae videatur esse coniunctum.”
65 Quint. Inst. 5.13.37 “alii diligentia lapsi verbis etiam vel sententiolis omnibus responden-
dum putant, quod est et infinitum et supervacuum; non enim causa reprehenditur sed
actor”.
66 Quint. Inst. 9.2.17 “quaedam praedictio, ut ‘dicam enim non augendi criminis gratia’”.
67 Quint. Inst. 12.10.52 “quod si mihi des consilium iudicum sapientium, perquam multa
recidam ex orationibus non Ciceronis modo sed etiam eius qui est strictior multo, Demos-
thenis. neque enim adfectus omnino movendi erunt nec aures delectatione mulcendae,
cum etiam prohoemia supervacua esse apud talis Aristoteles existimet; non enim trahen-
tur his illi sapientes: proprie et significanter rem indicare, probationes colligere satis est.”
68 Quint. Inst. 5.12.12 “altera ex adfirmatione probatio est: ‘ego hoc feci: tu mihi hoc dixisti’,
et ‘o facinus indignum!’ similia; quae non debent quidem deesse orationi et, si desunt,
multum nocent, non tamen habenda sunt inter magna praesidia, cum hoc in eadem causa
fieri ex utraque parte similiter possit.”
69 Quint. Inst. 3.7.24 “ipsorum etiam permiscenda laus semper (nam id benivolos facit), quo-
tiens autem fieri poterit, cum materiae utilitate iungenda. minus Lacedaemone studia
litterarum quam Athenis honoris merebuntur, plus patientia ac fortitudo. rapto vivere
quibusdam honestum, aliis cura legum. frugalitas apud Sybaritas forsitan odio foret, vet-
eribus Romanis summum luxuria crimen. eadem in singulis differentia.”
70 Quint. Inst. 4.5.8 “praeter haec in omni partitione est utique aliquid potentissimum, quod
cum audivit iudex cetera tamquam supervacua gravari solet”.
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though some qualification follows with regard to different attitudes within
the audience,71 and later the point is extended by the warning not to weaken
strong arguments by weaker ones and thus lose credibility.72
2.2.4 Special case: weak arguments
This last point constitutes a subgenre of “omission of superfluous points”:
omission of weak arguments, which are not really adverse but could possibly
be used by the opponent, to show that his opponent’s case is not sound.
The obvious conclusion is not to rely upon them unless necessary; equally
obvious is that one still has to rely on them if strong arguments are wanting.
The topic of including or omitting weak arguments was apparently more
on the mind of ancient orators and writers of rhetorical theory than omis-
sion of other superfluous, and adverse, topics—at least in Rome.73 Cicero
puts the point succinctly in De Oratore: “quae autem utilia sunt atque firma,
si ea tamen, ut saepe fit, valde multa sunt, ea, quae ex eis aut levissima sunt
aut aliis gravioribus consimilia, secerni arbitror oportere atque ex oratione
removeri”.74 We can see from his practice that if there are indeed enough
strong arguments, not only are others omitted but their omission is conve-
niently used as a praeteritio, e.g. “praetermittam minora omnia, quorum sim-
ile forsitan alius quoque aliquid aliquando fecerit; nihil dicam nisi singulare,
nisi id quod, si in alium reum diceretur, incredibile videretur”75 and “dixi
71 Quint. Inst. 4.5.14 “at si quid in eo quod est fortius timebimus, utraque probatione nitemur.
alius enim alio moveri solet”.
72 Quint. Inst. 5.12.8 “nec tamen omnibus semper, quae invenerimus, argumentis onerandus
est iudex, quia et taedium adferunt et fidem detrahunt. neque enim potest iudex credere
satis esse ea potentia, quae non putamus ipsi sufficere qui diximus”; Quint. Inst. 7.2.34
“eoque satius est omni se ante actae vitae abstinere convicio quam levibus aut frivolis aut
manifesto falsis reum incessere, quia fides ceteris detrahitur: et qui nihil obicit omisisse
credi potest maledicta tamquam supervacua, qui vana congerit confitetur unum in ante
actis argumentum, in quibus vinci quam tacere maluerit.”
73 The Attic Orators would only imply very allusively that the arguments they are going to
leave out are less supportive to their case, e.g. Dem. or. 23.125 “ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ὁ Χαρίδημος
οὔτε τῶν ἀναμαρτήτων ἐστὶ piρὸς ὑμᾶς οὔτε τῶν ἵνα μή τι piάθῃ ταῦθ’ εὑρισκομένων, ἐάσω·
ἀλλ’ ὡς οὐδὲ piιστὸς εἰς τὸν ἔpiειτα χρόνον, ἀκούσατέ μου, καὶ σκοpiεῖτε, ἂν ὑμῖν ὀρθῶς
ἐξετάζειν δοκῶ”: Demosthenes asks his audience to examine the argument which he does
use, perhaps implying that they better not examine whether the one which he omits would
be just as sound. Similarly Dem. or. 24.127; Aischin. Ctes. 51–53.
74 Cic. De orat. 2.309. Later (2.313–314) he deals with the ideal arrangement: i.e. weaker
arguments in the middle, surrounded by stronger ones at the beginning and end.
75 Cic. Verr. 2.1.44.
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iam ante me non omnia istius quae in hoc genere essent enumeraturum, sed
electurum ea quae maxime excellerent”;76 another praeteritio, also from the
Verrines, gives a quasi-definition of a weak argument: “non dicam id quod
probare difficile est; hoc dicam quod ostendam multos ex te viros primarios
audisse”.77 This notion may also be seen in one of Cicero’s attacks against
Antonius in Phil. 2: Cicero scorns Antonius’ arguments which are so weak
that they are unworthy of a human being, let alone an orator, implying that
Antonius is either incapable as an orator, or has no stronger arguments than
these.78
Quintilian adds nothing of significance on omission of weak arguments
but mentions only arrangement, albeit with a rather vague rule: if both
strong and weak arguments are to be used, the weak ones should be grouped
together;79 beyond this he gives no rule of arrangement (referring rather to
the piρέpiον again), except that the weakest arguments must not be the last in
line.80
2.2.5 Conclusion
To sum up: we find both ancient orators and writers of rhetoric aware that
superfluous material (i.e. material belonging to the case but without much
argumentative weight) can support the case better by being left out, even
though in theory, the inherent value of brevity is hardly acknowledged, and
there is a tendency to concentrate on finding as many arguments as possi-
ble. However, the frequent and versatile use of praeteritiones in this field in
practical oratory is not reflected in the theoretical works.
76 Cic. Verr. 2.2.82.
77 Cic. Verr. 2.1.157.
78 Cic. Phil. 2.9 “quid enim est minus non dico oratoris, sed hominis quam id obicere ad-
versario, quod ille si verbo negarit, longius progredi non possit, qui obiecerit?” Cf. Wisse
(2013, p. 169).
79 Quint. Inst. 5.12.4 “firmissimis argumentorum singulis instandum, infirmiora congre-
ganda sunt, quia illa per se fortia non oportet circumstantibus obscurare, ut qualia sunt
appareant, haec inbecilla natura mutuo auxilio sustinentur.”
80 Quint. Inst. 5.12.14 “quaesitum etiam, potentissima argumenta primo ne ponenda sint
loco, ut occupent animos, an summo, ut inde dimittant, an partita primo summoque,
ut Homerica dispositione in medio sint infirma †aut animis† crescant. quae, prout ratio
causae cuiusque postulabit, ordinabuntur, uno (ut ego censeo) excepto, ne a potentissimis
ad levissima decrescat oratio.”
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2.3 Omission of the known and obvious
2.3.1 Introduction
Somewhat different from the area of simply “superfluous” topics are those
points which are obvious or known to everybody anyway (while still be-
ing crucial points of the case, and strong arguments): here we find a certain
awareness that it may be better not to include every aspect of the actual case
into one’s speech, i.e. these points should be cut out, or covered only briefly.
2.3.2 Practice
In their speeches both the Attic Orators and Cicero make virtuoso use of
the point, again mostly for justifying a praeteritio, e.g. “neque necesse est
me id persequi voce quod vos mente videatis”;81 sometimes with special
variations: omitting something not exactly known to the audience, but in-
dubitable,82 or omitting not the facts themselves, but any additional elabora-
tion,83 or alluding to somebody but omitting the actual names.84 However, it
is not a matter of course that the point which the orators claims to be known
is indeed known or obvious to his audience. And for the orator’s argumen-
tation this is not even crucial: if the audience accepts that the point should be
known or obvious to them (and this is likely, as the alternative is to admit
their ignorance or stupidity), the argument is made.
81 Cic. Planc. 56; further examples are: Attic Orators: e.g. Lys. or. 10.5; Dem. or. 8.11, 18.89,
18.110, 18.129, 18.168, 22.10, 19.94, 19.217, 19.329; Aischin. Ctes. 53; Cicero: Cic. Q. Rosc.
8 “ego quae clara sunt consuetudine diutius dicere non debeo”, 24 “quid ego nunc illa
dicam quae vobis in mentem venire certo scio?”; Cic. Prov. cons. 8 “itaque omnia illa, quae
et saepe audistis et tenetis animis, etiamsi non audiatis, praetermitto”; Cic. Phil. 2.100
“quem ad modum illinc [Capua] abieris vel potius paene non abieris, scimus”, 3.8 “atque
ea quidem, quae dixi de Caesare deque eius exercitu, iam diu nota sunt nobis.”
82 Attic Orators: e.g. Dem. or. 18.88; Cicero: Cic. Tull. 55 “et ut rem perspicuam quam pau-
cissimis verbis agam”; Cic. Verr. 2.2.119 “quid porro argumenter, qua de re dubitare nemo
possit?”; Cic. Leg. agr. 2.65 “hic ego iam illud quod expeditissimum est ne disputo quidem,
Quirites”; Cic. Prov. cons. 3 “quid est quod possimus de Syria Macedonia dubitare?”
83 Cic. Cluent. 107 “quae cognita sunt ab omnibus verborum ornamenta non quaerunt”, con-
sequently followed by a percursio.
84 Cic. Leg. agr. 2.64 “sed quod ego nondum statuo mihi esse dicendum, vos tamen id potestis
cum animis vestris cogitare” (referring to the homines in the previous paragraph); Cic. Sest.
141 “summi eiusdem civitatis viri, quos nominatim appellari non est necesse”; Cic. Cael.
43 “ex quibus neminem mihi libet nominare; vosmet vobiscum recordamini.” Cf. p. 81 on
the “praeteritio of name”.
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On a more technical line, a point can be omitted as known because the
orator himself, or a witness, or another advocate for the same party, has spo-
ken about it before. This last case was quite usual: it must have happened
regularly, both in Athenian and Roman courts, whenever one side was repre-
sented by several “advocates” (συνήγοροι or patroni), that these divided the
material of the case between themselves, each speaking only about part of
the topics. In particular, several of Cicero’s defence speeches are the last of
a set,85 and in fact interpretation is sometimes rendered difficult by the fact
that Cicero does not speak about much of the actual charge,86 which prob-
ably had sufficiently been dealt with by his fellow orators.87 But the situa-
tion is rarely made explicit by the orators: we find the “backward reference”
to the same or another speech introducing a praeteritio in very few cases in
Lysias’ and Cicero’s speeches,88 but much less often than its counterpart, the
forward reference or “alio loco figure”.89
The explicit omission of something “known” to the audience is obviously
much more attractive rhetorically if referring to a rather vague point. There
are degrees to this vagueness: in some cases the point of omission is not
really omitted at all (as in Dem. or. 8.11: “ἴστε γὰρ δήpiου τοῦθ’ ὅτι οὐδενὶ
τῶν piάντων piλέον κεκράτηκε Φίλιpipiος, ἢ τῷ piρότερος piρὸς τοῖς piράγμασι
γίγνεσθαι”), but mostly the actual point is rather alluded to than spelt out
(as in Cic. Prov. cons. 3: “quid est quod possimus de Syria Macedonia du-
bitare?”). Here the praeteritio is “real” and un-ironic, as there actually is
something which is not said explicitly. Sometimes, however, the praeteritio
85 Pro Murena, Pro Rabirio perduellionis reo, Pro Sulla, Pro Flacco, Pro Sestio, Pro Caelio, Pro Balbo,
Pro Scauro, Pro Plancio.
86 Especially so in Pro Murena, Pro Rabirio perduellionis reo, Pro Sestio, Pro Caelio.
87 Most prominently in Pro Caelio: while Cicero does here speak about two charges which
had not been dealt with by the other orators of his party, the case as a whole consisted of
even more charges, and altogether this speech is probably the best-known example where
we get only a portion of the “big picture” due to this procedural issue.
88 The orator himself: Lys. or. 5.1, 14.3; Cic. Sull. 82 “sed quia sunt descripti consulares, de
his tantum mihi dicendum putavi quod satis esset ad testandam omnium memoriam,
neminem esse ex illo honoris gradu qui non omni studio, virtute, auctoritate incubuerit
ad rem publicam conservandam”; another advocate: Cic. Sull. 51 “si vetera, mihi ignota,
cum Hortensio communicata, respondit Hortensius”, Cic. Flacc. 41 “sed quoniam de hoc
teste totoque Mithridatico crimine disseruit subtiliter et copiose Q. Hortensius, nos, ut
instituimus, ad reliqua pergamus”; witness: Cic. Verr. 2.3.178 “ut hoc praeteream, quod
multorum est testimoniis expositum”.
89 See p. 76.
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is rendered a purely rhetorical question when the explicitly omitted point is
then explicitly stated, as in Cic. Q. Rosc. 24 “quid ego nunc illa dicam quae
vobis in mentem venire certo scio? fraudabat te in societate Roscius!” In
this case the praeteritio implodes, as there is nothing actually left out, and be-
comes a completely self-sufficient figure, a formula for a connection between
speaker and audience by shared knowledge and mutual understanding.90 It
keeps this function even though it is logically contradicted in the next phrase:
obviously the orator cannot rely here on his audience’s knowledge and un-
derstanding, or else he would not make explicit what he has announced to
omit.91 This might (in a strictly logical reasoning) be taken as an immediate
sign of distrust towards the audience and an offence, but obviously is not,
because the preceding praeteritio-question is not understood literally, rather
as a topos-formula, especially in the generic wording “quid . . . dicam?”
With irony, the point is turned against Clodius in De domo sua: “videsne
me non radicitus evellere omnis actiones tuas neque illud agere, quod apertum
est, te omnino nihil gessisse iure, non fuisse tribunum plebis, hodie esse patri-
cium?”92 where the next five paragraphs indulge in the adoptation problem,
i.e. the question whether Clodius is a patrician or a plebeian at this time.
There is a technical difference in the figure, as the addressee of this phrase
is not the entire audience but Clodius, Cicero’s opponent in this speech; but
quod apertum est obviously refers to common knowledge of the entire audi-
ence. By the following lengthy explanation Cicero makes clear that he does
want to explain this point, no matter whether it is known or to whom, and
that he does want to destroy Clodius’ doings root and branch.
90 On rhetorical devices of building a connection with the audience in a contio see Hölkes-
kamp (2013), e.g. “the ego of the orator addresses the public in contione as part of, and
partner in, an ‘imagined community’ of the Quirites sharing a common universe of ‘Ro-
manness’. Therefore, the contio a speech invariably, explicitly or implicitly, directly or
indirectly aims at the rhetorical construction of a consensus” Hölkeskamp (2013, p. 19),
furthermore on uses of ego, nos, vos; cf. Tan (2013) on Clodius’ negotiating boundaries
within and around contiones.
91 This reasoning is even valid in a case as this, where the entire figure is, on top of every-
thing else, ironical, as the point is eventually implied to be untrue (because—unusually—,
it is to the speaker’s disadvantage). One might “translate” the irony here as follows: “what
am I to say about that which I know comes to your mind anyway (and of which you know
immediately that it is not true)?” Even under these conditions, the orator could let this
allusion stand and not state explicitly what he has announced to omit.
92 Cic. Dom. 34.
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This argumentation can also be used with a limited scope: what the spe-
cific audience of a speech is familiar with need not be mentioned or at least
not be detailed, even if it is not common knowledge. In the De domo sua,
Cicero is speaking before an assembly of priests, and part of his arguments
relates to religious law, therefore:
sed hoc compensabo brevitate eius orationis quae pertinet ad ip-
sam causam cognitionemque vestram; quae cum sit in ius religio-
nis et in ius rei publicae distributa, religionis partem, quae multo
est verbosior, praetermittam, de iure rei publicae dicam. quid
est enim aut tam adrogans quam de religione, de rebus divinis,
caerimoniis, sacris pontificum conlegium docere conari, aut tam
stultum quam, si quis quid in vestris libris invenerit, id narrare
vobis, aut tam curiosum quam ea scire velle de quibus maiores
nostri vos solos et consuli et scire voluerunt?93
In the following course of the speech, Cicero does indeed not speak about de-
tailed questions of cults or sacrifices—whether his main intention really was
not to bore the priests with these details, or whether he had other, stronger
reasons (e.g. that he was himself not too versed in the subtleties of religious
law), must remain open to speculation; but Cicero was obviously able to
make his point without these details (as he won his “case” in the end), and
maybe the priests were indeed grateful to be spared the discussion of cultic
details. At any rate, the promise made in the praeteritio is kept, and the flat-
tering reference to the audience’s special knowledge is made; on the other
hand, this passage is followed immediately by the ironical one cited above
(note 92) and the lengthy explanation of adoption law, so that the reference
to the audience’s general knowledge is led ad absurdum; apparently Cicero’s
desire to leave no doubt whatsoever about Clodius’ situation was stronger
here.
In other cases, a praeteritio is phrased by a simple address to the audience,
where the wording refers to the audience’s general knowledge or under-
standing (“as you know”), rather than common knowledge (“as everybody
93 Cic. Dom. 32–33
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knows”), but without pointing to any specialised proficiency;94 sometimes
an explicit (and thus quite flattering) reference to the general intelligence
and knowledgeability of the audience is made.95 All of these tactics make
it even harder, if only a little bit, for the audience to admit their not know-
ing what the orator refers to, so the orator’s point is got across even more
effectively.
On the other hand, there are also reasons for explicitly stating and using
the known or obvious. In the Verres trial, for example, the audience is con-
fronted with masses of unfamiliar evidence, and this fact makes it interesting
but also hard to understand. It is here a profitable strategy, therefore, to make
much use of those events which the judges know from personal experience,
as these make strong, emotionally charged arguments.96
Another reason is given in Pro lege Manilia: the speech for Pompey’s com-
mand is not decisive for the political process—the proposal to send Pompey
on a campaign against Mithridates IV of Pontus is supported by Caesar and
highly popular with the Roman citizens, and is therefore, although opposed
by the aristocracy, very likely to be carried anyway by the contio97—, and
much of what can be said about Pompey should be sufficiently known at
94 Cic. Font. 42 “qua re si etiam monendi estis a me, iudices, quod non estis etc.”; Cic. Flacc.
66 “equidem mihi iam satis superque dixisse videor de Asiatico genere testium; sed tamen
vestrum est, iudices, omnia quae dici possunt in hominum levitatem, inconstantiam, cu-
piditatem, etiam si a me minus dicuntur, vestris animis et cogitatione comprendere”; Cic.
Phil. 13.30 “quid reliquos clarissimos viros commemorem? nostis omnes. magis vereor, ne
longum me in enumerando quam ne ingratum in praetereundo putetis.” Similarly Cic. Q.
Rosc. 18 “sed quid ego ineptus de Roscio apud Pisonem dico? ignotum hominem scilicet
pluribus verbis commendo. estne quisquam omnium mortalium de quo melius existimes
tu?”
95 Cic. Cluent. 115 “cuius rei quae consuetudo sit, quoniam apud homines peritissimos dico,
pluribus verbis docere non debeo”.
96 This holds true even though the strategy is not used here in the end, even though these
“known” point are in fact omitted: Cicero turns the point around by apologising that he
still has other, stronger reasons to omit these parts, due to the sheer mass of material, so
the omission is made although, not because the events under question are known to the
audience. The apology thus functions again as a connection-builder with the audience.
Cic. Verr. 2.1.103 “verum ad illam iam veniamus praeclaram praeturam, criminaque ea
quae notiora sunt his qui adsunt quam nobis qui meditati ad dicendum paratique veni-
mus; in quibus non dubito quin offensionem neglegendae vitare atque effugere non pos-
sim. multi enim ita dicent, ‘de illo nihil dixit in quo ego interfui; illam iniuriam non attigit
quae mihi aut quae amico meo facta est, quibus ego in rebus interfui.’ his omnibus qui
istius iniurias norunt, hoc est populo Romano universo, me vehementer excusatum volo
non neglegentia mea fore ut multa praeteream, sed quod alia testibus integra reservari
velim, multa autem propter rationem brevitatis ac temporis praetermittenda existimem.”
97 Fuhrmann (1970, vol. 1, p. 328); cf. Christ (2004, p. 68–69).
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Rome. Cicero cannot help but say it nevertheless, having not much else to
say: “atque haec qua celeritate gesta sint quamquam videtis, tamen a me
in dicendo praetereunda non sunt”.98 A variant is used in Phil. 7 in the ex-
plicit non-omission of good advice for consul Pansa: Cicero feels obliged to
mention that Pansa (of course) does not need his advice, before stating nev-
ertheless what he wants him to do.99
Finally, also the common figure “τίς οὐκ οἶδε / quis enim ignorat / nescit
/ non videt”100 works as a “praeteritio of the known”: the orator implies
again that what he is to say is well-known and may thus be omitted from
his speech, and this way of putting it even more indirect, especially in the
form “quis enim nostrum ignorat”. Besides, the figure always works as a
pure formula, outside argumentative logic, as it is always followed by the
known, and thus omissible, fact.
And even in general, it is not crucial for the figure “praeteritio of the
known” that the point is indeed known or obvious (whether in general or
to the specific audience), nor in fact that it is actually omitted. The figure
has developed an independent existence as a pure formula, so the audi-
ence probably expected rather an elaboration on the topic (which was in-
deed what followed in most cases) than the omission which was actually
announced. For example, the figure “quid dicam de Hirtio?” from Phil.
98 Cic. Manil. 34; similarly: Cic. Phil. 2.47 “quae peto ut, quamquam multo notiora vobis
quam mihi sunt, tamen ut facitis, attente audiatis. debet enim talibus in rebus excitare an-
imos non cognitio solum rerum, sed etiam recordatio”, 2.57 “scio me in rebus celebratis-
simis omnium sermone versari eaque, quae dico dicturusque sum, notiora esse omnibus,
qui in Italia tum fuerunt, quam mihi, qui non fui; notabo tamen singulas res, etsi nullo
modo poterit oratio mea satis facere vestrae scientiae. etenim quod umquam in terris
tantum flagitium exstitisse auditum est, tantam turpitudinem, tantum dedecus?”
99 Cic. Phil. 7.27 “te ipsum, Pansa, moneo (quamquam non eges consilio, quo vales pluri-
mum, tamen etiam summi gubernatores in magnis tempestatibus a vectoribus admoneri
solent), etc.”
100 E.g. Dem. or. 21.37, 21.132, 21.137, 21.141, 21.173; Aischin. Tim. 158, 189; Cic. Font. 31
“quis enim ignorat eos usque ad hanc diem retinere illam immanem ac barbaram consue-
tudinem hominum immolandorum?”; Cic. Sest. 91 “quis enim nostrum, iudices, ignorat
ita naturam rerum tulisse ut quodam tempore homines . . . ”; Cic. Leg. agr. 2.41 “quis enim
vestrum hoc ignorat, dici illud regnum testamento regis Alexae populi Romani esse fac-
tum?”; Cic. Cael. 57 “quis enim hoc non videt, iudices, aut quis ignorat, in eius modi domo
. . . ”; Cic. Phil. 2.79 “nihil queror de Dolabella, qui tum est inpulsus, inductus, elusus. qua
in re quanta fuerit uterque vestrum perfidia in Dolabellam, quis ignorat?”, 4.4 “quis est
enim, qui hoc non intellegat, nisi Caesar exercitum paravisset, non sine exitio nostro fu-
turum Antoni reditum fuisse?”; also Cic. De orat. 1.53; Tac. Dial. 5.2, 28.2. On the topos of
“everyone knows”, modeled by Cicero on Greek precedents, cf. Tempest (2007, p. 28).
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14101—a figure which usually implies “do I need to say anything at all?”—is
followed by an entire paragraph about Hirtius, and neither the (announced,
or at least implied) omission nor the (actual) non-omission is commented
on in any way. The praeteritio stands here only as a loose hint to Hirtius’
great (and thus well-known) achievements and as a nod towards the audi-
ence’s knowledge, but in so vague a way that it does not conflict with the
orator’s further explanations on the topic. Similar, even a little more para-
doxical, is the figure “nihil est, quod moneam vos. nemo est tam stultus, qui
non intellegat etc.” in Phil. 3 followed by exactly this “superfluous”, detailed
and urgent appeal.102 The suggestive (perhaps even autosuggestive) effect of
shared knownledge and agreement between orator and audience dominates
the passages and pushes the paradoxical element out of sight.
2.3.3 Theory
Omission of well-known facts is also considered in theory: Aristotle notes
that there can in general be no serious debate about facts that cannot possibly
be otherwise,103 but of course this does not exclude the orator’s using such
points in a speech; similarly, in a logical argument, the orator need not spell
out those parts of the argument that the hearer can supply by himself104—
but again, Aristotle does not actually advise against using these parts. Later
on, however, Aristotle explicitly advises the orator not against mentioning,
but against elaborating such points:“δεῖ δὲ τὰς μὲν γνωρίμους ἀναμιμνήσκειν·
διὸ οἱ piολλοὶ οὐδὲν δέονται διηγήσεως, οἷον εἰ θέλεις Α᾿χιλλέα ἐpiαινεῖν (ἴσασι
101 Cic. Phil. 14.27.
102 Cic. Phil. 3.34–36 “nihil est, quod moneam vos. nemo est tam stultus, qui non intelle-
gat, si indormierimus huic tempori, non modo crudelem superbamque dominationem
nobis, sed ignominiosam etiam et flagitiosam ferendam esse. [35] nostis insolentiam An-
toni, nostis amicos, nostis totam domum. libidinosis, petulantibus, impuris, impudicis,
aleatoribus, ebriis servire, ea summa miseria est summo dedecore coniuncta. quodsi iam,
quod di omen avertant! fatum extremum rei publicae venit, quod gladiatores nobiles faci-
unt, ut honeste decumbant, faciamus nos principes orbis terrarum gentiumque omnium,
ut cum dignitate potius cadamus quam cum ignominia serviamus. [36] nihil est detesta-
bilius dedecore, nihil foedius servitute. ad decus et ad libertatem nati sumus; aut haec
teneamus aut cum dignitate moriamur.”
103 Aristot. Rhet. 1357a4–7 “βουλευόμεθα δὲ piερὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέρως ἔχειν·
piερὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ ἔσεσθαι ἢ ἔχειν οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται οὕτως
ὑpiολαμβάνων· οὐδὲν γὰρ piλέον”; cf. Rhet. 1359a32–34.
104 Aristot. Rhet. 1357a17–19“ἐὰν γὰρ ᾖ τι τούτων γνώριμον, οὐδὲ δεῖ λέγειν· αὐτὸς γὰρ τοῦτο
piροστίθησιν ὁ ἀκροατής”.
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γὰρ piάντες τὰς piράξεις), ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι αὐταῖς δεῖ.”105 Commenting (in another
context) on the figure “who does not know . . . ?”, he notes its being used in
excess (κατακόρως), but acknowledges its effectiveness.106
The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and Rhetorica ad Herennium do not contain any
general statements on this point. The former only advises the orator not to
support a claim which is generally accepted with further reasoning (but does
not recommend to leave it out altogether).107 In another passage the author
mentions that the orator can flatter the audience by offering the first half of
a consideration and leaving the conclusion to them;108 this recommendation
to actually omit the (obvious) conclusion corresponds to Aristotle’s slight
aversion to the figure “who does not know . . . ?”, where the (presumably
obvious) point is in fact spelt out.
Some minor point may be mentioned: the Rhetorica ad Herennium lists as
a criterion of brevitas in the narratio that the orator starts his narration not
earlier than necessary, i.e. at a point so that the preceding events are known
or obvious to the audience;109 and in the section on the exordium of epideictic
speeches, we find as one possible topic a captatio benevolentiae referring to
the audience’s previous knowledge of the person who is to be praised or
criticised.110
In Cicero’s writings, we find first in De inventione the plain statement that
at least in the narratio “erit considerandum, [. . . ] ne quid, quod ad rem per-
tineat, praetereatur”,111 i.e. omission of anything pertaining to the matter is
105 Aristot. Rhet. 1416b26–29.
106 Aristot. Rhet. 1408a32–36 “piάσχουσι δέ τι οἱ ἀκροαταὶ καὶ ᾧ κατακόρως χρῶνται οἱ λο-
γογράφοι, ‘τίς δ’ οὐκ οἶδεν;’, ‘ἅpiαντες ἴσασιν’· ὁμολογεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἀκούων αἰσχυνόμενος,
ὅpiως μετέχῃ οὗpiερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι piάντες.
107 Rhet. Alex. 1430b3–5 “ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἔνδοξον λέγῃς, οὐδὲν δεῖ τὰς αἰτίας φέρειν· οὔτε γὰρ
ἀγνοεῖται οὔτ’ ἀpiιστεῖται τὸ λεγόμενον”.
108 Rhet. Alex. 1434a35–37 “ἀστεῖα μὲν οὖν λέγειν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ τόpiου ἔστιν, οἷον τὰ
ἐνθυμήματα λέγοντας ὅλα ἢ ἡμίση ὥστε τὸ ἥμισυ αὐτοὺς ὑpiολαμβάνειν τοὺς ἀκούοντας.”
109 Rhet. Her. 1.14 “rem breviter narrare poterimus, si inde incipiemus narrare, unde necesse erit;
et si non ab ultimo initio repetere volemus; et si summatim, non particulatim narrabimus;
et si non ad extremum, sed usque eo, quo opus erit, persequemur; et si transitionibus
nullis utemur, et si non deerrabimus ab eo, quod coeperimus exponere; et si exitus rerum
ita ponemus, ut ante quoque quae facta sint, scire possint, tametsi nos reticuerimus”.
110 Rhet. Her. 3.12 “ab auditorum persona, si laudabimus: quoniam non apud ignotos laude-
mus, nos monendei causa pauca dicturos; aut si erunt ignoti, ut talem virum velint
cognoscere, petemus: [. . . ] contraria vituperatio: quoniam norint, pauca de nequitia eius
dicturos; quod si ignorent, petemus, uti gnoscant, uti malitiam vitare possint”.
111 Cic. Inv. 1.29.
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strongly rejected; later, however, he recommends for agreed points to cut
short any explanation.112 Although this discrepancy may partly be due to
a difference between narratio and confirmatio / argumentatio, I would like to
point out that even in the first passage 1. considerare does not imply actual
use, but can very well result in discarding the point, and 2. that quod ad rem
pertineat can be understood in a strong sense of “what makes a difference
to the case”, rather than “what belongs to the matter”,113 and thus does not
conflict with the later advice.
Further on in De inventione, Cicero even constructs a useful argument from
the assumption that also others, and authors of laws in particular, do not
state the obvious: thus, if an orator does not find in the written law what he
needs for his case, but can claim it to be obvious and generally agreed upon,
he may employ it just as if it were stated in the law;114 and shortly afterwards
Cicero himself turns the point into an elegant praeteritio:115 “ex his horum
contraria facile tacentibus nobis intellegentur”,116 i.e. “goes without saying”.
Quintilian follows this line of thought far enough to drop the entire narra-
tio, if it is agreed upon:
plerique semper narrandum putaverunt: quod falsum esse pluri-
bus coarguitur. sunt enim ante omnia quaedam tam breves cau-
sae ut propositionem potius habeant quam narrationem. id acci-
dit aliquando utrique parti, cum vel nulla expositio est, vel de re
constat de iure quaeritur117
though not without employing his usual balanced approach:
nec hoc quidem simpliciter accipiendum, quod est a me positum,
supervacuam esse narrationem rei quam iudex noverit: quod sic
112 Cic. Inv. 1.62 “quae propositio in se quiddam continet perspicuum et quod stare inter
omnes necesse est, hanc velle approbare et firmare nihil attinet”.
113 Cf. OLD s.v. pertinere 4a “To relate or pertain (to), have to do (with)” vs. 4c “to be relevant
or to the point”. Cf. Cic. Leg. 1.54, Cic. Tusc. 1.35 where this stronger meaning of pertinere
is also used.
114 Cic. Inv. 2.140 “atqui lex nusquam excepit; non ergo omnia scriptis, sed quaedam, quae
perspicua sint, tacitis exceptionibus caveri”.
115 Cf. p. 79ff.
116 Cic. Inv. 2.157.
117 Quint. Inst. 4.2.4–5.
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intellegi volo, si non modo factum quid sit sciet, sed ita factum
etiam ut nobis expedit opinabitur.118
The same point occurs in other contexts, e.g. on narrating events in their
proper temporal order: if the earlier event is obvious from the later, the first
is to be dropped.119
2.3.4 Conclusion
As a result, arguments known or obvious to the audience are the most likely
points to be omitted from a speech (except for strictly adverse points). They
are not only superfluous, counting against a possible (assumed or actual)
time limit, but their omission can be used for flattering the audience for their
intelligence, or for establishing a connection between speaker and audience
based on shared knowledge, in particular when some knowledge specific to
the present audience is referred to. This reasoning has developed into a topos
that can be used as a standard figure even in cases when its logic does not
hold: when the explicitly omitted point is then still spoken about, or when
the point “known to everybody” is in fact not so common knowledge.
While some of the writers of rhetoric advise on omitting known and ob-
vious points, they do not mention the advantages of doing it explicitly in
a praeteritio, nor do we hear about the possibility of using such a praeteritio
even though the omitted fact is not known or obvious, thus deceiving the
audience.
2.4 Not speaking off-topic
2.4.1 Introduction
The question if the orator can and should include in his speech topics that
do not actually belong to his case or subject, or if he should first and fore-
most stick to the matter at hand, is one of the most controversial areas of
omissions. This is partly due to a lack of precise definition: there is no con-
118 Quint. Inst. 4.2.20.
119 Quint. Inst. 4.2.87. Cf. also Quint. Inst. 5.11.16 “quaedam significare satis erit [exempla].
haec ita dicentur, prout nota erunt vel utilitas causae aut decor postulabit.”
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sensus (ancient or modern) whether e.g. arguments from the character of the
accused in a criminal case are to be considered as belonging to the case.120
Topics from grey areas like this can be treated as being ad rem or as digres-
siones, depending on the specific situation and purpose.
2.4.2 Practice
While Athenian courts had some legal restrictions on speaking ἔξω τοῦ
piράγματος (see below p. 49), there was no law against digression in Rome,121
and one might come under the impression that digressiones were indeed
somewhat more accepted and frequent in Rome than in Athens, since it has
been concluded by Rhodes that “there were exceptions, but on the whole,
if we grant that the point includes its wider context, Athenian litigants
were much better than we have allowed at keeping to the point”,122 and
on the other hand we find all variants of dealing with digressio in Cicero’s
speeches: sometimes he digresses, explicitly or not, without any further com-
ment; sometimes he apologises for digressing; and sometimes he employs
praeteritio-like claims not to speak off-topic.
But all of this depends very much on the material left to us by transmis-
sion (which, on the Athenian side, contains many court speeches which were
under a strict time limit) and on the assumed definition or concept of digres-
sio, so that an actual comparison is near to impossible. Besides, as Canter
(1931) has shown, Cicero’s actual digressions always follow a precise, if not
immediately obvious, purpose within the speech, and Cicero spends con-
siderable efforts to embed the digressio organically in the rest of the speech.
This suggests that he is reluctant to stray too far from the point, apparently
or actually, and consequently he uses, in other cases, the explicit silence (i.e.
praeteritio) on unrelated topics for his aims.
120 This is a different issue from “superfluous” points as treated above: there can be topics
which belong directly to the case but are still discarded as “superfluous” for the argu-
mentation, because a sufficient amount of other material is available; on the other hand,
a point can be without any direct connection to the case, but still crucial for the orator’s
argumentation (e.g. some supporting point by which a claim about the client’s character
is substantiated). Of course these two categories cannot always be clearly distinguished.
121 Cf. Mommsen (1899, p. 421–422), Kaser (1966, p. 86–87, 276–279).
122 Rhodes (2004, p. 156).
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Indeed, several variants of explicit omission of points not belonging to the
case, or “praeteritio of off-topic points”, can be found both in the Attic Orators
and in Cicero’s speeches. A direct praeteritio is somewhat more frequent in
the Attic Orators,123 but also used in Cicero’s Pro Caecina, “multa enim, quae
sunt in re, quia remota sunt a causa, praetermittam”.124 In Cicero’s speeches
the intent to omit is mostly implied: more openly in Pro Quinctio, where Ci-
cero argues a juridic detail, i.e. that there has been a proper procurator in the
previous procedure, and continues: “qualis is [procurator] fuerit, si modo
absentem defendebat per ius et per magistratum, nihil ad rem arbitror per-
tinere”;125 the final conclusion, that he will not further discuss the character
of the procurator, is not made explicit.126 Less immediate is the conclusion
in Pro Sulla, “oratoris vitium non videre, quid quaeque causa postulet”,127
where it is implied that Cicero, as a good orator, does see clearly what each
case requires, and further, that he will therefore omit the points which this
particular case does not need. In Pro Sestio, Cicero claims an abundance of
evidence towards his client’s general moral integrity, and dismisses it as “mi-
nora” in order to hasten to his client’s achievements for the res publica;128
this lies in the overall line of the speech which, while being technically a
forensic speech, dealt much with the political attitudes and actions of Ses-
tius and others. In Pro Flacco, the omission is justified by a comparison with
other, more important topics (and clad in a rhetorical question): “sed quid
ego de epistulis Falcidi aut de Androne Sextilio aut de Deciani censu tam
diu disputo, de salute omnium nostrum, de fortunis civitatis, de summa re
publica taceo?”129 By not making the final conclusion to the point explicit,
i.e. by leaving it to the audience, the orator builds a kind of an intellectual-
emotional connection with them. He guides them along his argument, but
also leaves room for them to think for themselves (though in a very limited
123 E.g. Lys. or. 7.42, 12.43, 19.8; Dem. or. 18.44, 18.60, 20.63, 22.3, 29.50; Aischin. Ctes. 76, 176.
124 Cic. Caecin. 11.
125 Cic. Quinct. 68.
126 Similarly implicit e.g. in Lys. or. 32.11.
127 Cic. Sull. 31.
128 Cic. Sest. 7 “possum multa dicere de liberalitate, de domesticis officiis, de tribunatu mili-
tari, de provinciali in eo magistratu abstinentia; sed mihi ante oculos obversatur rei pub-
licae dignitas, quae me ad sese rapit, haec minora relinquere hortatur”.
129 Cic. Flacc. 94.
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space, in these cases), and the conclusion drawn by the judge himself, how-
ever much suggested to him, will have a stronger effect than the same point
presented explicitly by the orator. The audience is thus effectively led to the
opinion that the orator has sensibly decided which points are relevant to the
case, and which are not. This consequently heightens his authority on all
matters pertinent to the case.
A more positive view of speaking off-topic is employed in Pro Caelio, not
only because the speech as a whole is quite off-topic in relation to the official
charges,130 but because Cicero even jokes about this very fact: “res est omnis
in hac causa nobis, iudices, cum Clodia, muliere non solum nobili, sed etiam
nota; de qua ego nihil dicam nisi depellendi criminis causa.”131 In fact, nei-
ther is the res primarily about Clodia, as far as the charges brought forward
by the prosecution are concerned (only one of the numerous charges against
Caelius was directly connected to Clodia)—in fact, Cicero’s whole speech is
based on the notion that Clodia is behind the prosecution, of course—, nor is
Cicero about to restrict himself to arguments depellendi criminis causa.132 The
obvious irony was a means to gain the jury’s sympathy.
In (another passage of) the speech Pro Caecina the point of not speaking off-
topic is used to imply abundant evidence, together with a polite nod to both
the audience’s knowledge and time: “veniunt in mentem mihi permulta, vo-
bis plura, certo scio. verum ne nimium multa complectamur atque ab eo
quod propositum est longius aberret oratio etc.”.133 A similar bow to the au-
dience is found in De domo sua, but even more elegantly flattering, as Cicero
is adressing not a normal court but a highly distinguished board of priests:
“intellego, pontifices, me plura extra causam dixisse quam aut opinio tulerit
aut voluntas mea; sed cum me purgatum vobis esse cuperem, tum etiam
vestra in me attente audiendo benignitas provexit orationem meam.”134
This “tactical” usage, where this type of praeteritio is employed to achieve
some positive connection to the audience, or even a captatio benevolentiae, is
130 Though due to court proceedings, see below p. 98.
131 Cic. Cael. 31.
132 On Clodia’s role in the trial see Skinner (2011, 96–120) with much detail; cf. Dorey (1958).
133 Cic. Caecin. 55.
134 Cic. Dom. 32.
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also found in the Attic Orators, e.g. in Dem. or. 18.214, where Demosthenes
claims to omit an episode which would appear a μάταιον ὄχλον to his hear-
ers,135 and in Aischin. Tim. 39, where Aischines presents himself as rather
gracious towards his opponent by passing over all his childhood offences.
On the other hand, both the Attic Orators and Cicero repeatedly choose to
explicitly spend some sentences or paragraphs on a topic not directly related
to the case (though arguably pertaining to their strategy in court or assem-
bly). Sometimes an excuse or justification is provided;136 in other cases, an
excuse for straying from the point at issue might be expected, but there is
nothing but the announcement to do so.137 This silence, where a justification
could be expected, is a statement in itself: i.e., that the orator is absolutely
confident of his case and in no need to ask for understanding or lenience.
It does not matter much for the argument whether this is a statement of a
matter of fact, i.e. of real confidence, or whether it only indicates feigned
confidence, as long as the audience accepts the orator’s self-presentation. Fi-
nally, any digressio, whether announced in advance or not, can be concluded
by the figure which has become quite a topos, “but to return to the mat-
ter at hand. . . ”.138 It turns out that the area of “(not) speaking off-topic” is
handled in practice by the Attic Orators and Cicero without any consistent
general rule, the orators rather follow the requirements of each speaking sit-
uation. Accordingly, topics not directly pertaining to the matter at hand can
be employed or left out, explicitly or implicitly, and any such announcement
can be made in advance or ex post.139 Not all of this, however, is considered
in the theoretical rhetorical writings.
2.4.3 Theory
Treatment of the point in rhetorical theory starts with discussion of the exter-
nal factors: Aristotle’s often cited statement about the Athenian regulation
135 Cf. p. 70 on the advice not to annoy the audience.
136 E.g. Lys. or. 14.24, 16.9; Dem. or. 18.34, 18.59; Aischin. Tim. 117, leg. 167; Cic. Sest. 119, Tull.
37.
137 E.g. Lys. or. 13.3, 32.21; Dem. or. 24.122; Cic. Verr. 2.3.163, 2.4.82, Cluent. 10, Arch. 32.
138 Used e.g. in Lys. or. 3.46; Dem. or. 13.9, 18.42, 18.211, 21.196; Cic. Leg. agr. 2.28, Sull. 35, Rab.
Post. 6, 7, Lig. 20, Phil. 2.56.
139 Cf. p. 93 on “post-praeteritio”.
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on the point, “διομνύουσιν οἱ ἀντίδικοι εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ piρᾶγμα ἐρεῖν”,140 is quite
imprecise: it is not certain how strict this rule was, to which type of trials it
applied, and especially, we cannot assume that speaking εἰς τὸ piρᾶγμα ex-
cluded talking about the litigants’ character,141 and conclude that the oath
involved was ignored.142 On the other hand, Adriaan Lanni’s analysis of
homicide and maritime cases in Athens143 suggests that character traits and
wider circumstances of a case could (in these particular types of trial) be
considered off-topic and therefore inadmissable.144 In the majority of cases,
however, “there was no significant attempt to limit the information avail-
able to the juries. The only exception in Athens was the Areopagos, the chief
homicide court, where procedural rules forbade the introduction of matters
’outside the issue’. Aristotle makes clear that this was unusual not just in
Athens but in Greece in general. The result of the absence of such a restric-
tion may be seen in surviving oratory.”145 Carey has shown especially how
far insults were tolerated in many Athenian court speeches.146 But although
these matters were not legally forbidden in court speeches, they could still
140 Aristot. Ath. pol. 67.1. Cf. Rhodes (1981) ad locum: “The implication of A. P.’s including
this clause at this point, that this oath was taken in private suits only, is regularly accepted
[. . . ]: many have supposed that this was made necessary by the shorter time allowed for
private suits, but Harrison points out that the water clock should have been sufficient
to keep speeches short and suggests that the oath is a survival from a time when the
clock was not yet used. But, although it clearly is the implication of A. P.’s text, I am
not confident that the oath was taken in private suits only: it is dangerous to rely on
A. P.’s silences in such matters, and the distinction between public and private suits in
these chapters is not clearly maintained. It is in any case abundantly clear from surviving
speeches that the Athenians did not observe standards of relevance which would satisfy
the modern critic, either in public or in private suits (but we should not follow Lipsius in
concluding that the oath must have been instituted not long before A. P. was written).”
141 On the contrary, it has been argued that “the life and character of both defendant and
prosecutor are viewed not only as relevant but as essential to the argument” (Hunter,
1990, p. 306), and even “what constituted slander under Athenian law was so defined as
to ignore most of what we might regard as slander and abuse in the courts” (Hunter, 1990,
p. 305).
142 Cf. Lanni (2005, p. 113) “if in fact it existed, it appears to have had no effect”.
143 Lanni (2005).
144 Canter (1931), too, counts “denunciation of persons [. . . ]; criticism, blame, censure, or
ridicule of persons [. . . ]; eulogy of persons” (p. 358) as digressiones, some of which at least
may well have been considered as part of the case in Cicero’s time.
145 Carey (1994, p. 176).
146 “In the case of statements about human beings, a casual glance at the work of any of the
orators indicates the high tolerance of Athenian juries to the most outrageous of allega-
tions tangential to the main action.” Carey (1999, p. 374) “The narrowness of the legal
definitions of kakegoria meant that a wide range of allegations could be hurled in court
with complete freedom.” Carey (1999, p. 376)
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be disputed on factual and moral grounds, and attacked both by the oppo-
nent and the audience, as “[t]horubos served [. . . ] to curb excursions from the
true issue”.147 So “one had the right to reproach the plaintiff for attacking his
character instead of sticking to the object of litigation [. . . ], but also [. . . ] to
defend oneself by specifying that questions related to one’s character are in-
deed relevant”.148 Thus the orator could, by explicit silence (i.e. praeteritio)
on off-topic matters, claim to obey the law, implying that he had the stronger
case and did not need to resort to slander and gossip.149
The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum calls for concentration on the most relevant
points repeatedly, in specific advice on speeches exhorting the audience
to war150 and on using γνῶμαι in the speech;151 the most general state-
ment is part of the definition of σαφήνεια: “[σαφῶς μὲν οὖν δηλώσομεν] ἐὰν
μὴ piροαpiολιpiόντες τὴν piρᾶξιν, piερὶ ἧς ἂν ἐγχειρήσωμεν λέγειν, piάλιν ἑτέραν
ἐξαγγείλωμεν.”152
Aristotle at the beginning of his Ars rhetorica also generally agrees with
this line, and the Areopagus regulation mentioned above, as far as forensic
speech is concerned;153 in the following paragraph on deliberative speech
he states that it is less useful in political speeches to speak about points not
directly related to the fact or question at hand, ἔξω τοῦ piράγματος, implying
that doing so might be more useful in court154—here he is in agreement with
the oratorical practice. In the third book of the same work,155 we find him
147 Bers (1985, p. 13).Cf. Carey (1999, p. 378)
148 Montiglio (2000, p. 117, n. 9).
149 E.g. Lys. or. 3.46 “ἔχοιμι δ’ ἂν καὶ ἄλλα piολλὰ εἰpiεῖν piερὶ τούτου, ἀλλ’ ἐpiειδὴ piαρ’ ὑμῖν οὐ
νόμιμόν ἐστιν ἔξω τοῦ piράγματος λέγειν, ἐκεῖνο ἐνθυμεῖσθε· κτλ.”.
150 Rhet. Alex. 1425a24–26 “τούτων οὖν καὶ τῶν τούτοις ὁμοιοτρόpiων τὰ τοῖς piράγμασιν
οἰκειότατα λαμβάνοντες ἐμφανιοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐpiὶ τὸ piολεμεῖν piαρακαλῶμεν”.
151 Rhet. Alex. 1430b7–9 “δεῖ δὲ τὰς γνώμας οἰκείας φέρειν τῶν piραγμάτων, ἵνα μὴ σκαιὸν καὶ
ἀpiηρτημένον φαίνηται τὸ λεγόμενον.”
152 Rhet. Alex. 1438a31–33.
153 Aristot. Rhet. 1354a21–24 “ἅpiαντες γὰρ οἱ μὲν οἴονται δεῖν οὕτω τοὺς νόμους ἀγορεύειν,
οἱ δὲ καὶ χρῶνται καὶ κωλύουσιν ἔξω τοῦ piράγματος λέγειν, καθάpiερ καὶ ἐν Α᾿ρείῳ piάγῳ,
ὀρθῶς τοῦτο νομίζοντες”; cf. Rhet. 1355a1–3.
154 Aristot. Rhet. 1354b27–28 “ὅτι ἧττόν ἐστι piρὸ ἔργου τὰ ἔξω τοῦ piράγματος λέγειν ἐν τοῖς
δημηγορικοῖς”.
155 Which is considered as somewhat independent from the first two: Rapp (2002, vol. 1,
p. 172) “Obwohl sich die beiden Abhandlungen des dritten Buches an die wichtigsten
Ziele von Buch I & II heranführen lassen, ist daher klar, dass die Themen der sprachlichen
Gestaltung und der Anordnung der Redeteile Erweiterungen einer ursprünglich enger
gefassten Konzeption darstellen.”
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quite inclined towards deviation, even for mere entertainment: “ἅμα δὲ καὶ
ἐὰν ἐκτοpiίσῃ, ἁρμόττει, καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸν λόγον ὁμοειδῆ εἶναι”.156 A little later
he seems even to contradict his earlier advice of sticking to the case when he
declares that slander and other deviations (which are used by everyone in
the prooemion anyway) might be especially advisable for those with a weak
case, as for them it is βέλτιον to speak about anything but their actual case;157
but βέλτιον here is unlikely to mean “better” in a moral or artistic sense in
this context, but must mean “better for these orators’ purpose”, in a utili-
tarian way. Pointing towards omission is the more specific advice “piερὶ τὸ
ὁμολογούμενον οὐ διατριpiτέον, ἐὰν μή τι εἰς ἐκεῖνο συντείνῃ”158 (see above p.
41). Overall Aristotle is, as per usual, more inclined towards including than
to omitting, and follows a rather pragmatic, utilitarian argumentation.
Cicero’s theoretical writings quite accurately reflect his practical attitude
towards speaking off-topic: he makes a point against digressiones in De in-
ventione159 and even recommends exploiting an unnecessary digressio made
by the opponent,160 in line with the Rhetorica ad Herennium, which gives a
similarly practical advice against straying from the case.161
This corresponds to Cicero’s tentative approach in the early speeches. In
the later De oratore, however, he considers a digressio as possible and poten-
156 Aristot. Rhet. 1414b28–30
157 Aristot. Rhet. 1415b18–23 “piάντες γὰρ ἢ διαβάλλουσιν ἢ φόβους ἀpiολύονται ἐν τοῖς piρο-
οιμίοις· [. . . ] καὶ οἱ piονηρὸν τὸ piρᾶγμα ἔχοντες ἢ δοκοῦντες· piανταχοῦ γὰρ βέλτιον
διατρίβειν ἢ ἐν τῷ piράγματι”.
158 Aristot. Rhet. 1417a10–11.
159 Cic. Inv. 1.97 “nobis autem non placuit [digressionem] in numerum [partium orationis]
reponi, quod de causa digredi nisi per locum communem displicet”; cf. the reverse ap-
proach earlier in the same work, Inv. 1.29 “[in narratione] erit considerandum, [. . . ] ne
quid, quod ad rem pertineat, praetereatur”.
160 Cic. Inv. 1.94.
161 Rhet. Her. 2.43 “item verendum est, ne de alia re dicatur, cum alia de re controversia sit;
inque eiusmodi vitio considerandum est, ne aut ad rem addatur quid aut quippiam de
re detrahatur, aut tota causa mutata in aliam causam derivetur [. . . ]. item consideran-
dum est, ne aliud accusatoris criminatio contineat, aliud defensoris purgatio purget, quod
saepe consulto multi ab reo faciunt angustiis causae coacti; ut si quis, cum accusetur am-
bitu magistratum petisse, ab imperatoribus saepe numero apud exercitum *** donatum
esse. hoc si diligenter in oratione adversariorum observaverimus, saepe deprehendemus
eos de ea re quod dicant non habere.”
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tially useful at any point in the speech,162 except in the exordium163 and the
narratio164 (the part of the speech which according to tradition, even though
Cicero disagrees, should be rather short, see below p. 69).
In the Orator, Cicero mentions digression in a list of recommended fig-
ures of thought: “sic igitur dicet ille [orator] quem expetimus [. . . ] ut de-
clinet a proposito deflectatque sententiam”.165 In the Brutus, he quite fa-
vorably mentions a work by Servius Sulpicius Galba (a leading orator of
the 2nd c. BC), who “princeps ex Latinis illa oratorum propria et quasi le-
gitima opera tractavit, ut egrederetur a proposito ornandi causa, ut delectaret
animos, ut permoveret, ut augeret rem, ut miserationibus, ut communibus
locis uteretur”.166 This agrees with Cicero’s using digression more freely in
later speeches like Pro Caelio.167
162 Cic. De orat. 2.311–312 “sed his partibus orationis quae, etsi nihil docent argumentando,
persuadendo tamen et commovendo perficiunt plurimum, quamquam maxime proprius
est locus et in exordiendo et in perorando, digredi tamen ab eo, quod proposueris atque
agas, permovendorum animorum causa saepe utile est; [312] itaque vel re narrata et eita
saepe datur ad commovendos animos digrediendi locus, vel argumentis nostris confir-
matis vel contrariis refutatis vel utroque loco vel omnibus, si habet eam causa dignitatem
atque copiam, recte id fieri potest; eaeque causae sunt ad augendum et ad ornandum
gravissimae atque plenissimae, quae plurimos exitus dant ad eius modi digressionem,
ut eis locis uti liceat, quibus animorum impetus eorum, qui audiant, aut impellantur aut
reflectantur.” A more special application of digressio is mentioned in the almost contempo-
rary Partitiones oratoriae, in the answer to the question “quid faciendum est contra reo?”:
“firmamenta ad fidem posita aut per se diluenda aut obscuranda aut degressionibus obru-
enda” (Cic. Part. or. 15, cf. 52, 128).
163 Cic. De orat. 2.325 “conexum autem ita sit principium consequenti orationi, ut non
tamquam citharoedi prooemium adfictum aliquid, sed cohaerens cum omni corpore mem-
brum esse videatur. nam non nulli, cum illud meditati ediderunt, sic ad reliqua transeunt,
ut audientiam fieri sibi non velle videantur.” This point, too, corresponds to the Rhetorica
ad Herennium, “item vitiosum [exordium] est, [. . . ] quod non ex ipsa causa natum videa-
tur, ut proprie cohaereat cum narratione” (Rhet. Her. 1.11).
164 Cic. De orat. 2.329 “erit autem perspicua narratio, si verbis usitatis, si ordine temporum
servato, si non interrupte narrabitur.”
165 Cic. Orat. 137. In fact, this list contains several almost identical items which denote a
digressio: “ut declinet a proposito deflectatque sententiam”; “ut ab eo quod agitur avertat
animos”; “ut a proposito declinet aliquantum”.
166 Cic. Brut. 82.
167 An analogous development is shown by Davies (1988) who observes that the “post-
linkage”, i.e. the reditus ad rem after a digressio, “which occur in speeches later than the
pro Roscio Amerino tend to be more concise than those in the earlier speeches” (Davies,
1988, p. 306), corresponding to the call for conciseness reported by Cicero (quoting from
earlier rhetorical handbooks) in De orat. 3.203 “et ab re digressio, in qua cum fuerit delec-
tatio, tum reditus ad rem aptus et concinnus esse debebit”.
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Quintilian, when calling for brevitas in the narratio, defines this basically
as cutting off what does not belong to the case;168 but outside the particular
area of the narratio, he is less strict: he has admitted earlier that whatever
is relevant about the person of the orator can be relevant in the trial, even
though it does not refer to the case,169 and that some common topics should
be treated in any case, even if they are not directly relevant, only in order
to prevent their being occupied by the opponent.170 Afterwards he devotes
an entire chapter to the very useful and welcome digressio at any point in
the speech171—even if he notes that digression is again least advisable in
the narratio172 and, as a general caveat, that the orator ought not to spend
so much time there that the judges become bored or tired and forget what
has been said before.173 A few side points may be added which seem to be
based on Quintilian’s experience in school and court: the advice neither to
annoy a philosophically untrained audience with too many syllogisms174 nor
to employ flashy digressiones for show effects, calling for applause;175 and the
168 Quint. Inst. 4.2.40 “brevis erit narratio ante omnia si inde coeperimus rem exponere unde
ad iudicem pertinet, deinde si nihil extra causam dixerimus, tum etiam si reciderimus om-
nia quibus sublatis neque cognitioni quicquam neque utilitati detrahatur”; similarly Inst.
4.2.111 “effugiendae sunt enim morae [in narratione]” and 4.5.26 “propositio [. . . ] brevis
nec ullo supervacuo onerata verbo”, and 4.1.62 on the prooemium “evitanda est inmodica
eius longitudo, ne in caput excrevisse videatur et quo praeparare debet fatiget”. Cf. also
Quint. Inst. 5.10.83 “recte autem monemur causas non utique ab ultimo esse repetendas”.
169 Quint. Inst. 4.1.12 “negat haec prohoemia esse Cornelius Celsus quia sint extra litem: sed
ego cum auctoritate summorum oratorum magis ducor, tum pertinere ad causam puto
quidquid ad dicentem pertinet, cum sit naturale ut iudices iis quos libentius audiunt etiam
facilius credant.”
170 Quint. Inst. 4.1.33 “faciunt favorem et illa paene communia, non tamen omittenda vel ideo
ne occupentur: optare, abominari, rogare, sollicitum agere etc.”
171 Quint. Inst. 4.3.
172 Quint. Inst. 4.2.104, with exception of the epidiegesis, 4.2.128.
173 Quint. Inst. 4.3.8 “verum haec breviter omnia; iudex enim ordine audito festinat ad pro-
bationem et quam primum certus esse sententiae cupit. praeterea cavendum est ne ipsa
expositio vanescat, aversis in aliud animis et inani mora fatigatis.”
See also p. 70 on (not) annoying the audience.
174 Quint. Inst. 5.14.27 “namque ego, ut in oratione syllogismo quidem aliquando uti esse fas
duco, ita constare totam aut certe confertam esse adgressionum et enthymematum stipa-
tione minime velim. dialogis enim et dialecticis disputationibus erit similior quam nostri
operis actionibus, quae quidem inter se plurimum differunt.”, justification in 5.14.29.
175 Quint. Inst. 3.11.25–26 “sed non perpetuo intendimus in haec animum et cupiditate laudis
utcumque adquirendae vel dicendi voluptate evagamur, quando uberior semper extra
causam materia est, quia in controversia pauca sunt, extra omnia, et hic dicitur de iis
quae accepimus, illic de quibus volumus. [26] nec tam hoc praecipiendum est, ut quaestionem
continens iudicationem inveniamus (nam id quidem facile est), quam ut intueamur semper, aut
certe, si digressi fuerimus, saltem respiciamus, ne plausum adfectantibus arma excidant.”
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advice to have a digressio ready in case of interruptions, so that no important
part of the speech is lost in tumultus.176
Quintilian also adds a deceptive twist to the issue: he gives advice (twice
in the Institutio) to take an unfavourable argument made by the opponent
and present it as off-topic, and thus irrelevant to the case; this also justifies
that the orator only speaks briefly about it, which again lowers the audi-
ence’s attention towards the point177 (an attention which is already present,
as the opponent has spoken earlier about the topic; of course there may be
cases where it is more advisable to omit the point altogether, i.e. not to draw
attention to it again by way of the praeteritio; but if the point is very present
on the audience’s mind already, this strategy can be useful).
Overall, Quintilian has no objection against speaking off-topic; he wel-
comes digressiones as Cicero does in his later works and treats the topic in
due detail and with a practical approach. Like all his predecessors, however,
Quintilian does not mention the “praeteritio of digressio” as a tool in rhetorical
argumentation.
2.4.4 Special case: insult and invective
Insults and unsubstantiated personal attacks against the opponent, outside
the argumentation for the case, have always been part of practical oratory
and have always been considered critically by rhetorical theory.178
Cf. p. 171.
176 Quint. Inst. 4.3.16 “innumerabilia sunt haec, quorum alia sic praeparata adferimus,
quaedam ex occasione vel necessitate ducimus si quid nobis agentibus novi accidit, in-
terpellatio, interventus alicuius, tumultus.”
177 Quint. Inst. 5.13.22 “nonnumquam tamen quaedam bene et contemnuntur vel tamquam
levia vel tamquam ad causam nihil pertinentia. multis hoc locis facit Cicero. et haec
simulatio interim huc usque procedit, ut, quae dicendo refutare non possumus, quasi
fastidiendo calcemus.”; Quint. Inst. 7.2.29 “patrono, si fieri poterit, id agendum est ut
obiecta vel neget vel defendat vel minuat: proximum est ut a praesenti quaestione separet.
sunt enim pleraque non solum [et] dissimilia sed etiam aliquando contraria”.
178 Cf. Arena (2007) (with further bibliography) on Roman oratorical invective in general,
Powell (2007) on aspects of invective in Cicero.
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Invective as a genre of speech is rare;179 on the other hand, invective
and insults are a frequent element of forensic and political oratory both in
Greece180 and Rome.181 Plato and Solon proposed laws against insulting on
public occasions,182 but neither these ideas nor the actual law against speak-
ing off-topic183 seem to have had much effect in Athens; in Rome “[t]he
extent to which members of Rome’s ruling elite could shower each other
with abuse in the senate or the lawcourts is striking”,184 even de mortuis nil
nisi bonum was apparently “no constraining principle”,185 as can be seen e.g.
from Cicero’s attacks on the dead Clodius in Pro Milone.186 Conversely, Ci-
cero uses the (apparently rare) case where his opponent, the prosecutor, had
made no personal attack against his client as an argument in favour of his
client’s character.187
There was, however, in late Republican Rome an idea that personal insults
were somehow inappropriate,188 depending on the context,189 to which Ci-
cero could refer and present himself as a “decent” orator: either by distanc-
179 Koster (1980) discusses as a complete invective speech only Cicero’s In Pisonem, aside
from the faked or fictitious speeches by Sallustius against Cicero, Cicero against Sallustius,
and Calenus against Cicero; I would tend to add Cicero’s second Philippica, which Koster
accepts to be “von Cicero [. . . ] sowohl am Anfang als auch am Ende deutlich als suasio
charakterisiert” (Koster, 1980, p. 129).
180 Cf. the material in Süß (1910, p. 245–262); Craig (2004, p. 190–191).
181 Arena (2007, p. 150) “Invective was often a crucial factor in an orator’s success, whether
he was speaking in a judicial prosecution or defense or a political battle fought in the
senate or popular assembly (contio). This is because the highlighting of an individual’s
faults in an abusive or humorous manner provided a powerful means of manipulating
the audience’s emotions.”
182 Montiglio (2000, p. 128).
183 See p. 49.
184 Gildenhard (2007, p. 174).
185 Craig (2004, p. 203).
186 Koster finds significant amounts of “Invektivisches” in the following of Cicero’s speeches:
the Verrines; the fragmentary In senatu in toga candida contra C. Antonium et L. Catilinam
competitores; against Clodius, Gabinius, Piso and others in the speech mentioned in Att.
1.16.8, other fragmentary or lost speeches, Post reditum in senatu, De domo sua, Pro Sestio,
De haruspicum responso, De provinciis consularibus, Pro Plancio; and the second Philippica
(Koster, 1980, p. 113–133). Smaller examples of insults are found in even more speeches.
187 Cic. Font. 37 “de quo homine, iudices—iam enim mihi videor hoc prope causa duabus ac-
tionibus perorata debere dicere—de quo vos homine ne ab inimicis quidem ullum fictum
probrorum non modo crimen sed ne maledictum quidem audistis”.
188 The Attic Orators usually do not refrain explicitly from personal attacks, only from using
indecent language or topics, cf. p. 113. A rare example is Dem. or. 21.208.
189 Arena (2007, p. 154) “Given these important functions of invective, it is clear why the or-
ator could not resort to unbridled abuse against his opponent. To employ obscene insults
would risk compromising his own dignitas [. . . ].”
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ing himself from inappropriate attacks in a praeteritio,190 or by introducing
them in an excusing manner;191 or he accuses his opponent of improper at-
tacks.192
All of these figures, however, are rather rare in Cicero’s speeches, espe-
cially the reproach of the opponent, and Cicero must have been well aware
how vulnerable he was himself in this respect.
The writers of rhetorical theory concentrate on practical aspects of in-
vective: the Rhetorica ad Herennium argues that it would be detrimental to
the case if the orator attacked someone or something associated with the
judges193—which means that it does not oppose invective in general, only
if unreasonable under practical aspects. The line of thought is taken up by
Cicero and supplemented by advice against venting personal anger if speak-
ing as someone else’s advocate194 (which implies that personal invective can
have its place in political speeches).
190 Cic. S. Rosc. 94 “quae non modo idcirco praetereo quod te ipsum non libenter accuso
verum eo magis etiam quod, si de illis caedibus velim commemorare quae tum factae
sunt ista eadem ratione qua Sex. Roscius occisus est, vereor ne ad pluris oratio mea per-
tinere videatur”; Cic. Verr. 2.5.107 “non enim possum quemquam insimulare falso”; Cic.
Cael. 6–7 “sed aliud est male dicere, aliud accusare. accusatio crimen desiderat, rem ut
definiat, hominem ut notet, argumento probet, teste confirmet; maledictio autem nihil ha-
bet propositi praeter contumeliam quae si petulantius iactatur, convicium, si facetius ur-
banitas nominatur. [7] quam quidem partem accusationis admiratus sum et moleste tuli
potissimum esse Atratino datam. neque enim decebat neque aetas illa postulabat neque,
id quod animadvertere poteratis, pudor patiebatur optimi adulescentis in tali illum ora-
tione versari”; Cic. Phil. 2.6 “quid est dictum a me cum contumelia, quid non moderate,
quid non amice?” Cf. Cic. Phil. 12.21 “sed vincam animum mihique imperabo, dolorem
iustissimum, si non potuero frangere, occultabo” which does not refer directly to insults
but to a strong emotion which, if not suppressed, could lead to those.
191 Cic. Phil. 1.27 “ego, si quid in vitam eius aut in mores cum contumelia dixero, quo minus
mihi inimicissimus sit, non recusabo”, 8.9 “invitus dico, sed dicendum est”, 9.8 “vos enim,
patres conscripti (grave dictu est sed dicendum tamen), vos, inquam, Ser. Sulpicium vita
privastis”.
192 Cic. Sull. 40 “exclusus hac criminatione Torquatus rursus in me inruit”; Cic. Lig. 16 “nunc
quid dicis? ‘cave ignoscas!’ haec nec hominis nec ad hominem vox est; qua qui apud
te, C. Caesar, utetur, suam citius abiciet humanitatem quam extorquebit tuam”; Cic. Phil.
2.46 “haec tu cum per me acta meminisses, nisi illis, quos videmus, gladiis confideres,
maledictis me provocare ausus esses?” Similarly Dem. or. 19.213.
193 Rhet. Her. 2.43 “item vitiosum est, quod dicitur contra iudicis voluntatem aut eorum, qui
audiunt, si aut partes, quibus illi student, aut homines, quos illi caros habent, laedantur
aut aliquo eiusmodi vitio laeditur auditoris voluntas.”
194 Cic. De orat. 2.305 “quid, si, quae vitia aut incommoda sunt in aliquo iudice uno aut
pluribus, ea tu in adversariis exprobrando non intellegas te in iudices invehi, mediocrene
peccatum est? quid, si, cum pro altero dicas, litem tuam facias aut laesus efferare iracun-
dia, causam relinquas, nihilne noceas?”
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The same purely practical advice occurs also in Quintilian,195 but in a later
passage he goes further and classifies invective not only as detrimental in
certain cases but as indecora, i.e. morally bad in general.196
2.4.5 Conclusion
Throughout antiquity, one might say that we find oratorical practice more
open towards speaking off-topic than in modern times; from another per-
spective, however, we may consider this the result of a wider concept of what
is relevant to a case or topic, especially in court. Digressiones without any ar-
gumentative weight, however, are rare at all times. Consequently, there is
not much advice in theory against straying from the point. Since there is not
much to be gained from explicitly omitting digressiones, praeteritiones of this
type are in general comparatively rare in Athenian and Ciceronian practice,
but especially Cicero makes use of this type on a few occasions, in context
with other rhetorical devices and mostly with the aim of building a sympa-
thetic connection with the audience. This usage of “(not) speaking off-topic”
is not treated at all in rhetorical theory.
2.5 Omissions brevitatis gratia
2.5.1 Introduction
Omission of not strictly necessary points from a speech becomes a necessity
in case of an external time limit to the speech, a feature which was more usual
195 Quint. Inst. 4.1.10 “vitandum etiam ne contumeliosi maligni superbi maledici in
quemquam hominem ordinemve videamur, praecipueque eorum qui laedi nisi adversa
iudicum voluntate non possint.” To this may be added his advice against raging against
fate (Quint. Inst. 6.3.28 “sed hic quoque tamen inhumana videri solet fortunae insectatio,
vel quod culpa caret vel quod redire etiam in ipsos qui obiecerunt potest”).
196 Quint. Inst. 11.1.29 “impudens, tumultuosa, iracunda actio omnibus indecora, sed, ut
quisque aetate dignitate usu praecedit, magis in ea reprendendus.” On the moral side is
also the advice against petulantia towards groups of people in jokes (Quint. Inst. 11.1.86–87
“illud etiam in iocis monui, quam turpis esset fortunae insectatio, et ne in totos ordines
aut gentes aut populos petulantia incurreret”).
Two side points made by Quintilian combine practical and moral views: he rejects the
practice of filling argumentative gaps with insults, as this is only effective during the
speech and unworthy of the orator perfectus (Quint. Inst. 12.9.8); and he mentions that it
can be wise to meet the opponent’s invective with silence, ridiculing him (Quint. Inst.
6.2.16), or to ignore it and thus show a good conscience (Quint. Inst. 9.2.93).
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in Greece than in Rome. Beyond this, the idea of shortness for shortness’
sake or of a “natural time limit” to any speech, or part of a speech, was
implicitly present in omissions of many kinds in practice, as shown above
in sections 2.2–2.4. Yet brevity as a rhetorical concept or virtue was, as far
as the textual transmission allows us to tell, almost nonexistent in rhetorical
theory in antiquity (except for the custom of relatively short speeches in the
political assemblies); most of the writers of rhetorical theory mention it only
in particular aspects.
2.5.2 External time limits
Official regulations for the duration of speeches on public occasions were
known throughout antiquity, though not all occasions had such restrictions.
The probably best known feature of time limits in ancient oratory is the
Greek κλεψύδρα, the so-called water-clock, as it was used in Athenian courts
for both private and public trials.197
It served two purposes: 1. to ensure that both parties had equal amounts
of time at their disposal; 2. that the entire trial, or a certain number of tri-
als, were completed before sunset. The rather complex system of speaking
times for different types of trials, with many technical details, is described
in Aristotle’s Α᾿θηναῖων Πολιτεία.198 Thus any orator preparing a speech for
an Athenian court would know beforehand how much time he had at his
disposal; if there were several speakers, they had to divide the time between
themselves.
In contrast, we know scarcely anything in case of political speeches in
Athens, i.e. the situation in the ἐκκλησία. There seems to have been no
legal or otherwise official time limit for a single speech (beyond the limit for
the entire meeting), but I would suggest that an orator who went on speak-
ing for too long was inevitably interrupted either by the audience or by the
piρυτάνεις when they thought it was enough,199 although we have no proper
197 For the archeological evidence cf. Young (1939), Armstrong and Camp II (1977), Boegehold
(1995, p. 77–78, 226–230).
198 A thorough analysis and interpretation can be found in Hommel (1927); for a more recent
commentary cf. Rhodes (1981) ad locum.
199 Especially as the piρυτάνεις would have been responsible for ensuring that all items got a
hearing, cf. Carey (2000, p. 47–54).
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evidence for this; it follows that planning the length of an ἐκκλησία speech
beforehand was near to impossible.
The whole situation, both in court and in politics, was quite different in
Rome. In the courts of the Roman Republic, there were no legal time lim-
its for a long time; the meetings were restricted to daytime200 for practical
reasons, but trials could and often did go on for several days.201 How the
legal situation changed in the late Republic is not clear; a remark in Cicero’s
speech Pro Flacco that “sex horas omnino lex dedit”202 is taken to refer to the
lex Iulia de repetundis (59 BC), although other evidence about the law does
not mention time limits. Tacitus claims203 that before the lex Pompeia (52 BC),
orators in court were completely free to speak for as long as they wanted.204
However, already in the trial against Verres in 70 BC we find references to
legal restrictions of the speaking time.205 The lex Pompeia set, among other
regulations, a limit of three hours for each speaker which in most cases meant
that the trial was concluded in a single day;206 in the Milo trial at least the
speeches were concluded in one day, while the presentation of the evidence
took up two more (exceptionally in the case before the speeches—usually
the evidence was examined after the main speeches had been given). For
exceptions from the freedom of speaking time in the Republic see below p.
61.
200 Lex XII tab. 1.9 “sol occasus suprema tempestas esto”.
201 Cf. Cic. Planc. 37 “disputata hesterno die copiosissime a Q. Hortensio”.
202 Cic. Flacc. 82 “non est, mihi crede, corruptus. quid enim fuit quod ab eo redimeretur? ut
duceret iudicium? cui sex horas omnino lex dedit, quantum tandem ex his horis detra-
heret, si tibi morem gerere voluisset?”
203 Dismissed already by Mommsen (1899, p. 428, n. 4).
204 Tac. Dial. 38 “modum in dicendo sibi quisque sumebat et numerus neque dierum neque
patronorum finiebatur”.
205 Cic. Verr. 2.1.25 “hic tu fortasse eris diligens ne quam ego horam de meis legitimis horis
remittam; nisi omni tempore quod mihi lege concessum est abusus ero, querere, deum atque
hominum fidem implorabis, circumveniri C. Verrem quod accusator nolit tam diu quam
diu liceat dicere. quod mihi lex mea causa dedit, eo mihi non uti non licebit? nam accusandi
mihi tempus mea causa datum est, ut possem oratione mea crimina causamque explicare:
hoc si non utor, non tibi iniuriam facio, sed de meo iure aliquid et commodo detraho.”;
similarly Cic. Verr. 2.1.32 “nunc mihi temporis eius quod mihi ad dicendum datur, quoniam in
animo est causam omnem exponere, habenda ratio est diligenter.”
206 Cic. Brut. 324 “cum lege Pompeia ternis horis ad dicendum datis ad causas simillimas
inter se vel potius easdem novi veniebamus cotidie”.
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A water-clock is attested in Rome as early as 159 B.C.,207 but can only have
come into use as a permanent institution for measuring speaking time in
court after legal time limits were introduced, i.e. in the late Republic or un-
der Augustus. As Ker says,208 the κλεψύδρα was probably present even in Ci-
cero’s time, for he is confronted with a time limit in a speech during his con-
sulate,209 but this was not standard procedure before the Empire. After some
gap in the evidence for the Augustan age, we find the use of the κλεψύδρα in
court as common practice for Pliny the Younger; he reports about a clepsydra
in a trial where he spoke.210 The same passage, along with others,211 implies
that in some cases there was not a definite amount of time for certain types
of cases, but that the judges were responsible for setting the speaking times
in each trial separately. For other cases we know of a legal time limit: e.g. in
extortion courts six hours were allowed for the prosecution and nine for the
defence.212
We see a development in Roman courts from (allegedly) complete freedom
from time limits in the early and Mid-Republic, to first attempts of legal time
limits in the late Republic, and on to actual and sometimes quite narrow time
limits in the Empire; however, at no time do we find a differentiated system
of speaking times like in the Athenian courts.
The Roman Senate,213 too, was somewhat different from the Athenian ἐκ-
κλησία:214 in the Republic, the presiding magistrate had the right to deter-
mine the speaking order (beyond the order set by the ranks of the magis-
trates), but once a senator had started to speak he could not stop him, not
207 Plin. maior Nat. 7.215 “Scipio Nasica collega Laenati primus aqua divisit horas aeque noc-
tium ac dierum idque horologium sub tecto dicavit anno urbis DXCV.”
208 Ker (2009, p. 285).
209 Cic. Rab. perd.
210 Plin. minor Epist. 2.11.14 (of a trial held in January) “dixi horis paene quinque; nam
duodecim clepsydris, quas spatiosissimas acceperam, sunt additae quattuor.”
211 E.g. Plin. minor Epist. 1.20.10 “sequitur ergo ut actio sit absolutissima, quae maxime ora-
tionis similitudinem expresserit, si modo iustum et debitum tempus accipiat; quod si
negetur, nulla oratoris maxima iudicis culpa est.”
212 Plin. minor Epist. 4.9.9 “cum e lege accusator sex horas, novem reus accepisset”.
213 The Roman Senate is in its political function more similar to the Athenian βουλή, but in
oratorical terms, it is equivalent to the ἐκκησία as the place where most of the important
political speeches were given.
214 I follow both Mommsen (1871) and Lintott (1999) here.
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even if he went off-topic. According to Cicero215 it was good custom in the
senate to speak briefly and to the point. But the opposite was legally possi-
ble, and could be used for filibustering, as the meeting had to be adjourned
by sunset;216 filibustering was a speciality of Cato Uticensis, but also used
e.g. by Clodius.217 The speaking time in the senate was first limited by Au-
gustus, and restricted further in the later Empire.218
However, at no time was there a general time limit for a senate speech as
there was for court speeches; apparently this was not considered appropriate
for a situation of live discussion.
The issue of time limit naturally figures quite often in speeches by the At-
tic Orators, both in purely technical remarks and with rhetorical purpose.
The most common feature is the praeteritio in the form “I don’t have time to
say. . . ”,219 made all the more plausible to the audience by the well-visible
κλεψύδρα.220 Besides, the most important type of rhetorical use of the time
limit is the figure of granting part of one’s own time to the opponent, at least
in fiction:221 by offering his own speaking time to his opponent, the orator
215 Cic. Leg. 3.11 “loco senator et modo orato, causas populi teneto”.
216 Cic. Catil. 4.6 “nunc quicquid est, quocumque vestrae mentes inclinant atque sententiae,
statuendum vobis ante noctem est”; “gesetzliche[r] Schluss der Sitzung bei Sonnenunter-
gang” (Mommsen, 1871, vol. 3, p. 939, n. 3); debates of several days were not uncommon,
e.g. 1st–4th of January, 43 B.C., cf. Cic. Phil. 5+6.
217 Lintott (1999, p. 78); Mommsen (1871, vol. 3, p. 940, n. 2) “Absichtliches Verschleppen der
Verhandlung ist natürlich oft vorgekommen; aber die crude Form des Redens bis zum
Schluss der Sitzung ist, wie Freund [. . . ] und Feind [. . . ] gleichmässig bezeugen, eine Spe-
cialität Catos”. Mommsen’s sources are: Cic. Leg. 3.40 “ne sit infinitus; nam brevitas non
modo senatoris sed etiam oratoris magna laus est in sententia, nec est umquam longa
oratione utendum—quod fit ambitione saepissime—, nisi aut peccante senatu nullo mag-
istratu adiuvante tolli diem utile est, aut cum tanta causa est ut opus sit oratoris copia vel
ad hortandum vel ad docendum; quorum generum in utroque magnus noster Cato est”;
Caes. B.C. 1.32 “Catone vero acerrime repugnante et pristina consuetudine dicendi mora
dies extrahente”.
218 Mommsen (1871, vol. 3, p. 940).
219 E.g. Dem. or. 21.129, 24.61, 27.12, 40.38, 41.30, 45.48, 45.86, 47.82, 53.3, 54.44, 59.20; Aischin.
leg. 118; Isocr. Or. 15.320, 18.51.
220 Also the converse statement is used, “there is enough time left to . . . ”: Aischin. leg. 126.
221 E.g. Lys. or. 20.11; Dem. or. 18.139, 19.57, 50.2, 57.61; Aischin. leg. 59, 126, Ctes. 165–166.
An example of this figure by Demosthenes (Dem. or. 19.57 is quoted by Rowe (1997, p.
147) as an instance of the figure of thought ἐpiιτροpiή (“occurs when the speaker pretends
to allow, even to dare, someone (the judges or one’s opponent) to decide or to act inde-
pendently of or contrary to the speaker’s position”); however, the definitions for ἐpiιτροpiή
by Rufinianus and for permissio by Quintilian, quoted by Lausberg (1990, § 857), do not
actually include this.
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underlines the strength of a particular argument or of the whole of his argu-
mentation.
The picture for Rome is not completely different, but there is some shift of
focus. In Cicero’s speeches, we find nothing of the technicalities of the Attic
Orators, since the matter was not as technical in the Republic. On the con-
trary, in the rare cases when Cicero was subject to a time limit, he complains
about this disadvantage and thus produces a captatio benevolentiae: In the
speech Pro Quinctio,222 Cicero sets up a fictional dialogue between his oppo-
nent and himself, with the opponent arbitrarily setting a time limit, “horae”.
Cicero implies that he did not expect to be restricted in the length of his
speech when speaking in court.
Another, quite extreme example is the trial of C. Rabirius de perduellione
in 63 B.C. Due to an old-fashioned procedure, Cicero (as the defending ora-
tor) had to speak before the people for just half an hour. This seems to have
been a deliberate move by the presiding magistrate, and ultimately by Cae-
sar. But Cicero was not the type of orator to accept this without protest: after
the introduction, he lashed out furiously,223 came back to the point later in
his speech224 and made absolutely clear that he thought this restriction out-
rageous. The whole trial was finally abandoned without a result,225 but in
any case Cicero could regard the limit as an unfair disadvantage in his argu-
mentation.226
222 Cic. Quinct. 71 “‘non licet.’—at ea controversia est. ‘nihil ad me attinet; causam capitis
dicas oportet.’—accusa ubi ita necesse est.—‘non,’ inquit, ‘nisi tu ante novo modo priore
loco dixeris.’—dicendum necessario est.—‘praestituentur horae ad arbitrium nostrum, iudex
ipse coercebitur.’—quid tum?—‘tu aliquem patronum invenies, [. . . ].’ haec est iniqua certa-
tio [. . . ]”.
223 Cic. Rab. perd. 6 “nunc quoniam, T. Labiene, diligentiae meae temporis angustiis obsti-
tisti meque ex comparato et constituto spatio defensionis in semihorae articulum coegisti,
parebitur et, quod iniquissimum est, accusatoris condicioni et, quod miserrimum, inimici
potestati. quamquam in hac praescriptione semihorae patroni mihi partis reliquisti, con-
sulis ademisti, propterea quod ad defendendum prope modum satis erit hoc mihi tempo-
ris, ad conquerendum vero parum”.
224 Cic. Rab. perd. 9, 17, 35, 38.
225 Cassius Dio 37.26–28.
226 The scornful wording of Cic. De orat. 3.138 “at hunc [i.e. Periclem] non declamator aliqui
ad clepsydram latrare docuerat, sed, ut accepimus, Clazomenius ille Anaxagoras vir sum-
mus in maximarum rerum scientia” also implies that Cicero thought a strict time limit
unworthy of a decent orator (or at least that he could argue along this line before the
people).
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Considering the technical differences between Athens and Rome, it is
rather astonishing to find not only praeteritiones referring to a lack of time227
but also the most rhetorical way of using the time limit in Rome just as in
Greece, the figure of granting part of one’s own time to the opponent: e.g. in
the Pro S. Roscio, Cicero offers to his opponent: “ita quaero abs te, C. Eruci:
quo modo, et sic tecum agam ut meo loco vel respondendi vel interpellandi
tibi potestatem faciam vel etiam, si quid voles, interrogandi”,228 i.e. that the
opponent may stand up in Cicero’s allotted time229 to make statements or
ask questions of his own. In the strict sequence of a Roman trial, it is to
be assumed that this offer was not meant seriously, but just a rhetorical for-
mula.230 It may have been a real offer in contio speeches, although the in-
stances in the contio speeches De lege agraria do not show any sign of someone
else speaking in between.231
On the other hand, Cicero also knows how to turn the Roman regulations
into an argument: in Pro Tullio, he scorns with great irony the prosecutor’s
behaviour in a previous trial, where he has spoken until sundown so that the
judges’ verdict had to be postponed to the next day.232
227 Cic. Cael. 29 (with a percursio, omitting further illustration) “dies iam me deficiat, si, quae
dici in eam sententiam possunt, coner expromere: de corruptelis, de adulteriis, de proter-
vitate, de sumptibus immensa oratio est”; Cic. Verr. 2.2.2 “quo mihi maturius ad Siciliae
causam veniendum est relictis ceteris eius furtis atque flagitiis, ut et viribus quam inte-
gerrimis agere et ad dicendum temporis satis habere possim”.
228 Cic. S. Rosc. 73.
229 The issue of a strict time slot may be of less importance in Rome than under the precise
time regulations of Athenian courts, and the figure can certainly also be read in the sense
that the orator (fictitiously) concedes his right to an uninterrrupted speech. However, in
my view, the notion that an amount of time “on stage” which belonged rightfully to the
orator is used the opponent, would also be of importance.
230 Similarly in the Verrines: Cic. Verr. 2.1.25 (speaking to Hortensius) “hic tu fortasse eris
diligens ne quam ego horam de meis legitimis horis remittam; nisi omni tempore quod
mihi lege concessum est abusus ero, querere, deum atque hominum fidem implorabis,
circumveniri C. Verrem quod accusator nolit tam diu quam diu liceat dicere. quod mihi
lex mea causa dedit, eo mihi non uti non licebit? nam accusandi mihi tempus mea causa
datum est, ut possem oratione mea crimina causamque explicare: hoc si non utor, non
tibi iniuriam facio, sed de meo iure aliquid et commodo detraho”, 2.1.51 (speaking to
Verres) “postea quam nostris testibus nos quam horis uti malle vidisti, nullum signum
domi reliquisti”.
231 Cic. Leg. agr. 2.78 “quod si vestrum commodum spectat, veniat et coram mecum de agri
Campani divisione disputet.”, 3.1 “nunc, si videtur eis, in meam contionem prodeant et,
quo provocati a me venire noluerunt, revocati saltem revertantur”.
232 Cic. Tull. 6 “unum hoc abs te, L. Quincti, pervelim impetrare—quod tametsi eo volo quia
mihi utile est, tamen abs te idcirco quia aequum est, postulo—ut ita tibi multum temporis
ad dicendum sumas ut his aliquid ad iudicandum relinquas. namque antea non defensio-
nis tuae modus, sed nox tibi finem dicendi fecit; nunc, si tibi placere potest, ne idem facias,
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Beyond these cases, we also have the Verres trial where Cicero, as the pros-
ecutor, gave up a large part of his first continuous speech in order to begin
as soon as possible with the presentation of evidence and witnesses, and to
speed up the entire trial, so that it would not be continued into the next cal-
endar year. This tactic was neither innovative, as Cicero says himself,233 nor
extraordinary, as Cicero mentions in a later trial about the prosecutor using
the same tactic.234 Only to us may it seem quite special, for lack of extant
speeches from similar cases.
In fact, one may even wonder why Cicero, if he was pressed for time,
still gave235 an actio prima of 55 paragraphs (which, compared to other court
speeches by him, is not exactly a short speech236). Two reasons may be con-
sidered: 1. since we have no examples of prosecution speeches from other
trials, neither repetundae nor otherwise, it is quite possible that an actio prima
of the prosecution of 55 paragraphs is indeed extraordinarily short; 2. more
importantly, the major point in Cicero’s tactic is not the shortness of the first
speech, but that in this first speech he mostly speaks about the political cir-
cumstances, the specifics of the festival calendar and the delaying tactics of
his opponents (§§ 3–32) and his resulting tactic of shortening parts of the
trial in order to speed up the procedure (§§ 32–55). Only in the very last
paragraph he names the charge that he brings against Verres (§ 56). So it
may be said that Cicero, while giving a first speech longer than most of his
political speeches, and longer than Pro Archia and Pro Rabirio Postumo, com-
pletely cancelled his actio prima in terms of what was usually expected of an
actio prima, i.e. a presentation and substantiation of the charges. Thereby he
id abs te postulo. neque hoc idcirco postulo quod te aliquid censeam praeterire oportere
aut non quam ornatissime et copiosissime dicere, verum ut semel una quaque de re dicas;
quod si facies, non vereor ne dicendo dies eximatur.”
233 Cic. Verr. 1.55 “faciam hoc non novum, sed ab eis qui nunc principes nostrae civitatis sunt
ante factum, ut testibus utar statim”.
234 Cic. Scaur. 30 “omnis ista celeritas ac festinatio, quod inquisitionem, quod priorem ac-
tionem totam sustulisti”.
235 We may in this case assume a fairly close relationship between the delivered and the writ-
ten version of the speech, as the trial had drawn much attention, so the delivered speech
was quite widely known, and was a success, so that there cannot have been much neces-
sity or room for editing before publication.
236 Pro Archia poeta (32§§), Pro Rabirio Postumo (48§§) are shorter, Pro Balbo (65§§) is not much
longer.
64
Chapter 2 Limits of content: omissions
Section 2.5 Omissions brevitatis gratia
frustrated Hortensius’ plans, who found nothing in Cicero’s speech to reply
to.237
The “technical” part of Cicero’s tactic, his using the specifics of the Roman
calendar, is a valuable source for political and social history—more impor-
tant from a rhetorical-oratorical point of view, however, is his tactic of omit-
ting the usual content (i.e. the support of the charges) from his actio prima,
by breaking off with the announcement “ut testibus utar statim”.238 Under
different circumstances239 all the previous content of the speech might have
formed an extended prooemium on procedural details, with the actual prose-
cution speech to follow. Exactly at this point Cicero places a major praeteritio
comprising almost all the remainder of his speech (if considered in the usual
structure of a prosecution speech). This move did not only render Cicero’s
own speech unusually short, it also had the effect of shortening Hortensius’
reply, as it left him with little material to build his own speech upon. Since
Cicero could not start the examination of the witnesses and evidence before
Hortensius had given his first speech, this effect further promoted Cicero’s
technical tactic of speeding up the entire trial as much as possible.
The differences in the official regulations on time limits across different
periods of antiquity, as well as the differences in the oratorical reactions to
them, are also reflected in rhetorical theory. Considering the importance of
time limits in practical oratory in Greece, it is no surprise to find the most
practical instruction in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum,240 a short but systematic
survey on how to adjust a speech to a particular length,241 which is not taken
up by the Roman writers of rhetorical theory. Cicero mentions the point in
a side remark, which is nonetheless interesting: in De oratore, Crassus ends
his last contribution with the statement “edidi, quae potui, non ut volui, sed
ut me temporis angustiae coegerunt; scitum est enim causam conferre in
237 Cic. Verr. 2.1.24 “nunc ne novo querimoniae genere uti possit Hortensius et ea dicere, [. . . ]
me [. . . ] eum, quem contra dicerem, quia non dixerim, perdidisse”.
238 Cic. Verr. 1.55.
239 I.e. if Cicero had not started to announce his tactic in § 33.
240 Even though the evidence does not correspond exactly (since the Rhet. Alex. is not neces-
sarily a strictly Athenian treatise, while almost all our evidence on practical oratory relates
to Athens only), the connection is plausible enough.
241 Rhet. Alex. 1434b1–27.
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tempus, cum adferre plura, si cupias, non queas.”242 This description not
only of a praeteritio (a figure which is in general ignored in theory by Cicero,
cf. p. 95) but even of a rather dishonest type is only possible because it is
offered in the background narration of De oratore, outside the actual treatise
parts, and with a self-ironical attitude.
In the Empire, when official time limits become relevant, Tacitus mentions
the issue rather in passing in the Dialogus, when Marcus Aper calls for a new
way of oratory due to a new type of judges who, among other things, set a
(possibly arbitrary) time limit for the orator.243 But the Dialogus is a descrip-
tion and evaluation of oratory, not a textbook, and consequently gives no
advice. More could be expected of Quintilian, but even here we find noth-
ing but a few general side remarks: a note specifically on the prooemium,244
another on the actio,245 and the observation that time limits set by the judge
often make the given speech shorter than the published version, but without
specifying the cut-out parts.246 From another passage, however, we can infer
that the issue must have played a role in his practice as a teacher of rhetoric,
since he warns his students against the situation where at their first appear-
ance in court “laboratam congestamque dierum ac noctium studio actionem
aqua deficit”;247 but we are not told how Quintilian himself prepared his
students for this mishap.
Official time limits and length of speeches were an issue throughout an-
cient oratory, and they were dealt with in varying degrees of technicality.
Naturally we have most evidence in areas where there were strictest limits,
242 Cic. De orat. 3.228.
243 Tac. Dial. 19 “qui vi et potestate, non iure et legibus cognoscunt, nec accipiunt tempora, sed
constituunt, nec exspectandum habent oratorem, dum illi libeat de ipso negotio dicere, sed
saepe ultro admonent atque alio transgredientem revocant et festinare se testantur”.
244 Quint. Inst. 4.1.72 “aliquando tamen uti nec si velimus eo [prooemio] licet, cum iudex oc-
cupatus, cum angusta sunt tempora, cum maior potestas ab ipsa re cogit incipere”; Quin-
tilian adopts this advice on the prooemium from his sources, although, as he says before,
this should be a reason for brevity in the whole speech.
245 Quint. Inst. 11.3.52 “vitium nimiae tarditatis: nam et difficultatem inveniendi fatetur et
segnitia solvit animos, et, in quo est aliquid, temporibus praefinitis aquam perdit. promptum
sit os, non praeceps, moderatum, non lentum”.
246 Quint. Inst. 12.10.55 “quid ergo? semper sic aget orator ut scribet? si licebit, semper.
sed erunt quae impediant brevitate tempora a iudice data: multum ex eo quod potuit dici
recidetur, editio habebit omnia.”
247 Quint. Inst. 12.6.5.
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i.e. the courts—the Athenian248 and, to a somewhat lesser degree, the Ro-
man courts, especially in the Empire. Beyond just coping with the time limit,
it was employed for rhetorical purposes, mainly in praeteritiones and in the
figure of granting one’s own speaking time to the opponent. The most strik-
ing finding here, however, is the lack of advice from the writers of rhetorical
theory, especially from Quintilian, who in other areas shows great diligence
and attention to practical problems and their consequences.
2.5.3 “Natural” time limits
The concept of a “natural” time limit to a speech, i.e. the idea of shortness
for shortness’ sake,249 has found little more echo than external time limits
in the extant theoretical works on rhetoric.250 The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum
recommends only very specifically that when the orator recapitulates the
opponent’s arguments, “δεῖ δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα συνάγειν ὡς εἰς βραχύτατα καὶ
φράζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἐν ὀλίγοις τοῖς ὀνόμασι.”251 In Aristotle’s Ars rhetorica the
point is to be found in two aspects, first quasi ex negativo, in a rather unex-
pected place in book 2, mentioned in passing in the section on ἐνθυμήματα:
“οὔτε γὰρ piόρρωθεν οὔτε piάντα δεῖ λαμβάνοντας συνάγειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς
διὰ τὸ μῆκος, τὸ δὲ ἀδολεσχία διὰ τὸ φανερὰ λέγειν”,252 implying that less
μῆκος of a speech will lead to greater σαφήνεια, that cutting off unnecessary
topics will help to avoid ἀδολεσχία, the loquacitas for which the Greek were
so notorious. In the second passage, Aristotle mentions συντομία as a means
to de-emphasise certain aspects against others.253
248 While we have some evidence also for the legal situation in other Greek cities (especially
in inscriptions), our sources for practical oratory handling these time limits are virtually
exclusively Athenian.
249 This was implicitly present in omissions of many kinds in practice, as shown above in
sections 2.2–2.4.
250 I do not discuss here aspects of stylistic brevity (which figures e.g. most prominently in
the Stoics which counted συντομία among oratory’s stylistic virtues, cf. Diog. Laert. 7.59),
since there is hardly any omission from the speech to be grasped in it.
251 Rhet. Alex. 1430a36–38.
252 Aristot. Rhet. 1395b25–27.
253 Aristot. Rhet. 1416b4–7 “ἄλλος τῷ διαβάλλοντι, τὸ ἐpiαινοῦντα μικρὸν μακρῶς ψέξαι μέγα
συντόμως, ἢ piολλὰ ἀγαθὰ piροθέντα, ὃ εἰς τὸ piρᾶγμα piροφέρει ἓν ψέξαι.”
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The praise of brevitas in the Rhetorica ad Herennium254 mentions the issue
of time limits, but it refers exclusively to stylistic brevity, not to omission of
speech contents. Where the Auctor is concerned with contents, he only makes
a negative point against a proliferating argumentation;255 besides, he gives a
few specific pieces of advice for brevity in the exordium,256 in the narratio,257
in arousing commiseration258 and in conclusions.259
For Cicero βραχύτης or brevitas is not a virtue of a speech as a whole or of
oratory as a genre; in fact, Cicero in the Brutus states succinctly that “brevi-
tas autem laus est interdum in aliqua parte dicendi, in universa eloquentia
laudem non habet”260 (a point which a few sentences later is turned against
the Asianist orators261). The same is implied later when he praises brevi-
tas as particularly appropriate for historiography.262 But Cicero at the same
time, instead of banning brevitas from oratory altogether, allows for some
balance, like in his praise for Crassus as “quodque difficile est, idem et per-
ornatus et perbrevis”,263 or twice in the Orator, both times in enumerations
of what a “good” orator ought to do: he must structure his speech “ut nulla
neque praetermittatur neque redundet”264 and “[sequetur] brevitatem, si res
petet”.265 Apparently, the idea of a “natural time limit” or of omissions bre-
vitatis gratia is not completely alien to Cicero’s thinking about oratory, but he
would not himself consider it a rhetorical concept.
254 Rhet. Her. 4.68 “brevitas est res ipsis tantummodo verbis necessariis expedita [. . . ]. habet
paucis conprehensa brevitas multarum rerum expeditionem. quare adhibenda saepe est,
cum aut res non egent longae orationis aut tempus non sinet commorari.”
255 Rhet. Her. 2.27 “haec enim res [i.e. a well-structured argumentation] facit, ut neque diutius,
quam satis sit, in eisdem locis commoremur”.
256 Rhet. Her. 1.11 “item vitiosum [exordium] est, quod nimium apparatis conpositum est aut
nimium longum est”.
257 See below p. 69.
258 Rhet. Her. 2.50 “conmiserationem brevem esse oportet; nihil enim lacrima citius arescit.”
259 Rhet. Her. 3.15 “conclusionibus brevibus utemur”.
260 Cic. Brut. 50; the “aliqua pars dicendi” might be seen as referring to the narratio, where
brevitas was traditionally requested, see below p. 69; however, Cicero had already before,
in the De oratore, expressly rejected brevitas in the narratio, see p. 69.
261 Cic. Brut. 51 “Asiatici oratores non contemnendi quidem nec celeritate nec copia, sed
parum pressi et nimis redundantes”, cf. Quint. Inst. 11.3.52, see p. 139, n. 44.
262 Cic. Brut. 262 “nihil est enim in historia pura et inlustri brevitate dulcius”. Oratory and
historiography are also contrasted in the use of pauses, see p. 132.
263 Cic. Brut. 158.
264 Cic. Orat. 117.
265 Cic. Orat. 139.
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Similarly, Quintilian’s general remarks on brevitas result in no statement at
all: brevitas and copia ought to be employed, or not, in whatever way suits
the matter.266
There are indeed discussions of brevity in the rhetorical literature, but they
almost exclusively refer to the διήγησις or narratio, the exposition of the case
in a court speech. The canonical, but not unchallenged view in rhetorical
tradition is that the narratio should be short: the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum
states that in a διήγησις within a speech (as in a forensic speech) “συντόμως δέ
[δεῖ τούτων ἕκαστον piοιεῖν], ἵνα μνημονεύσωσι τὰ ῥηθέντα”267 (in contrast to a
speech which consists only of a διήγησις, like a report of an embassy268); later
ταχεῖα is listed under the virtues of the διήγησις.269 Isocrates is a prominent
supporter.270 Aristotle objects to the common view, pointing to τὸ μετρίως in-
stead;271 he allows for references to the speaker’s character and to emotion,
and generally leaves the length or brevity of the διήγησις to the orator’s own
judgment.
The Auctor ad Herennium takes for granted what was established in the
rhetorical tradition (see above Rhet. Alex.), that “tres res convenit habere nar-
rationem, ut brevis, ut dilucida, ut veri similis sit”, and provides an extensive
explanation how to achieve brevitas.272
Cicero, by contrast, rejects the point openly and completely, claiming
through Antonius’ voice in De oratore that brevity “saepe obest vel maxime
in narrando, non solum quod obscuritatem adfert, sed etiam quod eam vir-
tutem, quae narrationis est maxima, ut iucunda et ad persuadendum accom-
266 Quint. Inst. 3.8.67 “brevitas quoque aut copia non genere materiae sed modo constat”;
Quint. Inst. 10.5.8 “sua brevitati gratia, sua copiae”; Cic. Orat. 139 “brevitatem, si res petet”
is cited in Quint. Inst. 9.1.45.
267 Rhet. Alex. 1438a23–24.
268 Rhet. Alex. 1438a14–17.
269 Rhet. Alex. 1446a8–11 “ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ ταχεῖαν καὶ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ἄpiιστον τὴν διήγησιν λέγεσθαι
τὰς piράξεις δεῖ τοιαύτας piοιεῖσθαι. ταχέως μὲν οὖν ἐpiιτελέσεις, ἂν μὴ ****” (where an
unfortunate lacuna has been proposed).
270 According to Quint. Inst. 4.2.32.
271 Aristot. Rhet. 1416b33–36 “δεῖ γὰρ μὴ μακρῶς διηγεῖσθαι ὥσpiερ οὐδὲ piροοιμιάζεσθαι
μακρῶς, οὐδὲ τὰς piίστεις λέγειν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνταῦθά ἐστι τὸ εὖ ἢ τὸ ταχὺ ἢ τὸ συντόμως,
ἀλλὰ τὸ μετρίως”.
272 Rhet. Her. 1.14.
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modata sit, tollit”.273 At this point, Cicero’s consistent rejection of brevitas
collides most visibly with the rhetorical tradition.
The most balanced account on brevitas in the narratio is found, as usual, in
Quintilian, who briefly reviews the previous discussion of the point274 and
then indulges in a thorough consideration,275 and although he first declares
to generally agree with the tradition,276 he later feels time and again obliged
to warn against too much brevity,277 so that he eventually rather comes to
terms with Aristotle’s call for measurement.278
Another aspect of brevitas,279 which in rhetorical theory is treated exclu-
sively by Quintilian, is the point that sometimes even useful parts of the
speech are better left out, so that the audience does not become annoyed
and bored simply by being kept too long (in court, on a particular topic,
etc.).280 The most important point, however, as stated by Quintilian, is to
273 Cic. De orat. 2.326; similarly De orat. 3.202 “nam et commoratio una in re permultum movet
et inleustris explanatio rerumque, quasi gerantur, sub aspectum paene subiectio; quae et
in exponenda re plurimum valent et ad inlustrandum id, quod exponitur, et ad amplifi-
candum [. . . ]; et huic contraria saepe percursio est et plus ad intellegendum, quam dixeris,
significatio et distincte concisa brevitas et extenuatio”.
274 Quint. Inst. 4.2.32.
275 Quint. Inst. 4.2.40–51, cf. 4.2.104, 111.
276 Quint. Inst. 4.2.32 “eadem nobis placet divisio”.
277 E.g. Quint. Inst. 4.2.43 “nos autem brevitatem in hoc ponimus, non ut minus sed ne plus di-
catur quam oporteat”, 44 “non minus autem cavenda erit, quae nimium corripientes om-
nia sequitur, obscuritas, satiusque aliquid narrationi superesse quam deesse”, 47 “neque
mihi umquam tanta fuerit cura brevitatis ut non ea quae credibilem faciunt expositionem
inseri velim”.
278 Quint. Inst. 4.2.45 “ut fortasse ubique, in narratione tamen praecipue media haec tenenda
sit via dicendi: ‘quantum opus est et quantum satis est’”.
Quintilian makes another point for brevitas in the partitio and propositio (Inst. 4.5.24–26);
this is self-evident at first, since much detail would be illogical in these parts, but Quin-
tilians tactics go further: a little earlier (Inst. 4.5.6) he puts not only brevitas, but even
obscuritas to a practical use, “interim refugienda non modo distinctio quaestionum est,
sed omnino tractatio: adfectibus turbandus et ab intentione auferendus auditor. non enim
solum oratoris est docere, sed plus eloquentia circa movendum valet. cui rei contraria
est maxime tenuis illa et scrupulose in partis secta divisionis diligentia eo tempore quo
cognoscenti iudicium conamur auferre”, i.e. it is easier to deceive the audience if the or-
ator does not tell them too clearly what he intends to say. It also gives the orator more
liberty for changes later in his speech, since “turpissimum vero non eodem ordine exse-
qui quo quidque proposueris” (Inst. 4.5.28).
279 See also p. 163 on the orator’s asking the audience for attentive silence.
280 Even Horace agrees: “quicquid praecipies, esto brevis, ut cito dicta / percipiant animi
dociles teneantque fideles. / omne supervacuum pleno de pectore manat” (Hor. Ars 337).
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appear brief281 and keep the audience’s attention by announcing brevity, es-
pecially when speaking before a tired jury.282 But Quintilian also repeatedly
recommends actual omissions with the argument of the annoyed audience:
avoid an overlong prooemium,283 a long narratio,284 a long digressio.285
Ignored in all discussions of brevitas in rhetorical theory is the possibility
of constructing a praeteritio from the topic, though both the Attic Orators and
Cicero widely employ this device in their speeches. A very common figure
in the Attic Orators is the “praeteritio of details”, often phrased as “it would
be a lengthy affair to tell you all the details”,286 implying that the speech will
profit from the brevity which is achieved by omitting said details, and that
the orator strive not to annoy his audience by boring them.
Even more often, the orator would announce to be brief about some point
of his case (or, sometimes, the whole case): mostly without giving any justi-
fication,287 but in a few cases with an explicit effort, again, not to annoy his
audience with lengthy explanations or narrations.288
281 Quint. Inst. 4.1.34 “sunt et illa excitandis ad audiendum non inutilia, si nos neque diu
moraturos neque extra causam dicturos existiment. docilem sine dubio et haec ipsa praestat
attentio, sed et illud, si breviter et dilucide summam rei de qua cognoscere debeat indicarimus”.
282 Quint. Inst. 4.1.48 “his etiam de causis insinuatione videtur opus esse si adversarii actio
iudicum animos occupavit, si dicendum apud fatigatos est; quorum alterum promittendo
nostras probationes et adversas eludendo vitabimus, alterum spe brevitatis et iis quibus
attentum fieri iudicem docuimus.”
283 Quint. Inst. 4.1.62 “nec minus evitanda est inmodica eius [prooemii] longitudo, ne in caput
excrevisse videatur et quo praeparare debet fatiget.”
284 Quint. Inst. 4.2.47 “quibus [longis narrationibus] extrema, ut praecepi, prohoemii parte
ad intentionem praeparandus est iudex, deinde curandum ut omni arte vel ex spatio eius
detrahamus aliquid vel ex taedio.”
285 Quint. Inst. 4.3.8 “verum haec breviter omnia; iudex enim ordine audito festinat ad pro-
bationem et quam primum certus esse sententiae cupit. praeterea cavendum est ne ipsa
expositio vanescat, aversis in aliud animis et inani mora fatigatis.”
Other aspects related to “avoid annoying the audience”, but not to omissions, are: use
ornatus to keep the audience’s attention (Quint. Inst. 4.2.22 “in quo genere [i.e. factis notis]
plurimis figuris erit varianda expositio ad effugiendum taedium nota audientis”), and do
not appear as if you mistrust or underestimate the audience’s memory (Quint. Inst. 6.1.2
“quae autem enumeranda videntur, cum pondere aliquo dicenda sunt et aptis excitanda
sententiis et figuris utique varianda: alioqui nihil est odiosius recta illa repetitione velut
memoriae iudicum diffidentis.”).
286 Examples: Lys. or. 18.3, 24.21, 30.2, 32.26; Dem. or. 3.27, 9.60, 9.64, 10.3, 18.215, 18.258,
32.17; Aischin. Tim. 40, 52, leg. 22, 112, 118
287 E.g. Lys. or. 12.3, 12.62, 13.33, 13.62, 16.9, 19.55, 23.1, 24.4; Dem. or. 6.6, 8.76, 14.2, 15.22,
18.95, 18.229, 20.75, 21.77, 21.184, 23.21, 23.102, 23.144, 23.215, 24.6, 24.10, 24.17, 24.159,
190, 27.3, 29.25, 34.3, 36.3, 36.36; Aischin. Tim. 155, Ctes. 9, 28, 69, 213.
288 E.g. Dem. or. 14.14, 14.41, 23.88
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Cicero (who is, in theory, more strictly against brevitas than the other writ-
ers of rhetoric) uses the figure in his speeches, too, but with a somewhat
different focus: he rather rarely just announces that he will treat a certain
point briefly,289 more often he gives the brevitas a connotation as positive290
or necessary;291 the latter case does allude to a kind of time limit, not an of-
ficial one, but the necessity or wish to conclude the speech within a certain
time frame.292 An ironical touch is in the remark in Pro Quinctio, “et a me,
qui neque excogitare neque pronuntiare multa possum, brevitas postulatur,
quae mihimet ipsi amicissima est”293 (though we have to take into account
that Cicero is in the very first stage of his career at this point), and in the
passages of In Verrem 2 where this not particularly short speech is presented
as brevis compared to the mass of possible arguments against Verres.294 A
very special reason for brevitas is the situation of the speeches before Caesar,
mentioned in the peroratio of the Pro Ligario: with Caesar as the only judge
and audience, the whole matter depends more on him, Caesar, than on any-
thing Cicero could say (so Cicero argues), therefore the speech may as well
289 Cic. Caecin. 17 “ut in pauca conferam”; Cic. Sull. 62 “cuius ego de virtute et constantia,
iudices, tantum dico [. . . ]”; Cic. Phil. 2.20 “nec vero tibi de versibus plura respondebo;
tantum dicam breviter [. . . ]”.
290 Cic. Flacc. 34 “quas ego non solum propter longitudinem sed etiam propter turpissimam
obscenitatem verborum praetereundas puto”; Cic. Flacc. 12 “sed non dilatabo orationem
meam”; cf. the implied connotation of longum as negative: Cic. Verr. 2.1.156 “iam vero in
bonis Q. Opimi vendendis quas iste praedas, quam aperte, quam improbe fecerit, longum
est dicere”.
291 Cic. Verr. 2.1.32 “nunc mihi temporis eius quod mihi ad dicendum datur, quoniam in an-
imo est causam omnem exponere, habenda ratio est diligenter. itaque primum illum ac-
tum istius vitae turpissimum et flagitiosissimum praetermittam”, 2.1.42 “nolite, quaeso,
iudices, brevitate orationis meae potius quam rerum ipsarum magnitudine crimina pon-
derare; mihi enim properandum necessario est, ut omnia vobis quae mihi constituta sunt
possim exponere”, 2.2.2 “quo mihi maturius ad Siciliae causam veniendum est relictis
ceteris eius furtis atque flagitiis, ut et viribus quam integerrimis agere et ad dicendum
temporis satis habere possim”, 2.4.57 “nullo modo possum omnia istius facta aut memo-
ria consequi aut oratione complecti: genera ipsa cupio breviter attingere”; Cic. Flacc. 75
“vellem tantum habere me oti, ut possem recitare psephisma Smyrnaeorum”; also used
in Cic. De orat. 3.209 “his autem de rebus sol me ille admonuit, ut brevior essem, qui ipse
iam praecipitans me quoque haec praecipitem paene evolvere coegit”.
292 A similar reference is Cic. Q. Rosc. 41 “frustra tempus contero”.
293 Cic. Quinct. 34.
294 Cic. Verr. 2.4.35 “tametsi iam dudum ego erro qui tam multa de tuis emptionibus verba
faciam, et quaeram utrum emeris necne et quo modo et quanti emeris, quod verbo tran-
sigere possum”, 2.4.38 “sed quid ego istius in eius modi rebus mediocris iniurias col-
ligo, quae tantum modo in furtis istius et damnis eorum a quibus auferebat versatae esse
videantur? accipite, si vultis, iudices, rem eius modi ut amentiam singularem et furorem
iam, non cupiditatem eius perspicere possitis.”
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be cut short.295 This argumentation is, of course, mainly a figure of flattery
towards the dictator.
Also the point of “(not) annoying the audience” is used in a number of
praeteritiones. This is the clearest expression of the “natural time limit” con-
cept; it is suggested as a reason for omission in several passages of Cicero’s
rhetorical writings296 and used for praeteritio in some of his speeches: in the
Pro S. Roscio Amerino, which is indeed a rather long speech (154§§), he in-
dicates in the middle of the narratio that the complicated nature of the case
is no fault of his, though he puts it with some irony, as his “ne diutius te-
neam, iudices”297 is followed by another eight paragraphs of narratio, and
another 130 paragraphs of speech altogether. And he apologises once more
later on: “vereor ne aut molestus sim vobis, iudices, aut ne ingeniis vestris
videar diffidere, si de tam perspicuis rebus diutius disseram”.298 Here he
cleverly suggests that his argument so far has been more detailed and clear
than necessary, and flatters the judges’ intellect, making it difficult for his
audience to claim that the case has not been made perfectly clear to them,
even if they felt that more explanation would have been necessary.
Sometimes Cicero expresses fear to annoy the judges not just by talking for
too long, but by keeping their curiosity in suspense: “ne diutius oratione mea
suspensa exspectatio vestra teneatur, adgrediar ad crimen”.299 But as might
be expected, apologies like this are most needed in the actio secunda of the
Verres trial, Cicero’s longest speech by far.300 Here we find general remarks
295 Cic. Lig. 38 “longiorem orationem causa forsitan postulet, tua certe natura breviorem.
quare cum utilius esse arbitrer te ipsum quam aut me aut quemquam loqui tecum, finem
iam faciam”.
296 Cic. Inv. 1.28 “oportet igitur [narrationem] tres habere res: ut brevis, ut aperta, ut proba-
bilis sit. brevis erit, [. . . ] si non modo id, quod obest, verum etiam id, quod nec obest nec
adiuvat, praeteribitur”; De orat. 3.31 “haeret in causa semper et quid iudici probandum
sit cum acutissime vidit, omissis ceteris argumentis in eo mentem orationemque defigit”,
2.296 “dixisse me cum ceteris tuis laudibus hanc esse vel maximam quod non solum quod
opus esset diceres, sed etiam quod non opus esset non diceres”; Orat. 47 “faciet igitur hic
noster [. . . ] ut, quoniam loci certi traduntur, percurrat omnis, utatur aptis, generatim dicat
[. . . ]. nec vero utetur imprudenter hac copia, sed omnia expendet et seliget”.
297 Cic. S. Rosc. 21.
298 Cic. S. Rosc. 82.
299 Cic. Cluent. 8, remarkably early in the speech.
300 The length of this speech, though exceptional in the Ciceronian corpus, may have been
rather typical of the genre of prosecution de repetundis. The figure of apologising for the
length of the speech may thus well have been just as typical for this type of speech, of
which we have no other example.—It does not matter for the oratorical analysis here
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about the judges’ weariness (satietas)301 as well as apologies for lingering
on the same subject for too long,302 a feature obviously brought about by
his organising the material into five books (or speeches) according to the
subject matter. The last example in particular, being at the same time one
of the many praeteritiones in the Verrines,303 shows Cicero’s unease about the
problem as he first states the necessity of elaborating the point at hand, but
immediately afterwards304 apologises for it.
Remarkably the point of (not) annoying the audience is to be found only
in forensic speeches of Cicero’s, not in his political oratory; the main reason
is probably that most of Cicero’s political speeches are indeed much shorter
than the forensic speeches, with exception of the “invectives” In Pisonem and
Phil. 2, but even in these two the point is not mentioned. In Phil. 2, this did
not matter much, as the speech was not actually delivered, and in In Pisonem
Cicero probably did not really care, since he had no need to convince the
senators of anything and thus did not need their goodwill. Furthermore I
would speculate that senators, being exposed to a lot more speeches than
the men acting as judges in court, were expected to have more stamina in
this respect. Cicero’s speeches to the people, however, are normally much
shorter than the average forensic speeches, suggesting less patience in the
crowd.305
whether Verr. 2 was actually given, intended to be given, or purely fictitious, and whether
it should be considered as one speech or five connected speeches: for the argumentation
within the speech, it is assumed in any case that the judges would have to listen to its
entirety—hence the apologies about the length.
301 Cic. Verr. 2.3.103 “sentio, iudices, moderandum mihi esse iam orationi meae fugien-
damque vestram satietatem.”
302 E.g. Cic. Verr. 2.3.126 “si ego accusator totiens de re eadem dicerem, vererer ne animos
vestros offenderem, iudices.”, 2.4.105 “nimium mihi diu videor in uno genere versari
criminum; sentio, iudices, occurrendum esse satietati aurium animorumque vestrorum.
quam ob rem multa praetermittam; ad ea autem quae dicturus sum reficite vos, quaeso,
iudices, per deos immortalis—eos ipsos de quorum religione iam diu dicimus,—dum id
eius facinus commemoro et profero quo provincia tota commota est.”
303 See below p. 94.
304 Cic. Verr. 2.4.109 “non obtundam diutius; etenim iam dudum vereor ne oratio mea aliena
ab iudiciorum ratione et a cotidiana dicendi consuetudine esse videatur.”
305 Approximately 30 against 100 paragraphs; exceptions are the early speeches Pro lege
Manilia (71 §§) and De lege agraria 2 (103 §§).
The argument of not annoying one’s audience is adopted later in Horace’s Satires: “ergo
non satis est risu diducere rictum / auditoris; et est quaedam tamen hic quoque virtus. /
est brevitate opus, ut currat sententia neu se / inpediat verbis lassas onerantibus auris”
(Hor. Sat. 1.10.9).
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2.5.4 Conclusion
In his rhetorical writings, Cicero expresses his aversion against brevity, quite
consistently and sometimes (regarding the narratio) against the rhetorical tra-
dition. This may be a personal preference, but it is quite possible that, espe-
cially where Cicero defends his style in the Asianism/Atticism debate, he
occupies a much more extreme position than would have matched his actual
opinion. From this point it appears consequent that he also avoids men-
tioning the possibilities of brevitas as an argument for praeteritio. Quintilian,
however, with his more balanced view on brevitas in the Institutio, does not
make the point either, although he could have more easily pointed out the
practical advantage of explicitly not annoying the audience.
2.6 “Spare your ammunition”
Another aspect of omissions is the concept of “sparing one’s ammunition”:
it can be advisable not to use some element of a speech in a certain passage,
even though it is appropriate there, if it can be more beneficial at a different
point of the speech, or in another, later speech; and especially one should
sometimes not concentrate all facets of an aspect in one spot, but spread
them over the speech.
Cicero in his speeches only once directly mentions the point of “spare your
ammunition”, here rather “spare your strength”, in the Philippicae:
nec enim omnia effundam, ut, si saepius decertandum sit, ut erit,
semper novus veniam; quam facultatem mihi multitudo istius
vitiorum peccatorumque largitur . . .
hunc ego diem expectans M. Antoni scelerata arma vitavi, tum
cum ille in me absentem invehens non intellegebat, ad quod tem-
pus me et meas vires reservarem . . .
quamquam animus mihi quidem numquam defuit, tempora de-
fuerunt, quae simul ac primum aliquid lucis ostendere visa sunt,
princeps vestrae libertatis defendendae fui. quodsi id ante facere
conatus essem, nunc facere non possem.306
306 Cic. Phil. 2.43, 3.33 , 4.1.
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Apparently Cicero pays credit here to the special (political) situation, where
a prolonged conflict was repeatedly discussed in the senate over several
months with varying alliances and shifting political opinions.307
In other cases where this thought is made explicit in the speech it usually
results in a special variety of praeteritio, the expressed intent to consider the
omitted point at a later point in the speech, “alio loco”. The point at issue
is therefore only postponed to a more suitable section of the speech (or a
different speech), at least if the orator keeps his promise; if not, i.e. if the
point is announced for a later part of the speech but actually never treated,
the figure is used as a means of deception.
2.6.1 Practice
The figure is used already, however rarely, by the Attic Orators.308 In Ci-
cero’s speeches, the majority of examples where he announces that some
topic will be treated later in the speech are found in the actio secunda of the
Verres trial.309 Obviously in this text (no matter whether it is considered as
a single speech or as five interconnected speeches) the need to organise and
categorise the material is far greater than elsewhere in the extant speeches,
as well as some necessity to keep the audience informed about what is yet
to come. Furthermore, Cicero deals not with a single event or sequence of
events, but with numerous parallel stories which connect to each other by
people, locations, and crime categories, so that any arrangement of them
for a speech will make forward cross-references necessary.310 While almost
307 These passages come from speeches early in Cicero’s corpus of “Philippic speeches”, but
the conflict since Caesar’s death had by this time already been dragging on for more than
six months.
308 E.g. Dem. or. 16.3, 18.42, 29.4; Aischin. Ctes. 84
309 Other examples are: Cic. Flacc. 6 “at a testibus laeditur. ante quam dico a quibus, qua spe,
qua vi, qua re concitatis, qua levitate, qua egestate, qua perfidia, qua audacia praeditis,
dicam de genere universo et de condicione omnium nostrum”; Cic. Har. 56 “sequitur illud,
‘ne deterioribvs repvlsisqve honos avgeatvr’. repulsos videamus, nam deteriores qui sint,
post docebo”; Cic. Deiot. 35 “nihil a me arbitror praeteritum, sed aliquid ad extremum
causae reservatum”; Cic. Phil. 2.3 “cui priusquam de ceteris rebus respondeo, de amicitia
quam a me violatam esse criminatus est, quod ego gravissimum crimen iudico, pauca
dicam”, 2.8 “quantam iam proferam”, 2.43 “sed dicam alio loco et de Leontino agro et de
Campano”.
310 Cic. Verr. 2.1.45 “iam quae iste signa, quas tabulas pictas ex Achaia sustulerit, non dicam
hoc loco: est mihi alius locus ad hanc eius cupiditatem demonstrandam separatus”, 2.1.61
“alio loco hoc cuius modi sit considerabimus; nunc nihil ad me attinet”, 2.2.13 “atque ea
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all occurrences of the alio loco figure are in the first three books of the actio
secunda—logically, being forward references—there are, in the later books,
also cross-references to earlier passages, though not as many as might be ex-
pected: “verum haec et dicentur alio loco et dicta sunt”,311 and “ac iam illa
omitto quae disperse a me multis in locis dicentur ac dicta sunt”,312 which
both at the same time function as forward references. Apparently Cicero
deemed it more important to keep his audience’s (or his readers’) attention
and expectation awake than to expose clearly at any point the structure of all
five parts of the speech.313
Forward references to another speech or another part of the trial do not
occur in Cicero’s extant speeches (with one exception, see below). This is
partly due to technical reasons: when there was a group of orators speaking
for a client, forward references to a later speech may plausibly have been
used, but not in Cicero’s speech, as he usually spoke last.314 On the contrary,
forward references to the examination of witnesses were decidedly avoided,
as Powell (2010) has shown for Cicero’s speeches: “[i]t seems fairly clear that
ipsa civitas [Mamertinorum] quo ratione isti amica sit, dicetur certo loco”, 2.2.15 “tamen
vobis alio loco ut se tota res habeat, quod ad eam civitatem [Syracusarum] attineat,
demonstrabitur”, 2.2.50 “qua de re alius mihi locus ad dicendum est constitutus”, 2.2.88,
“verum hasce eius cupiditates exponam alio loco; nunc ad Sthenium revertar”, 2.2.150
“verum esto; alio loco de aratorum animo et iniuriis videro”, 2.2.184 “quae vobis alio loco
planius explicabuntur”, 2.3.38 “sicut ostendam”, 2.3.59 “mitto, inquam, haec omnia atque
in aliud dicendi tempus reicio”, 2.3.80 “qua de paucitate aratorum alio loco dicam: nunc il-
lud quod praeterii non omnino relinquendum videtur”, 2.3.84 “itaque hoc mihi reservabo
genus totum integrum: ad illam quam institui causam frumenti ac decumarum revertar”.
311 Cic. Verr. 2.3.10.
312 Cic. Verr. 2.4.116.
313 The effect of keeping the audience’s attention is similarly achieved by announcing the
structure of the speech: e.g. Cic. Tull. 1 “〈la〉borabam ut, quod arguebam, id factum esse
ostenderem; nunc in eo consumenda est oratio ut ne adversarii, quod infitiari nullo modo
potuerunt, cum maxime cuperent, id cum confessi sunt, meliore loco esse videantur.”;
Cic. Planc. 4 “haec mihi sunt tractanda, iudices, et modice, ne quid ipse offendam, et tum
denique cum respondero criminibus”; Cic. Scaur. 21–22 “est enim unum maximum totius
Sardiniae frumentarium crimen, de quo Triarius omnis Sardos interrogavit, quod genus
uno testimoni foedere et consensu omnium est confirmatum. quod ego crimen ante quam
attingo, peto a vobis, iudices, ut me totius nostrae defensionis quasi quaedam fundamenta
iacere patiamini. quae si erunt, ut mea ratio et cogitatio fert, posita et constituta, nullam
accusationis partem pertimescam. [22] dicam enim primum de ipso genere accusationis,
postea de Sardis, tum etiam pauca de Scauro; quibus rebus explicatis tum denique ad
hoc horribile et formidolosum frumentarium crimen accedam.”; Cic. Phil. 1.11 “quoniam
utriusque consilii causam, patres conscripti, probatam vobis esse confido, priusquam de
re publica dicere incipio, pauca querar de hesterna Antoni iniuria”.
314 Backward references from Cicero to earlier speeches of the same trial do occur, however
rarely (most prominently in Pro Caelio); cf. above p. 35.
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neither the prosecution nor the defence were entirely in a position to predict
what the witnesses would say, or even, in the case of voluntary witnesses,
whether they would appear at all”,315 so that Cicero would make sure not to
give away too much too early, and avoid suspicion of having the witnesses
prepared. This accounts for some non-explicit omissions (where an alio loco
figure might be expected) in Cicero’s speeches.316 It is not contradicted by
the sole occurrence of a forward reference to a witness account,317 as this
comes from the actio secunda of the Verres trial, at which point Cicero already
had a fairly secure case (no matter whether in the real trial or in the fictitious
speech setting).
2.6.2 Theory
In rhetorical theory the possibility of the alio-loco praeteritio is not mentioned
before Quintilian. In the earlier writings, the advice to spread one’s material
over the speech (without making this explicit in a praeteritio) is made for spe-
cific elements of a speech: Aristotle makes the point about enthymemes,318
Cicero about ornamenta.319 Quintilian gives similar advice about emotion320
and arguments.321 But he also takes into account strategical considerations:
315 Powell (2010, p. 27). On the other hand, retrospective references to witnesses were stan-
dard procedure when they had already been heard priore actione, e.g. in the case of Cic.
Flacc., Font., Scaur. (Powell, 2010, p. 32–33)
316 E.g. “Cicero is at first sight surprisingly cagey about the details of Verres’ misdeeds in the
Diuinatio in Caecilium, but the surprise disappears when one realises that he is deliberately
avoiding giving too much away.” (Powell, 2010, p. 30)
317 Cic. Verr. 2.1.86 “nam quid a Milesiis lanae publice abstulerit, item de sumptu in ad-
ventum, de contumeliis et iniuriis in magistratum Milesium tametsi dici cum vere tum
graviter et vehementer potest, tamen dicere praetermittam eaque omnia testibus integra
reservabo”.
318 Aristot. Rhet. 1418a6–7 “οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ἀλλ’ ἀναμιγνύναι· εἰ δὲ
μή, καταβλάpiτει ἄλληλα.”
319 Cic. De orat. 3.96 “ut porro conspersa sit quasi verborum sententiarumque floribus, id non
debet esse fusum aequabiliter per omnem orationem, sed ita distinctum, ut sint quasi in
ornatu disposita quaedam insignia et lumina etc.”
320 Quint. Inst. 4.1.14 “degustanda tamen haec [miseratio] prohoemio, non consumenda”; cf.
Quint. Inst. 6.1.51 “omnis autem hos adfectus, etiam si quibusdam videntur in prohoemio
atque in epilogo sedem habere, in quibus sane sint frequentissimi, tamen aliae quoque
partes recipiunt, sed breviores, ut cum ex iis plurima sint reservanda. at hic, si usquam, totos
eloquentiae aperire fontes licet.”
321 Quint. Inst. 4.3.3 “in quo vitium illud est, quod sine discrimine causarum atque utilitatis
hoc tamquam semper expediat aut etiam necesse sit faciunt, eoque sumptas ex iis partibus
quarum alius erat locus sententias in hanc congerunt, ut plurima aut iterum dicenda sint
aut, quia [alia] alieno loco dicta sunt, dici suo non possint”; cf. Quint. Inst. 4.2.82 “at enim
quaedam argumenta turba valent, diducta leviora sunt” and Quint. Inst. 4.5.7 “quid quod
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in order to keep the narratio short, some points should be reserved for a later
passage, rather than omitted;322 if a point is difficult to defend on the spot,
it may wisely be kept for the altercatio;323 and sometimes it is useful to omit
some arguments at the point where the audience would expect them in the
speech, so that the opponent is tricked into asking for them, and the ora-
tor can then present the argument as a triumphant answer.324 Furthermore
Quintilian, going beyond all preceding (extant) treatises, recommends the
figure of alio loco: once with his advice to defer material from the narratio to
the probatio,325 and once as a means to support the effect of varatio.326 This is
thus one of the rare cases where the explicit omission is recognised in rhetor-
ical theory, even if only by Quintilian.
2.7 praeteritio: summary and further aspects
2.7.1 Summary of common types and applications
So far the most common types of praeteritio have been discussed; in this sec-
tion I am going to consider some additional, rarer features of the figure, be-
fore presenting the treatment of praeteritio in rhetorical theory, with a conclu-
sion on the topic of praeteritio, in section 2.7.9.
In general, forms of praeteritio may be classified by asking three questions:
1. what is omitted?, 2. why is it omitted?, and 3. how is the omission framed?
interim quae per se levia sunt et infirma, turba valent, ideoque congerenda sunt potius, et
velut eruptione pugnandum?”
322 Quint. Inst. 4.2.48 “ut minus longa sit [narratio] efficiemus quae poterimus differendo”.
323 Quint. Inst. 6.4.14 “nonnumquam tamen solet hoc quoque esse artis genus, ut quaedam
in actione dissimulata subito in altercando proferantur (est inopinatis eruptionibus aut
incursioni ex insidiis factae simillimum); id autem tum faciendum est cum (est) aliquid
cui responderi non statim possit, potuerit autem si tempus ad disponendum fuisset.”
324 Quint. Inst. 6.4.17 “ideo quaedam bene dissimulantur instrumenta; instant enim et saepe
discrimen omne committunt quod deesse nobis putant et faciunt probationibus nostris
auctoritatem postulando.”
325 Quint. Inst. 4.2.48 “ut minus longa sit efficiemus quae poterimus differendo, non tamen
sine mentione eorum quae differemus: ‘quas causas occidendi habuerit, quos adsumpserit
conscios, quem ad modum disposuerit insidias, probationis loco dicam.’” Cf. Quint. Inst.
4.2.54 “semina quaedam probationum spargere, verum sic ut narrationem esse meminer-
imus, non probationem”.
326 Quint. Inst. 9.2.63 “faciunt illa quoque iucundam orationem, aliqua mentione habita dif-
ferre et deponere apud memoriam iudicis et reposcere quae deposueris et iterare quaedam
schemate aliquo”.
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The most common types of praeteritio are those where neither the “what”
nor the “why” of the omission are much specified, where rather something
which is implied to to be superfluous to the case is omitted due to an implied
“natural time limit”. These types (praeteritio of unrelated topics, “standard”
praeteritio, “praeteritio of the rest”, “praeteritio of argument”, and praeteritio of
the known and obvious) are covered above from section 2.2.
A comparison of these types reveals that the common view that any prae-
teritio is somewhat ironical, since it mentions what it claims to omit,327 holds
true in general only for the “standard” praeteritio. Other types give a vague
notion at best of what is omitted: the “praeteritio of the rest” in particular
gives an indication of the content of the omission (it is necessarily similar to
the example the orator has used in detail), but no specifics. Likewise, some
instances of the praeteritio of off-topic matters provide no information about
the omitted content (e.g. “ne [. . . ] ab eo quod propositum est longius aberret
oratio”328), and the praeteritio of known facts sometimes rather implies than
states what could be said (e.g. “neque necesse est me id persequi voce quod
vos mente videatis”329).
By using these unspecific praeteritiones the orator can cover a lack of argu-
ments and convey a (however vague) impression of strength, without open-
ing himself to specific attacks. Similarly the “standard” praeteritio and the
more specific instances of other types can shield the orator against attacks
on his lack of evidence: he can always deny that he made a particular claim,
which nevertheless has found its way to the audience’s ears. While this is
sometimes indeed a matter of irony (see also below p. 92), it can also be used
as a non-ironical rhetorical tactic.
More special types of praeteritio in terms of what is omitted include: “prae-
teritio of name” (see below), where a person is mentioned and identified be-
yond doubt, but his or her name is explicitly left out; and the praeteritio of
insults (see from p. 54), where the orator expressly avoids strong or indecent
language, sometimes referring to the dignity of the situation or the audience.
327 E.g. Lausberg (1990, § 884) “Die Kundgabe der Absicht der Auslassung einerseits, die
Tatsache der aufzählenden Nennung andererseits [. . . ] ergeben für die praeteritio das Vor-
liegen einer Ironie”.
328 Cic. Caecin. 55.
329 Cic. Planc. 56.
80
Chapter 2 Limits of content: omissions
Section 2.7 praeteritio: summary and further aspects
These types, too, are not ironical in themselves, as the announced omission
is indeed made. They are used not to express that something should not be
said at all, but that it should not be said in a particular way; this is taken
further to the point that the orator declares himself unable to say something
in any way, something which in itself could well be mentioned, resulting in
pretended voice failure (see p. 184) or the “topos of the inexpressible” (see p.
214).
Another quite rare kind of praeteritio is the promise not to use any invented
arguments; this should be a matter of course anyway (although the orator is
not bound to truth, cf. p. 111), but the praeteritio makes it explicit and thus
demonstrates the truth to be outrageous enough.330
2.7.2 praeteritio of name
While most praeteritiones more or less share the irony that the figure itself
mentions what it promises to omit, one type of praeteritio in particular does
not: the “praeteritio of name” which declares that certain people are not to be
named, and the orator does indeed not say these names. The crucial point
is, of course, that the audience knows nevertheless who the orator is talking
about.
The figure is thus connected to pure allusion331 but makes the omission
explicit. In Athens it is rare and seems to have been a specialty of Aischines;
Cicero uses it rather widely in his speeches. The intent not to give names
is sometimes stated without giving a particular reason,332 sometimes explic-
330 E.g. Cic. Verr. 1.15 “ut mihi magis timendum sit, ne multa crimina praetermittere, quam
ne qua in istum fingere, existimer”, 2.2.179 “quod cum ita sit, nihil fingam tamen”, 2.2.180
“quapropter nihil est quod metuas ne quid in te confingam: etiam quod laetere habes.”
331 Like Dem. or. 20.91; Aischin. Ctes. 81; Cic. S. Rosc. 1 “tot summi oratores hominesque
nobilissimi”; Cic. Quinct. 68 “illis dominantibus” (i.e. Marius’ followers).
332 Aischin. Tim. 58; Cic. Div. in Caec. 13 “deinde sunt testes viri clarissimi nostrae civitatis,
quos omnis a me nominari non est necesse: eos qui adsunt appellabo, quos, si mentirer,
testis esse impudentiae meae minime vellem”; Cic. p. red. in sen. 32 “quem ego inimicum
mihi fuisse non dico, tacuisse, cum diceretur esse inimicus, scio”; Cic. Dom. 30 “si utile rei
publicae fuit haurire me unum pro omnibus illam indignissimam calamitatem, etiam hoc
utile est, quorum id scelere conflatum sit, me occultare et tacere”; Cic. Sest. 141 “summi
eiusdem civitatis viri, quos nominatim appellari non est necesse”; Cic. Cael. 43 “ex quibus
neminem mihi libet nominare; vosmet vobiscum recordamini.”; Cic. Phil. 2.1 “nec vero
necesse est quemquam a me nominari; vobiscum ipsi recordamini”, 2.15 “neminem nom-
inabo”, 2.25 “quis enim meum in ista societate gloriosissimi facti nomen audivit? cuius
autem, qui in eo numero fuisset, nomen est occultatum? occultatum dico; cuius non sta-
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itly out of politeness333 or (alleged) caution,334 for strategic reasons335 or as
a praeteritio brevitatis causa.336 The figure occurs also as allusion not to a per-
son or persons but to a thing, fact, event etc.337 In some cases the allusion is
very dark; while a part of the audience, at least the judge(s) and/or oppo-
nent in forensic speeches, must have understood the allusion (otherwise it
would have been useless), the omitted name(s) could probably not be sup-
plemented with certainty and in detail by the corona or, in senate speeches,
senators of lower ranks who were not privy to the discussions of “inner cir-
cles” of the socio-political elite.338
On the other hand there are instances where the allusion is so open that
nothing is actually hidden any more, which makes the figure purely ironical
and a means of mocking the opponent; the best example is in Pro Caelio,
tim divulgatum? citius dixerim iactasse se aliquos, ut fuisse in ea societate viderentur,
cum conscii non fuissent, quam ut quisquam celari vellet, qui fuisset.”
333 Cic. S. Rosc. 47 “verum homines notos sumere odiosum est, cum et illud incertum sit
velintne ei sese nominari”; Cic. Leg. agr. 2.63 “non consuevi homines appellare asperius,
Quirites, nisi lacessitus”; Cic. Sull. 72 “quos ego nominarem—neque enim ipsi nolunt et
huic animo gratissimo adsunt—sed, quia maius est beneficium quam posse debet civis
civi dare, ideo a vobis peto ut quod potuit, tempori tribuatis, quod fecit, ipsi.”
334 Aischin. Tim. 158, 165, 172; Cic. Manil. 37 “vestra admurmuratio facit, Quirites, ut
agnoscere videamini qui haec fecerint; ego autem nomino neminem; qua re irasci mihi
nemo poterit nisi qui ante de se voluerit confiteri.”
335 Aischin. Tim. 193.
336 Cic. Phil. 2.27 “longum est persequi ceteros, idque rei publicae praeclarum, fuisse tam
multos, ipsis gloriosum.” Cf. also p. 71.
337 Aischin. Ctes. 128; Cic. S. Rosc. 94 “quae non modo idcirco praetereo quod te ipsum non
libenter accuso verum eo magis etiam quod, si de illis caedibus velim commemorare quae
tum factae sunt ista eadem ratione qua Sex. Roscius occisus est, vereor ne ad pluris ora-
tio mea pertinere videatur”, 139 “nolo in eos gravius quicquam ne ominis quidem causa
dicere, unum hoc dico: etc.”; Cic. Div. in Caec. 28 “quare negent ex me non audies: hos
patere id suspicari quod necesse est”; Cic. Cael. 69 “audita et percelebrata sermonibus res
est. percipitis animis, iudices, iam dudum, quid velim vel potius quid nolim dicere”; Cic.
Phil. 11.34 “in quo quid faciendum Deiotaro, quid omnino rectius fuerit, dicere non est
necesse, praesertim cum contra, ac Deiotarus sensit, victoria belli iudicarit”, 11.35 “max-
imam eius et singularem laudem praetermitto; cuius enim praedicatio nondum omnibus
grata est, hanc memoriae potius quam vocis testimonio conservemus.”
338 Cic. Cluent. 6 “tum autem, cum ego una quaque de re dicam et diluam, ne ipsi quae con-
traria sint taciti cogitationi vestrae subiciatis, sed ad extremum exspectetis meque meum
dicendi ordinem servare patiamini: cum peroraro, tum, si quid erit praeteritum, animo
requiratis”, 167 “multa sunt quae dici possunt, sed non committam ut videar non dicendo
voluisse dicere; res enim iam se ipsa defendit”; Cic. Sest. 52 “quae cum omnia atque etiam
multo alia maiora, quae consulto praetereo, accidissent”, 62 “[Sestius] adiit tum pericu-
lum, sed adiit ob eam causam quae quanta fuerit iam mihi dicere non est necesse”; Cic.
Pis. 3 “nihil dicam gravius, quam quod omnes fatentur”; Cic. Mil. 14 “divisa sententia est,
postulante nescio quo: nihil enim necesse est omnium me flagitia proferre”; Cic. Phil. 1.27
“ne gravius quidpiam dicam”, 2.48 “quid dicam, ipse optime intellegit.”
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where Cicero ostentatiously and explicitly does not name some “non nupta
mulier”, only to address Clodia directly in the next paragraph.339
Also the counterpart to the “praeteritio of name” is used, in the figure where
a person or persons are indeed named, but with an excuse or qualification.340
In rhetorical theory the topic of allusion has a firm place. The Rhetorica ad
Herennium devotes an entire chapter to it and recommends it as a figure of
style.341 Cicero mentions it briefly in De oratore,342 probably relying on his
readers’ knowledge of common rhetorical textbooks.343 Quintilian treats the
topic in extenso in Inst. 9.2.65–80, with a definition,344 occasions for using it,345
the aspect of artem celare,346 and practical considerations.347 In other contexts,
339 Cic. Cael. 48–50.
340 Cautious excuse: Dem. or. 21.58, 24.132; Cic. S. Rosc. 6 “de viro fortissimo et claris-
simo L. Sulla, quem honoris causa nomino”, 15 “nam cum Metellis, Serviliis, Scipionibus
erat ei non modo hospitium, verum etiam domesticus usus et consuetudo, quas, ut ae-
quum est, familias honestatis amplitudinisque gratia nomino”, 27 “Caeciliam, Nepotis
sororem, Baliarici filiam, quam honoris causa nomino”; Cic. Verr. 1.18 “C. Curio; quem
ego hominem honoris [potius quam contumeliae] causa nominatum volo”; percursio: Cic.
Sest. 94 “omitto iam Numerium, Serranum, Aelium, quisquilias seditionis Clodianae; sed
tamen hi quoque . . . ”; post-praeteritio: Cic. Phil. 2.12 (after a long enumeration) “sed quid
singulos commemoro?”
341 Rhet. Her. 4.67.
342 Cic. De orat. 2.268 “arguta etiam significatio est, cum parva re et saepe verbo res obscura
et latens inlustratur”.
343 He does so explicitly in other passages, e.g. in his description of mnemotechnics, cf. p.
195.
344 65 “in quo per quandam suspicionem quod non dicimus accipi volumus, non utique con-
trarium, ut in εἰρωνείᾳ, sed aliud latens et auditori quasi inveniendum”.
345 66 “eius triplex usus est: unus si dicere palam parum tutum est, alter si non decet, tertius
qui venustatis modo gratia adhibetur et ipsa novitate ac varietate magis quam si relatio
sit recta delectat.”
346 69 “hoc parcius et circumspectius faciendum est, quia nihil interest quo modo offendas, et
aperta figura perdit hoc ipsum quod figura est”. Cf. section 2.11 on the concept of artem
arte celare.
347 E.g. the figure is useful especially as it cannot be attacked (75 “haeret enim nonnumquam
telum illud occultum, et hoc ipso quod non apparet eximi non potest: at si idem dicas
palam, et defenditur et probandum est.”) and nice for the listener who feels smart when
he gets the point (78 “adiuvat etiam quod auditor gaudet intellegere et favet ingenio suo
et alio dicente se laudat”).
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figures similar to allusion are included as a type of ἔμφασις348 and of irony;349
besides, Quintilian mentions the opportunity to exploit an allusion made by
the opponent.350 While Quintilian does not differentiate between explicit
and implicit allusions (i.e. whether it is framed as a praeteritio or not), he
thoroughly treats the points, especially with all practical aspects employed
by the Attic Orators and Cicero.
2.7.3 percursio
Under the question of how a praeteritio is staged (the third categorial ques-
tion after the what and the why of the omission), we come across the related
figures percursio351 and ἀpiοσιώpiησις.352
The percursio is, in Lausberg’s wording, “die kurze Aufzählung von Ge-
genständen, von denen jeder eigentlich eine eingehendere Behandlung (auf
die verzichtet wird) verdient hätte”.353 If the omission of the “eingehen-
dere Behandlung” is made explicit, it is also a praeteritio. Conversely, if the
praeteritio refers to omission of several items, “so enthält die praeteritio eine
Aufzählung, d.h. eine percursio”.354 The figure suggests, like the “praeteritio
of the rest” and the “praeteritio of argument”, that the orator has abundant
details and evidence which he could provide, but no need to do so as his
case is strong enough anyway. The percursio can be phrased as an announce-
348 Quint. Inst. 8.3.85 “sequens [i.e. the second type of ἔμφασις] positum in voce aut omnino
suppressa aut etiam abscisa. supprimitur vox, ut fecit pro Ligario Cicero: ‘quod si in
tanta fortuna bonitas tanta non esset quam tu per te, per te, inquam, optines: intellego
quid loquar’. tacuit enim illud, quod nihilo minus accipimus, non deesse homines qui ad
crudelitatem eum inpellant. absciditur per ἀpiοσιώpiησιν, quae quoniam est figura reddetur
suo loco.” Cf. on ἀpiοσιώpiησις Quint. Inst. 9.2.54 and 9.3.60.
349 Quint. Inst. 8.6.54 “in eo vero genere quo contraria ostenduntur ironia est (inlusionem
vocant): quae aut pronuntiatione intellegitur aut persona aut rei natura; nam si qua earum
verbis dissentit, apparet diversam esse orationi voluntatem.”
350 Quint. Inst. 9.2.94 “atque etiam si fuerint crebriores figurae quam ut dissimulari possint,
postulandum est ut nescio quid illud quod adversarii obliquis sententiis significare
voluerint, si fiducia sit, obiciant palam, aut certe non exigant ut, quod ipsi non audent
dicere, id iudices non is modo intellegant sed etiam credant.” Cf. p. 145 on exploiting the
opponent’s silence in argumentation.
351 Sometimes (e.g. Rowe (1997, p. 148–149)) also referred to under the much later term ἐpiι-
τροχασμός, attested first in Phoebammon (6 c. AD) (Lausberg, 1990, § 881).
352 These three are covered as figurae per detractionem in Lausberg (1990, §§ 880–889).
353 Lausberg (1990, § 881).
354 Lausberg (1990, § 882).
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ment,355 but it develops its whole force in its largest form and in combination
with a praeteritio, e.g. in the Pro Sestio:
omitto gratulationes, epulas, partitionem aerari, beneficia, spem,
promissa, praedam, laetitiam paucorum in luctu omnium. ve-
xabatur uxor mea, liberi ad necem quaerebantur, gener, et Piso
gener, a Pisonis consulis pedibus supplex reiciebatur, bona diri-
piebantur eaque ad consules deferebantur, domus ardebat in Pa-
latio: consules epulabantur. quod si meis incommodis laetaban-
tur, urbis tamen periculo commoverentur. sed ut a mea causa iam
recedam, reliquas illius anni pestis recordamini—sic enim facillime
perspicietis quantam vim omnium remediorum a magistratibus
proximis res publica desiderarit—356
Cicero’s task in this speech is the defence of Sestius against the charge de vi,
but he connects it (here and elsewhere) with his own experiences concern-
ing his exile. By sweeping over a long list of offences, some of which were
committed against himself and his family, topping it with the silence on all
the details which could be said about each, and then turning to the actually
“relevant” points, Cicero evokes an impression of having abundant material
355 E.g. Cic. S. Rosc. 83 “desinamus aliquando ea scrutari quae sunt inania; quaeramus ibi
maleficium ubi et est et inveniri potest; iam intelleges, Eruci, certum crimen quam multis
suspicionibus coarguatur, tametsi neque omnia dicam et leviter unum quidque tangam”.
356 Cic. Sest. 54–55.
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against his opponents, plus sympathy for himself, without being pressed for
details.357
2.7.4 ἀpiοσιώpiησις
The third figura per detractionem (after praeteritio and percursio), the ἀpiοσιώpiη-
σις or reticentia, is “die durch Abbruch eines begonnenen Satzes kenntlich ge-
machte, manchmal auch nachträglich ausdrücklich festgestellte Auslassung
der Äußerung eines Gedankens”,358 i.e. it can also coincide with a praeteritio
(and if not, the omission is implied all the same). Being an “affektische Aus-
lassung”359 and thus a very expressive means, it is used rarely throughout
ancient oratory; we find it in Demosthenes and Cicero, sometimes in its pure
form,360 sometimes without an incomplete sentence, only breaking off the
line of thought,361 and in the notorious passage from the Verrines, in comical
357 Further examples are: Dem. or. 9.21, 22.69, 23.148; Cic. Verr. 2.1.33 “omne illud tempus
quod fuit antequam iste ad magistratus remque publicam accessit, habeat per me solutum
ac liberum. sileatur de nocturnis eius bacchationibus ac vigiliis; lenonum, aleatorum, per-
ductorum nulla mentio fiat; damna, dedecora, quae res patris eius, aetas ipsius pertulit,
praetereantur; lucretur indicia veteris infamiae; patiatur eius vita reliqua me hanc tan-
tam iacturam criminum facere”, 2.4.48 “hic nolite exspectare dum ego haec crimina agam
ostiatim, ab Aeschylo Tyndaritano istum pateram abstulisse, a Thrasone item Tyndari-
tano patellam, a Nymphodoro Agrigentino turibulum. cum testis ex Sicilia dabo, quem
volet ille eligat quem ego interrogem de patellis, pateris, turibulis: non modo oppidum
nullum, sed ne domus quidem ulla paulo locupletior expers huius iniuriae reperietur”;
Cic. Leg. agr. 1.21 “non queror deminutionem vectigalium, non flagitium huius iacturae
atque damni, praetermitto illa quae nemo est quin gravissime et verissime conqueri pos-
sit, nos caput patrimoni publici, pulcherrimam populi Romani possessionem, subsidium
annonae, horreum belli, sub signo claustrisque rei publicae positum vectigal servare non
potuisse, eum denique nos agrum P. Rullo concessisse, qui ager ipse per sese et Sullanae
dominationi et Gracchorum largitioni restitisset; non dico solum hoc in re publica vectigal
esse quod amissis aliis remaneat, intermissis non conquiescat, in pace niteat, in bello non
obsolescat, militem sustentet, hostem non pertimescat; praetermitto omnem hanc ora-
tionem et contioni reservo; de periculo salutis ac libertatis loquor.”; Cic. Prov. cons. 3–4
“quid est quod possimus de Syria Macedonia dubitare? mitto quod eas ita partas habent
ii, qui nunc obtinent, ut non ante attingerint, quam hunc ordinem condemnarint, quam
auctoritatem vestram e civitate exterminarint, quam fidem publicam, quam perpetuam
populi Romani salutem, quam me ac meos omnis foedissime crudelissimeque vexarint.
[4] omnia domestica atque urbana mitto”.
358 Lausberg (1990, § 887).
359 Lausberg (1990, § 880).
360 E.g. Dem. or. 16.18, 20.157; Cic. Verr. 2.4.33 “at ita studiosus est huius praeclarae existi-
mationis, ut putetur in hisce rebus intellegens esse, ut nuper—videte hominis amentiam:
posteaquam est comperendinatus, etc.”; 2.4.45 “tu dignior, Verres, quam Calidius? qui, ut
non conferam vitam neque existimationem tuam cum illius—neque enim est conferenda”.
361 Cic. Cael. 60 “sed revertor ad crimen; etenim haec facta illius clarissimi ac fortissimi viri
mentio et vocem meam fletu debilitavit et mentem dolore impedivit”.
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imitation of memory failure.362 It is quite likely, and is well imaginable for
the instances of ἀpiοσιώpiησις mentioned above, that Cicero sometimes broke
off a sentence and substituted the remainder by a gesture, as A. L. Boege-
hold363 has demonstrated for several instances of incomplete sentences in
the Attic Orators (though the precise form of these gestures is subject to spec-
ulation).
In the theoretical writings the reticentia is named among figures of speech
in De oratore,364 but not discussed further. The Rhetorica ad Herennium gives a
definition and examples of the figure under the term praecisio,365 but no ad-
vice on usage. Quintilian relates that the figure has been treated by several
previous writers of rhetorical theory and that it is used to convey emotion,
and gives examples.366 He does not mention any use of gestures in the con-
text of ἀpiοσιώpiησις.367
Another special case in the “how” of a praeteritio is the figure of alio loco
(see p. 76), where something is omitted only temporarily and postponed to
a later part of the speech.
2.7.5 “anti-praeteritio”
As a counterpart to praeteritio, we frequently find a figure that may be called
anti-praeteritio: the explicit statement that something is not omitted, i.e. that
a possible or expectable omission, with or without praeteritio, is not made.
Mostly this is worded with some kind of necessity, claiming that someone or
362 Cic. Verr. 2.4.6 “sed earum artificem—quem? quemnam? recte admones—Polyclitum esse
dicebant.”, commented on by Quintilian (Inst. 9.2.61) and classified there among venusti
transitus. On memory failure cf. p. 187.
363 Boegehold (1999, ch. 7).
364 Cic. De orat. 3.205 “reticentia”; on the problems of the term, which can here be taken to
mean ἀpiοσιώpiησις, but also praeteritio, see Leeman et al. (1981, vol. 5, p. 319). The passage
is cited in Quint. Inst. 9.1.31.
365 Rhet. Her. 4.41.
366 Quint. Inst. 9.2.54 “ἀpiοσιώpiησις, quam idem Cicero reticentiam, Celsus obticentiam, non-
nulli interruptionem appellant, et ipsa ostendit adfectus, vel irae, ut [exemplum], vel sol-
licitudinis et quasi religionis: [exemplum]; vel alio transeundi gratia [exemplum]”.
367 Gestures as a substitute for words are mentioned only once, insofar as pointing can sub-
stitute adverbs and pronouns; this, however, would usually not mean breaking off the
sentence. (Quint. Inst. 11.3.87 “[manus] non in demonstrandis locis atque personis adver-
biorum atque pronominum optinent vicem?”)
The figure is treated in more detail in late antiquity, e.g. by Menander Rhetor who divides
it into ἀpiοσιώpiησις and ὑpiοσιώpiησις, cf. Carbone and Spina (2008).
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something just cannot be ignored; this can be an (otherwise unrelated) his-
torical exemplum,368 but in most cases it is implied or stated that the crime (or
badness of character) at hand is too formidable to be passed over.369 In this
rhetorical figure, the orator suggests that the facts of the case are stronger
than any oratorical artistry,370 implying both a strong case and that he is not
trying to deceive his audience. Building a connection of trust with the audi-
ence is also the aim of anti-praeteritiones where the orator announces to speak
more freely about a delicate issue than he or his client initially intended.371
The anti-praeteritio can also be used tactically, like Cicero does in the Pro Tullio
and Pro Plancio, where he explicitly takes up a point made by his opponent,
which he would (he claims) otherwise not have mentioned.372
368 E.g. Cic. Cluent. 134 “non enim mihi exemplum summi et clarissimi viri, P. Africani,
praetereundum videtur”; cf. p. 81 on praeteritio of names.
369 Already in the Attic Orators, e.g. Lys. or. 8.2, 32.1. Cicero: See above Cic. Verr. 2.1.86 (p. 78
n. 317) and e.g. Cic. Verr. 2.1.90 “tamen hoc tantum facinus non modo negare interrogati,
sed ne producti quidem reticere poterunt”, 2.2.141 “non mihi praetermittendum vide-
tur ne illud quidem genus pecuniae conciliatae”, 2.2.155 “hi cum de tuis factis publice
conqueruntur, nonne hoc indicant, tantas esse iniurias ut multo maluerint de suo more
decedere quam de tuis moribus non dicere?”, 2.4.86 “nihil enim praetermittendum de
istius impudentia videtur”, 2.5.16 “quid? de Apollonio, Diocli filio, Panhormitano, cui
Gemino cognomen est, praeteriri potest? ecquid hoc tota Sicilia clarius, ecquid indignius,
ecquid manifestius proferri potest?”, Cic. Vatin. 1 “si tantum modo, Vatini, quid indignitas
postularet spectare voluissem, fecissem id quod his vehementer placebat, ut te, cuius tes-
timonium propter turpitudinem vitae sordisque domesticas nullius momenti putaretur,
tacitus dimitterem”.
370 Cf. p. 120 on artem arte celare.
371 Attic Orators: e.g. Dem. or. 3.3, 4.51, 8.21, 8.24, 8.32, 10.35, 16.18, 20.57; Aischin. Tim. 177,
leg. 70; Cicero: Cic. Verr. 2.2.11 “videor enim mihi iam liberius apud vos pro Siculis loqui
debere quam forsitan ipsi velint”, 2.2.176 “dicam paulo promptius; neque enim iam vereor
ne quis hoc me magis accusatorie quam libere dixisse arbitretur”; Cic. Cluent. 89 “vultus
enim vestri, iudices, me invitant ut quae reticenda putaram libeat iam libere dicere.”
piαρρησία / licentia is itself treated as figure of thought by Rowe (1997, p. 139) and Lausberg
(1990, § 761).
372 Cic. Tull. 37 “et tamen dicendum est ad ea quae dixit Quinctius, non quo ad rem pertineat,
sed ne quid, quia a me praetermissum sit, pro concesso putetur.”; Cic. Planc. 83 “sed haec
nescio quo modo frequenter in me congessisti saneque in eo creber fuisti, te idcirco in
ludos causam conicere noluisse ne ego mea consuetudine aliquid de tensis misericordiae
causa dicerem, quod in aliis aedilibus ante fecissem. non nihil egisti hoc loco; nam mihi
eripuisti ornamentum orationis meae. deridebor, si mentionem tensarum fecero, cum tu
id praedixeris; sine tensis autem quid potero dicere?” A similar argument is used in Verr.
2: Cic. Verr. 2.1.24 “nunc ne novo querimoniae genere uti possit Hortensius et ea dicere,
opprimi reum de quo nihil dicat accusator, nihil esse tam periculosum fortunis innocen-
tium quam tacere adversarios; et ne aliter quam ego velim meum laudet ingenium, cum
dicat me, si multa dixissem, sublevaturum fuisse eum quem contra dicerem, quia non
dixerim, perdidisse”. Similar manoeuvres in Dem. or. 18.56, 20.78, 22.4.
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Besides, a very formalised type of anti-praeteritio is the common figure
“paene excidit mihi”,373 in Cicero’s speeches more common in the form
“paene praeterii”.374 In its formality it has only a weak notion of omission or
non-omission, and is rather used as a common figure of emphasis.
2.7.6 Whistle-blowing
Explicit non-omission of a point or topic is especially prominent in the phe-
nomenon of “whistle-blowing”, where an entire case, or a significant part
of it, is built around the point that some fact has been kept in silence so far,
but is revealed now by the orator, for his client’s or his party’s benefit. It
means not only commenting on an omission by the opponent, but includes
the perception that there is a reason to the orator’s joining this silence (be-
cause the orator does not know about it at all, or has not thought or inquired
far enough, or because the orator has some self-interest to keep silent about
it). It is against this expectation that the orator breaks the (allegedly com-
plete) silence and lays bare the topic in question. The phenomenon need not
include a direct statement “I shall not keep silent about . . . ”, it can also take
the form of antithesis of “my opponent has deceived you into believing that
. . . but I reveal to you that instead . . . ”.
The device is used already by the Attic Orators,375 and three of Cicero’s
most important and most famous speeches or speech compounds are dom-
inated by the phenomenon of whistle-blowing: Pro S. Roscio Amerino, the
Verrines, and De lege agraria. There are quite different circumstances to be
considered for the three cases.
The speech Pro S. Roscio Amerino relies much on Cicero’s claim that the
accusation of patricide against Roscius is a pretext to cover up the crimes
of the prosecutors, committed under Sulla’s dictatorship. Cicero aims at the
judges’ sympathy for his boldness as he stands up, in the name of truth,
373 Lausberg (1990, § 886).
374 E.g. Cic. Verr. 2.2.87 “quod paene praeterii”; Cic. Cluent. 138 “est etiam reliqua permagna
auctoritas, quam ego turpiter paene praeterii; mea enim esse dicitur”; Cic. Phil. 11.14
“lumen et decus illius exercitus paene praeterii”. The figure is not nearly as common in
the Attic Orators, but it does occur, in the form “μικροῦ piαρῆλθεν”, e.g. in Dem. or. 19.234,
21.110.
375 E.g. Dem. or. 8.7, 13.15, 23.3, 28.9.
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against men of power for his innocent client.376 For all we know this is
basically true: Roscius was innocent,377 and his opponents still politically
powerful, so Cicero was probably right in principle when he alleged that
the prosecutors expected no one to dare to lay open their atrocities,378 even
though a certain degree of exaggeration must be assumed as usual.
The case of the Verrines is more complicated. Here Cicero reveals two “se-
crets”: 1. that Caecilius, who wants to act as Verres’ prosecutor, is actually
his friend;379 and 2. the tactical moves of Verres, Hortensius, and Metellus.380
Especially in the latter case the situation is not quite clear: Cicero argues that
his opponent would rely on his, Cicero’s, fear for his own political career,381
while actually it is equally probably that they either thought Cicero would
not see the connection, or that he would think it useless exploiting the point,
or that he would bring it up without achieving anything, or that he would
even achieve some advantage but the connection would still work in their
favour—they certainly did not expect Cicero’s procedural strategy, but Ci-
cero insinuates a reasoning on his opponents’ side which may or (rather)
may not be true, and which he exploits in his favour.
We can even observe several nested levels of whistle-blowing in Cicero’s
argumentation: Cicero not only lays open his opponents’ “real intentions”
(which may or may not be true) against some assumed “false intentions”
376 Explicitly Cic. S. Rosc. 31–32 “certum est deliberatumque, quae ad causam pertinere ar-
bitror, omnia non modo dicere, verum etiam libenter, audacter libereque dicere; nulla res
tanta exsistet, iudices, ut possit vim mihi maiorem adhibere metus quam fides etc.”
377 This is the communis opinio (e.g. in Badian (2003), Fündling (2006), Seager (2007), all the
while various other possible culprits are discussed); A. Dyck / Dyck (2003), Dyck (2010))
is careful not to decide on the question, but claims that the pictures painted by Cicero
“have their weaknesses” (Dyck, 2010, p. 5), and his statement that “[t]he corona and the
senatorial jury fell under the speel of the young, impassioned orator” (Dyck, 2010, p. 18)
implies a tendency against Roscius’ innocence.
378 Cic. S. Rosc. 60–61.
379 Cf. e.g. Cic. Div. in Caec. 33–34 “atque ego haec quae in medio posita sunt commemoro:
sunt alia magis occulta furta, quae ille, ut istius, credo, animos atque impetus retardaret,
benignissime cum quaestore suo communicavit. [34] haec tu scis ad me esse delata; quae
si velim proferre, facile omnes intellegent vobis inter vos non modo voluntatem fuisse
coniunctam, sed ne praedam quidem adhuc esse divisam.”, 55 “nam id quoque ad rem
pertinere arbitror, qualis iniuria dicatur quae causa inimicitiarum proferatur. cognoscite
ex me; nam iste eam profecto, nisi plane nihil sapit, numquam proferet”.
380 Explained in Verr. 1.26.
381 Cic. Verr. 1.27 “an me taciturum tantis de rebus existimavistis? et me, in tanto rei publicae
existimationisque meae periculo, cuiquam consulturum potius quam officio et dignitati
meae?”
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(which the opponents may or may not have voiced), he even claims that his
opponents have insinuated certain intentions on his own side (if this had
happened, it might have taken the form of whistle-blowing, too) against
which he now puts his “real intentions”—while it might be intriguing in
itself to analyse (or speculate) who has actually said what and whose inten-
tions, claimed or alleged, are true or not, it is eventually not relevant for
Cicero’s argumentation, and it may even work in his favour that for his au-
dience, and for most of his readers, finding out the truth is a complicated
task here. For Cicero’s success it is sufficient if his audience accepts the un-
derlying message, i.e. that he, Cicero, has unravelled this tangle and wants
to share it, honestly, with his audience.382
An even more complicated case an be observed in the three speeches De
lege agraria: these are political, not forensic speeches, and deal with a very
long political controversy in Rome (the essential point had been introduced
in the debate by Tiberius Gracchus seventy year earlier, and was settled by
Caesar four years after Cicero’s speeches); besides, the extant speeches are
incomplete. They are part of a discussion in which both sides tried to present
themselves as populares (meaning in this case: generous to the “common peo-
ple”) and the other side as snobbish and selfish. Even more than in the Ver-
rines, thus, Cicero’s claims of truth and honesty, and of the opponents’ dis-
honesty,383 must be seen less in relationship to a “historical reality” than as
382 Another question that might be asked here is why Cicero was so eager to prevent the
tactical move of his opponents’, although he had a watertight case. Unless he was just
overzealous (which is unlikely) he seems to have known that the question of the presiding
magistrates would indeed have a greater influence on the trial than it should—but this
question leads in the field of sociopolitics in Rome and is not to be covered here.
383 E.g. Cic. Leg. agr. 1.13 “quasi vero non intellegamus”, again 1.14 “quasi vero non intellega-
mus”, 1.17 “id cuius modi esset neminemne nostrum intellecturum existimavistis?”, 2.15
“atque ego a primo capite legis usque ad extremum reperio, Quirites, nihil aliud cogita-
tum, nihil aliud susceptum, nihil aliud actum nisi uti x reges aerari, vectigalium, provin-
ciarum omnium, totius rei publicae, regnorum, liberorum populorum, orbis denique ter-
rarum domini constituerentur legis agrariae simulatione atque nomine. sic confirmo,
Quirites, hac lege agraria pulchra atque populari dari vobis nihil, condonari certis ho-
minibus omnia, ostentari populo Romano agros, eripi etiam libertatem, privatorum pe-
cunias augeri, publicas exhauriri, denique, quod est indignissimum, per tribunum plebis,
quem maiores praesidem libertatis custodemque esse voluerunt, reges in civitate consti-
tui.”, 2.20 “hoc dicam planius”, 2.36 “cur hoc tam est obscurum atque caecum? quid?
ista omnia de quibus senatus censuit nominatim in lege perscribi nonne potuerunt? duae
sunt huius obscuritatis causae, Quirites etc.”, 2.50 “quam ob rem, cum intellegam totam
hanc fere legem ad illius [sc. Pompei] opes evertendas tamquam machinam comparari, et
resistam consiliis hominum et perficiam profecto, quod ego video, ut id vos universi non
solum videre verum etiam tenere possitis.”, 3.6 “quam procul a suspicione fugit, quod
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rhetorical means to appear credible and trustworthy. Cicero succeeded in-
sofar as the proposed law against which he argued was withdrawn in that
year.
Like in the anti-praeteritio, the most important effect of “whistle-blowing”
is an emphasis on the point which would not be achieved by simply men-
tioning it; secondly, the orator presents himself as honest and (in cases like
Pro S. Roscio Amerino) a bold and fearless defender of the truth (regardless
whether it really is the truth that he is defending, and whether it has been
attacked at all).
2.7.7 Irony
In a number of occasions, praeteritiones are used ironically. The figure in it-
self is ironical in many cases (though by no means always, see above p. 80),
since the point which is not to be mentioned is mentioned in the figure itself,
drawing attention to it; but there are ironical ways of using it beyond this,
and one might be surprised that these are not employed by Cicero even more
often, given his tendency to “σκώμματα καὶ piαιδιά”.384
Ironical is constructing the praeteritio as a hypothetical clause “I would say
. . . , if not . . . ”, especially if the hypothetical statement spans a whole para-
graph:
“ego, si Metellus statuas Centuripinos reponere non coegisset,
haec dicerem: videte, iudices, quantum et quam acerbum do-
lorem sociorum atque amicorum animis inusserint istius iniuriae,
cum Centuripinorum amicissima ac fidelissima civitas, quae tan-
tis officiis cum populo Romano coniuncta est ut non solum rem
publicam nostram, sed etiam in quovis homine privato nomen
ipsum Romanum semper dilexerit, ea publico consilio atque auc-
toritate iudicarit C. Verris statuas esse in urbe sua non oportere.
recitarem decreta Centuripinorum; laudarem illam civitatem, id
quod verissime possem; commemorarem decem milia civium
esse Centuripinorum, fortissimorum fidelissimorumque socio-
eos consules qui adversarii Sullae maxime fuerunt potissimum nominavit! si enim Sul-
lam dictatorem nominasset, perspicuum fore et invidiosum arbitratus est.”
384 Plut. Cic. 5.4.
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rum; eos omnis hoc statuisse, monumentum istius in sua civitate
nullum esse oportere. haec tum dicerem, si statuas Metellus non
reposuisset”.385
Ironical are the ten lines of not saying something in the speech Pro lege
Manilia:
“non dicam hoc loco maiores nostros semper in pace consuetu-
dini, in bello utilitati paruisse; semper ad novos casus tempo-
rum novorom consiliorum rationes adcommodasse: non dicam
duo bella maxima, Punicum atque Hispaniense, ab uno imper-
atore esse confecta, duasque urbis potentissimas, quae huic im-
perio maxime minitabantur, Karthaginem atque Numantiam, ab
eodem Scipione esse deletas: non commemorabo nuper ita vobis
patribusque vestris esse visum, ut in uno C. Mario spes imperi
poneretur, ut idem cum Iugurtha, idem cum Cimbris, idem cum
Teutonis bellum administraret.”386
And ironical is the type of praeteritio which announces the intent of omit-
ting something only after it has been said—even though here, just as for
the “normal” praeteritio, “omission” can (and in many cases must) mean
no (further) elaboration, rather than no mentioning; I call this figure post-
praeteritio.387 The effect is enhanced if an expectation is raised for some elab-
oration to come,388 or if the fact is particularly stressed that the point at issue
has indeed been said.389 Special cases are the somewhat hypothetical post-
385 Cic. Verr. 2.2.163–164.
386 Cic. Manil. 60.
387 Examples are: Attic Orators: e.g. Dem. or. 18.231, 21.126, 32.27; Cic. Cael. 27 “sed haec omit-
tam; ad illa, quae me magis moverunt, respondebo”; Cic. Verr. 2.3.178 “ut hoc praeteream,
quod multorum est testimoniis expositum”, 2.3.200 “quamquam haec omitto: de cella lo-
quor”. This figure can be regarded as a subspecies of the μετάβασις, the figure of returning
to the subject after a digressio, classified as a figure of thought by Rowe (1997, p. 145), cf.
Lausberg (1990, § 848). It appears first in late antiquity in Rutilius Lupus 2.1 and the
Carmen de figuris vel schematibus 88 (Halm).
388 Cic. Cael. 54 “sed haec, quae sunt oratoris propria, quae mihi non propter ingenium meum,
sed propter hanc exercitationem usumque dicendi fructum aliquem ferre potuissent, cum
a me ipso elaborata proferri viderentur, brevitatis causa relinquo omnia”.
389 Cic. Verr. 2.3.106 “audistis haec, iudices; quae nunc ego omnia praetereo et relinquo.”
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praeteritio “nollem dixisse”,390 and a post-praeteritio which is immediately re-
voked.391
In rhetorical theory the post-praeteritio is mentioned only by Quintilian,392
in a series of figures which are sub-types of piρόληψις, but without any further
comment.
2.7.8 praeteritiones in the Verrines
It cannot go unnoticed that the majority of, and in some areas all, exam-
ples of praeteritio in Cicero’s speeches come from the Verrines, in particular
the actio secunda. At first sight it may seem contradictory to find so many
signs of omissions in a text which as a single speech is by far the longest of
Cicero’s speeches; but this may be caused by the transmission situation, as
Verr. 2 is the only extant prosecution speech from a repetundae trial393 and
may well have been typical of this kind of speech,394 and only to us does
it look like mockery when Cicero speaks of brevitas orationis here: “nolite,
quaeso, iudices, brevitate orationis meae potius quam rerum ipsarum mag-
nitudine crimina ponderare; mihi enim properandum necessario est, ut om-
nia vobis quae mihi constituta sunt possim exponere.”395 He is serious: even
in what seems a vast text he can only cover a fraction of the evidence he has
collected in Sicily, thus his speech is short in comparison to what he could
say (and this again could have been even more if he had spent the entire al-
lotted time in Sicily). This crass disproportion is reflected in the massive use
of all varieties of praeteritio, incessantly reminding the audiences that there
is always more that could be said. There is no chance to check if there really
390 Cic. Verr. 2.4.43.
391 Cic. Sest. 13 “verum haec ita praetereamus ut tamen intuentes et respectantes relinqua-
mus”.
392 Quint. Inst. 9.2.17 “quaedam emendatio, ut ‘rogo ignoscatis mihi, si longius sum evec-
tus’”, where also the praedictio (= “praeteritio of argument”) is mentioned, cf. p. 32.
393 The question in how far the actio secunda against Verres was delivered is open. J. G. F.
Powell, among others, has argued recently that the speech was possibly delivered, at least
in parts (Powell and Paterson (2004, p. 56, n. 201–211) and Powell (2010, p. 32, n. 24) with
further literature). For my argument the question of actual delivery is irrelevant, and I
accept that the speech is, overall, at least a plausible specimen of its kind.
394 However, “their length was felt burdensome by some even in antiquity (quis quinque in
Verrem libros exspectabit?, ‘who will last through five books against Verres?’, Tac. Dial.
20.1)”. (Craig, 2007, p. 269)
395 Cic. Verr. 2.1.42.
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were evidence and witnesses behind each and every omission (except for
the alio loco figure), but while some praeteritiones might have had only weak
or doubtful support from evidence, the majority very probably were sound;
had they not been, this would have been used against Cicero once the speech
was published and open to verification.396
2.7.9 Theory and conclusion
The evidence in the theoretical writings about praeteritio provides a diverse
picture, especially in view of the situation in oratorical practice. The concept
does not figure at all in Aristotle’s Ars rhetorica—a surprising fact, given the
long passage about figures of speech in book 3, but not so surprising as Aris-
totle appears in general quite unconcerned about omitting possible topics
(cf. above p. 51). In the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, the figure of piαράλειψις is not
treated in its own right, but referenced twice in a casual way which suggests
that it was a common stock item in contemporary rhetorical theory.
In the Rhetorica ad Herennium, the occultatio397 is one of the stylistic figures
treated in detail in book 4; however, as it is defined here, it does not include
all kinds of explicit praeteritio, but only those cases where the orator claims
to omit something, but speaks about it nunc maxime; and only where the fig-
ure is used as a kind of insurance, in case the orator is attacked for having
said something inappropriate (in particular, something off-topic or unverifi-
able). In contrast, the most common purposes of praeteritio found in Cicero’s
speeches, i.e. emphasis on the point at hand, and reference to an abundance
of material (especially in the “praeteritio of the rest”), are not included here.
Much more important is the situation in Cicero’s own rhetorical writings:
even though none of these is exactly a comprehensive “textbook” of rhetoric,
one would expect the phenomenon to be covered; but in De oratore, the only
(rather faint) hint at the figure of praeteritio is made at the end of the passage
on inventio of (“rational”) arguments, in an appendix rounding off the sec-
396 The question whether praeteritio is characteristic of prosecution speeches, or of repetundae
cases, or of prosecution speeches in repetundae cases, cannot be decided on the singular ex-
amples of the Verrines; further research on speeches of different types of the Attic Orators
might shed some light on the point.
397 Rhet. Her. 4.37.
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tion with some random advice on presenting the inventa: “tractatio autem
varia esse debet: [. . . ] ex eisdem illis locis interdum concludere [oportet],
relinquere alias alioque transire; saepe non proponere ac ratione ipsa adferen-
da quid proponendum fuerit, declarare etc.”398 Beyond this, De oratore only
contains some ironical examples of praeteritio, e.g. Crassus “almost omitting”
some topics about which he talks for 13 paragraphs.399 Only in the Orator is
the praeteritio actually mentioned,400 but even there only in a quite cursory
enumeration and, on top of it, in the list of figures of words, not figures of
thought where it belongs. In the quite extensive list of figures of speech in
De oratore,401 we find reticentia (i.e. ἀpiοσιώpiησις), but not the concept of prae-
teritio.402
Clearly the abstract concept of praeteritio, which had long been part of the
rhetorical tradition as visible in the Rhetorica ad Herennium and indirectly
in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, was not something Cicero thought worth in-
cluding in any detail in his rhetorical writings. Most likely it had virtually no
relevance for him when thinking and writing about oratory in theory (other
than in his speeches), especially with the more “philosophical” approach of
his major rhetorical works. Moreover, since Cicero’s ideal orator “is a good
man, in the sense that he will use his eloquence for good purposes”,403 he
possibly found that a technique like the praeteritio, which often has a ma-
nipulative and thus dishonest touch to it, should not be given space in this
context, that he found it disreputable and maybe even that did not want to
give away his own addiction to it (although, even according to De oratore, “in
the harsh reality of Roman politics, he [the ideal orator] will not hesitate to
manipulate his audience if those purposes demand it”404).
398 Cic. De orat. 2.177.
399 Cic. De orat. 3.38–50; 3.52 “quas modo percucurri vel potius paene praeterii”.
400 Cic. Orat. 138 “ut aliquid reticere se dicat”.
401 Cic. De orat. 3.202–207, which is in itself a percursio.
402 The term praeteritio is not found until the 3rd c. AD (Aquila Rhetor). Since Cicero did
actually coin new Latin terms for philosophical concepts (like qualitas: Cic. Ac. post. 1.25
“qualitates igitur appellavi quas piοιότητας Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non
est vulgi verbum sed philosophorum”), he might well have done so here, especially as the
Greek term piαράλειψις was used e.g. by Demetrius of Phaleron (Demetr. Eloc. 263).
403 May and Wisse (2001, 12)
404 May and Wisse (2001, ibid.)
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Nor does the situation change much with Quintilian: he, who usually
treats even minor aspects in exhaustive detail, does not discuss the figure
of praeteritio either; he quotes both lists from De oratore and Orator405 without
commenting on them, and he himself treats the figure as a subcategory of
(a subcategory of) irony,406 without clearly defining it. Among the figures
of word (where Cicero had filed it in the Orator) Quintilian has a category
of figurae per detractionem,407 but there we find only a cross-reference to the
ἀpiοσιώpiησις, and not a hint that Quintilian has thought also of figures of
thought per detractionem; occultatio408 is an item in the list of figures which
Quintilian cites from other authors (Cornificius, for this particular figure),
but discards himself.
This result is striking, in particular for Cicero, who appears widely un-
aware of, or unwilling to talk about (or both), a rhetorical means that he
used throughout his speeches, in all genres and in a large variety of forms.
Altogether we find praeteritiones used by Cicero in a variety of ways, which
is an odd discrepancy when compared to his neglect of the phenomenon in
theory. All of his rhetorical works, except De inventione, were written after
the Verrines, where he made most use of praeteritiones, yet we find no mention
of the tool which he had so successfully used. Furthermore, even Quintilian,
who knew the Verrines well, does not consider the phenomenon in his Insti-
tutio.
2.8 Omission of adverse points
I shall now turn, after explicit omissions within a speech, to silent omissions,
i.e. points in a case which the orator wishes to avoid completely.409 Naturally,
the most obvious points to omit are adverse aspects of a case, i.e. anything
405 Quint. Inst. 9.1.26–36, Quint. Inst. 9.1.37–45.
406 Quint. Inst. 9.2.44–53, in which §§ 47–48 deal with ἀντίφρασις; and even there only some
of the examples constitute a praeteritio proper.
407 Quint. Inst. 9.3.58–65.
408 Quint. Inst. 9.3.98.
409 It must be stressed again here that we cannot normally tell whether there are in fact such
omissions in a speech as we have it (and even less whether such omission were made in
the speech as delivered). We must again rely on cases where we have external evidence
about the case or speech topic, and (with caution) on speeches where the omission can be
somehow deducted from the text.
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which might be necessary for a full account, but could get in the way of the
orator’s purpose. However, often enough this is impossible in practice, as
the orator must deal with any adverse point which his opponent has already
mentioned. And this would be the normal case in a defence speech, where
the most adverse point of all, the charge, is difficult to avoid altogether.
2.8.1 Practice
Yet it is possible, as Cicero shows in Pro Caelio: the actual charges (“[crimina]
quae in hunc proprie conferuntur”410), which have been brought forward
by the prosecution, are passed over in half a paragraph, while the speech
only deals with Caelius’ and Clodia’s reputation.411 It has to be considered,
however, that in this case Cicero spoke only after two other defence orators
had dealt with the charges. Cicero was successful with the tactic in this case,
which in others, with only one defence speech, would have been impossible,
and more than dangerous to the client. Similarly, as described by Ch. Craig,
Cicero manages in Pro Sestio to avoid the actual charge, discussing various
topics and persons “while the expected treatment of Sestius’ specific act dis-
appears completely, never to return”;412 “[f]inally, without ever admitting
the fact that Sestius has raised armed bands that have engaged in violence,
Cicero explicitly tries to justify Sestius’ doing just that, plainly invoking the
arguments of the status of quality [. . . ], but without ever having admitted the
act that he is justifying.”413
A complementary case is the trial against Verres, in which Hortensius com-
plained that he had nothing to defend his client against, since Cicero had in
his actio prima presented nothing but the actual charge (or at least not the
usual elaborations); therefore, Hortensius may be understood, Cicero has
defeated his client “by saying nothing”, because he had left Hortensius no
chance to avoid speaking about the charge.414 Of course this was part of Ci-
410 Cic. Cael. 30.
411 Cf. van der Wal (2007, p. 194–195) ad locum.
412 Craig (2001, p. 113)
413 Craig (2001, p. 116)
414 Cic. Verr. 2.1.24 “nunc ne novo querimoniae genere uti possit Hortensius et ea dicere, op-
primi reum de quo nihil dicat accusator, nihil esse tam periculosum fortunis innocentium
quam tacere adversarios; et ne aliter quam ego velim meum laudet ingenium, cum dicat
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cero’s particular tactic, and he explicitly catches up on the manifold details
of the charge, as well as related arguments about Verres’ character, in the
actio secunda.
Almost as dangerous is the omission of adverse points for the orator
who speaks first, and must expect his opponent to blow the whistle after-
wards. This does not occur in most of Cicero’s speeches, as they are defence
speeches which were delivered after the prosecution speeches. Cicero heav-
ily complains about the loss of this advantage in the Pro Quinctio, where he
acts, at least officially, for the prosecution.
On the other hand, there are numerous examples, from Cicero as well as
already from the Attic Orators, in which the orator exploits the fact that the
opponent must either admit or deny or keep silent about a major adverse
fact. These take slightly varying shapes; sometimes the orator just states the
opponent’s being silent,415 sometimes he predicts the opponent’s future si-
lence,416 and frequently he reports some past silence as being in effect a con-
me, si multa dixissem, sublevaturum fuisse eum quem contra dicerem, quia non dixerim,
perdidisse”.
415 Attic Orators: e.g. Lys. or. 4.5; Dem. or. 18.76, 18.112, 18.150, 19.32, 19.75, 21.98, 29.41, 31.9,
35.49; Aischin. Ctes. 165–166; Cicero: Cic. S. Rosc. 45 “neque haec tu non intellegis, sed
usque eo quid arguas non habes, ut non modo tibi contra nos dicendum putes verum
etiam contra rerum naturam contraque consuetudinem hominum contraque opiniones
omnium.”, 54 “ea [. . . ] quae, cum taces, nulla esse concedis”, 120 “res [servos in quaes-
tionem] porro abs te eius modi postulabatur ut nihil interesset, utrum eam rem recusares
an de maleficio confiterere. quae cum ita sint, quaero abs te quam ob causam recusaris”,
123 “ego sic existimo, qui quaeri velit ex eis quos constat, cum caedes facta sit, adfuisse,
eum cupere verum inveniri; qui id recuset, eum profecto, tametsi verbo non audeat, tamen
re ipsa de maleficio suo confiteri”; Cic. Q. Rosc. 8 “quaero: quam pridem hoc nomen,
Fanni, in adversaria rettulisti? erubescit, quid respondeat nescit, quid fingat extemplo
non habet.”; Cic. Tull. 35 “quid ad haec Quinctius? sane nihil certum neque unum, in quo
non modo possit verum putet se posse consistere”; Cic. Verr. 2.4.104 “omnibus in rebus
coarguitur a me, convincitur a testibus, urgetur confessione sua, manifestis in maleficiis
tenetur—et manet etiam ac tacitus facta mecum sua recognoscit!”; Cic. Cluent. 93 “quid
ergo est causae quod nunc nostra defensio audiatur tanto silentio, tum Iunio defendendi
sui potestas erepta sit?”; Cic. Leg. agr. 2.71 “aut dicat quos agros empturus sit; ostendat et
quid et quibus daturus sit.”, 2.79 “aut, si hoc ab se dictum negat et satis facere omnibus
vobis cogitat, proferat; in iugera dena discribat, a Suburana usque ad Arniensem nomina
vestra proponat.”; Cic. Mur. 14 “nihil igitur in vitam L. Murenae dici potest, nihil, inquam,
omnino, iudices. sic a me consul designatus defenditur ut eius nulla fraus, nulla avaritia,
nulla perfidia, nulla crudelitas, nullum petulans dictum in vita proferatur. bene habet;
iacta sunt fundamenta defensionis. nondum enim nostris laudibus, quibus utar postea,
sed prope inimicorum confessione virum bonum atque integrum hominem defendimus”;
Cic. Phil. 2.61 “quam miserum est id negare non posse, quod sit turpissimum confiteri!”
416 Attic Orators: e.g. Lys. or. 14.16; Dem. or. 19.212, 21.41, 36.28; Cicero: Cic. Div. in Caec. 31
“tu, Caecili, quid facies? utrum hoc tantum crimen praetermittes an obicies? si obicies,
idne alteri crimini dabis quod eodem tempore in eadem provincia tu ipse fecisti? [. . . ] sin
praetermittes, qualis erit tua ista accusatio [. . . ]?”; Cic. Verr. 2.2.167 “neque tu hoc dicere
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fession.417 A quite curious exploitation of the point is found in Pro Plancio:
“facile patior id te agere multis verbis quod ad iudicium non pertineat, et id
te accusantem tam diu dicere quod ego defensor sine periculo possim con-
audebis, nec si cupias licebit”, 2.5.22 “omnia tibi ista concedam et remittam; provideo
enim quid sit defensurus Hortensius; fatebitur apud istum neque senectutem patris neque
adulescentiam fili neque lacrimas utriusque plus valuisse quam utilitatem salutemque
provinciae; dicet rem publicam administrari sine metu ac severitate non posse; quaeret
quam ob rem fasces praetoribus praeferantur, cur secures datae, cur carcer aedificatus,
cur tot supplicia sint in improbos more maiorum constituta. quae cum omnia graviter
severeque dixerit, quaeram cur hunc eundem Apollonium Verres idem repente nulla re
nova adlata, nulla defensione, sine causa de carcere emitti iusserit; tantumque in hoc
crimine suspicionis esse adfirmabo ut iam ipsis iudicibus sine mea argumentatione coniec-
turam facere permittam quod hoc genus praedandi, quam improbum, quam indignum,
quamque ad magnitudinem quaestus immensum infinitumque esse videatur.”, 2.5.33 “di
faciant ut rei militaris, ut belli mentionem facere audeas!”; Cic. Leg. agr. 2.40 “utrum oratio
ad eius rei disputationem deerit, an, cum idem et disseret et iudicabit, impelli non poterit
ut falsum iudicet?”; Cic. Rab. Post. 8 “quod si item a Gabinio seiunctam ostendero, certe
quod dicas nihil habebis”; Cic. Phil. 2.111 “respondebisne ad haec aut omnino hiscere au-
debis?”
417 Attic Orators: e.g. Dem. or. 18.28, 18.191, 18.198; Aischin. Ctes. 163; Cic. S. Rosc. 53 “tametsi
te dicere atque enumerare causas omnis oportebat, et id erat certi accusatoris officium qui
tanti sceleris argueret explicare omnia vitia ac peccata fili quibus incensus parens potuerit
animum inducere ut naturam ipsam vinceret, ut amorem illum penitus insitum eiceret ex
animo, ut denique patrem esse sese oblivisceretur”; Cic. Verr. 2.1.20 “ut tertius dies [of the
trial] sic hominem prosterneret ut morbo simulato non quid responderet, sed quem ad
modum non responderet, deliberaret.”, 2.2.92 “erat eius modi causa ut ille ne sine adver-
sario quidem apud inimicum iudicem reperire posset quid diceret;”, 2.2.101 “cum haec ad
istum adferrentur, pertimuit aliquando et commotus est; vertit stilum in tabulis suis, quo
facto causam omnem evertit suam; nihil enim sibi reliqui fecit quod defendi aliqua ratione
posset.”, 2.2.191 “laudantur oratores veteres, Crassi illi et Antonii, quod crimina diluere
dilucide, quod copiose reorum causas defendere solerent: nimirum illi non ingenio solum
bis patronis, sed fortuna etiam praestiterunt. nemo enim tum ita peccabat ut defensioni
locum non relinqueret; nemo ita vivebat ut nulla eius vitae pars summae turpitudinis esset
expers; nemo ita in manifesto peccato tenebatur ut, cum impudens fuisset in facto, tum
impudentior videretur si negaret.”, 2.3.62 “homo quid ageret, taceret responderet, quid
faceret denique illa aetate et auctoritate praeditus nesciebat.”, 2.3.131 “cum planum fieret,
decumis contra instituta leges consuetudinemque omnium venditis, in aratorum bonis
fortunisque diripiendis decumanos dictitasse tuas esse partis, tuam rem, tuam praedam,
idque te tacuisse et, cum dissimulare non posses, potuisse tamen perpeti et perferre, quod
magnitudo lucri obscuraret periculi magnitudinem plusque aliquanto apud te pecuniae
cupiditas quam iudici metus posset.”, 2.3.133 “cum vero in foro celeberrimo tanta fre-
quentia hoc verbo ac simulatione Apronio, re vera tibi obiectum esset, tu umquam tan-
tam plagam tacitus accipere potuisses nisi hoc ita statuisses, in re tam manifesta quicquid
dixisses te deterius esse facturum?”, 2.5.73 “at quem ad modum ipse se induit priore ac-
tione! qui tot dies tacuisset, repente in M. Anni, hominis splendidissimi, testimonio—cum
is civem Romanum dixisset, archipiratam negasset securi esse percussum—exsiluit con-
scientia sceleris et furore ex maleficiis concepto excitatus”; Cic. Catil. 2.13 “cum ille homo
audacissimus conscientia convictus primo reticuisset, patefeci cetera”; Cic. Sull. 40 “ex-
clusus hac criminatione Torquatus rursus in me inruit”, 85 “dico hoc quod initio dixi,
nullius indicio, nullius nuntio, nullius suspicione, nullius litteris de P. Sulla rem ullam ad
me esse delatam”; Cic. Flacc. 19 “itaque perscrutamini penitus naturam rationemque crim-
inum; iam nihil praeter spem, nihil praeter terrorem ac minas reperietis.”, 48 “sed cum se
homo volubilis quadam praecipiti celeritate dicendi in illa oratione iactaret, repente tes-
timoniis Fufiorum nominibusque recitatis homo audacissimus pertimuit, loquacissimus
obmutuit.”; Cic. p. red. in sen. 32 (on Caesar) “quem ego inimicum mihi fuisse non dico,
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fiteri”,418 i.e. the prosecutor has spoken off-topic for a substantial time, and
this, with the time limit,419 has the effect that he has said nothing, or very
little, about the actual charge—an omission which Cicero now exploits. In a
passage in Verr. 2, Cicero explicitly uses only the point which his adversary
has actually admitted,420 implying that there is much more material that he
could use if he wanted.421 It must be kept in mind, however, that this claim
(of the opponent’s omission) is not necessarily true: the statement “your si-
lence is a confession that . . . ” remains unchallenged, at least for the moment,
since in most speaking situations the opponent has no right to reply on the
spot. It is thus “the orator’s task—and at the same time a challenge to his
manipulative abilities—to make the opponent’s silence appear hermeneuti-
cally unambiguous and to force onto it his own interpretation, which will be
in tune with his chain of argument.”422
It was thus often a better strategy to obscure rather than omit adverse
points in a speech, and various techniques to this effect were discussed in
theory.423 However, these techniques, like all techniques taught in rhetor-
ical schools and handbooks, were known to the audience, a fact which in
tacuisse, cum diceretur esse inimicus, scio”; Cic. Har. 1 “itaque hominem furentem ex-
sultantemque continui simul ac periculum iudici intendi: duobus inceptis verbis omnem
impetum gladiatoris ferociamque compressi.”; Cic. Phil. 2.22 “quod igitur, cum re age-
batur, nemo in me dixit, id tot annis post tu es inventus qui diceres?” (cf. introduction
in Fuhrmann (1970, vol. 7 p. 137): “Eine Teilhaberschaft an der Tötung des Clodius habe
man ihm nicht einmal zur Zeit des Milo-Prozesses vorgeworfen – in seiner eigenen Rede
für Milo, 47, liest es sich anders.” / Cic. Mil. 47 “deinde—non enim video cur non meum
quoque agam negotium—scitis, iudices, fuisse qui in hac rogatione suadenda dicerent
Milonis manu caedem esse factam, consilio vero maioris alicuius. me videlicet latronem
ac sicarium abiecti homines et perditi describebant.”); a particularly ironical variant: Cic.
Leg. agr. 2.13 “legem hominis contionemque exspectabam; lex initio nulla proponitur, con-
tionem in pridie Idus advocari iubet. summa cum exspectatione concurritur. explicat
orationem sane longam et verbis valde bonis. unum erat quod mihi vitiosum videbatur,
quod tanta ex frequentia inveniri nemo potuit qui intellegere posset quid diceret. hoc ille
utrum insidiarum causa fecerit, an hoc genere eloquentiae delectetur nescio. tametsi, qui
acutiores in contione steterant, de lege agraria nescio quid voluisse eum dicere suspica-
bantur.”
418 Cic. Planc. 63.
419 Cf. p. 59: although we cannot say anything definite about time limits in Pro Plancio (since
we have no particular evidence about official time limits in trials de ambitu, and the trial in
54 BC is not affected by the lex Pompeia of 52 BC), it is likely that the speaking time for each
side was limited in some way, if only by the court day which was concluded at sunset.
420 Cic. Verr. 2.2.152 “utar eo quod datur”.
421 This can actually be classified as a “praeteritio of the rest”, cf. p. 20.
422 Vogt-Spira (2004, p. 52).
423 Cf. below p. 104.
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turn had to be taken into account by the orator. He can therefore use the
promise not to omit adverse points as a kind of captatio benevolentiae: Ci-
cero e.g. at the very beginning of his speech Pro Cluentio assures that he will
speak “ut omnes intellegant nihil me nec subterfugere voluisse reticendo nec
obscurare dicendo”424—although this is somewhat ironic here, as Cicero has
opened his speech by claiming that the prosecution has tried to divert the
attention from the legally relevant points, and then promises to follow the
same twisted structure, “so that everybody can see that I won’t avoid or ob-
scure anything”.425
Another tactic is visible in Leg. agr. 3.4, where Cicero must deal with a
unfavourable point in Rullus’ law: he argues that he has avoided before to
speak about this point, not because he found it difficult but because he did
not want to bring up unpleasant memories or cause untimely disturbance,426
i.e. he uses his own former silence on the point as evidence for his unwill-
ingness to exploit the point at the expense of his audience’s feelings, and can
thus still speak about it without appearing too arrogant.
2.8.2 Theory
We find the point treated quite differently in the rhetorical treatises, a differ-
ence which may be seen as connected to their respective character.
Aristotle, in the first and second book of his Ars rhetorica, lays out an ex-
tensive list of topics for the orator to draw from, and the reader receives no
prominent warning against using just whatever he can fit into his speech, not
even an observation that some of the topics can be adverse to the case,427 only
a very occasional remark about what is apparently all too obvious to Aris-
424 Cic. Cluent. 1
425 See also the section on “omission of lies” from p. 111.
426 Cic. Leg. agr. 3.4 “caput est legis XL de quo ego consulto, Quirites, neque apud vos ante
feci mentionem, ne aut refricare obductam iam rei publicae cicatricem viderer aut aliq-
uid alienissimo tempore novae dissensionis commovere, neque vero nunc ideo disputabo
quod hunc statum rei publicae non magno opere defendendum putem, praesertim qui oti
et concordiae patronum me in hunc annum populo Romano professus sim, sed ut doceam
Rullum posthac in eis saltem tacere rebus in quibus de se et de suis factis taceri velit.”
427 For example, it might be dangerous, depending on one’s case, to discuss in court how
the prospect of revenge makes people happy (Aristot. Rhet. 1370b30–32) or how someone
with many friends and a large fortune has the best chances to get away with a crime
unpunished (1372a11-14).
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totle: that the orator has to make a choice to suit his particular situation.428
Aristotle’s focus on rhetoric, which he has defined as “δύναμις piερὶ ἕκαστον
τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον piιθανόν”,429 lies more on the possible spectrum
of τὸ piιθανόν than on the process of θεωρῆσαι in the sense of judging, which
would mean assessing potential arguments for their value as piιθανόν and
accepting or rejecting them accordingly.
In the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum the omission of adverse points is not con-
sidered in general, either, but it is mentioned within some practical aspects:
the discussion about use of genealogy includes advice to omit inferior ances-
tors and make up a plausible reason why they are still men of merit;430 in the
section on the piροοίμιον of a defence speech a point is made which could well
be generalised: that the orator should pass over charges which cannot be de-
nied or defended, and concentrate on those he can attack with a reasonable
chance of success.431
A similar picture can be seen in the Auctor’s treatment of the opponent: an-
ticipation of the opponent’s arguments is mentioned variously,432 as is their
refutation;433 predicting the opponent’s silence on some unfavourable point,
however, is only used within an example for a different figure,434 and using
omissions made earlier by the opponent is only touched on in passing and
not actually recommended,435 except for the exceptional situation when an
428 E.g. Aristot. Rhet. 1399b13–14 “ληpiτέον δ’ ὁpiότερον ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον”.
429 Aristot. Rhet. 1355b25–26.
430 Rhet. Alex. 1440b29–1441a14.
431 Rhet. Alex. 1443b23–27 “ἐὰν δὲ ἀpiολογώμεθα, τὸ μὲν piροοίμιον ὁμοιοτρόpiως τῷ κατη-
γοροῦντι συστήσομεν. τῶν δὲ κατηγορουμένων ἃ μὲν εἰδέναι τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐpiοίησε,
piαραλείψομεν, ἃ δὲ δοξάζειν, ταῦτα piροθέμενοι μετὰ τὸ piροοίμιον διαλύσομεν”.
432 Rhet. Alex. 1428a8 “piροκαταλήψεις”, 1433a36–40 “ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς piροτέροις λόγοις οὕτω
δεῖ τὰ ἐpiίδοξα λέγεσθαι ὑpiὸ τῶν ἐναντίων piροκαταλαμβάνοντα διαλύειν καὶ ἀσθενῆ piοιεῖν·
καὶ γὰρ κἂν piάνυ ἰσχυρὰ ᾖ τὰ piροκατειλημμένα, οὐχ ὁμοίως φαίνεται μεγάλα τοῖς ἤδη
piροακηκοόσιν., 1439b3–5 “αὕτη δέ ἐστι, δι’ ἧς τὰς ἐνδεχομένας ἀντιλογίας ῥηθῆναι τοῖς
ὑpiὸ σοῦ εἰρημένοις piροκαταλαμβάνων διασύρεις.”, 1442b4–6 “τὸ μέν [στοιχεῖον], οἷς ἂν
νομίζῃς τοὺς κριτὰς ἐpiιpiλήξειν, piροκαταλάμβανε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐpiίpiληττε”.
433 Rhet. Alex. 1443a6–8 “μετὰ δὲ τὴν βεβαίωσιν τὰ piρὸς τοὺς ἀντιδίκους τάττοντες piροκατα-
ληψόμεθα αὐτῶν τὰ ἐpiίδοξα λέγεσθαι.”
434 Rhet. Alex. 1434a10–17 “ἐξ ἐpiερωτήσεως δὲ τόνδε τὸν τρόpiον· ἡδέως δ’ ἂν αὐτῶν piυθοίμην,
διὰ τί τὰς συντάξεις ἡμῖν οὐκ ἀpiοδιδόασιν; οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἀpiοροῦσιν εἰpiεῖν ἂν τολμήσαιεν, οἳ
τοσαῦτα χρήματα καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἐpiιδεικνύονται λαμβάνοντες, οὐδ’
αὖ φήσουσιν εἰς τὴν τῆς piόλεως διοίκησιν piολλὰ δαpiανᾶν· piαντελῶς γὰρ ἐλάχιστα τῶν
νησιωτῶν ἀναλίσκοντες φαίνονται. ἐκ μὲν οὖν ἐpiερωτήσεως οὕτω piαλιλλογήσομεν.”
435 Rhet. Alex. 1440a15–17 “κράτιστος μὲν οὖν ὁ τρόpiος τῆς ἀpiοτροpiῆς οὗτός ἐστιν· ἐὰν δὲ
μὴ ἐνδέχηται τοῦτο piοιεῖν, ἐκ τοῦ piαραλελειμμένου τόpiου ἀpiότρεpiε λέγων”.
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accusation is made in a political debate but not at the same time brought to
trial.436
Cicero, on the other hand, is aware of the problems of adverse topics; he
puts it plainly already in De inventione: “omnia torquenda sunt ad com-
modum suae causae, contraria, quae praeteriri poterunt, praetereundo, quae di-
cenda erunt, leviter attingendo, sua diligenter et enodate narrando”,437 and
later quite clearly explains how between the alternatives of admitting, deny-
ing and concealing a fact, “taciturnitas imitatur confessionem”.438 A slightly
more precise version of the first passage comes later in De oratore, “qui locus
est talis, ut plus habeat adiumenti quam incommodi, hunc iudico esse di-
cendum; ubi plus mali quam boni reperio, id totum abiudico atque eicio”.439
The same book contains a long and rather philosophical discussion440 by An-
tonius about the point that the orator should at all costs avoid harming his
client, rather than strive to serve him (and this implicitly includes avoiding
adverse arguments), but also very practical advice on the point at hand:
mea autem ratio haec esse in dicendo solet, ut, boni quod habeam,
id amplectar, exornem, exaggerem, ibi commorer, ibi habitem, ibi
haeream; a malo autem vitioque causae ita recedam, non ut me
id fugere appareat, sed ut totum bono illo ornando et augendo
dissimulatum obruatur;441
436 Rhet. Alex. 1437a18–21 (in a passage on assembly speeches) “ἐὰν δὲ οἱ ἐγκαλέσαντες μὴ
ἐpiεξίωσιν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο χρὴ σημεῖον piοιεῖσθαι, διότι τὴν διαβολὴν ψευδῶς ἡμῶν κατήνεγκαν·
οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς εἶναι δόξει τοὺς ἀληθῶς ἐγκαλοῦντας μὴ βούλεσθαι κρίσιν λαβεῖν.”
437 Cic. Inv. 1.30.
438 Cic. Inv. 1.54 (the passage explains how the adversary can be forced to concede a point;
when the adversary has made some concession and is then confronted with a similar
point, he is left with these three options:) “extremum autem aut taceatur oportet aut con-
cedatur aut negetur. si negabitur, aut ostendenda similitudo est earum rerum, quae ante
concessae sunt, aut alia utendum inductione. si concedetur, concludenda est argumenta-
tio. si tacebitur, elicienda responsio est aut, quoniam taciturnitas imitatur confessionem, pro
eo, ac si concessum sit, concludere oportebit argumentationem.” Cf. the “Rechtsgrund-
satz Qui tacet consentire videtur” (Klecker (2004, p. 105), referring to Otto (1890, p. 339,
no. 1734)).
439 Cic. De orat. 2.102.
440 Cic. De orat. 2.296–306.
441 Cic. De orat. 2.292. Similarly about reacting to adverse points brought up by the oppo-
nent: Cic. De orat. 2.294 “unum, ut molesto aut difficili argumento aut loco non numquam
omnino nihil respondeam”, where non numquam implies a minority of cases where this is
good advice.
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and throughout his rhetorical works, Cicero offers some more ideas: the or-
ator can shift the weights within his speech using more or less detail, and
therefore divert the audience’s attention from an unpleasant fact without
omitting it;442 conversely, he can draw special attention to less dangerous
aspects;443 or he can just obscure the adverse facts without skipping them
completely.444 Another possibility is to claim ignorance, like Cicero did in
Pro S. Roscio Amerino on the legal background of the case.445 Of course this
option is not available in every situation.446
Similar advice is found in Quintilian’s Institutio, though, as usual, with
more detail than Cicero provides, and more balance: Seel447 is right that
“[s]orgfältig erörtert er mehrfach die Frage, wie sich der Rechtswalter gegen-
über Argumenten verhalten solle, die seinem Beweiszweck abträglich sind.
Das Problem ist mit ungemeiner Sorgfalt durchreflektiert”, but the follow-
ing claim that “sich die Hauptdirektive ergibt, ungünstige Fakten ja nicht zu
verschweigen” needs some qualifying. The problem is covered in Inst. 4.1–2;
in 4.1 the first advice is quite general: “ut autem haec [favorabilia] invenire
et augere, ita quod laedit aut omnino repellere aut certe minuere ex causa
est.”448 The second part of “exclude altogether or at least reduce” is then
442 Cic. De orat. 2.330 “ac si quando erit narrandum, nec illa, quae suspicionem et crimen ef-
ficient contraque nos erunt, acriter persequemur et, quicquid potuerit, detrahemus”. This
strategy is also employed outside of narrationes, e.g. in Phil. 11.17–18: here Cicero wants
to argue against an extraordinary command for P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus using histori-
cal examples, and he cannot completely omit the case of Pompeius’ command against the
pirates, which he himself supported. Consequently, he spends much time on the exempla
of the two Scipiones and passes briefly over the much more recent case of Pompeius, and
he “conveniently forgets” (Ker, 1926, p. 477 n. 5) his own role there.
443 Cic. Inv. 1.24 “si causae turpitudo contrahit offensionem, aut pro eo homine, in quo of-
fenditur, alium hominem, qui diligitur, interponi oportet; aut pro re, in qua offenditur,
aliam rem, quae probatur; aut pro re hominem aut pro homine rem, ut ab eo, quod odit,
ad id, quod diligit, auditoris animus traducatur”.
444 Cic. Orat. 49 “[orator] aut occultabit quae dilui non poterunt atque omnino opprimet, si
licebit, aut abducet animos aut aliud adferet, quod oppositum probabilius sit quam illud
quod obstabit”. These are not stated as rules here, but taken for granted as the orator’s
duties.
445 In particular Cic. S. Rosc. 125 “ista ipsa lege quae de proscriptione est, sive Valeria est sive
Cornelia—non enim novi nec scio—”.
This is closely related to pretended memory failure, see section 4.3.3 from p. 202.
446 Cf. Cic. S. Rosc. 2 “si qui istorum dixisset, quos videtis adesse, in quibus summa auctoritas
est atque amplitudo, si verbum de re publica fecisset, id, quod in hac causa fieri necesse
est, multo plura dixisse, quam dixisset, putaretur.”
447 Seel (1977, p. 85).
448 Quint. Inst. 4.1.27. Similarly general in the section on oaths: Quint. Inst. 5.6.6 “nam si
dicere contraria turpe advocato videretur, certe turpius habendum facere quod noceat.”
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elaborated further into the suggestion already made by Cicero: divert the
audience’s attention from the adverse parts449 and draw it to less dangerous
topics.450
In Inst. 4.2 Quintilian then shows a more dialectic vein and balances his
advice with a warning of the extreme:
“sed quatenus etiam forte quadam pervenimus ad difficilius
narrationum genus, iam de iis loquamur in quibus res contra nos
erit: quo loco nonnulli praetereundam narrationem putaverunt.
et sane nihil est facilius nisi prorsus totam causam omnino non
agere. sed si aliqua iusta ratione huiusmodi susceperis litem,
cuius artis est malam esse causam silentio confiteri? nisi forte tam
hebes futurus est iudex ut secundum id pronuntiet quod sciet
narrare te noluisse.”451
This seems to be what Seel saw as the “Hauptdirektive”, but the main point
returns later: “neque infitias eo in narratione ut aliqua neganda, aliqua adi-
cienda, aliqua mutanda, sic aliqua etiam tacenda: sed tacenda quae tacere
oportebit et liberum erit. quod fit nonnumquam brevitatis quoque gratia”.452
Quintilian takes up some of the practical advice from Cicero, and he goes
even further, as in contrast to Cicero he does factor in whether the opponent
has been silent on the point, or will be silent about it later. Quintilian ad-
mits that sometimes the adverse aspect just cannot be avoided, for which an
example is given in book 5:
atqui quaedam sunt, quae neque negari neque defendi neque
transferri possunt. ‘adulterii rea est, quae cum anno vidua fuis-
set, enixa est’: lis non erit. quare illud stultissime praecipitur,
quod defendi non possit, silentio dissimulandum, si quidem est
id, de quo iudex pronuntiaturus est453
449 Quint. Inst. 4.1.38 “inminuenda quaedam et elevanda et quasi contemnenda esse consen-
tio ad remittendam intentionem iudicis quam adversario praestat”, cf. Cic. De orat. 2.330.
450 Quint. Inst. 4.1.44 “illud in universum praeceptum sit, ut ab iis quae laedunt ad ea quae
prosunt refugiamus: si causa laborabimus, persona subveniat, si persona, causa; si nihil
quod nos adiuvet erit, quaeramus quid adversarium laedat”, cf. Cic. Inv. 1.24.
451 Quint. Inst. 4.2.66.
452 Quint. Inst. 4.2.67.
453 Quint. Inst. 5.13.9.
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and in the following paragraph he explains his preference for somehow in-
cluding rather than omitting an adverse side point of a case which the adver-
sarius has mentioned.454 In the same chapter, more tactical advice follows for
the preparation of a speech: the orator ought to consider possible counter-
arguments (i.e. adverse points for his case) beforehand, but not offer them
to his opponent in the actual trial, as some overzealous orators do.455 More-
over, in the next book Quintilian emphasises that the orator must not only
consider in preparation but also observe in court which strategy or argu-
ments actually work in his favour and which do not, and adjust his speech
accordingly.456 This point is not made by the earlier extant rhetorical works,
and may be a consequence of Quintilian’s experience with declamation in
school where in his view the students often become accustomed to an un-
realistically convenient speaking situation.457 Furthermore, Quintilian is the
first writer of rhetorical theory, as far as we know, who actually advises the
orator to take advantage of the opponent’s silence on difficult points.458
Overall Quintilian wants the orator to rely on silence about uncomfortable
facts more than Cicero, but always with consideration of the requirements of
the case at hand. In practical advice he goes clearly beyond his predecessors.
454 Quint. Inst. 5.13.10 “at si extra causam sit adductum et tantum coniunctum, malim quidem
dicere, nihil id ad quaestionem nec esse in iis morandum et minus esse quam adversarius
dicat. tamen huic velut simulationi oblivionis ignoscam; debet enim bonus advocatus pro
rei salute brevem neglegentiae reprensionem non pertimescere.”
455 Quint. Inst. 5.13.44–50; cf. Quint. Inst. 12.8.13 (on proper examination of the evidence)
“denique linum ruptum aut turbatam ceram aut sine agnitore signa frequenter invenies:
quae nisi domi excusseris, in foro inopinata decipient, plusque nocebunt destituta quam
non promissa nocuissent.”
456 Quint. Inst. 6.4.19 “est in primis acuti videre quo iudex dicto moveatur, quid respuat: quod
et vultu saepissime et aliquando etiam dicto aliquo factove eius deprehenditur. et instare
proficientibus et ab iis quae non adiuvent quam mollissime pedem oportet referre.” Cf.
Quint. Inst. 12.10.56 “ideoque instandum iis quae placere intellexeris, resiliendum ab iis
quae non recipientur.”
457 Quint. Inst. 12.6.5.
458 Quint. Inst. 4.2.92 “est tamen quibusdam scholasticis controversiis, in quibus ponitur
aliquem non respondere quod interrogatur, libertas omnia enumerandi quae responderi
potuissent.”, 6.1.4 “illa vero iucundissima, si contingat aliquo ex adversario ducere argu-
mentum, ut si dicas: ‘reliquit hanc partem causae’, aut ‘invidia premere maluit’, aut ‘ad
preces confugit merito, cum sciret haec et haec’.”
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2.8.3 Special form: the omitted alternative
A special kind of tactical omission of adverse points can lie in misuse of the
method of elimination. This is normally a common and sound method of
reasoning: the orator lists a number of possibilities (mostly two or three)
and proceeds to prove wrong all but one of these, which must therefore be
true. However, if from the beginning the enumeration of possibilities is not
complete, i.e. if one or more possibilities are left out (with or without intent),
the conclusion and the whole argument is flawed. Cicero mentions this as
a chance to break into the opponent’s case (in De inventione, book 1, in the
section devoted to the reprehensio):
enumeratio vitiosa intellegitur, si aut praeteritum quiddam di-
cimus, quod velimus concedere, aut infirmum aliquid adnume-
ratum, quod aut contra dici possit aut causa non sit quare non
honeste possimus concedere.459
What Cicero does not mention is that exactly this, listing several possibilities
(but not the true one) and then excluding all but the one he wants his audi-
ence to believe, is a favourite device in his own speeches.460 I shall discuss
just two instances, first an almost schematical example in Pro Cluentio:
unum quidem certe nemo erit tam inimicus Cluentio qui mihi
non concedat, si constet corruptum illud esse iudicium, aut ab
Habito aut ab Oppianico esse corruptum: si doceo non ab Habito,
vinco ab Oppianico; si ostendo ab Oppianico, purgo Habitum.461
The suggestive modesty of the “nemo erit tam inimicus Cluentio” obscures
the fact that there are indeed more possibilities than the two Cicero puts
459 Cic. Inv. 1.84, parallel to Rhet. Her. 2.33 “item vitiosa expositio est, cum omnes res osten-
demus nos collegisse et aliquam rem idoneam praeterimus”.
460 Observed by Classen (1982, p. 168): “Besonders falsche Alternativen erlauben ihm, un-
bequeme Probleme auszuschalten oder keineswegs notwendige Konsequenzen als un-
vermeidlich hinzustellen”; Craig (1993) concentrates on another (but similar) rhetorical
figure, the “dilemma” in which each of two alternatives is shown to be equally damning
to the opponent (or similar), but also notes that “A dilemma may serve to make oppos-
ing arguments disappear; it may dismiss valid assumptions, including valid assumptions
about character, simply through excluding them from its apparently exhaustive structure. [foot-
note: [. . . ] This use of dilemma is one species of a general Ciceronian tactic of posing
alternatives that seem exhaustive, but fail to cover viable possibilities.]” (Craig (1993, p.
172), my emphasis)
461 Cic. Cluent. 64.
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forward: the bribery could have been unsuccessful, and the jury could have
been bribed by both parties.
A similar structure underlies a lengthy argument in Pro Caelio:
quo quidem in crimine primum illud requiro, dixeritne Clodiae,
quam ad rem aurum sumeret, an non dixerit. si non dixit, cur
dedit? si dixit, eodem se conscientiae scelere devinxit. . . . vidit
hoc Balbus; celatam esse Clodiam dixit, atque ita Caelium ad il-
lam attulisse, se ad ornatum ludorum aurum quaerere. si tam fa-
miliaris erat Clodiae, quam tu esse vis, cum de libidine eius tam
multa dicis, dixit profecto, quo vellet aurum; si tam familiaris
non erat, non dedit. ita, si verum tibi Caelius dixit, o immoder-
ata mulier, sciens tu aurum ad facinus dedisti; si non est ausus
dicere, non dedisti!462
Twice in two paragraphs Cicero presents two alternatives which are equally
damning to Clodia (and the prosecution’s case) and which imply a logical
tertium non datur: either he did tell her or he did not. The simplicity of the
argument blanks out the third alternative (that Caelius did tell Clodia some-
thing, but not the truth) which Cicero himself has even mentioned. Appar-
ently Cicero could claim in this trial, just as in the defence for Cluentius, “se
tenebras offudisse iudicibus”.463
Both these speeches, along with the Pro Roscio Amerino and the Pro Milone,
are discussed in much detail in Seager (2011), and many more from the Phil.
and other speeches are listed by Classen (1982).464 Remarkably, this appears
to be a device which was not much used by the Attic Orators,465 but rather
developed in later times, perhaps even by Cicero himself. It thus seems more
than likely that Cicero was aware of this tactical device and deliberately em-
ployed it in practice. This raises not only the question asked by Seager, “why
Cicero is partial to a device so artificial, so crudely mechanical and so trans-
parently dishonest, a device that repeatedly led him into implausibility, ab-
462 Cic. Cael. 52–53.
463 Quint. Inst. 2.17.21.
464 See the list in Classen (1982, p. 168, n. 4), to which I would like to add: Cic. Q. Rosc. 13,
Cic. Sull. 36–38, Cic. Deiot. 15; Cic. Phil. 2.31, 3.21, 4.2, 4.8, 5.2, 9.14, 10.17 (ironically), 11.20,
11.36, 13.49.
465 Two rare examples are Dem. or. 19.106–107 and 22.62.
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surdity and the suppression or falsification of widely known facts”,466 but
also why Cicero did not include the figure in his rhetorical writings. The first
question is answered easily enough with Cicero’s success.467 Concerning the
second, this device was certainly not among the lists of figures which Cicero
would adopt (and adapt) from his predecessors in rhetorical theory;468 he
would have had to present it as a new, even innovative tool. The decep-
tive, thus dishonest and morally questionable nature of the device may have
dissuaded him from doing so, especially in De oratore with its philosophical
aspects: there the partitio with the method of elimination is also treated,469
but without the possibility of mistakes or abuse.
The same applies to Quintilian, despite his more practical approach and
greater lenience for deception; twice he discusses the principle of enumera-
tion and elimination, once in the section on methods of proof,470 once under
divisio,471 but only in the first of these passages does he mention the possibil-
ity of omitting an item from the list, and even then he considers it only as a
dangerous mistake to be avoided, not as an intentional manipulation.472
466 Seager (2011, p. 107).
467 “It was certainly in the main effective” (Seager, 2011, p. 108).
468 Aristotle mentions the figure of (and argumentation from) enumeration, but no aspect
of omission: Aristot. Rhet. 1398a30–32 ἄλλος ἐκ διαιρέσεως, οἷον εἰ piάντες τριῶν ἕνεκεν
ἀδικοῦσιν (ἢ τοῦδε γὰρ ἕνεκα ἢ τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε), καὶ διὰ μὲν τὰ δύο ἀδύνατον, διὰ δὲ τὸ
τρίτον οὐδ’ αὐτοί φασιν.
469 Cic. De orat. 2.165.
470 Quint. Inst. 5.10.64–70.
471 Quint. Inst. 7.1.31–37.
472 Quint. Inst. 5.10.67 “periculosum et cum cura intuendum genus, quia, si in proponendo
unum quodlibet omiserimus, cum risu quoque tota res solvitur.”
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2.9 Avoidance of lies
The omission, or rather avoidance,473 of lies in itself is not always to the
orator’s advantage: even Quintilian has to admit that a bonus orator can be
obliged to deceive for the sake of his case474 while trying to appear truthful
all the same. Still the explicit avoidance of lies, untruth and the like is a
possibility for the orator of achieving his audience’s goodwill; but it is a risky
exercise, and consequently praeteritiones of this kind are not very frequent
either in the Attic Orators’ or in Cicero’s speeches, and the orator generally
does not actually promise not to lie: he either declares that he will not invent,
fingere, anything,475 or states that he will pass over certain facts for which
he has no proof,476 or he makes the positive promise to speak true477 or to
produce evidence.478 The last point had in Athens obviously become a sort
of formula to introduce evidence or a witness: “to prove that I speak true,
473 The English term “omission” is defined in the OED as (among other definitions) “The
action of omitting, leaving out, or not including a person or thing” (Oxford English Dic-
tionary, online version http://www.oed.com 2016 s.v. omission); however, if for some
person or thing there never was a reason or intention to include it, the act of not including
it would not normally be termed “omission”; usually one can only omit what is already
there, at least in a preliminary concept. I shall therefore reserve the term “omission” e.g.
for possible arguments that present themselves, and for adverse points in a case which
have already been mentioned by someone else (covered in the previous sections), and
from this section rather use “avoidance” for elements which were never present in the
speech, or the speaker’s mind, in the first place.
474 Quint. Inst. 12.1.11–12 “bonus quidem et dicet saepius vera atque honesta. [12] sed etiam
si quando aliquo ductus officio (quod accidere, ut mox docebimus, potest) falso haec ad-
firmare conabitur, maiore cum fide necesse est audiatur”; Quint. Inst. 12.8.5 “nam qui iu-
dicare quid dicendum, quid dissimulandum, quid declinandum mutandum fingendum
etiam sit potest cur non sit orator, quando, quod difficilius est, oratorem facit?”
475 Attic Orators: e.g. Dem. or. 19.154, 29.10; Cicero: Cic. Q. Rosc. 34 “id, quod probare non
potest, fingere conatur”; Cic. Verr. 2.3.164 “non agam tecum accusatorie, nihil fingam,
nihil cuiquam probari volo me dicente quod non ante mihimet ipsi probatum sit”; Cic.
Manil. 10 “sed de Lucullo dicam alio loco, et ita dicam, Quirites, ut neque vera laus ei
detracta oratione mea neque falsa adficta esse videatur”; Cic. Har. 40 “haruspicum verba
sunt haec omnia: nihil addo de meo”; Cic. Scaur. 7 “ac ne existimes, Triari, quod adferam,
in dicendo me fingere ipsum et non a reo causam cognoscere, explicabo tibi . . . ”, 16 “ar-
gumentum vero, quod quidem est proprium rei—neque enim ullum aliud argumentum
vere vocari potest—rerum vox est, naturae vestigium, veritatis nota; id qualecumque est,
maneat immutabile necesse est; non enim fingitur ab oratore, sed sumitur.”
476 Cic. Prov. cons. 6 “nec haec idcirco omitto, quod non gravissima sint, sed quia nunc sine
teste dico”; Cic. Phil. 10.7 “ac de hac quidem divina atque immortali laude Bruti silebo,
quae gratissima memoria omnium civium inclusa nondum publica auctoritate testata est.”
477 Cic. Leg. agr. 2.10 “nam vere dicam, Quirites”.
478 Attic Orators: e.g. Dem. or. 20.88; Cicero: Cic. Mur. 20 “atque haec quamquam praesente L.
Lucullo loquor, tamen ne ab ipso propter periculum nostrum concessam videamur habere
licentiam fingendi, publicis litteris testata sunt omnia”.
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read the evidence” etc. (spoken to the clerk),479 which would not appear in
Roman courts where the speeches were separated from the examination of
the evidence.
In theory the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum offers detailed and practical advice
on how to deal with unproven and/or improbable points, including the pre-
sentation as εἰδώς (which corresponds to non fingere), the alio loco praeteri-
tio,480 and the promise to provide evidence later.481 The question whether or
not the orator is (morally) allowed to lie (or even should do so) is not treated.
Cicero does not treat the question of lying in his rhetorical treatises (only
in De orat. 2.30, Antonius mentions casually that orators sometimes happen
to lie in court, but the point is not developed; the orator’s moral integrity is
treated 3.55,482 but without explicit mention of lying).483 Quintilian makes
some concessions here which are quite remarkable at first sight, consider-
ing the high moral standards of his treatise; he regards truth not as a moral
value in itself but as a useful means to an end, and where verum and hones-
tum collide, Quintilian opts for the latter. Consequently, he not only allows
479 Examples from the Attic Orators: Lys. or. 3.20, 13.66, 13.71, 13.72, 13.81, 17.8, 19.23, 19.27,
20.10, 23.8, 23.11, 23.14, 23.15, 31.14, 31.23; Dem. or. 18.37, 18.115, 18.135, 18.137, 19.146,
19.161, 19.170, 19.176, 19.213, 21.82, 21.93, 21.107, 21.121, 21.167, 21.174; 23.159, 23.174,
31.4, 32.19, 33.8, 33.12, 33.13, 33.15, 34.15, 34.37, 35.19, 35.22, 36.10, 36.13, 36.16, 36.22,
36.35; Aischin. Tim. 100, 104, 115, leg. 19, 46, 54, 73, 85, 107, 134, 143, 155, 170, Ctes. 15, 30,
47, 68, 70, 75, 93, 101, 105, 124, 187.
480 See p. 76.
481 Rhet. Alex. 1438b3–10 “ὅσα δ’ ἂν λίαν ἄpiιστα συμβαίνῃ, δεῖ piαραλείpiειν. ἐὰν δὲ ἀναγκαῖον
ᾖ λέγειν, εἰδότα δεῖ φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἐpiιpiλέξαντα αὐτὰ τῷ τῆς piαραλείψεως σχήματι
ὑpiερβάλλεσθαι καὶ piροϊόντος τοῦ λόγου ἐpiιδείξειν ἀληθῆ ὑpiισχνεῖσθαι piροφασισάμενον,
ὅτι τὰ piροειρημένα piρῶτον βούλει ἀpiοδεῖξαι ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἢ δίκαια ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων. καὶ
τοῦτον μὲν τὸν τρόpiον τὰς ἀpiιστίας ἰασόμεθα.” Another passage rather points towards
complete omission, if possible: Rhet. Alex. 1429a15–16 “ἂν δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν ᾖ τοῦτο δεῖξαι,
καταφευκτέον ἐpiὶ τὰς ἀτυχίας ἢ τὰς ἁμαρτίας κτλ.”.
482 Cf. Leeman et al. (1981, p. 200–201), Fantham (2004, p. 247–248).
483 In the second book of De Officiis, Cicero discusses the moral duties of an orator (Cic.
Off. 2.49–51) and, after making clear that an orator must undertake only honorable cases
(which may include defending a guilty client, if he is in general a person of integrity) al-
lows for the advocate to knowingly maintain what is only verisimile, but not strictly true.
In the third book (Cic. Off. 3.50–57), in a more general discussion (not only under orator-
ical aspects) of truth and deception, he takes a slightly different position and relates the
Stoic position held by Diogenes that omission/avoidance (tacere) of a fact is not the same
as deceitful concealment (celare), which would support the point that omission of adverse
points in a speech is not morally bad (and is thus preferable to lying); however, Cicero
himself is here partial to the position attributed to Antipater, that any kind of deception
to the speaker’s advantage should be regarded as turpe.
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for rhetoric to focus on the probable rather than on the true484 and advises
to avoid untrue statements in particular if they are implausible485 (though
not in general486), but concedes explicitly that the orator is allowed to lie in
court if it serves his case (under the tacit assumption that the case itself is
morally sound), as he has inexperienced judges to persuade.487 His advice
to avoid lying is restricted to practical aspects, not brought forward as a moral
demand.488
2.10 Avoidance of indecent language and
inappropriate topics
A topic related to insults/invective is the use (or avoidance) of indecent,
obscene, or rude language and topics. This includes words which are them-
selves obscene (but used to describe otherwise rather neutral things); things
(facts, events, features etc.) which are unfit to describe in themselves, no mat-
ter in what kind of language; and the topos of things so repulsive that any
appropriate description would necessarily employ indecent language. These
three aspects are close enough in rhetoric to be treated together here.
484 Quint. Inst. 2.17.39 “quid quod rhetorice non utique propositum habet semper vera di-
cendi, sed semper veri similia? scit autem esse veri similia quae dicit.”
485 Quint. Inst. 3.8.48 “multum refert etiam quae sit persona suadentis, quia, ante acta vita si
inlustris fuit aut clarius genus aut aetas aut fortuna adfert expectationem, providendum
est ne quae dicuntur ab eo qui dicit dissentiant. at his contraria summissiorem quendam
modum postulant. nam quae in aliis libertas est, in aliis licentia vocatur, et quibusdam
sufficit auctoritas, quosdam ratio ipsa aegre tuetur.”
486 E.g. Quint. Inst. 2.17.19 “ego rhetoricen nonnumquam dicere falsa pro veris confitebor,
sed non ideo in falsa quoque esse opinione concedam, quia longe diversum est ipsi quid
videri et ut alii videatur efficere.”, 2.17.20 “item orator, cum falso utitur pro vero, scit esse
falsum eoque se pro vero uti: non ergo falsam habet ipse opinionem, sed fallit alium.”
487 Quint. Inst. 2.17.26–27 “uti etiam vitiis rhetoricen, quod ars nulla faciat, criminantur, quia
et falsum dicat et adfectus moveat. [27] quorum neutrum est turpe, cum ex bona ratione
proficiscitur, ideoque nec vitium; nam et mendacium dicere etiam sapienti aliquando
concessum est, et adfectus, si aliter ad aequitatem perduci iudex non poterit, necessario
movebit orator: imperiti enim iudicant et qui frequenter in hoc ipsum fallendi sint, ne
errent.” (similarly Quint. Inst. 2.17.36 on the priority of communis utilitas over truth, and
Quint. Inst. 3.8.1–3 on dealing in a similar way with an inexperienced audience in delib-
erative speeches); Quint. Inst. 12.1.36 “verum et illud, quod prima propositione durum
videtur, potest adferre ratio, ut vir bonus in defensione causae velit auferre aliquando iu-
dici veritatem. quod si quis a me proponi mirabitur (quamquam non est haec mea proprie
sententia, sed eorum quos gravissimos sapientiae magistros aetas vetus credidit), sic iu-
dicet, pleraque esse quae non tam factis quam causis eorum vel honesta fiant vel turpia.”
488 On moral aspects of ancient rhetoric in general cf. Wisse (2013).
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In rhetorical theory, we can observe a different approach to the topic be-
tween the “textbooks” and the more “philosophical” writings. The Rhetorica
ad Alexandrum advises directly against σκώpiτειν, opposed to narrating the
opponent’s life and deeds, and emphasises the practical effects of piείθειν and
λυpiεῖν.489 The Rhetorica ad Herennium does not cover the topic at all; only a
passage against overstrong expressions comes close490 which warns against
appearing adrogans and arousing odium—factors which might have a nega-
tive effect on the orator’s success.
Cicero advises to avoid turpitudo and obscenitas in De oratore (mentioned in
the most risky areas of jokes491 and figurative expressions492), even more so
in the Orator where he twice warns against involuntarily using improper lan-
guage,493 a feature which is closely related to the orator’s habits (of speaking
and in general) and thus to (the presentation of) his character. The treatment
of the issue by Cicero follows that of joke and ridicule: offending the oppo-
nent is to be avoided, not out of moral grounds but for utilitarian reasons.494
Quintilian even more explicitly rejects low language and topics due to
moral reasons, referring to dignitas, pudor and verecundia in several pas-
sages;495 only once does he include that decent words and facts are also po-
489 Rhet. Alex. 1441b16–20 “δεῖ δὲ μὴ σκώpiτειν, ὃν ἂν κακολογῶμεν, ἀλλὰ διεξιέναι τὸν βίον
αὐτοῦ· μᾶλλον γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τῶν σκωμμάτων καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας piείθουσι καὶ τοὺς κα-
κολογουμένους λυpiοῦσι. τὰ μὲν γὰρ σκώμματα στοχάζεται τῆς ἰδέας ἢ τῆς οὐσίας· οἱ δὲ
λόγοι τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ τῶν τρόpiων εἰσὶν οἷον εἰκόνες.”. The next sentence belongs in this
context, too (Rhet. Alex. 1441b20–23 “φυλάττου δὲ καὶ τὰς αἰσχρὰς piράξεις μὴ αἰσχροῖς
ὀνόμασι λέγειν, ἵνα μὴ διαβάλῃς τὸ ἦθος, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰνιγματωδῶς ἑρμηνεύειν καὶ
ἑτέρων piραγμάτων ὀνόμασι χρώμενος δηλοῦν τὸ piρᾶγμα.”), and must be meant as a prac-
tical instruction, even though διαβάλλειν is not denoted as either harmful or indecent.
490 Rhet. Her. 4.50 “deminutio est, quom aliquid inesse in nobis aut in iis, quos defendimus,
aut natura aut fortuna aut industria dicemus egregium, quod, ne qua significetur adro-
gans ostentatio, deminuitur et adtenuatur oratione [. . . ]. nam eiusmodi res et invidiam
contrahunt in vita et odium in oratione, si inconsiderate tractes.”
491 Cic. De orat. 2.242 “praestet [orator] ingenuitatem et ruborem suum verborum turpitudine
et rerum obscenitate vitanda.”
492 Cic. De orat. 3.163–164 “et quoniam haec vel summa laus est in verbis transferendis, ut
sensum feriat id, quod translatum sit, fugienda est omnis turpitudo earum rerum, ad quas
eorum animos, qui audient, trahet similitudo. [164] nolo dici morte Africani ‘castratam’
esse rem publicam, nolo ‘stercus curiae’ dici Glauciam; quamvis sit simile, tamen est in
utroque deformis cogitatio similitudinis”.
493 Cic. Orat. 125 “omnis pars orationis esse debet laudabilis, sic ut verbum nullum nisi aut
grave aut elegans excidat”; 134 “ut verbum ex ore nullum nisi aut elegans aut grave ex-
eat”.
494 Cf. Leeman et al. (1981, vol. 3, p. 206–210).
495 General statements: Quint. Inst. 2.13.12 “quid? non in oratione operienda sunt quaedam,
sive ostendi non debent sive exprimi pro dignitate non possunt?”; Quint. Inst. 8.2.2 “nam
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tiora.496 He also discusses the difference between base words and base facts:
there are very few words which are in themselves too obscene to be used in
oratory,497 but also repulsive things, if not clad in the most simple and bare
words, can offend the audience. In this case even words appropriate to the
matter can be inappropriate in the speech, and if the orator cannot think of
a decent expression, he ought to keep silent.498 After all, both words and
content of the speech must not be obscene.499
In oratorical practice it seems to have been often expedient or at least not
harmful for an orator to employ base language and insults.500
But the orators also make use of the explicit avoidance of base language.501
The praeteritio that promises to refrain from bad or inappropriate language,
either by describing something unpleasant in decent words (which are there-
fore not completely adequate), or by cutting out the description, since it can-
not allegedly be given without using indecent language, is related to the
“praeteritio of name”502 insofar as it does not contain the irony that most
types of praeteritio share to a degree: here the level of language which it
promises to avoid is actually not used.
et obscena vitabimus et sordida et humilia. sunt autem humilia infra dignitatem rerum
aut ordinis”.
496 Quint. Inst. 8.3.17 “et honesta quidem turpibus potiora semper nec sordidis umquam in
oratione erudita locus.”
497 Quint. Inst. 10.1.9 “omnibus enim fere verbis, praeter pauca quae sunt parum verecunda,
in oratione locus est.”
498 Quint. Inst. 8.3.38–39 “sed ne inornata sunt quidem [i.e. verba singula], nisi cum sunt infra
rei de qua loquendum est dignitatem, excepto si obscena nudis nominibus enuntientur.
[39] quod viderint qui non putant esse vitanda quia nec sit vox ulla natura turpis, et,
si qua est rei deformitas, alia quoque appellatione quacumque ad intellectum eundem
nihilo minus perveniat. ego Romani pudoris more contentus etiam respondendi talibus
verecundiam silentio vindicabo.”
499 Quint. Inst. 6.3.29 “obscenitas vero non a verbis tantum abesse debet, sed etiam a signifi-
catione.”
500 “[I]t is abundantly evident that Athenian orators made frequent and quite creative use of
character assassination (diabole, loidoria), both in forensic cases and in the Assembly” (Wor-
man, 2004, p. 1). For Cicero I would like to quote just a selection from the attacks against
Clodius in De domo sua (where the speech was given before a tribunal of priests, i.e. a
highly respected body, and the case was won by Cicero): 2 amens, perditus, labes rei pub-
licae, 3 demens, vesanus, furiosus, 13 armiger Catilinae, stipator tui corporis, signifer seditionis,
concitator tabernariorum, damnatus iniuriarum, percussor, lapidator, fori depopulator, obsessor
curiae, 26 importuna pestis, patricida, fratridica, sororicida, 48 omnium non bipedum solum sed
etiam quadrupedum impurissimus, 49 scortum populare, 99 furia atque pestis, 115 intolerabilis
audacia cum proiecta quadam et effrenata cupiditate.
501 For the Attic Orators cf. Carey (1994) and Carey (1999).
502 See p. 81.
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Most praeteritiones of this type in the Attic Orators’ and Cicero’s speeches
are made with some reference, explicit or implicit, to pudor;503 sometimes
they refer more specifically to dignitas, either in general504 or, more fre-
quently, to the dignitas of the location, of the audience or of some other per-
son,505 in a special case to the gods.506 Also the figure of anti-praeteritio occurs
here (more frequent in the Attic Orators), as an excuse and an expression of
the monstrosity of the fact.507
Special cases of “inappropriate topics” are self-praise (see below) and
jokes.508 Jokes and mockery were a common device in oratory: the derisory
passages in Pro Caelio and the teasing in Pro Murena are perhaps the best-
known examples. There must have been many speeches in which the orator
decidedly avoided joking; however, we do not find any case of explicit re-
fraining from joking.
Treatment of the use of jokes in ancient rhetorical writings generally re-
sults in the advice to be careful—not a total ban, but jokes must only be used
when and where appropriate (which is rarer than the orator might want or
503 Attic Orators: e.g. Lys. or. 8.4; Dem. or. 18.3, 18.103, 18.129, 18.264, 18.318, 21.79, 22.12;
Aischin. Tim. 41, 55, 157, Ctes. 162, 174; Cicero: Cic. Quinct. 70 “tametsi nolo eam rem
commemorando renovare cuius omnino rei memoriam omnem tolli funditus ac deleri ar-
bitror oportere; unum illud dico [. . . ]”; Cic. Verr. 1.14 “in stupris vero et flagitiis, nefarias
eius libidines commemorare pudore deterreor”, 2.1.148 “ineptum est de tam perspicua
eius impudentia pluribus verbis disputare”, 2.2.180 “multa enim quae scio a te esse com-
missa, quod aut nimium turpia aut parum credibilia sunt, praetermittam” (where ob-
scenity conincides with irrelevance), 2.4.89 “illud vero quid sit iam non queo dicere, quo
nomine appellem nescio, quod in C. Marcelli statua”; Cic. Flacc. 34 “quas ego non solum
propter longitudinem sed etiam propter turpissimam obscenitatem verborum praetere-
undas puto” (where obscenity coincides with length); Cic. Phil. 2.47 “sed iam stupra et
flagitia omittamus: sunt quaedam, quae honeste non possum dicere”, 8.7 “de proximo
bello civili non libet dicere; ignoro causam, detestor exitum”.
504 Cic. Verr. 2.5.170 “verbo satis digno tam nefaria res appellari nullo modo potest.”
505 Attic Orators: e.g. Dem. or. 2.19, 8.51; Aischin. Tim. 45, Ctes. 182; Cic. Cluent. 66 “profecto
nihil a me dicetur quod non dignum hoc conventu et silentio, dignum vestris studiis atque
auribus esse videatur”; Cic. Pis. 71 “ex quibus multa a multis et lecta et audita recitarem,
ni vererer ne hoc ipsum genus orationis quo nunc utor ab huius loci more abhorreret”;
Cic. Phil. 2.16 “qui apud talis viros tam impudenter loquare!”, 5.15 “atque ego de notis
iudicibus dixi; quos minus nostis, nolui nominare; saltatores, citharistas, totum denique
comissationis Antonianae chorum in tertiam decuriam iudicum scitote esse coniectum.”
506 Cic. Planc. 83 “deridebor, si mentionem tensarum fecero, cum tu id praedixeris; sine tensis
autem quid potero dicere?”
507 Attic Orators: e.g. Lys. or. 13.43–44; Dem. or. 9.1, 24.104; Aischin. Tim. 37–38, 52, 70, 112; Ci-
cero: Cic. Verr. 2.1.86 “illud, quod neque taceri ullo modo neque dici pro dignitate potest,
cognoscite”, 2.1.121 “quae ego non commemorarem—neque enim perfacite dicta neque
porro hac severitate digna sunt—, nisi vos illud vellem recordari, istius nequitiam et iniq-
uitatem tum in ore vulgi atque in communibus proverbiis esse versatam.”
508 Cf. (Wisse, 2013, p. 182–183) on the risks of joking for an orator.
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think). We find the point considered only by Cicero and Quintilian; Cicero
vigorously warns against using whatever joke comes to mind509 and espe-
cially against jokes about criminals and about vulnerable people;510 imita-
tion should be used with great care, their extreme forms (which probably
include explicit visual comical imitation, i.e. by gestures) should be left to
actors.511 Quintilian, who devotes an entire chapter to the topic of jokes,
also makes a point against hurting someone with a joke,512 but somewhat
shifts the emphasis towards respecting the dignity of the case513 and being
especially careful with persons of high standing514 (clearly a feature of the
Empire and its development of the crimen maiestatis); furthermore he rejects
jokes about oneself515 and recommends to be careful with ironical remarks,
as they may turn against the orator.516
Whether the orator needs to actually be a vir bonus or just to appear so
for the benefit of his case and client has been amply discussed in ancient
rhetoric, especially by Cicero and Quintilian—a different question is whether
he should actually talk about himself, his achievements etc.517 Aristotle,
509 Cic. De orat. 2.221 “quod est hominibus facetis et dicacibus difficillimum, habere hominum
rationem et temporum et ea, quae occurrunt, cum salsissime dici possunt, tenere”; cf.
also 2.229; 2.244 “hoc, opinor, primum, ne, quotienscumque potuerit dictum dici, necesse
habeamus dicere”.
510 Cic. De orat. 2.237–239 “quatenus autem sint ridicula tractanda oratori, perquam diligenter
videndum est, quod in quarto loco quaerendi posueramus. nam nec insignis improbitas
et scelere iuncta nec rursus miseria insignis agitata ridetur: facinerosos [enim] maiore
quadam vi quam ridiculi vulnerari volunt; miseros inludi nolunt, nisi se forte iactant;
parcendum autem maxime est caritati hominum, ne temere in eos dicas, qui diliguntur.
[238] haec igitur adhibenda est primum in iocando moderatio; [. . . ] [239] est etiam defor-
mitatis et corporis vitiorum satis bella materies ad iocandum; sed quaerimus idem, quod
in ceteris rebus maxime quaerendum est, quatenus; in quo non modo illud praecipitur, ne
quid insulse, sed etiam, quid perridicule possis, vitandum est oratori utrumque, ne aut
scurrilis iocus sit aut mimicus.”
511 Cic. De orat. 2.242 “atqui ita est totum hoc ipso genere ridiculum, ut cautissime tractan-
dum sit; mimorum est enim et ethologorum, si nimia est imitatio, sicut obscenitas. orator
surripiat oportet imitationem, ut is, qui audiet cogitet plura quam videat”.
512 Quint. Inst. 6.3.28 “laedere numquam velimus, longeque absit illud propositum, potius
amicum quam dictum perdendi.”
513 Quint. Inst. 6.3.31 “nec accusatorem autem atroci in causa nec patronum in miserabili
iocantem feret quisquam.”
514 Quint. Inst. 6.3.33 “sed quidam ita sunt receptae auctoritatis ac notae verecundiae ut noc-
itura sit in eos dicendi petulantia”.
515 Quint. Inst. 6.3.82 “in se dicere non fere est nisi scurrarum et in oratore utique minime
probabile”.
516 Quint. Inst. 9.2.95 “utilis aliquando etiam dissimulatio est [. . . ] ut protinus etiam praecep-
tum sit eius modi figuris utendum temere non esse”.
517 On the special point of hiding the art of rhetoric, see section 2.11.
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who argues that the orator’s own character is an important means of per-
suasion, does not make clear whether it may be used explicitly;518 how-
ever, in a different passage, he names self-praise within the list of things that
cause shame.519 Cicero does not give any advice on the point in his rhetor-
ical writings,520 but it is remarkable in De oratore how anxious Cicero is to
let his protagonists avoid any semblance of self-praise; since they are repre-
sented as model-orators (in some way), this is an indirect proof that Cicero
regarded avoidance of self-praise as characteristic of a good orator. Quintil-
ian explicitly states his preference for indirect self-presentation over direct
self-praise,521 although he concedes that the orator speaking about himself
need not even count as off-topic.522 In particular he advises, in several pas-
sages, against the orator showing off his oratorical artistry or appearing over-
confident.523
Among the extant speeches there are of course some in which the orator’s
praising himself was the point, more or less—for Cicero, e.g. Divinatio in
Caecilium, the speeches Post reditum, De domo sua, and parts of the Philippicae.
But in many occasions, especially forensic speeches, the orator could make
use of a praeteritio.524 Alternatively, the orator does speak about himself but
518 Aristot. Rhet. 1356a4–13 διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἤθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόpiιστον
piοιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐpiιεικέσι piιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον, piερὶ piάντων μὲν
ἁpiλῶς, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μὴ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ piαντελῶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο
συμβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ piροδεδοξάσθαι piοιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα·
οὐ γάρ, ὥσpiερ ἔνιοι τῶν τεχνολογούντων, οὐ τίθεμεν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὴν ἐpiιείκειαν τοῦ
λέγοντος, ὡς οὐδὲν συμβαλλομένην piρὸς τὸ piιθανόν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰpiεῖν κυριωτάτην
ἔχει piίστιν τὸ ἦθος..
519 Aristot. Rhet. 1384a4–6 καὶ τὸ piερὶ αὑτοῦ piάντα λέγειν καὶ ἐpiαγγέλλεσθαι, καὶ τὸ τἀλλότρια
αὑτοῦ φάσκειν· ἀλαζονείας γάρ..
520 Only in De officiis: Cic. Off. 1.137 “deforme etiam est de se ipsum praedicare, falsa prae-
sertim, et cum inrisione audientium imitari militem gloriosum.”
521 Quint. Inst. 4.1.7 “quamquam enim [orator] pauciora de se ipso dicit et parcius, plurimum
tamen ad omnia momenti est in hoc positum, si vir bonus creditur.”
522 Quint. Inst. 4.1.12 “negat haec prohoemia esse Cornelius Celsus quia sint extra litem: sed
ego cum auctoritate summorum oratorum magis ducor, tum pertinere ad causam puto
quidquid ad dicentem pertinet, cum sit naturale ut iudices iis quos libentius audiunt etiam
facilius credant.”
523 Quint. Inst. 4.1.55 “odit enim iudex fere litigantis securitatem, cumque ius suum intelle-
gat tacitus reverentiam postulat”; Quint. Inst. 11.1.15 “in primis igitur omnis sui vitiosa
iactatio est, eloquentiae tamen in oratore praecipue, adfertque audientibus non fastid-
ium modo sed plerumque etiam odium”; Quint. Inst. 11.1.27 “adrogantes et illi qui se
iudicasse de causa nec aliter adfuturos fuisse proponunt. nam et inviti iudices audiunt
praesumentem partes suas”.
524 Attic Orators: e.g. Dem. or. 5.4, 8.70, 13.13, 18.268, 19.167; Cicero: Cic. Flacc. 87 “sed omit-
tamus querelas, ne nostrum consilium in praetermittendis provinciis laudare videamur.”,
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feels obliged to introduce it with an excuse (which results in the figure of
anti-praeteritio, cf. p. 87)—Cicero apparently prefers this to the praeteritio in
this case, as he justifies his speaking about himself more often than refraining
from it. An instructive example is found in De domo sua:
aliud exortum est: obicitur mihi meus ille discessus: cui ego cri-
mini respondere sine mea maxima laude non possum. [. . . ] di-
cendum igitur est id, quod non dicerem nisi coactus525
Cicero claims, without further explanation, that in order to handle the matter
at hand, he is not only obliged to speak about himself (which was obviously
the case, as his own house was the subject of the hearing) but to do so in
highly laudatory terms. That he actually goes on to depict his exile as a
sacrifice for the Roman people in exaggerated terms, and eventually wins
his case, shows that this strategy was, at least in this case, effective—possibly
more effective than any praeteritio could have been.526
Neither praeteritio nor anti-praeteritio are mentioned as possibilities to deal
with self-praise by Quintilian, nor any other writer of rhetorical theory.
103 “nihil dicam enim de me”; Cic. Sest. 14 “sed agam moderate et huius potius tempori
serviam quam dolori meo”, 65 “non disputo cuius modi civis . . . ”; Cic. Planc. 74 “praeter-
mitto, ne aut proferre videar ad tempus”; Cic. Lig. 18 “sed non loquor de nobis, de illis
loquor qui occiderunt”; Cic. Phil. 12.21 “ut non obstarem rei publicae, ne quid adrogantius
videar dicere”.
525 Cic. Dom. 95–96.
526 Further examples for the “anti-praeteritio of self-praise”: Attic Orators: e.g. Dem. or. 18.4,
18.256; Cicero: Cic. Verr. 2.1.10 “metuo ne quid adrogantius apud talis viros videar dicere”;
Cic. Leg. agr. 2.2 “de me autem ipso vereor ne adrogantis sit apud vos dicere, ingrati
tacere”; Cic. Sull. 2 “quo quidem genere non uterer orationis, iudices, hoc tempore, si mea
solum interesset; multis enim locis mihi et data facultas est et saepe dabitur de mea laude
dicendi”, 80 “haec auctoritas—saepe enim est de ea dicendum, quamquam a me timide
modiceque dicetur”; Cic. Har. 16 “quae quidem ego si aut per me aut ab aliis haberem,
non praedicarem apud vos, ne nimis gloriari viderer; sed cum sint mihi data a vobis,
cum ea attemptentur eius lingua cuius ante manu eversa vos mihi et liberis meis manibus
vestris reddidistis, non ego de meis sed de vestris factis loquor, nec vereor ne haec mea
vestrorum beneficiorum praedicatio non grata potius quam adrogans videatur”; Cic. Sest.
31 “ac si in exponendis vulneribus illis de me ipso plura dicere videbor, ignoscitote”; Cic.
Prov. cons. 40 “sed non alienum esse arbitror, quo minus saepe aut interpeller a non ullis
aut tacitorum existimatione reprehendar, explicare breviter quae mihi sit ratio et causa
cum Caesare”; Cic. Planc. 64 “non vereor ne mihi aliquid, iudices, videar adrogare, si
de quaestura mea dixero”; Cic. Phil. 2.10 “alterum peto a vobis, ut me pro me dicentem
benigne, alterum ipse efficiam, ut, contra illum cum dicam, attente audiatis”, 14.13 “‘tu
igitur ipse de te?’ dixerit quispiam. equidem invitus, sed iniuriae dolor facit me praeter
consuetudinem gloriosum.”
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2.11 artem arte celare
While the use of downright lies does not offer much room for discussion, this
is different for the grey area between truth and lie—hidden facts, misleading
turns, distractions. Thus from the moment when rhetoric is brought in con-
nection with deception (which happens especially in the conflict of rhetoric
with philosophy527), a recurring element of the rhetorical discussion is the
claim that the art of rhetoric must be concealed: that it must be used, but not
visibly so. This develops along two lines: 1., positively, writers of rhetorical
theory and practical orators refer to res ipsa which will defend itself (a point
which underlines the strength of the argumentation, even if falsely so); 2.,
negatively, it is claimed that the art of rhetoric, when used, must not be vis-
ible, either (aesthetically) in order to remain artful, or (practically) in order
that the audience does not suspect they are to be deceived. Both lines lead
(taken in their extreme) to the omission of rhetoric from oratory, at least on
the surface.
2.11.1 res ipsa
There has been a long discussion between the idealistic position, most fa-
mously represented by the elder Cato’s saying “rem tene, verba sequen-
tur”,528 and the realistic view that res ipsa is not always sufficient (an opinion
any writer of rhetorical theory must necessarily hold, to justify their exis-
tence). Both views are brought together as far as possible in Cicero’s De
oratore, in the passage about pathos in the actio (albeit with a certain “dry
irony”529 on Crassus’ side, who is speaking here):
ac sine dubio in omni re vincit imitationem veritas, sed ea si satis
in actione efficeret ipsa per sese, arte profecto non egeremus; verum
quia animi permotio, quae maxime aut declaranda aut imitanda
est actione, perturbata saepe ita est, ut obscuretur ac paene obru-
527 Cf. Wardy (2009), Halliwell (1994), Cooper (1985).
528 Quoted by Iul. Vict. Rhet. 1.
Cf. Aristotle’s related claim that the truth is always easier to defend (Aristot. Rhet.
1355a37–38 (regarding real things) “ἀεὶ τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῇ φύσει εὐσυλλογιστότερα
καὶ piιθανώτερα ὡς ἁpiλῶς εἰpiεῖν”).
529 Leeman et al. (1981, vol. 5, p. 353).
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atur, discutienda sunt ea, quae obscurant, et ea, quae sunt emi-
nentia et prompta, sumenda.530
The topic is thus connected to the question whether the orator bonus is al-
lowed to lie and deceive for the benefit of a good cause (cf. p. 111 on avoid-
ance of lies), a question which is answered positively by Quintilian.531
The reasoning which leads to Quintilian’s statement “imperiti enim iudi-
cant et qui frequenter in hoc ipsum fallendi sint, ne errent”532 underlies the
entire discussion, and indeed the entire history of oratory: if everybody were
able to recognise what is true and right from the facts alone, and ready to act
accordingly, oratory itself would be superfluous. Thus any speech, by its
existence, insinuates that this is not the case for the respective audience. It
is from this, rather academic, reasoning that Cicero builds a certain type of
captatio benevolentiae: he refers in his speech to res ipsa which speaks suffi-
ciently for itself, thus flattering his audience as he implies that they actually
do not need him or his speech.533 The resulting contradiction must be sim-
ply accepted, which makes the figure somewhat risky, and consequently it
is not used often by Cicero, and it is remarkable in which of his speeches he
does so:534 In Verrem 2, Pro Cluentio and Pro Milone are all speeches from very
complex cases, involving many facts and arguments—only here it can be im-
plied that res ipsa still needs an orderly presentation to defend itself. Besides,
In Verrem 2 and Pro Cluentio are quite confident speeches, from trials where
Cicero achieved a triumphant victory; and while the speech Pro Milone in
530 Cic. De orat. 3.215.
531 Quint. Inst. 2.17.26–27 “uti etiam vitiis rhetoricen, quod ars nulla faciat, criminantur, quia
et falsum dicat et adfectus moveat. [27] quorum neutrum est turpe, cum ex bona ratione
proficiscitur, ideoque nec vitium; nam et mendacium dicere etiam sapienti aliquando
concessum est, et adfectus, si aliter ad aequitatem perduci iudex non poterit, necessario
movebit orator: imperiti enim iudicant et qui frequenter in hoc ipsum fallendi sint, ne
errent”; Quint. Inst. 2.17.36 “non semper autem ei, etiamsi frequentissime, tuenda veritas
erit, sed aliquando exigit communis utilitas ut etiam falsa defendat.”
532 Quint. Inst. 2.17.27, see the previous note.
533 Other than the “topos of incapability” (cf. p. 214) or the “topos of the inexpressible” (cf. p.
214), this figure appears to be very rare in the Attic Orators (an example is Dem. or. 27.2).
534 Cic. Verr. 2.2.104 “at quem ad modum corrupisti? nonne ita ut omnibus nobis tacentibus
ipsae tuae te tabulae condemnare possent?”, 2.2.157 “res declarabit”, 2.5.159 “opinor, unus
modus atque una ratio est; rem in medio ponam; quae tantum habet ipsa gravitatis ut
neque mea, quae nulla est, neque cuiusquam ad inflammandos vestros animos eloquentia
requiratur”; Cic. Cluent. 167 “multa sunt quae dici possunt, sed non committam ut videar
non dicendo voluisse dicere; res enim iam se ipsa defendit”; Cic. Mil. 53 “res loquitur ipsa,
iudices, quae semper valet plurimum”, 66 “ut eo tacente res ipsa loqueretur”.
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the version as delivered was a disastrous failure, the speech as we have it
is written in the safe knowledge that nothing can be lost anymore.535 Thus,
although the sample is too small to draw a strong conclusion, we observe
no instance of the figure in speeches from either much simpler cases or from
more risky situations (like more precarious trials, or the Philippicae).
Even less frequent, used just once by Cicero in a speech, is the correspond-
ing anti-praeteritio, the confession that res ipsa (which in this case is his and
his client’s intention) is not sufficiently clear by itself, and Cicero immedi-
ately combines it with the promise to use his speech not for deception but
for revealing the res ipsa.536
2.11.2 Concealing the art of rhetoric while using it
Advice towards artem arte celare, concealing the art of rhetoric while (and by)
using it, has been a constant topic in rhetorical theory. Ever since Plato’s at-
tacks against the sophists’ “τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω piοιεῖν”,537 rhetoric had to
defend itself against the accusation of malicious, profit-oriented deception.
The point gained an even higher significance in Rome, where rhetoric (as
opposed to practical oratory) was associated with Greece, i.e. with sophistry
and effeminacy.538 With this suspicion always present, and with the orator’s
intent not only to be honest but also to appear so before his audience, the
orator is required, so to speak, to exclude himself, his identity as a trained
orator, his education and skills, from his speech.539
535 Besides, a certain taunt against the judges in the original trial lies in the implication in the
extant version of Pro Milone that they would have come to the right conclusion if only they
had listened to res ipsa.
536 Cic. Caecin. 53 “quae res igitur valuit? voluntas, quae si tacitis nobis intellegi posset, verbis
omnino non uteremur; quia non potest, verba reperta sunt, non quae impedirent sed quae
indicarent voluntatem”.
537 Plat. Apol. 19b4–5; cf. Protagoras frg. A21 (Diels-Kranz) (= Aristot. Rhet. 1402a24–28).
538 “What must be emphasized is that oratory in itself was not among the things suspected as
Greek: speaking in public was an integral part of Roman politics, and at least from the first
half of the second century BC it was expected of an ambitious Roman aristocrat that he
should regularly speak in trials. It was rhetoric, the theory of speaking and its teaching,
that was suspicious and Greek, along with philosophy and other ’theoretical’ pursuits.
Being an orator was unproblematic and even highly prized, and (alleged) incompetence
could be damaging; what was dangerous was being too clever.” (Wisse, 2013, p. 184)
539 Cf. Andersen (2001, p. 12) “the charge of δεινότης may be an effective weapon against
an opponent, not only in court, but also in the assembly and in public affairs in general.
Thus, it would seem that a speaker should not be too good.”
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Within the extant rhetorical treatises, the point is first made explicitly in
Aristotle’s Ars rhetorica: “διὸ δεῖ λανθάνειν piοιοῦντας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν piε-
piλασμένως ἀλλὰ piεφυκότως (τοῦτο γὰρ piιθανόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ τοὐναντίον)”.540 Aris-
totle is also the first to notice that too prominent a rhythm is rather a distrac-
tion than a support for the speech and should be avoided.541 The Rhetorica
ad Alexandrum does not cover the point.542 The Rhetorica ad Herennium men-
tions it several times543 and emphasises that the speech must not appear to
be prepared beforehand, a point for which the enumeratio is particularly dan-
gerous: we see a connection to the common mnemotechnics544 which mainly
enable the orator to reproduce the structure of his speech, i.e. all main sec-
tions in their proper order. If this technique is too obvious, according to the
Rhetorica ad Herennium, it reduces the audience’s fides and arouses suspicio.
Cicero’s general advice on the point mentions two effects of obvious
rhetorical artistry which the orator must avoid: he must not appear involved
in (Greek) philosophy and therefore remote from “real life”, and he must not
make his hearers feel stupid in comparison with himself.545 In a later pas-
sage, Cicero develops these two points into a slight difference between sen-
ate speeches and speeches to the people, as D. Mack546 has elaborated: in the
contio it is most important not to appear too artificial, and not under Greek
540 Aristot. Rhet. 1404b18–19, cf. Porter (2009, 98); in an earlier passage Aristotle expresses his
objection to sophistic argumentation, Rhet. 1355b15–21; similarly Rhet. 1400b34–1402a27
with more details on φαινόμενα ἐνθυμήματα. Cf. Hesk (2009, p. 154) “The evidence of other
forensic speeches suggests that over-cleverness and sophistry went down badly with ju-
ries and provided opponents with an opportunity for democratically charged character
assassination.”
541 Aristot. Rhet. 1408b20–23τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως δεῖ μήτε ἔμμετρον εἶναι μήτε ἄρρυθμον·
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀpiίθανον (piεpiλάσθαι γὰρ δοκεῖ), καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐξίστησι· piροσέχειν γὰρ piοιεῖ τῷ
ὁμοίῳ, piότε piάλιν ἥξει.
542 Except for the advice against using a script or notes, cf. p. 201.
543 Rhet. Her. 1.11 “in exordienda causa servandum est, [. . . ] ut non adparata videatur oratio
esse”; Rhet. Her. 1.17 “[enumerationem] plus quam trium partium numero constare non
oportet: nam et periculosum est, ne quando plus minusve dicamus; et suspicionem adfert
auditori meditationis et artificii: quae res fidem abrogat orationi”; Rhet. Her. 2.47 “item
curandum est, ne aut ab exordio aut narratione repetatur orationis enumeratio. ficta enim
et dedita opera conparata oratio videbitur esse artificii significandi, ingenii venditandi,
memoriae ostendendae causa. quapropter initium enumerationis sumendum est a divi-
sione.”
544 See p. 194.
545 Cic. De orat. 1.221 “neque vult ita sapiens inter stultos videri, ut ei, qui audiant, aut illum
ineptum et Graeculum putent, aut, etiam si valde probent ingenium, oratoris sapientiam
admirentur, se esse stultos moleste ferant”.
546 Mack (1937, p. 14).
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influence,547 in the senate the orator must not appear too clever (implied:
cleverer than his fellow-senators).548
A general warning against showing one’s rhetorical education is also vis-
ible in Cicero’s depiction of Antonius and Crassus in De oratore, who both
aspire to appear without theoretical instruction throughout the dialogue.549
More special advice given by Cicero concerns the orator appearing unpre-
pared and thus nervous particularly at the beginning of his speech;550 he
also takes up the point from the Rhetorica ad Herennium on enumeratio, that
the orator ought not to show the (prepared) structure of his speech, but ren-
der the speech by stylistic means as one continuous flow551 and on the topic
of prose rhythm he states that the rhythm of the speech must be subordinate
to its words and thoughts, so that the audience is aware only of the latter,
and unconsciously influenced by the former,552 whereby again the orator’s
artistry and effort is hidden553 (while in another context he emphasises that a
rhythm of which the audience is not aware is not equivalent to the absence of
rhythm554). The advice that jokes must not appear too contrived555 follows
the same line of thought.
547 Cic. De orat. 2.153 “semper ego existimavi iucundiorem et probabiliorem huic populo ora-
torem fore, qui primum quam minimam artifici alicuius, deinde nullam Graecarum rerum
significationem daret”.
548 Cic. De orat. 2.333 “vitanda etiam ingeni ostentationis suspicio”.
549 E.g. Cic. De orat. 2.4 “sed fuit hoc in utroque eorum, ut Crassus non tam existimari vellet
non didicisse, quam illa despicere et nostrorum hominum in omni genere prudentiam
Graecis anteferre; Antonius autem probabiliorem hoc populo orationem fore censebat
suam, si omnino didicisse numquam putaretur; atque ita se uterque graviorem fore, si
alter contemnere, alter ne nosse quidem Graecos videretur”, Cic. De orat. 3.77 (Crassus
speaking) “in quo genere nos quidem versamur tantum quantum possumus, quantum in-
genio, quantum mediocri doctrina, quantum usu valemus”. Cf. Cic. Brut. 139 (on Antonius)
“imparatus semper aggredi ad dicendum videbatur”.
550 E.g. Cic. De orat. 1.119; on (pretended) nervousness see section 4.4.
551 Cic. De orat. 2.177 “interpuncta argumentorum plerumque occulas, ne quis ea numerare
possit, ut re distinguantur, verbis confusa esse videantur.” Cf. Leeman et al. (1981, vol. 3,
p. 117 ad loc.).
552 Cic. Orat. 197 “nam qui audiunt haec duo animadvertunt et iucunda sibi censent, verba
dico et sententias, eaque dum animis attentis admirantes excipiunt, fugit eos et praeter-
volat numerus; qui tamen si abesset, illa ipsa delectarent minus”.
553 Cic. Orat. 197 “sic minime animadvertetur delectationis aucupium et quadrandae oratio-
nis industria”.
554 Cic. Brut. 33 “ante [Isocratem] enim verborum quasi structura et quaedam ad numerum
conclusio nulla erat aut, si quando erat, non apparebat eam dedita opera esse quaesitam—
quae forsitan laus sit, verum tamen natura magis tum casuque, non umquam aut ratione
aliqua aut ulla observatione fiebat”.
555 Cic. De orat. 2.256 “est enim cavendum, ne arcessitum dictum putetur”.
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Quintilian, in line with his predecessors, recommends in various passages
to hide the art of rhetoric,556 especially in forensic speeches;557 in his defini-
tion of urbanitas he even talks of tacita eruditio, the art of hiding any kind of
education while using it.558
Quintilian’s more special advice on artem celare emphasises the area of
prose rhythm, where the point occurs several times.559 He also takes up the
advice against overeager use of jokes560 and against a too artful dispositio561
from the earlier writers of rhetorical theory, and adds a warning against dra-
556 Quint. Inst. 4.1.56–57 “nec minus diligenter ne suspecti simus ulla parte vitandum est,
propter quod minime ostentari debet in principiis cura, quia videtur ars omnis dicentis
contra iudicem adhiberi. [57] sed ipsum istud evitare summae artis”; Quint. Inst. 4.1.59–
60 “magis conciliatis animis et iam calentibus haec libertas feretur, maximeque cum in
locos fuerimus ingressi, quorum naturalis ubertas licentiam verbi notari circumfuso ni-
tore non patitur. [60] nec argumentis autem nec locis nec narrationi similis esse in pro-
hoemio debet oratio, neque tamen deducta semper atque circumlita, sed saepe simplici
atque inlaboratae similis nec verbis vultuque nimia promittens; dissimulata enim et, ut
Graeci dicunt, anepiphantos actio melius saepe subrepit. sed haec prout formari animum
iudicum expediet”; Quint. Inst. 4.2.58 “arte occulta”; Quint. Inst. 4.2.127 “at hoc pati non
possumus, et perire artem putamus nisi appareat, cum desinat ars esse si apparet”; Quint.
Inst. 5.14.32 “non inspiret? non augeat? non mille figuris variet ac verset? ut ea nasci, et
ipsa provenire natura, non manu facta, et arte suspecta, magistrum fateri ubique videan-
tur. quis umquam sic vicit orator?”
557 Quint. Inst. 2.10.11 “artem, quae latere plerumque in iudiciis debet”.
558 Quint. Inst. 6.3.17 “nam et urbanitas dicitur, qua quidem significari video sermonem
praeferentem in verbis et sono et usu proprium quendam gustum urbis et sumptam ex
conversatione doctorum tacitam eruditionem, denique cui contraria sit rusticitas”.
559 Quint. Inst. 4.2.117 “compositio dissimulata quidem, sed tamen quam iucundissima”;
Quint. Inst. 9.4.21 “simplicitas, quae non nullis sed aliis utitur numeris, dissimulatque
eos et tantum communit occultius”; Quint. Inst. 9.4.60 “orationis compositio, nisi varia
est, et offendit similitudine et in adfectatione deprenditur”; Quint. Inst. 9.4.144 (on verse-
like sentences) “ideoque interim quaedam quasi solvenda de industria sunt, et quidem
illa maximi laboris, ne laborata videantur”; Quint. Inst. 9.4.147 “ratio in adiectione detrac-
tione mutatione: usus pro natura rerum quas dicimus: cura ita magna ut sentiendi atque
eloquendi prior sit: dissimulatio curae praecipua, ut numeri sponte fluxisse, non arcessiti
et coacti esse videantur.”
560 Quint. Inst. 6.3.26 “idem autem de vultu gestuque ridiculo dictum sit: in quibus est
quidem sua gratia, sed maior cum captare risum non videntur; nihil enim est iis quae
†dicenti† salsa dicuntur insulsius”; Quint. Inst. 6.3.30 “oratorem praeterea ut dicere ur-
bane volo, ita videri adfectare id plane nolo. quapropter ne dicet quidem salse quotiens
poterit, et dictum potius aliquando perdet quam minuet auctoritatem.”
561 Quint. Inst. 8.3.2 “dispositio modicae doctrinae credi potest: si quae sunt artes altiores,
plerumque occultantur ut artes sint”.
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matic gestures562 and a related, rather special point: that the orator should
not let a witness show that he is eager to get the opponent into trouble.563
Where Quintilian justifies his advice for ars celata, he uses the argument of
suspicio564 known especially from the Rhetorica ad Herennium, that the audi-
ence might fear that they are deceived instead of being told the truth; there-
fore the most important quality of the orator is to appear unprepared and as
if speaking without particular effort, as Quintilian says several times;565 this
may be connected to his instruction on pretended memory failure.566
A new point brought into the discussion by Quintilian (which therefore
was probably more problematic in the oratorical practice of his times) is the
advice not to appear over-confident by using too much ornamentation;567 in
this case his point of argumentation is that the audience is annoyed not by
the figurative artistry itself, but because an orator who has time and nerve to
bother too much about ornatus obviously does not care about the case itself.
As a rhetorical education had become a standard for Roman citizens in the
Empire, most listeners in court and in the senate would be used to a highly
stylised speaking manner and not even notice a certain degree of ornatus as
they would have in the Republic, as Quintilian himself relates.568 The same
562 Quint. Inst. 1.11.3 “ne gestus quidem omnis ac motus a comoedis petendus est. quam-
quam enim utrumque eorum ad quendam modum praestare debet orator, plurimum ta-
men aberit a scaenico, nec vultu nec manu nec excursionibus nimius. nam si qua in his ars
est dicentium, ea prima est ne ars esse videatur.”
563 Quint. Inst. 5.7.16 “nam si habet testem cupidum laedendi, cavere debet hoc ipsum, ne cu-
piditas eius appareat, nec statim de eo quod in iudicium venit rogare, sed aliquo circumitu
ad id pervenire, ut illi quod maxime dicere voluit videatur expressum”.
564 Quint. Inst. 5.13.51 “est et illud vitium nimium solliciti et circa omnia momenta luctantis;
suspectam enim facit iudici causam, et frequenter, quae statim dicta omnem dubitationem
sustulissent, dilata ipsis praeparationibus fidem perdunt, quia patronus et aliis crediderit
opus fuisse.” Cf. Quint. Inst. 9.3.102 “ubicumque ars ostentatur, veritas abesse videatur”.
565 Quint. Inst. 4.1.54 “hoc ipso quod non compositum domi sed ibi atque ex re natum et facil-
itate famam ingenii auget et facie simplicis sumptique ex proximo sermonis fidem quoque
adquirit”; Quint. Inst. 4.2.57 “optimae vero praeparationes erunt quae latuerint”; Quint.
Inst. 11.3.56 “quod adfectant quoque, tamquam inventionis copia urgeantur maiorque vis
eloquentiae ingruat quam quae emitti faucibus possit.”
566 Quint. Inst. 4.5.4, see p. 202.
567 Quint. Inst. 11.1.48 “hoc adhuc adiciendum, aliquas etiam quae sunt egregiae dicendi vir-
tutes quo minus deceant effici condicione causarum”, with examples in 49–56.
568 Quint. Inst. 4.1.9 “inde illa veterum circa occultandam eloquentiam simulatio, multum
ab hac nostrorum temporum iactatione diversa”; Quint. Inst. 4.2.122 “quod cum sit fac-
tum iis quoque temporibus quibus omnis ad utilitatem potius quam ostentationem com-
ponebatur oratio et erant adhuc severiora iudicia, quanto nunc faciendum magis, cum
in ipsa capitis aut fortunarum pericula inrupit voluptas?”; Quint. Inst. 4.3.2 “quod qui-
dem natum ab ostentatione declamatoria iam in forum venit, postquam agere causas
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development led to some extreme variants of oratorical style, including an
ostentatiously “natural” style, which prompts Quintilian to emphasise that
the orator ought to appear artless, not be569 (a point made by Cicero only in
the area of prose rhythm).
Even worse than appearing too confident, of course, is open boasting
about one’s abilities.570
The point of artem arte celare, while important both for theory and for prac-
tice, is apparently so self-referential that it does not lend itself to a praeteritio-
like figure; at least it is not used in this manner in the Attic Orators’571 or
Cicero’s speeches—other than the “topos of incapability” (cf. p. 214). It was
well known that Cicero, just like any of his “colleagues” (or even more,
as a homo novus), relied on a thorough rhetorical education, and while he
could use certain stereotypical figures of pretended incapability and failure,
he could obviously not make a point out of explicitly and deliberately not
using the art of speech in a speech—other than e.g. Socrates in Plato’s Apolo-
gia,572 who could plausibly claim that he neither was a trained orator, nor
ever wanted to be one.
non ad utilitatem litigatorum sed ad patronorum iactationem repertum est, ne, si pressae
illi qualis saepius desideratur narrationis gracilitati coniuncta argumentorum pugnacitas
fuerit, dilatis diutius dicendi voluptatibus oratio refrigescat”; Quint. Inst. 12.9.5–6 “vet-
eribus quidem etiam dissimulare eloquentiam fuit moris, idque M. Antonius praecipit,
quo plus dicentibus fidei minusque suspectae advocatorum insidiae forent. sed illa dis-
simulari quae tum erat potuit: nondum enim tantum dicendi lumen accesserat ut etiam
per obstantia erumperet. quare artes quidem et consilia lateant et quidquid si deprendi-
tur perit. hactenus eloquentia secretum habet. [6] verborum quidem dilectus, gravitas
sententiarum, figurarum elegantia aut non sunt aut apparent: sed vel propter hoc ipsum
ostentanda non sunt, quod apparent, ac, si unum sit ex duobus eligendum, causa potius
laudetur quam patronus.”
569 Quint. Inst. 2.17.5–6 “quidam naturalem esse rhetoricen volunt et tamen adiuvari exerci-
tatione non diffitentur, ut in libris Ciceronis de Oratore dicit Antonius observationem
quandam esse, non artem. [6] quod non ideo ut pro vero accipiamus est positum, sed
ut Antoni persona servetur, qui dissimulator artis fuit”; Quint. Inst. 2.12.1 “ne hoc quidem
negaverim, sequi plerumque hanc opinionem, ut fortius dicere videantur indocti, primum
vitio male iudicantium, qui maiorem habere vim credunt ea quae non habent artem, ut ef-
fringere quam aperire, rumpere quam solvere, trahere quam ducere putant robustius.”
570 Quint. Inst. 11.1.15 “in primis igitur omnis sui vitiosa iactatio est, eloquentiae tamen
in oratore praecipue, adfertque audientibus non fastidium modo sed plerumque etiam
odium.” Cf. p. 117 on avoidance of self-praise.
571 Schulz (2014, p. 88): “[bei Demosthenes] kann die Behauptung, der Gegner übe seine
Stimme und bereite sie auf den Auftritt vor, in den Vorwurf münden, er lege bei seinen
echten Reden den Schwerpunkt auf die Stimme und nicht auf den Inhalt des Gesagten”,
referring to Dem. or. 18.308 and 19.336.
572 Plat. Apol. 17b–c.
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Overall the ancient orators and writers of rhetorical theory tend to agree that
anything can or should be included in a speech unless there is some explicit
argument against it; the issue of selectivity in the employment of arguments
is often present in the background, but brevitas as a general value of an entire
speech is unknown (brevitas is regarded as generally desirable only in the
narratio).
Valid arguments for omission of topics or arguments are in particular the
following: that a point is plainly adverse to the orator’s purpose; that an
argument is weak; and that a point is obvious or known to the audience.
Superfluous points, in contrast, and points not belonging directly to the case,
were not regarded as strong candidates for omission.
A striking difference between practice and theory can be observed regard-
ing the various possibilities and advantages of explicitly omitting or avoid-
ing (and even explicitly not omitting) something. Given the possibility of
classifying praeteritiones as shown above, it would be no surprise to find a
classification of the phenomenon at least in Quintilian, who treats e.g. ges-
tures or enthymemes etc. in a systematic and detailed way.573 Furthermore,
it is unlikely that he should omit the praeteritio because he considers it dis-
reputable, since praeteritio can hardly be morally worse than lying, which he
treats openly.574
It has thus become evident that, other than the point of omission or avoid-
ance in itself, the figure of praeteritio was much more used in practice than
rhetorical theory was aware of.
573 Enthymeme, epicheireme, syllogism: Quint. Inst. 5.14.1–26; gestures: Quint. Inst. 11.3.65–
149.
574 Quint. Inst. 4.2.89–93.
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A pause, which will in this context be defined as any period of silence inter-
rupting the continuous flow of the orator’s speech, can take various lengths
and forms and can occur for a number of reasons. The phenomena grouped
under this heading can be roughly divided into three groups (which will
also determine the sections of this chapter): 1. shorter pauses (mostly frac-
tions of a second) for breathing and for structuring the flow of words, which
are closely related to prose rhythm (section 3.2); 2. longer pauses, placed
deliberately in reaction to, or interaction with, something or someone out-
side the speech, e.g. when dialogues with the audience or the opponent, real
or imagined, occur, or when an interval is made for court proceedings of
a rather technical nature (a law being read out etc.) (section 3.3); 3. longer
pauses forced upon the orator by interruptions, positive or negative, by the
audience1 (section 3.4).2 While all these types of pauses need to be consid-
ered by the orator, only the longer pauses would be perceived as pauses in
the speech by the audience.
We face a methodological problem here: the extant speeches, in their
present form, give no indication for most of the pauses made by the orator in
the actio. Structural pauses were indeed marked in the text in antiquity (see
below p. 134); however, this ancient punctuation was lost in the transmission
1 These groupings are, naturally, somewhat artificial and just one possible way of organ-
ising the material. Overlaps and grey areas are inevitable, and it has proved useful to
treat interruptions by a single person in section 3.3 along with other dialogical settings, even
though it does not meet the criterion of a pause placed deliberately by the orator.
2 Pauses arising from some failure or incapacity of the orator, e.g. voice failure, memory
failure, or nervousness, are treated in chapter 4.
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process (with very few exceptions).3 On the other hand, we have sufficient
theoretical statements and advice about structural pauses and punctuation in
the ancient grammarians to at least attempt a reconstruction for the speeches.
Whether strategic pauses or interruptions left any trace in the written ver-
sions of speeches depended greatly, not only on the actual situation, but on
whether and how the speech was written down before delivery and edited
afterwards. To appear in the manuscript before delivery, the event in ques-
tion would need to be anticipated in some way, and in the case of publication
from some kind of transcript or from memory, it is likely that most unwel-
come interruptions (or indications thereof) would be deleted in the editing
process. I would assume, therefore, that actual (unwelcome) interruptions
were in fact more frequent than can be directly deduced from the written
speeches which we have.
My thesis, however, focuses on the rhetorical use of pauses and interrup-
tions, on the techniques and principles employed rather than on the actual
historical events. I shall therefore use the speeches not as accurate accounts
of actually delivered speeches (what we can never assume them to be) but
as authentic examples of (in this case) Roman Republican oratory, and of
what might have been said in a trial or assembly, regardless of whether it
actually was. For this chapter, I shall therefore examine in most cases the
orator’s explicit pauses and reactions to interruptions etc., without consider-
ation whether these, or indeed the interruption itself, actually happened or
not. We only have to keep in mind that any sign of a negative interruption
which can be left out without disturbing the argumentative and procedural
plausibility would likely be deleted in the editing process. Thus many of
the audience’s utterances and the orator’s reactions which occurred in the
historical speech setting are lost for analysis. On the other hand, theoretical
advice from the treatises can not only help with interpreting the pertinent
passages, but also give a broader image of what might have happened in a
speech setting.
3 See Parkes (1992, p. 9–19), Müller (1964, p. 34–54).
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3.2.1 Pauses for breathing
Firstly (and obviously), pauses are necessary for breathing and cannot be
avoided completely; therefore the orator must place them deliberately, in
order not to run out of air at an inappropriate point. This observation is
found in Greek and Roman rhetorical theory from Aristotle4 onwards, as
is the consequence that beyond this, pauses necessary for breathing can be
used at the same time for structuring the speech.5
3.2.2 Prose rhythm
In fact, pauses can be said to make prose rhythm possible.6 “Prose rhythm”
is an area which has produced much scholarship in antiquity and in mod-
ern times. It covers two different (though connected) concepts:7 1. periodi-
sation, i.e. the composition of longer sentences8 from shorter units (κόμμα,
4 Aristot. Rhet. 1409b15 “ἔστιν δ’ ἐν κώλοις μὲν λέξις ἡ τετελειωμένη τε καὶ διῃρημένη καὶ
εὐανάpiνευστος”; Cicero makes the appropriate placement of pauses a crucial, if not the
most crucial point for distinguishing a (true) orator from a non-trained speaker: De orat.
3.175 “neque est ex multis res una, quae magis oratorem ab imperito dicendi ignaroque
distinguat, quam quod ille rudis incondite fundit quantum potest et id, quod dicit, spiritu,
non arte determinat, orator autem sic inligat sententiam verbis, ut eam numero quodam
complectatur et astricto et soluto”; Quintilian gives the same advice with more details:
Inst. 11.3.53 “spiritus quoque nec crebro receptus concidat sententiam nec eo usque tra-
hatur donec deficiat. nam et deformis est consumpti illius sonus et respiratio sub aqua diu
pressi similis et receptus longior et non oportunus, ut qui fiat non ubi volumus sed ubi
necesse est. quare longiorem dicturis perihodon colligendus est spiritus, ita tamen ut id
neque diu neque cum sono faciamus, neque omnino ut manifestum sit: reliquis partibus
optime inter iuncturas sermonis revocabitur.”
5 Cic. De orat. 3.173 “interspirationis enim, non defetigationis nostrae neque librariorum
notis, sed verborum et sententiarum modo interpunctas clausulas in orationibus esse
voluerunt”.
6 Cic. De orat. 3.186 “numerus autem in continuatione nullus est; distinctio et aequalium aut
saepe variorum intervallorum percussio numerum conficit, quem in cadentibus guttis,
quod intervallis distinguuntur, notare possumus, in amni praecipitante non possumus
etc.”; cf. Cic. Orat. 206 and Hermogenes Id. p. 218 Rabe.
7 Several books and articles on “prose rhythm” / “Prosarhythmus” define the topic as only
one of these (in particular, the OCD articles “prose-rhythm, Greek” (Dover, 2003) and
“prose-rhythm, Latin” (Powell, 2003) do not mention periodisation).
8 I use this term for want of a better one; in ancient theory a piερίοδος does not necessarily
coincide with a grammatical sentence, cf. Müller (1964, p. 89): “gelegentlich wird aber
Periodenende konstatiert, wo keineswegs Satzende ist”, with examples from Dionysios of
Halicarnassos.
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κῶλον, piερίοδος9), the length of these and their relationships, e.g. through
parallelisms, anaphora, or homoioteleuta; 2. clausulae, i.e. the preference or
avoidance of certain “rhythms” (sequences of long and short syllables) at the
end of piερίοδοι, κῶλα, κόμματα.
Both concepts deal with “units” of a text and with the boundaries between
them. The most basic requirement, quoted already from Cicero, is to place
breathing pauses not wherever the orator happens to run out of air, but with
deliberation;10 but beyond this, Cicero says, even if a speaker had unlim-
ited breath, he would be well advised to make pauses nevertheless, to make
the speech pleasant to listen to: “si cui sit infinitus spiritus datus, tamen
eum perpetuare verba nolimus; id enim auribus nostris gratum est, quod
hominum lateribus non tolerabile solum, sed etiam facile esse posset.”11
Quintilian mentions that these structural pauses not only improve the
audience’s attention but also allow for audience reactions, especially ap-
plause;12 accordingly a high frequency of pauses is more typical of oratory
than other literary genres (particularly historiography13), and within oratory,
according to Cicero, short phrases with many pauses are especially suitable
9 For the Latin technical terms cf. Quint. Inst. 9.4.22 “at illa conexa series tris habet for-
mas: incisa, quae commata dicuntur, membra, quae kola, periodon quae est vel ambitus vel
circumductum vel continuatio vel conclusio. in omni porro compositione tria sunt genera
necessaria: ordo, iunctura, numerus.”
10 Quint. Inst. 11.3.53 “quare longiorem dicturis perihodon colligendus est spiritus, ita tamen
ut id neque diu neque cum sono faciamus, neque omnino ut manifestum sit: reliquis
partibus optime inter iuncturas sermonis revocabitur”.
Another type of pause at an unsuitable point which the orator must avoid is caused by
hiatus: Quint. Inst. 9.4.33 “tum vocalium concursus: quod cum accidit, hiat et intersistit et
quasi laborat oratio.” This corresponds to the earlier advice in the Rhet. Alex. to place a
hiatus only where a pause occurs anyway (Rhet. Alex. 1435b17–19).
11 Cic. De orat. 3.181–182; similarly Quint. Inst. 9.4.67 “ itaque non modo membra atque
incisa bene incipere atque cludi decet, sed etiam in iis quae non dubie contexta sunt nec
respiratione utuntur sunt illi vel occulti gradus.” Sometimes a pause is even needed for
clarity where it is required neither by structure nor by the need to breathe, to make an
ambiguous phrase clear: Quint. Inst. 7.9.9–11 (explaining how the phrase “testamento quidam
iussit poni statuam auream hastam tenentem” can be rendered clear) “divisio respiratione et
mora constat: ‘statuam’, deinde ‘auream hastam’, vel ‘statuam auream’, deinde ‘hastam’”.
12 Quint. Inst. 9.4.61–62 “neque enim loqui possum nisi e syllabis brevibus ac longis, ex
quibus pedes fiunt. magis tamen et desideratur in clausulis et apparet, primum quia
sensus omnis habet suum finem, poscitque naturale intervallum quo a sequentis initio divi-
datur, deinde quod aures continuam vocem secutae, ductaeque velut prono decurrentis
orationis flumine, tum magis iudicant cum ille impetus stetit et intuendi tempus dedit. [62]
non igitur durum sit neque abruptum quo animi velut respirant ac reficiuntur. haec est sedes
orationis, hoc auditor exspectat, hic laus omnis †declamat†.”
13 Quint. Inst. 9.4.18 “et historiae, quae currere debet ac ferri, minus convenissent insistentes
clausulae et debita actionibus respiratio et cludendi inchoandique sententias ratio”.
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when arguing in court.14 Quintilian does not differentiate here, since his
concept of oratory has a strong emphasis on forensic speeches anyway (in
his methodical approach, if not in his own claim).
Yet with all the pauses necessary for and typical of oratorical texts, the fre-
quency of pauses seems to have reached a level of excess in the Empire, when
it became fashionable to catch the audience by verbal fireworks; this can be
deduced from Quintilian’s criticising both the tendency to use as many sen-
tentiae as possible15 and to wait for applause after every sentence.16 In fact,
with pauses long enough to allow for applause, we have already moved be-
yond purely structural pauses which have only the aesthetic value of ren-
dering the speech clear and pleasant, and have arrived at interactions with the
audience (see below from p. 140).
3.2.3 Prose rhythm: periodisation
Periodisation, i.e. the division of a speech into certain units, is rendered in
the oral performance by pauses between these units.17 The actual duration of
pauses in the performance of any given text in antiquity cannot, of course, be
recovered. And even the relative classification of pauses in a certain text, like
in Primmer’s “Pausenstufenvergleich”, seems to me too dependent on indi-
14 Cic. Orat. 225 “incisim autem et membratim tractata oratio in veris causis plurimum valet,
maximeque eis locis, cum aut arguas aut refellas”.
The data in Frischer (1996, table p. 596) does not show any difference between foren-
sic and political speeches. Of the speeches which Frischer has considered (about half of
Cicero’s extant speeches), the 17 forensic speeches have an average sentence length of
16.95 words, the 13 political speeches have 16.02; the difference is far from significant,
and nowhere near as important as Cicero’s development throughout his career and as the
different oratorical styles (high, middle, and low), where Frischer has indeed shown sig-
nificant discrepancies. Cicero’s statement in the Orator, however, does not refer to entire
forensic speeches but to parts of them, argumentatio and refutatio. A separate analysis of
the parts of each forensic speech by Frischer’s methods might lead to further evidence.
15 Quint. Inst. 8.5.27 “facit res eadem concisam quoque orationem: subsistit enim omnis sen-
tentia, ideoque post eam utique aliud est initium. unde soluta fere oratio et e singulis
non membris sed frustis conlata structura caret, cum illa rutunda et undique circumcisa
insistere invicem nequeant.”
16 Quint. Inst. 8.5.14 “turpe autem ac prope nefas ducunt respirare ullo loco qui adclama-
tionem non petierit. inde minuti corruptique sensiculi et extra rem petiti: neque enim
possunt tam multae bonae sententiae esse quam necesse est multae sint clausulae.”
17 Cf. Norden (1915, p. 64): the most eminent characteristic of Gorgias’ style is his “Zerhackt-
heit des Satzbaus: es sind lauter ganz kleine κῶλα oder nur κόμματα, die den Vortragenden
fortwährend zwingen, mit der Stimme anzuhalten. Da nun der Rhythmus durch Kola
und Pausen entsteht, so steigert sich das rhythmische Gepräge mit der wachsenden Zahl
dieser Kola und Pausen.”
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vidual interpretation to base extensive statistical work on it.18 We do know,
however, that “[d]uring the Classical Age, formally written Latin, in mar-
ked contrast with contemporary Greek, was [. . . ] divided into sentences and
clauses by special signs of punctuation”;19 although almost nothing of the
original punctuation has survived in the texts,20 we are quite well-informed
about how punctuation was used, namely, quite differently from modern En-
glish (and even more from German) punctuation. Norden already notes that
“[ü]berhaupt scheint im Altertum nicht bloß nach syntaktischen, sondern
auch nach rhetorischen Prinzipien interpungiert zu sein”.21 This impression
is confirmed in the brilliant dissertation by Müller, who draws in particular
on grammatical treatises, and comes to the conclusion that punctuation was
mainly used to support good reading, as the different types of distinctiones
in punctuation (roughly, end of a complete thought, end of a sentence, and
subdivision of a sentence) were correlated to different degrees of caesurae
between the rhetorical elements (period, colon, comma) of a text.22 Müller
thus confirms what has been suspected by others:23 that Latin punctuation
was very closely connected to pauses in oral performance, and that both co-
18 Primmer attempts to show that certain clausulae are more frequent before certain types
of pauses. For this purpose, he classifies the pauses which he identifies in the text ac-
cording to their duration in the oral presentation, first into three (Primmer, 1968), later
even six (Primmer, 1990) types of pauses. However, the decision to assign a certain
caesura in the speech text to a certain length of pause in this system is not based on a
documented methodology; as Primmer himself notes, “die Festlegung der verschiedenen
Pausenstufen einer Rede läßt sich durch sonst nichts bewerkstelligen als durch ihre gewis-
senhafte philologische Interpretation” (Primmer, 1968, p. 111), which makes the method
appear somewhat arbitrary.
19 Wingo (1972, p. 132).
Cf. Aristot. Rhet. 1407b11–15. “ὅλως δὲ δεῖ εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον καὶ
εὔφραστον· ἔστιν δὲ τὸ αὐτό· ὅpiερ οἱ piολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν, οὐδ’ ἃ μὴ ῥᾴδιον
διαστίξαι, ὥσpiερ τὰ ῾Ηρακλείτου. τὰ γὰρ ῾Ηρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι
piοτέρῳ piρόσκειται, τῷ ὕστερον ἢ τῷ piρότερον”, implying that correct punctuation and
proper periodisation are almost identical.
20 The scarce evidence is discussed in Müller (1964) and Wingo (1972). Parkes (1992, ch. 1
“Antiquity”) gives a useful overview of the use of punctuation by teachers and readers
(not authors) in antiquity. Cf. Turner (1973) and Turner (1987) on punctuation in Greek
texts, with similar results.
21 Norden (1915, p. 47, n. 1).
22 Müller (1964), especially p. 69, 85, 91–92. On the use of proper breathing in reading exer-
cises cf. Quint. Inst. 1.8.1.
23 Fraenkel (1968, p. 20), for example, resorts to “natural units” (“dass ein Satz sich ganz
natürlich in jene kleinere [. . . ] Einheiten zerlegt”), which, he notes, are not necessarily
syntactical and not necessarily rhythmical, but he does not reach a reliable definition.
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incided with sense units, but not necessarily with syntactical structures.24 I
would like to refine “syntactical structures” further by adding “as 19th/20th
century Latin grammar knows them”, for Habinek has later brought “a con-
cept from descriptivist linguistics, that of ‘sentence constituent’”25 into the
discussion, and has shown that
“[i]n ideal delivery of speech, pauses always come at constituent
boundaries and most often at the boundaries of sentence con-
stituents. This does not imply the converse, that every con-
stituent boundary is marked by a pause, although it is probably
the case that the percentage of boundaries that receive pauses is
directly related to the speed of delivery”.26
The ancient rhetoricians give some advice on the length of rhythmical
units, and thus, we may conclude, on the frequency and (at least relative)
length of pauses between these: Cicero in De oratore provides a list of rules for
Latine dicere which includes that piερίοδοι be not too long and not too short.27
In the Orator, he gives the length of a full period as four membra in length
of hexameters,28 which is cited by Quintilian (though he gives four senarii
instead of hexameters),29 but Quintilian seems more concerned with a mini-
mum than a maximum length of speech units, as he repeatedly insists on the
problem of “jumping rhythm” caused by too many pauses.30
24 Müller even includes in his book a chapter “Zur Entstehung der modernen deutschen
Interpunktion und Syntax und ihrem Gegensatz zur rhetorischen Interpunktion” to make
the difference as clear as possible.
25 Habinek (1986, p. 13): “A sentence constituent is ‘a group of words that can be replaced
by a single word without a change in function and without doing violence to the rest of
the sentence.’ [quoted from Clark and Clark (1977, 48)]”
26 Habinek (1986, p. 13–14).
27 Cic. De orat. 3.49 “Latine scilicet dicendo, verbis usitatis ac proprie demonstrantibus ea,
quae significari ac declarari volemus, sine ambiguo verbo aut sermone, non nimis longa
continuatione verborum, non valde productis eis, quae similitudinis causa ex aliis rebus
transferuntur, non discerptis sententiis, non praeposteris temporibus, non confusis personis,
non perturbato ordine.”
28 Cic. Orat. 222 “e quattuor igitur quasi hexametrorum instar versuum quod sit constat fere
plena comprehensio.”
29 Quint. Inst. 9.4.125 “habet perihodos membra minime duo; medius numerus videtur quat-
tuor, sed recipit frequenter et plura. modus eius a Cicerone aut quattuor senariis versibus
aut ipsius spiritus modo terminatur.”
30 Quint. Inst. 9.4.42 “etiam monosyllaba, si plura sunt, male continuabuntur, quia necesse
est compositio multis clausulis concisa subsultet.”, again Quint. Inst. 9.4.66 “ne, quod
nunc maxime vitium est, brevium contextu resultent ac sonum reddant paene puerilium
crepitaculorum.”, again Quint. Inst. 9.4.91 “et ponderis habent longae, celeritatis breves:
quae si miscentur quibusdam longis, currunt, si continuantur, exsultant.”
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To sum up: in oral performance, any text has to be divided into units by
pauses (and this is much more the case in actual oratory than in, e.g., histori-
ography read out loud, cf. above p. 132). The units are determined mainly31
by sense (although they coincide, on the grammatical side, with one or more
“sentence constituents”); the pauses have to be of different lengths to group
several units together, again following the sense.32 In a “rhythmical” prose
text, the units are, additionally, composed following certain rules (equal or
rising length of κῶλα etc.).
Thus a text of “good prose” has to be composed with skillful periodisa-
tion (i.e. giving periods, cola and commata the right length),33 but to bring
this to effect in an oral performance, the orator also needs some skill in po-
sitioning the pauses and determining their ideal length. For purposes of
practising, preparation,34 and declamation, punctuation in the written text
is employed.35
Cf. p. 133 on too many pauses calling for applause.
31 Hutchinson (1995) has shown that emphasis can lead to a caesura which would not be
justified by sense alone.
32 Cf. Quintilian on the different length of pauses in general: Quint. Inst. 9.4.51 “ubi tem-
pora [etiam animo] metiuntur et pedum et digitorum ictu, intervalla signant quibusdam
notis, atque aestimant quot breves illud spatium habeat: inde tetrasemoe, pentasemoe,
deinceps longiore sunt percussiones (nam semion tempus est unum)”, and 11.3.35–39 in
detail (with an analysis of the beginning of the Aeneid), with the conclusion “virtus autem
distinguendi fortasse sit parva, sine qua tamen esse nulla alia in agendo potest”. But he
makes clear what he already said in Inst. 1.8.1: “demonstrari nisi in opere ipso non potest”,
i.e. there are indeed no strict rules to be memorised.
33 Cf. Dionysios of Halicarnassos describing a speech by Demosthenes, in which the words
themselves command how they want to be pronounced: Dion. Hal. Dem. 54 ἐνταῦθα
ἀστεῖον ἦχον, ταῦτα ἐσpiευσμένως εἰpiέ, ταῦτ’ ἀναβεβλημένως, δευρὶ δ’ ἀpiόλιpiε τὸ συ-
νεχές, ἐνταυθοῖ σύναψον τὰ ἑξῆς, τούτοις συνάλγησον, τούτων καταφρόνησον, ταῦτα
ἐκδειματώθητι, ταῦτα διάσυρον, ταῦτα αὔξησον. (However, it is clear “dass Dionysios
in seiner stilkritischen Schrift Demosthenes keine vollständige Vortragstheorie entwickeln
wollte” (Schulz, 2014, p. 149).)
34 Cf. Cic. De orat. 3.190 “‘hanc igitur’ Crassus inquit ‘ad legem cum exercitatione tum stilo,
qui et alia et hoc maxime ornat ac limat, formanda nobis oratio est [. . . ]’”.
35 There remains the somewhat unsatisfactory situation that in many cases we cannot know
if an ancient orator made a pause at a certain point in a speech; but at least we can be
sure about many points where he most definitely did not make a pause: namely, within
the “sentence constituents” referred to by Habinek, provided that they are not composed
of smaller constituents. For example, a pause must not be made within a prepositional
phrase which consists only of the preposition and a noun or pronoun; nor within a noun-
phrase which consists only of a noun and an adjective with no other words in between;
and most definitely not within a single word, where Schmid wants to put a pause (e.g.
Schmid (1959, p. 145)).
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3.2.4 Prose rhythm: clausulae
The other aspect of “prose rhythm”, the clausulae, are connected with pauses,
too; the communis opinio on the topic can be rendered as follows: at the end
of certain units (commata, cola, periods) in a (rhythmically designed) prose
text, some sequences of long and short syllables are more frequent than oth-
ers. These ends of units are exactly where pauses should be made in deliv-
ery, so the general theory of clausulae could also be put as: before a pause,
some sequences of long and short syllables are more frequent than others, or:
before a pause, we expect a “clausula”, i.e. one of a limited number of com-
binations of long and short syllables. It is beyond the focus of this thesis to
report on the extensive statistical work that has been done in this area36 and
that has, beyond all methodological problems and different findings in de-
tails, proven in general what has never been contested: that some “rhythms”
are indeed more frequent than others at the end of piερίοδοι or κῶλα. I would
like to point out instead that at least in oral performance, the listener can-
not “expect” a certain clausula before a pause (i.e. before he has heard the
pause); he can only expect the pause after a certain clausula, which leads to
the question: is there a statistically significant avoidance of those “rhythms”
which are generally regarded as strong “clausulae” in places where a pause
does not follow?37 An answer to this would require a complete metrical anal-
ysis of a substantial amount of text and a statistical evaluation of whether the
points where, technically, a clausula (taken as a particular sequence of sylla-
ble lengths) is found, indeed coincide with the end of a comma, colon, or
period; this, however, is in its entirety beyond the scope of this thesis. If, as
I suspect would be the result, a clausula is itself no strong reason to “expect”
a pause, it yields a significant consequence for the actio of a speech. It would
follow that even where a clausula is positioned in the text at the end of some
36 E.g. by Zielinski (1904), de Groot (1921), Broadhead (1922), and Primmer (1968).
37 This seems to be implied by statements of Aristotle and Cicero, who claim that a caesura
should be announced or even enforced by a preceding clausula (Aristot. Rhet. 1409a19–21
“[δεῖ] καὶ δήλην εἶναι τὴν τελευτὴν μὴ διὰ τὸν γραφέα, μηδὲ διὰ τὴν piαραγραφήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ
τὸν ῥυθμόν”; Cic. Orat. 228 “oratio, quae non aut spiritu pronuntiantis aut interductu li-
brari, sed numero coacta debet insistere”); in both of these passages, however, the rhythm
is contrasted with punctuation (and in Cicero with the orator’s breath, or lack thereof),
and in my opinion the point is that a caesura must not be enforced by punctuation against
rhythm, that any caesura must be preceded by a suitable rhythm, but not that any clausula
automatically enforces a caesura.
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unit of sense, it is the orator’s task to pronounce it in the appropriate way to
convey the underlying structure to the audience,38 while in other situations
the same “rhythm” must be pronounced without “announcing” a caesura.
This brings us back to Quintilian’s warning against waiting for applause
after every sentence: on the structural side it is the orator’s task to align
clausulae, pauses, and speech units, so that the longest type of structural
pause comes at the end of a large argumentative unit of the speech and is
preceded by a major clausula. Now if the orator intends to provoke applause,
the most appropriate moment for this is immediately after he has concluded
a major argument (and thus a speech unit). In the theory of prose rhythm,
this point ideally coincides with the longest type of pause and with a clausula
which is both aesthetically pleasing in itself and announces the unit closure
and the following pause, so that this longest type of structural pause natu-
rally blends into the longer, non-structural pause when the orator interrupts
his speech for some audience interaction.
3.2.5 Stylistic pauses
Beyond general recommendations of pauses for “good oratory”, the use of
many pauses can be characteristic of a particular orator or oratorical style,
though notices thereof are few: the Rhetorica ad Herennium states that a partic-
ularly passionate speaking style is characterised by either very few or many
pauses;39 Cicero mentions that a passage within a speech containing many
pauses can be employed as a figure of style depicting anger.40 Cicero also
describes Crassus’ style as using short periodoi and many kola (which must
mean many pauses), though without a positive or negative evaluation,41 and
he explicitly praises Cn. Lentulus’ use of intervalla (among other aspects).42
38 The exact execution—whether to achieve this by rising of falling voice, slowing down,
emphasis on a particular syllable etc.—differs from case to case.
39 Rhet. Her. 3.23 “contentio dividitur in continuationem et in distributionem.”
40 Cic. De orat. 3.217 “aliud enim vocis genus iracundia sibi sumat, acutum, incitatum, crebro
incidens: ‘ipsus hortatur me frater, ut meos malis miser / mandarem natos . . . ’ et ea, quae
tu dudum, Antoni, protulisti ‘segregare abs te ausu’ s . . . ’ et ‘ecquis hoc animadvortet?
vincite . . . ’ et Atreus fere totus.”
41 Cic. Brut. 162.
42 Cic. Brut. 234. “intervallis” is an example of very rare praise of the use of pauses as a
characteristic of an orator (the only one in the Brutus), but this may be a case of concealing
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Hermogenes mentions pauses in an example of clarity from Herodotus.43
Quintilian mentions an undue speed of delivery, in which pauses cannot be
made properly, as a bad style of delivery.44
But while there are (some) rules for positioning pauses in the appropriate
places, their frequency is eventually a matter of taste (and not to be argued
about): “flumen aliis verborum volubilitasque cordi est, qui ponunt in ora-
tionis celeritate eloquentiam; distincta alios et interpuncta intervalla, morae
respirationesque delectant: quid potest esse tam diversum? tamen est in
utroque aliquid excellens.”45
3.2.6 Conclusion
To summarise: shorter, structural pauses are in ancient rhetorical theory rou-
tinely connected to prose rhythm (i.e. to periodisation or clausulae or both)
and extensively discussed under this heading. Style and delivery are in a
double relationship here: the text must be prepared (in writing or in cogita-
tio, cf. p. 199) with a “correct” or “good” length of units (piερίοδοι, κῶλα) and
with “correct” or “good” clausulae at the ends of these units, in order to en-
able a “good” distribution of pauses of different length in delivery. Yet even
with a “good” written text, it is the orator’s task to place pauses properly in
delivery, in order to convey the structure of the text. As there was no way of
recording delivery in antiquity, ancient rhetorical theorists, when discussing
the topic of structural pauses, focused on the preparation of the text; here we
see very detailed observations on the effects of prose rhythm on the audi-
ence in oratorical practice, as far as these effects can be related to the written
text of the speech. Beyond this, observations on structural pauses in deliv-
ery tend to be general, concerning oratory in comparison to other genres, or
the delivery style of particular orators. Training in the proper positioning of
art: a good orator must make appropriate pauses, but the best pauses are those which are
not noticed by the audience and consequently not mentioned by Cicero.
43 Hermogenes Id. p. 230 Rabe “κατὰ βραχὺ αἱ ἔννοιαι διανεpiαύοντο ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν piερι-
γραφόμεναι”. Though historiography is is many ways treated as different from oratory,
the connection between pauses and clarity is likely to be transferable.
44 Quint. Inst. 11.3.52 “nec volubilitate nimia confundenda quae dicimus, qua et distinctio
perit et adfectus”. Cf. Lucianus Rh. Pr. 18: “piλὴν ἀλλ’ ἔpiειγε καὶ σύνειρε καὶ μὴ σιώpiα
μόνον” (as a satirical advice).
45 Cic. Orat. 53.
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structural pauses was apparently conducted solely by imitation and exercise,
and is not reflected in the theoretical writings.
3.3 Dialogues and related settings
3.3.1 Dialogue with the audience
Actual dialogue with the audience (or part of it) during a speech,46 initiated
by the orator, was a rare phenomenon, as far as we can tell.47 It is difficult to
control (and thus unattractive for most orators), it was forbidden in some sit-
uations, and probably it was also just unusual for anyone else to speak dur-
ing a speech.48 We have two examples from Demosthenes’ speeches, where
apparently, as far as we can tell from the transmitted text, a dialogue with
the audience took place: the first instance comes from Demosthenes’ Crown
Speech,49 where he asks a question (rather a rhetorical question, since no-
body can have been uncertain about the answer) and continues “ἀκούεις ἃ
λέγουσιν”. This implies that Demosthenes, in the court situation, addressed
his question to the jury or the bystanders, waited for the answer, and then
turned to his adversary Aischines: “you hear what they say”, employing
the audience as a sort of witness and probably producing a neat show effect
(while the actual argumentative value of the question, piότερον [. . . ] δοκεῖ μι-
σθωτὸς Αἰσχίνης ἢ ξένος εἶναι Α᾿λεξάνδρου;, was rather marginal). In his pros-
46 Of course we have abundant examples of orators addressing the audience, and of rhetori-
cal questions, but as long as no reply seems to have taken place, or to have been expected,
this means no interruption to the speech, and is therefore not pertinent.
47 There were, of course, procedural situations where the orator was in a dialogical situation
from the beginning; for Athens we have examples from Lysias’ speeches where a dia-
logue between the orator and a witness is incorporated completely in the speech text (Lys.
or. 12.25, 22.5), and from the speech contexts this seems to have been not unusual, but
with the Athenian custom of choosing witnesses supportive to one’s case (Carey, 1994, p.
176), these “interrogations” were most likely planned beforehand just as any part of the
speech. In Rome, the altercatio was dialogical by definition (the more so if the altercatio
was as well used in the examination of witnesses, where Mommsen sees its main place
(Mommsen, 1899, p. 431, n. 4); Greenidge (1901, p. 479) sees it as a fixed part of the trial
after the presentation of the evidence, while Powell (2010, p. 27, n. 14) regards the term
in Quintilian as referring rather loosely to “impromptu exchanges which might arise at
any time after the set speeches were over”) and thus required, in any case, an altogether
different approach from a structured and (more or less) prepared “set speech”.
48 Cf. p. 63 on the figure of granting the floor to the opponent.
49 Dem. or. 18.52.
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ecution speech against Aristocrates,50 Demosthenes lets the audience choose
which of three possible topics they want to hear first. Whatever happened in
the actual trial, the extant speech text suggests that there was a comprehen-
sible answer from the audience (“the first one!”), as the orator “repeats” it
and continues accordingly, so this must have been a plausible scenario (even
if it was set up beforehand).
The only example in Cicero’s speeches where an actual dialogue becomes
visible is in De lege agraria 2, where a question-and-answer game is played
out in the extant speech text.51 Whether in the actual contio Cicero answered
his own questions, or received the answers which are in the text now from
the audience, cannot be determined today, but since the answers are short,
simple, and repetitive, it seems quite possible that Cicero managed to pro-
voke a functioning conversation with the crowd (though one might argue
that if that was the case, he would probably have incorporated something
indicating this in the written speech text).
In another situation (in Verr. 1) this was not the case, apparently:
ego, iudices, iam vos consulo, quid mihi faciendum putetis. id
enim consili mihi profecto taciti dabitis, quod egomet mihi nec-
essario capiendum intellego.52
Cicero addresses the audience (the judges) and directly asks for advice. In
the next sentence, he emphasises that the judges were taciti, implying that
there had been no utilisable reaction from the audience. However, what kind
of dialogue could have arisen here? The question asked by Cicero, if taken
seriously, requires a rather complex answer, in any case more than a yes or no
or some other one-word reply. Such a more complex answer, which would
have been close to a discussion of procedural issues between the judges, was
very unlikely (and even more so in a trial than in a contio like Leg. agr. 2),
even if some of the judges had correctly guessed what the answer would
50 Dem. or. 23.18–19.
51 Cic. Leg. agr. 2.22 “quis legem tulit? Rullus. quis maiorem partem populi suffragiis pro-
hibuit? Rullus. quis comitiis praefuit, quis tribus quas voluit vocavit nullo custode sorti-
tus, quis Xviros quos voluit creavit? idem Rullus. quem principem renuntiavit? Rullum.
vix me hercule servis hoc eum suis, non 〈modo〉 vobis omnium gentium dominis probatu-
rum arbitror.” Cic. ad Q. fr. 2.3.2 reports a similar interaction of Clodius with the audience,
or part of it, of a trial.
52 Cic. Verr. 1.32.
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be, i.e. Cicero’s tactical move of drastically shortening his speech to speed
up the trial.53 The question is thus of a rather rhetorical kind, and Cicero
could, in the expected silence, substitute himself what he needed for his ar-
gument, and at the same time flatter his audience by implying that they had
themselves thought ahead just as cleverly (regardless of whether they had or
not).
Advice on this matter can be found under the term communicatio in Quin-
tilian,54 who, however, does not treat actual dialogical situations but figures
where the orator addresses the audience, asking or inviting them to contem-
plate some argument; these are more akin to rhetorical questions to which an
answer is implied, but not actually given.55 Quintilian does not differentiate
here whether there is an articulate reaction from the audience.
3.3.2 Deliberate interruption by a single person
The orator can also be forced into a dialogical situation by someone else in-
terrupting him (and interrupting in an articulate way, more than just disturb-
ing the speech setting56). In Rome, such deliberate interruptions were legally
prohibited in political assemblies, both in the contio and in senate meetings57,
53 A move which, as J. Powell has recognised, was not as “brilliantly original” as it is some-
times thought to be (Powell, 2010, p. 32).
54 Quint. Inst. 9.2.21 “[communicatio:] aut cum iudicibus quasi deliberamus, quod est fre-
quentissimum: ‘quid suadetis?’ et ‘vos interrogo’ et ‘quid tandem fieri oportuit?’ ut Cato:
‘cedo, si vos in eo loco essetis, quid aliud fecissetis?’ et alibi: ‘communem rem agi putatote
ac vos huic rei praepositos esse’”.
55 Cf. Lausberg (1990, §§ 767–770) and Rowe (1997, p. 139–140) on the figures of ἐρώτησις
/ interrogatio and piύσμα / quaesitum; cf. Wooten (2013) on questions in imperial Greek
rhetoric.
56 On rather inarticulate interruptions (θόρυβος etc.) see p. 157.
57 On the contio: “One particular feature of such assemblies was the protection of the tribune,
when speaking, from interruption, treated by Cicero as an element of the sacrosanctity of
the tribunate” (Lintott, 1999, p. 122), cf. Cic. Sest. 79 “itaque fretus sanctitate tribunatus,
cum se non modo contra vim et ferrum sed etiam contra verba atque interfationem legibus
sacratis esse armatum putaret, venit in templum Castoris”; Val. Max. 9.5.2 “parum enim
habuit [M. Drusus tribunus pl.] L. Philippum consulem, quia interfari se contionantem
ausus fuerat”; however, some articulate interference by the audience seems to have been
possible, as far as it was not hostile: Plut. TG 21.4–5 “[Σκιpiίων ὁ Α᾿φρικανός] τῶν piερὶ Γάιον
καὶ Φούλβιον αὐτοῦ δι’ ἐκκλησίας piυνθανομένων, τί φρονοίη piερὶ τῆς Τιβερίου τελευτῆς,
οὐκ ἀρεσκομένην τοῖς ὑpi’ ἐκείνου piεpiολιτευμένοις ἀpiόκρισιν ἔδωκεν.”
On the senate: “while he had the word, a speaker could talk on any matter he considered
of public importance, but he could not intervene in the discussion without being invited to do
so.” (Raaflaub, 2004, p. 55, my emphasis) Still an altercatio in the senate was possible if
the speaker decided to reply to an interruption, as Cicero did in the lively exchange with
142
Chapter 3 Limits of performance: pauses and interruptions
Section 3.3 Dialogues and related settings
and were probably quite unusual and disapproved of in court, except for the
judge’s right to admonish the speaker, e.g. to remind him of the time limit.58
Looking at the Attic Orators, we find a few instances in the long speeches
by Demosthenes and Aischines where they report on earlier speaking sit-
uations where they were interrupted (by a single, identifiable person, in a
more or less articulate manner); this behaviour is described, implicitly or ex-
plicitly, as an unseemly attack.59 However, all these instances happened in
political meetings (βουλή, ἐκκλησία, a private meeting of ambassadors with
Philip of Macedonia, and the Amphictyonic Council); in Athenian courts,
spontaneous comments or questions by the audience were apparently con-
sidered less inappropriate, as Demosthenes discusses this possibility quite
casually: καὶ μὴν εἴ τις ἐκεῖν΄ ὑpiολαμβάνει, piοῦ δὲ γένοιτ΄ ἂν ταῦτα; τί κωλύει
κἀμὲ λέγειν, τίς δ΄ ἂν ἀpiοκτείναι Χαρίδημον;60
In a few of Cicero’s speeches, incidents of interruption are reported with
great indignation (from the texts there is no clear line to be drawn between
articulate interruptions and more general disturbance).61 By accusing the
disturber, Cicero puts himself into the position of the innocent victim (how-
ever minuscule the offence) and thus gains an implicit captatio benevolentiae.
Clodius which he relates in Att. 1.16.10: “surgit pulchellus puer, obicit mihi me ad Baias
fuisse. falsum, sed tamen ‘quid? hoc simile est,’ inquam, ‘quasi in operto dicas fuisse?’
‘quid,’ inquit, ‘homini Arpinati cum aquis calidis?’ ‘narra,’ inquam, ‘patrono tuo, qui
Arpinatis aquas concupivit’ (nosti enim Marianas). ‘quousque,’ inquit, ‘hunc regem fer-
emus ?’ ‘regem appellas,’ inquam, ‘cum Rex tui mentionem nullam fecerit?’; ille autem
Regis hereditatem spe devorarat. ‘domum,’ inquit, ‘emisti.’ ‘putes,’ inquam, ‘dicere: iu-
dices emisti.’ ‘iuranti,’ inquit, ‘tibi non crediderunt.’ ‘mihi vero,’ inquam, ‘XXV iudices
crediderunt, XXXI, quoniam nummos ante acceperunt, tibi nihil crediderunt.’ magnis
clamoribus adflictus conticuit et concidit.”
58 Cf. p. 59 on enforcement of time limits. At least in Quintilian’s time a judge could appar-
ently interrupt and rebuke an orator for quite arbitrary reasons: Quint. Inst. 4.5.10 “festinat
enim iudex ad id quod potentissimum est, et velut obligatum promisso patronum, si est
patientior, tacitus appellat: si vel occupatus vel in aliqua potestate vel etiam sic moribus
compositus, cum convicio efflagitat.”; Tac. Dial. 39.3 “ipsam quin immo curam et diligen-
tis stili anxietatem contrariam experimur, quia saepe interrogat iudex, quando incipias,
et ex interrogatione eius incipiendum est.” Cf. also p. 70 on the advice not to annoy the
audience.
59 Dem. or. 19.23, 19.45–46; Aischin. leg. 106, Ctes. 117.
60 Dem. or. 23.58
61 Cic. Sest. 78 “magistratus templo deicias, caedem maximam facias, forum purges?”; 85
“magistratus templis pellebantur, alii omnino aditu ac foro prohibebantur”; 135 “solet
enim tribunos plebis appellare et vi iudicium disturbare, cum diffidit”; Cic. Vatin. 34 “num
quis reus in tribunal sui quaesitoris escenderit eumque vi deturbarit, subsellia dissiparit,
urnas deiecerit, eas denique omnis res in iudicio disturbando commiserit, quarum rerum
causa iudicia sunt constituta?”
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In the Pro Ligario, Cicero mentions his fear of an incident of this sort (al-
though he probably does not seriously expect it to happen) and exploits it
(beyond a general incitement of a disapproving mood against the disturber)
in a more explicit captatio benevolentiae;62 in the De provinciis consularibus, he
uses it as a demonstration of boldness and thus as what might be called cap-
tatio admirationis.63
This is one of the rare cases where we find, at least in Quintilian, theoretical
advice on the rhetorical use of the phenomenon under discussion64 and even
the recommendation to pretend that there was an interruption (in this case,
by the orator’s own client) if it seems convenient.65
The latter is something we also observe in Cicero’s speeches, when he
makes use of pretended or hypothetical interruptions by a hostile member
of the audience.66
Closely related are fictitious dialogues with the opponent or the audience,
which are found in several of Cicero’s speeches.67 As these need to be acted
62 Cic. Lig. 13 (to the prosecutor Tubero) “quodne nos [domi] petimus precibus ac lacrimis,
strati ad pedes, non tam nostrae causae fidentes quam huius humanitati, id ne impe-
tremus pugnabis et in nostrum fletum irrumpes et nos iacentis ad pedes supplicum voce
prohibebis?”
63 Cic. Prov. cons. 18 “qua de re dicam, Patres conscripti, quae sentio, atque illam interpella-
tionem mei familiarissimi, qua paulo ante interrupta est oratio mea, non pertimescam.”
64 Quint. Inst. 6.4.11 “sunt enim quidam praeduri in hoc oris, ut obstrepant ingenti clamore
et medios sermones intercipiant et omnia tumultu confundant, quos ut non imitari, sic
acriter propulsare oportebit, et ipsorum improbitatem retundendo, et iudices vel praesi-
dentis magistratus appellando frequentius ut loquendi vices serventur. non est res animi
iacentis et mollis supra modum frontis, fallitque plerumque quod probitas vocatur quae
est inbecillitas.”
65 Quint. Inst. 4.5.20 “quaedam interim nos et invitis litigatoribus simulandum est dicere,
quod Cicero pro Cluentio facit circa iudiciariam legem: nonnumquam quasi interpellemur
ab iis subsistere”.
66 Cic. Cluent. 63 “nam etsi a vobis sic audior ut numquam benignius neque attentius
quemquam auditum putem, tamen vocat me alio iam dudum tacita vestra exspectatio,
quae mihi obloqui videtur: ’quid ergo? negasne illud iudicium esse corruptum?’ non
nego, sed ab hoc corruptum non esse confirmo. ‘a quo igitur est corruptum?’ opinor,
primum [. . . ]” (maybe Cicero had hoped for real interruptions here); Cic. Prov. cons. 40
“sed non alienum esse arbitror, quo minus saepe aut interpeller a non ullis aut tacitorum
existimatione reprehendar, explicare breviter quae mihi sit ratio et causa cum Caesare.”
67 E.g. Cic. S. Rosc. 58 “quid mihi ad defendendum dedisti, bone accusator? quid hisce
autem ad suspicandum? ‘ne exheredaretur, veritus est.’ audio, sed qua de causa vereri
debuerit, nemo dicit. ‘habebat pater in animo.’ planum fac. nihil est; non quicum delib-
eraverit, quem certiorem fecerit, unde istud vobis suspicari in mentem venerit. cum hoc
modo accusas, Eruci, nonne hoc palam dicis: ‘ego quid acceperim scio, quid dicam nescio;
unum illud spectavi quod Chrysogonus aiebat neminem isti patronum futurum; de bono-
rum emptione deque ea societate neminem esse qui verbum facere auderet hoc tempore’?
haec te opinio falsa in istam fraudem impulit; non me hercules verbum fecisses, si tibi
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out to a certain degree in order to be understood as dialogues (especially as
often only the direct speech passages are given, without speaker indications
or “stage directions”), longer pauses must have been used. And even more
so if the orator hoped for actual questions or answers from the audience,
both in these passages and when he posed direct questions to the audience.68
Even if he provided answers himself, it would be wise to give the audience
time to think about the question on their own.
A similar situation arises when the orator puts a question to his opponent,
implying or stating that the opponent has no answer.69 Of course this ex-
quemquam responsurum putasses.”; Cic. Quinct. 79 “quo die? te ipsum, Naevi, volo au-
dire; volo inauditum facinus ipsius qui id commisit voce convinci. dic, Naevi, diem. ‘ante
diem V Kalend. intercalaris.’ bene ais. quam longe est hinc in saltum vestrum Galli-
canum? Naevi, te rogo. ‘MDCC milia passuum.’ optime. de saltu deicitur Quinctius—
quo die? possumus hoc quoque ex te audire? quid taces? dic, inquam, diem. pudet dicere;
intellego; verum et sero et nequiquam pudet.”; Cic. Cluent. 63 “nam etsi a vobis sic audior
ut numquam benignius neque attentius quemquam auditum putem, tamen vocat me alio
iam dudum tacita vestra exspectatio, quae mihi obloqui videtur: ‘quid ergo? negasne il-
lud iudicium esse corruptum?’ non nego, sed ab hoc corruptum non esse confirmo. ‘a quo
igitur est corruptum?’ opinor, primum [. . . ]”; Cic. Phil. 2.41 “velim mihi dicas, nisi moles-
tum est, L. Turselius qua facie fuerit, qua statura, quo municipio, qua tribu. ‘nihil scio’,
inquies, ‘nisi quae praedia habuerit.’ is igitur fratrem exheredans te faciebat heredem?”
Fictitious dialogue is classified as a figure of thought by Rowe (1997, p. 140), somewhat
strangely under the term αἰτιολογία; more correctly as subiectio by Lausberg (1990, §§ 771–
775).
Similar to this are passages where quotations from the prosecution speech or another
source are included in the speech and answered on the spot, e.g. Cic. Sest. 84 “‘homines,’
inquit, ‘emisti, coegisti, parasti.’ quid uti faceret? senatum obsideret?” and all of Cic. Phil.
13, which is a detailed answer to Antonius’ letter.
68 E.g. Cic. Quinct. 54 “quaero abs te, C. Aquili, L. Lucili, P. Quinctili, M. Marcelle: vadi-
monium mihi non obiit quidam socius et adfinis meus quicum mihi necessitudo vetus,
controversia de re pecuniaria recens intercedit; postulone a praetore ut eius bona mihi
possidere liceat, an, cum Romae domus eius, uxor, liberi sint, domum potius denuntiem?
quid est quod hac tandem de re vobis possit videri? profecto, si recte vestram bonitatem
atque prudentiam cognovi, non multum me fallit, si consulamini, quid sitis responsuri:
primum exspectare, deinde, si latitare ac diutius ludificare videatur, amicos convenire,
quaerere quis procurator sit, domum denuntiare. dici vix potest quam multa sint quae
respondeatis ante fieri oportere quam ad hanc rationem extremam necessario devenire.”.
69 Cic. Quinct. 79 “quid taces? dic, inquam, diem. pudet dicere; intellego; verum et sero et
nequiquam pudet.”; Cic. S. Rosc. 38 “in hoc tanto, tam atroci, tam singulari maleficio [. . . ],
quibus tandem tu, C. Eruci, argumentis accusatorem censes uti oportere? nonne et au-
daciam eius, qui in crimen vocetur, singularem ostendere et mores feros immanemque
naturam et vitam vitiis flagitiisque omnibus deditam, et denique omnia ad perniciem
profligata atque perdita? quorum tu nihil in Sex. Roscium ne obiciendi quidem causa con-
tulisti”; Cic. Q. Rosc. 44 “si iam tibi deliberatum est quibus abroges fidem iuris iurandi,
responde. Manilio et Luscio negas esse credendum? dic, aude; est tuae contumaciae,
adrogantiae vitaeque universae vox. quid exspectas?”; Cic. Verr. 2.2.191 “tu ipse, Verres,
quid sedes, quid moraris? nam aut exhibeas nobis Verrucium necesse est aut te Verrucium
esse fateare.”; Cic. Sull. 44 (to Torquatus) “〈cur〉 cum videres aliter fieri, tacuisti, passus
es, non mecum aut 〈ut〉 cum familiarissimo questus es aut, quoniam tam facile inveheris
in amicos, iracundius et vehementius etulasti?”; Cic. Flacc. 6 “hunc igitur virum, Laeli,
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ploits the fact that in most speaking settings the opponent was not allowed
to reply immediately, and since everybody was aware of this, the argument
drawn from the opponent’s silence is not very strong in itself, but in the live
performance it may well have some dramatic effect all the same if the ques-
tion or request was followed by a noticeable silence.
This tactic itself is treated as a standard by the writers of rhetorical theory:
driving the opponent into a corner from where he cannot give any answer
(or if he tries, the orator can react with indignation), i.e. the tactic of using
the opponent’s silence, even though he may not be actually allowed to re-
ply.70 Aristotle has a comprehensive paragraph on ἐρώτησις (interrogation)
and its tactics.71 Cicero in De inventione describes a similar tactic of pressur-
ing the opponent into a sort of confession (here without directly exploiting
the opponent’s silence, although this possibility results indirectly from the
quibus tandem rebus oppugnas? fuit P. Servilio imperatore in Cilicia tribunus militum;
ea res siletur. fuit M. Pisoni quaestor in Hispania; vox de quaestura missa nulla est. bel-
lum Cretense ex magna parte gessit atque una cum summo imperatore sustinuit; muta
est huius temporis accusatio. praeturae iuris dictio, res varia et multiplex ad suspiciones
et simultates, non attingitur.”; Cic. Planc. 48 “quid taces, quid dissimulas, quid tergiver-
saris?”; Cic. Deiot. 20 “quid igitur causae excogitari potest cur te lautum voluerit, cenatum
noluerit occidere?”; Cic. Phil. 2.5 “at beneficio sum tuo usus. quo? [. . . ] sed quo benefi-
cio?”; Cic. Phil. 2.111 “ecquid reperies ex tam longa oratione mea, cui te respondere posse
confidas?”
Cf. also the examples given p. 99 n. 415–417 for Cicero’s exploiting his opponent’s lack of
arguments.
70 Worman (2009) shows that, as early as in the Iliad, a major aim of oratory is to silence the
opponent: Worman (2009, p. 33–34) “the didactic use of invective and threat anticipates
quite precisely the ways in which orators in the classical period align themselves [34]
with their audiences by means of insulting example—that is, by working to exclude their
opponents an enemies from the realm of citizens fit to speak in assembly.”
71 Aristot. Rhet. 1418b40–1419a18 piερὶ δὲ ἐρωτήσεως, εὔκαιρόν ἐστι piοιεῖσθαι μάλιστα μὲν
ὅταν τὸ ἕτερον εἰρηκὼς ᾖ, ὥστε ἑνὸς piροσερωτηθέντος συμβαίνει τὸ ἄτοpiον [. . . ]. δεύτερον
δὲ ὅταν τὸ μὲν φανερὸν ᾖ, τὸ δὲ ἐρωτήσαντι δῆλον ᾖ ὅτι δώσει [. . . ]. ἔτι ὅταν μέλλῃ ἢ
ἐναντία λέγοντα δείξειν ἢ piαράδοξον. τέταρτον δὲ ὅταν μὴ ἐνῇ ἀλλ’ ἢ σοφιστικῶς ἀpiο-
κρινάμενον λῦσαι [. . . ]. ἄλλως δὲ μὴ ἐγχείρει. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐνστῇ, κεκρατῆσθαι δόξεις· οὐ γὰρ
οἷόν τε piολλὰ ἐρωτᾶν, διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ·
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described procedure),72 and Quintilian refers to it as a well-known method;73
for the altercatio, where an answer is indeed possible, he recommends strik-
ing back with the same figure (i.e. answering the opponent’s unanswerable
question with a similar question).74 The subiectio discussed in the Rhetorica
ad Herennium and Quintilian75 comes closest to a dialogue, but it is not quite
a dialogue acted out, rather a rhetorical question to which the answer is then
provided (but still from the orator’s point of view).
Yet we do not have any information on the specific use of pauses in this
context: neither as indication of pauses in the text of speeches, nor as ad-
vice on these from rhetorical theory. For the subiectio, Quintilian even states
(though without much emphasis) that the orator does not wait for an ac-
tual answer. How these dialogical passages were acted out in practice, and
how their performance may have differed between times and genres, must
remain mostly speculative; as far as this was part of an orator’s education, it
was apparently taught only in practical training.
72 Cic. Inv. 2.125–126: “quem locum multis modis variare oportebit, [. . . ] tum ipsum ad-
versarium quasi in testis loco producendo, hoc est interrogando, utrum scriptumne neget
esse eo modo, an ab se contra factum esse aut contra contendi neget; utrum negare ausus
sit, se dicere desiturum. si neutrum neget et contra tamen dicat: nihil esse quo hominem
inpudentiorem quisquam se visurum arbitretur.”
In the Orator, Cicero describes the situation of the “opponent silenced” as a sign of suc-
cess, without, however, addressing the particular circumstances of each instance (i.e. court
vs. senate, set speech vs. altercatio): Cic. Orat. 129 “nobis pro familiari reo summus orator
non respondit Hortensius; a nobis homo audacissimus Catilina in senatu accusatus obmu-
tuit; nobis privata in causa magna et gravi cum coepisset Curio pater respondere, subito
adsedit, cum sibi venenis ereptam memoriam diceret”.
73 Quint. Inst. 9.2.20 “a quo schemate non procul abest illa quae dicitur communicatio, cum
aut ipsos adversarios consulimus, ut Domitius Afer pro Cloatilla: ‘nescit trepida quid
liceat feminae, quid coniugem deceat: forte vos in illa solitudine obvios casus miserae
mulieri optulit: tu, frater, vos, paterni amici, quod consilium datis?’”
74 Quint. Inst. 6.4.20 “quid enim, cum respondere non possis, agendum est nisi ut aliud
invenias cui adversarius respondere non possit?”
75 Rhet. Her. 4.33 “subiectio est, cum interrogamus adversarios aut quaerimus ipsi, quid ab
illis aut quid contra nos dici possit, deinde subicimus id, quod oportet dici aut non oportet
aut nobis adiumento futurum sit aut illis obfuturum sit e contrario”; Quint. Inst. 9.2.15
“cui diversum est, cum alium rogaveris, non exspectare responsum, sed statim subicere:
‘domus tibi deerat? at habebas. pecunia superabat? at egebas’. quod schema quidam ‘per
suggestionem’ vocant.”
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3.3.3 prosopopoeia
Much more frequent is the figure of piροσωpiοpiοιία / prosopopoeia / sermoci-
natio / conformatio,76 where the orator introduces some other person, or per-
sonified object, as speaking, and where he steps back with his own persona,
falls silent and grants the floor to his fictitious counterpart.77
The figure is rare in the Attic Orators;78 Cicero uses it in his speeches sev-
eral times,79 although not very frequently, and whenever he does, it is an
76 sermocinatio / piροσωpiοpiοιία is classified as a figure of thought by Rowe (1997, p. 144); cf.
Lausberg (1990) on sermocinatio (§§ 820–825) and fictio personae (§§ 826–829).
77 Alexander Arweiler has examined on a much broader scale how power is constructed
in literature by the use of certain authorities, especially by “borrowing their voice”, i.e.
writing in first person (Arweiler, 2001, esp. p. 57–65). prosopopoeia in oratory might be
considered a subgenre of this technique.
78 At least a similar effect is gained by Demosthenes’ quoting another orator (Dem. or. 7.21–
23); a prosopopoeia of “the truth” is found in Aischin. Ctes. 155. V. Bers (Bers, 1997) has
examined the use of oratio recta in Attic Oratory; this is not actually relevant to my topic,
as a short quote does not mean “granting the floor”; besides, “[c]learly the emphasis in
rhetorical manuals was on imaginary, not real, discourse.” Bers (1997, p. 130)
79 Cic. S. Rosc. 32 “etenim quis tam dissoluto animo est, qui, haec cum videat, tacere ac
neglegere possit? ‘patrem meum, cum proscriptus non esset, iugulastis, occisum in pro-
scriptorum numerum rettulistis, me domo mea per vim expulistis, patrimonium meum
possidetis. quid voltis amplius? etiamne ad subsellia cum ferro atque telis venistis, ut hic
aut iuguletis aut condemnetis?’” (the client is imagined speaking, with no explicit sign in
the text); Cic. Verr. 2.5.136–138 “ipse pater si iudicaret, per deos immortalis, quid facere
posset? cum tibi haec diceret, ‘tu in provincia populi Romani . . . ” (Verres’ father then
speaks for three paragraphs); Cic. Catil. 1.18–19 “quae [i.e. patria] tecum, Catilina, sic agit
et quodam modo tacita loquitur: ‘nullum iam aliquot annis facinus exstitit nisi per te, nul-
lum flagitium sine te; tibi uni multorum civium neces, tibi vexatio direptioque sociorum
inpunita fuit ac libera; tu non solum ad neglegendas leges et quaestiones, verum etiam
ad evertendas perfringendasque valuisti. superiora illa, quamquam ferenda non fuerunt,
tamen, ut potui, tuli; nunc vero me totam esse in metu propter unum te, quicquid incre-
puerit, Catilinam timeri, nullum videri contra me consilium iniri posse, quod a tuo scelere
abhorreat, non est ferendum. quam ob rem discede atque hunc mihi timorem eripe; si est
verus, ne opprimar, sin falsus, ut tandem aliquando timere desinam.’ [19] haec si tecum,
ita ut dixi, patria loquatur, nonne impetrare debeat, etiamsi vim adhibere non possit?”; Cic.
Cael. 33–34 “exsistat igitur ex hac ipsa familia aliquis ac potissimum Caecus ille; mini mum
enim dolorem capiet, qui istam non videbit. [34] qui profecto, si exstiterit, sic aget ac sic
loquetur: ‘mulier, quid tibi cum Caelio . . . ”, 36 “sin autem urbanius me agere mavis, sic
agam tecum; removebo illum senem durum ac paene agrestem; ex his igitur tuis sumam
aliquem ac potissimum minimum fratrem [. . . ]. eum putato tecum loqui: ‘quid tumultu-
aris, soror? . . . ”; Quint. Inst. 4.1.69 “idem Cicero pro Scauro ambitus reo, quae causa est
in commentariis (nam bis eundem defendit), prosopopoeia loquentis pro reo utitur” (on
Cicero’s lost second speech for Scaurus, cf. Crawford (1984, p. 198–201)); Cic. Phil. 13.6
“quid sapientia? cautioribus utitur consiliis, in posterum providet, est omni ratione tec-
tior. quid igitur censet? parendum est enim atque id optimum iudicandum, quod sit sapi-
entissime constitutum. si hoc praecipit, ne quid vita existimem antiquius, ne decernam
capitis periculo, fugiam omne discrimen, quaeram ex ea: ‘etiamne, si erit, cum id fecero,
serviendum?’ si annuerit, ne ego Sapientiam istam, quamvis sit erudita, non audiam. sin
responderit: ‘tuere ita vitam corpusque [servato], ita fortunas, ita rem familiarem, ut haec
libertate posteriora ducas itaque his uti velis, si libera re publica possis, nec pro his liber-
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essential and carefully designed passage within the speech, and each exam-
ple is unique in its combination of who is speaking and how the prosopopoeia
is framed: we find persons speaking (the client in Pro S. Roscio Amerino, the
opponent’s father in In Verrem 2, a supporter of the client in the lost speech
Pro Scauro de ambitu, and two relatives of the opponent in Pro Caelio) and ab-
stract objects (Patria in In Catilinam 1, Sapientia in Philippica 13); the fictitious
speaker is introduced either not at all (S. Rosc.) or in a straightforward man-
ner (Verr.) or with a lengthy deliberation (Cael.); he can be directly set up as
speaking (Catil.) or introduced with a potentialis (Phil.).
All of these carefully designed variants correspond with the values which
the theorists of rhetoric have found in this figure. Two important purposes
for which the figure is used are mentioned already in the Rhet. Her.: variatio
and affectus (here limited to commiseratio), along with a number of exam-
ples.80 The point of variatio is also taken up in Cicero’s De inventione.81 Later
in De oratore the figure is only mentioned briefly in a list, but with a reference
to amplificatio.82
Quintilian also treats all these aspects, and adds some more. He mentions
prosopopoeia in five different books of his Institutio: he cites affectus83 and vari-
tatem, sed pro libertate haec proicias tamquam pignora iniuriae’: tum Sapientiae vocem
audire videar eique ut deo paream.”
80 Rhet. Her. 4.66 “conformatio est, cum aliqua, quae non adest, persona confingitur quasi
adsit, aut cum res muta aut informis fit eloquens, et forma ei et oratio adtribuitur ad digni-
tatem adcommodata, aut actio quaedam, hoc pacto: ‘quodsi nunc haec urbs invictissima
vocem mittat, non hoc pacto loquatur: “ego illa plurimis tropeis ornata, triumphis di-
tata certissimis, clarissimis locupletata victoriis, nunc vestris seditionibus, o cives, vexor;
quam dolis malitiosa Kartago, viribus probata Numantia, disciplinis erudita Corinthus
labefactare non potuit, eam patimini nunc ab homunculis deterrumis proteri atque con-
culcari?”’ item: ‘quodsi nunc Lucius ille Brutus revivescat et hic ante pedes vestros adsit,
is non hac utatur oratione: “ego reges eieci, vos tyrannos introducitis; ego libertatem, quae
non erat, peperi, vos partam servare non vultis; ego capitis mei periculo patriam liberavi,
vos liberi sine periculo esse non curatis?”’ haec conformatio licet in plures res, in mutas
atque inanimas transferatur. proficit plurimum in amplificationis partibus et conmisera-
tione.”
81 Cic. Inv. 1.99 “ita per brevem conparationem auditoris memoria et de confirmatione et
de reprehensione redintegrabitur. atque haec aliis actionis quoque modis variare opor-
tebit. nam tum ex tua persona enumerare possis, ut, quid et quo quidque loco dixeris,
admoneas; tum vero personam aut rem aliquam inducere et enumerationem ei totam at-
tribuere.”
82 Cic. De orat. 3.205 “personarum ficta inductio vel gravissimum lumen augendi” (in a per-
cursio of rhetorical figures), quoted in Quint. Inst. 9.1.31.
83 Quint. Inst. 6.1.25–26 “his praecipue locis utiles sunt prosopopoeiae, id est fictae alien-
arum personarum orationes. †quale litigatore dicit patronum† nudae tantum res movent:
at cum ipsos loqui fingimus, ex personis quoque trahitur adfectus. [6.1.26] non enim au-
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atio84 as aims of this figure, recommends it as a valuable exercise,85 remarks
on the best position for it in a speech,86 and in book 9 of the Institutio, he
gives a thorough treatment of the criteria for a good prosopopoeia (it must be
plausible, i.e. suited in style and content to the fictitious speaker), its pur-
pose (again, variatio and affectus), and possible variations (different persons
speaking, indicative vs. subjunctive, and direct vs. reported speech).87
A side point on the use of silence can be made here: Cicero even uses
a figure which we might call anti-prosopopoeia, when he introduces abstract
dire iudex videtur aliena mala deflentis, sed sensum ac vocem auribus accipere misero-
rum, quorum etiam mutus aspectus lacrimas movet: quantoque essent miserabiliora si ea
dicerent ipsi, tanto sunt quadam portione ad adficiendum potentiora cum velut ipsorum
ore dicuntur, ut scaenicis actoribus eadem vox eademque pronuntiatio plus ad movendos
adfectus sub persona valet.”
84 Quint. Inst. 11.1.41 “denique non modo quot in causa totidem in prosopopoeia sunt va-
rietates, sed hoc etiam plures, quod in his puerorum, feminarum, populorum, mutarum
etiam rerum adsimulamus adfectus, quibus omnibus debetur suus decor.”
85 Quint. Inst. 3.8.49–50 “ideoque longe mihi difficillimae videntur prosopopoeiae, in quibus
ad relicum suasoriae laborem accedit etiam personae difficultas: namque idem illud aliter
Caesar, aliter Cicero, aliter Cato suadere debebit. utilissima vero haec exercitatio, vel quod
duplicis est operis vel quod poetis quoque aut historiarum futuris scriptoribus plurimum
confert: verum et oratoribus necessaria. [50] nam sunt multae a Graecis Latinisque com-
positae orationes quibus alii uterentur, ad quorum condicionem vitamque aptanda quae
dicebantur fuerunt.”
86 Quint. Inst. 4.1.28 “in epilogo vero liceat totos effundere adfectus, et fictam orationem in-
duere personis et defunctos excitare et pignora reorum producere: quae minus in exordiis
sunt usitata.”
87 Quint. Inst. 9.2.29–32 “illa adhuc audaciora et maiorum, ut Cicero existimat, laterum, fic-
tiones personarum, quae piροσωpiοpiοιίαι dicuntur: mire namque cum variant orationem tum
excitant. [30] his et adversariorum cogitationes velut secum loquentium protrahimus (qui
tamen ita demum a fide non abhorrent si ea locutos finxerimus quae cogitasse eos non
sit absurdum), et nostros cum aliis sermones et aliorum inter se credibiliter introducimus,
et suadendo, obiurgando, querendo, laudando, miserando personas idoneas damus. [31]
quin deducere deos in hoc genere dicendi et inferos excitare concessum est. urbes etiam
populique vocem accipiunt. ac sunt quidam qui has demum prosopopoiias dicant in
quibus et corpora et verba fingimus: sermones hominum adsimulatos dicere dialogous
malunt, quod Latinorum quidam dixerunt sermocinationem. [32] ego iam recepto more
utrumque eodem modo appellavi: nam certe sermo fingi non potest ut non personae
sermo fingatur. sed in iis quae natura non permittit hoc modo mollior fit figura: ‘etenim
si mecum patria mea, quae mihi vita mea multo est carior, si cuncta Italia, si omnis res
publica sic loquatur: Marce Tulli, quid agis’? illud audacius genus: ‘quae tecum, Catilina,
sic agit et quodam modo tacita loquitur: nullum iam aliquot annis facinus extitit nisi per
te’.”
150
Chapter 3 Limits of performance: pauses and interruptions
Section 3.3 Dialogues and related settings
objects not as speaking (instead of himself) but, on the contrary, as silent.88
This feature is not mentioned in rhetorical theory.
3.3.4 Pauses for procedural reasons
A kind of technical pause occurs when the orator interrupts his speech for
court proceedings, i.e. for evidence or a law being read out. This is quite
frequent in Greek forensic speeches,89 but less so in Roman oratory, as in Ro-
man courts the examination of the evidence was conducted separately from
the set speeches of prosecution and defence.90 Speeches could contain re-
readings of evidence already given (this occurred in actiones secundae given
after the evidence91) or readings of written evidence taken from witnesses
who would not appear in person.92 Pauses for procedural reasons are recog-
nisable in six of Cicero’s extant speeches,93 but as these pauses are entirely
88 Cic. Q. Rosc. 17 “dabit enim nobis iam tacite vita acta in alterutram partem firmum et grave
testimonium”; Cic. Sull. 82 “atque ut de eorum constantia atque animo in rem publicam
dicam quorum tacita gravitas et fides de uno quoque loquitur neque cuiusquam orna-
menta orationis desiderat”; Cic. Mil. 11 “silent enim leges inter arma”; Cic. Verr. 2.5.176
“de omnibus nobis, si qui tantulum de recta regione deflexerit, non illa tacita existima-
tio quam antea contemnere solebatis, sed vehemens ac liberum populi Romani iudicium
consequetur.”
89 Cf. the examples p. 112, n. 479, where the orator explicitly refers to a witness or piece of
evidence “to prove that I speak true”; there are many more instances where the reference
is made without the claim of truth. A rather curious point is made by Lysias, who uses the
duration of the witness’ statements to get some rest (Lys. or. 12.61); something different
occurs in one of Demosthenes’ speeches, where he carries on instead of making a “pro-
cedural pause”, because the clerk is unable to find the proper statute (temporarily, it is
indeed read out a few paragraphs later (Dem. or. 21.108).
90 Mommsen (1899, p. 426–427), Greenidge (1901, p. 477).
91 Greenidge (1901, p. 478).
92 Greenidge (1901, p. 488).
93 Cic. Tull. 24 “audite, quaeso, in eas res quas commemoro hominum honestorum testimo-
nium. haec quae mei testes dicunt etc.”; Cic. Font. 18 “quas si antea non legistis, nunc ex
nobis quid de eis rebus Fonteius ad legatos suos scripserit, quid ad eum illi rescripserint,
cognoscite. L. M. AD C. ANNIVM LEG., AD C. FONTEIVM LEG., L. 〈A.〉 AB C. ANNIO
LEG., AB C. FONTEIO LEG.”; Cic. Cluent. 168 “quem propter animi dolorem pertenuis sus-
picio potuisset ex illo loco testem in A. Cluentium constituere, is hunc suo testimonio sub-
levat; quod recita.”; Cic. Leg. agr. 2.48 “eam tu mihi ex ordine recita de legis scripto populi
Romani auctionem; quam me hercule ego praeconi huic ipsi luctuosam et acerbam praed-
icationem futuram puto.—(AUCTIO)—”; Cic. Flacc. 20 “quam vero facile falsas rationes
inferre et in tabulas quodcumque commodum est referre soleant, ex Cn. Pompei litteris
ad Hypsaeum et Hypsaei ad Pompeium missis, quaeso, cognoscite.—LITTERAE POMPEI
ET HYPSAEI.—”, 27 “licuisse ut intellegas, cognosce quid me consule senatus decreverit,
cum quidem nihil a superioribus continuorum annorum decretis discesserit.—SENATVS
CONSVLTVM.—”, 78 “num aliter censuit senatus? ‘in absentem.’ decrevit, cum ibidem
esses, cum prodire nolles; non est hoc in absentem, sed in latentem reum.—SENATVS
CONSVLTVM ET DECRETVM FLACCI.—”; “recita.—LITTERAE Q. CICERONIS.—”; Cic. Cael.
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planned and controlled by the orator and have no particular oratorical rele-
vance as pauses, rhetorical theory does not treat the issue.
3.3.5 Conclusion
Dialogical settings, real or fictitious, are rare both in the Attic Orators and in
Cicero’s oratory, and Cicero does not cover the point in his theoretical works.
All the more remarkable is Quintilian’s advice on exploiting interruptions by
single persons and on simulating these. The figure of prosopopoeia, where the
orator creates the appearance of someone else speaking in his place, had a
set place in oratorical practice and rhetorical theory and is duly treated also
by Quintilian.
3.4 Interruption by the audience
Within the dialogical setting which I have considered so far, events of inter-
ruption have been articulate and made by a single person, aimed at engaging
the orator in some kind of conversation. A different type altogether are in-
terruptions by the audience, or part of the audience (and by this I mean not
only the addressees of the speech but anyone who is listening, for what-
ever reason): here a dialogical situation is in most cases not aimed at, nor
does it actually arise. Instead, the action of the audience has the sole (or at
least main) intention of interrupting the orator, of hindering him from con-
tinuing his speech, from being understood, or from speaking at all. Beyond
this, I shall include in this section a broad spectrum of audience reactions,
although not every (audible) audience reaction is necessarily an interruption
of the speaker, as he may still be able to carry on and be understood. Even if
the orator is effectively hindered in his speech, the interruption can be pro-
voked by himself (in which case he will assume that the outcry will die away
in a reasonable time), or unprovoked and unexpected, but still welcomed as
a positive signal. Interruptions of all these kinds are possible whenever the
orator has an audience, even if it only consists of a single person—and since
an orator without an audience is no orator at all, interruptions are an integral
55 “ipsius iurati religionem auctoritatemque percipite atque omnia diligenter testimonii
verba cognoscite. recita.—L. LUCCEI TESTIMONIVM.—”
152
Chapter 3 Limits of performance: pauses and interruptions
Section 3.4 Interruption by the audience
part of the business of oratory. At the same time, interruptions are limiting
to the orator, and are outside his immediate control. However, I shall show
that ancient orators also knew how to turn the topic into a challenge as well
as a tool that could be used to their advantage.
3.4.1 Methodological remarks
Records of actual speech interruptions in antiquity are scarce, of course. Yet
we find some indications in the extant speeches, the clearest of which consist
of the orator actually mentioning the interruption: e.g. “clamor iste”,94 “ves-
tra admurmuratio”.95 We find examples of both positive and negative inter-
ruptions, and any conclusion about the one or the other being more frequent
must remain somewhat speculative, as it would seem probable that negative
interruptions were less likely to be included in the published speech, even
though they may have been just as frequent, or more, in reality.96
A more implicit signal of a pause due to interruption is to be seen when the
orator asks for attention,97 implying that this is necessary (although whether
it was, and whether an actual pause occurred in the delivery, is impossible
to tell). The most remarkable example in Cicero’s speeches is the beginning
of Pro Cluentio (Cic. Cluent. 1–8), where the orator asks for attention several
times. This paints an image of a particularly noisy and agitated audience
and again raises the question how these passages came to be included in the
written speech: did Cicero anticipate a difficult audience, and if so, how?98
Or if, as is quite likely, we have a version of the speech written up from mem-
ory in the aftermath and edited to some degree in content and style,99 what
does it reveal about the actual speech situation? Indeed, we cannot know
94 Cic. Rab. perd. 18 “nihil me clamor iste commovet sed consolatur, cum indicat esse quos-
dam civis imperitos sed non multos”.
95 Cic. Manil. 37 “vestra admurmuratio facit, Quirites, ut agnoscere videamini qui haec fe-
cerint”.
96 The case of Cicero’s Pro Milone comes to mind as a somewhat extreme example; it is to be
expected that there are many lesser ones which are unknown to us.
97 Cf. p. 163 on the audience’s attentive silence.
98 The question is particularly relevant as the prooemium was a part of the speech which
Cicero usually prepared in detail beforehand (Quint. Inst. 10.7.30). However, even if he
did so in the case of Pro Cluentio, this written version of the prooemium is not necessarily
identical with that in the extant speech.
99 This is Kirby’s opinion regarding this speech (Kirby, 1990, p. 162–170).
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anything with certainty and in any detail about the audience’s behaviour at
the trial, nor even about anything Cicero did or did not say. But, as Kirby
observes, this
does not concern us here, for we are incapable of practising
rhetorical criticism except on the text we have. If we can have any
faith that our received text bears close resemblance to the speech
as originally delivered, then our inquiry can extend also to the
effect of the speech in its original historical milieu.100
Whether or not the text of the speech as we have it is historically “correct”,
it is at any rate authentic for the oratorical practice of its time, so that we may
at least ask what Cicero intended by addressing his audience in the way de-
scribed above, but also what he intended to achieve in his readers by includ-
ing these passages in the published version of the speech.101 The impression
given by the extant text is an audience which is noisy at the beginning, but
unusually quiet halfway through the speech.102 This contrast serves a rhetor-
ical purpose. The image of an excited audience at the beginning underlines
implicitly Cicero’s claim that the case (with all its history) has caused much
gossip in the Roman public (Cluent. 4). This image is maintained through-
out the first third of the speech103 but changes, quite suddenly, in Cluent. 63,
with exuberant praise of the judges’ attention. It is even more surprising as
it is not presented as a change—on the contrary, Cicero implies that the audi-
ence has been highly attentive all along. The earlier tension, while the orator
had to work rather against the audience and their noise, suddenly relaxes
and the orator is now completely with his audience, having even apparently
forgotten (or forgiven) his earlier difficulties with them. With hindsight it
is remarkable that this suggestive flattering is placed immediately before a
100 Kirby (1990, p. 163), italics by Kirby.
101 Cf. Fuhrmann (1990, p. 61) (on Cic. Verr. 2) “Der in die imaginäre Gegenwart der Verhand-
lung geführte Leser sollte glauben, er werde darüber belehrt, mit welchen Mitteln Cicero
auf die Richter eingewirkt hatte – er sollte darüber vergessen, daß der Appell ihm galt,
daß er also der wahre Adressat der Einwirkung war.”
102 E.g. Cic. Cluent. 93 “quod nunc nostra defensio audiatur tanto silentio”. Although the
argument here is made about the entire speech, in contrast to Junius’ defence in 74 BC,
whom defendendi sui potestas erepta sit, this stands in contrast to the pleas for attention
in the first paragraphs; however, in order for the argument to work in the actual speech
situation, the orator needs only a sufficiently silent audience in the very moment when
the argument is made. This is therefore what is implied by the written text.
103 E.g. Cic. Cluent. 29 “sentio [. . . ] vos [. . . ] vehementer esse commotos”.
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crucial, but in fact very weak, argument of the speech.104 As a rhetorical
strategy it may be seen as Cicero’s attempt to gain the jury’s sympathy and
prevent them from examining his argument too critically; as a literary strat-
egy, directed at his reader, it is a demonstration of Cicero’s oratorical excel-
lence, as the reader (who is able to reread the passage and thus more likely
to consider it with critical distance) sees through the strategy which enabled
Cicero to deceive the jury.105 Indeed, whether or not the reader reads the
passage critically or not, or whether he is deceived and convinced like the
primary addressee or whether he marvels at Cicero’s power of deception,
Cicero succeeds.
In the following considerations I shall mostly take the extant speeches as
plausible (though not necessarily exact) representations of what was said
on the respective occasions, not as literary products aimed at readers as a
secondary audience.
3.4.2 Background
As has already become apparent, a general ambiguity dominates this topic:
every orator wants, and needs, to move his audience, but if the audience gets
too excited and noisy, the orator will have difficulties in getting his message
across. The same is true, to a degree, for individuals: it may well be a sign
of the orator’s success if his opponent loses his composure, but this can also
develop into a serious obstacle.
Both in Athens and Rome, a large audience and the resulting noise and
disquiet is generally associated with interest in the orator and his case, rather
104 Cic. Cluent. 64 “unum quidem certe nemo erit tam inimicus Cluentio qui mihi non con-
cedat, si constet corruptum illud esse iudicium, aut ab Habito aut ab Oppianico esse cor-
ruptum: si doceo non ab Habito, vinco ab Oppianico; si ostendo ab Oppianico, purgo
Habitum.” Cf. p. 108. On the weakness of the argument e.g. Fuhrmann (1997, p. 60),
Burnand (2004, p. 284).
The flattery is continued two paragraphs later (66 “vos quaeso—ut adhuc me attente
audistis—item quae reliqua sunt audiatis”) and taken up again later in the speech (89
“hic ego magis ut consuetudinem servem, quam quod vos non vestra hoc sponte faciatis,
petam a vobis ut me, dum de his singulis disputo iudiciis, attente audiatis”); similarly 156
“attenditis et auditis silentio sicut facere debetis”.
105 As Cicero himself claimed: Quint. Inst. 2.17.21 “se tenebras offudisse iudicibus in causa
Cluenti gloriatus est”.
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than considered a disturbance.106 Vice versa, a small and quiet audience is
irritating to the orator, even if there are external reasons.107
In the Pro Sestio, however, a philosophical standpoint is employed, ac-
cording to which visible and audible audience interest is generally a sign
of favour, but the ideal (gravis) orator does not need it.108
In this section, I shall discuss interruptions of a speech by the audience,
which can be either negative (uproar, protest) or positive (applause etc.). Re-
lated to these phenomena, but as their counterparts, are situations of audi-
ence silence: positive (attentive, benevolent) silence as opposed to protest-
ing, negative (hostile) silence as opposed to applause. During a speech,
the audience normally has nothing to say, yet they are expected (more so
in Athens than in Rome) to express their opinion constantly, which must
cause some interruption to the speaker. On the other hand, this expectation
means that silence is not necessarily positive, i.e. attentive (though it can be,
more likely in Rome than in Athens). A special situation is the fictitious or
actual dialogue, where the audience is given a real chance to speak during
the orator’s speech; this has been covered in section 3.3.1, see above p. 140.
From the ancient texts we are provided with far more evidence on these
topics than on interruptions by a single person, which have been dealt with
briefly in section 3.3.2.
106 Bers (1985) includes in his discussion of θόρυβος “the voicing of positive as well as nega-
tive sentiments” (p. 1) and cites examples for positive and negative audience utterances in
Athenian courts. Cf. Carey (1994, p. 177) “We know from a number of sources that Athe-
nian juries were highly demonstrative. They were inclined to shout their approval and
disapproval of what they were hearing.” This behaviour was expected and accepted by
everyone, including the speakers; consequently it made not much sense for them to ask for
silence. Even when asking for attention (see p. 166) they probably did not mean the sort
of focused attention which a modern orator would call for, rather emotional involvement.
For Rome cf. e.g. Cic. S. Rosc. 11 “quanta multitudo hominum convenerit ad hoc iudicium,
vides”, from which Cicero infers a “cupiditas, ut acria ac severa iudicia fiant”; Cic. Sest.
36 “neque huic vestro tanto studio audiendi nec vero huic tantae multitudini, quanta mea
memoria numquam ullo in iudicio fuit, deero”.
107 Cic. Mil. 1 “haec novi iudici nova forma terret oculos: [. . . ] non enim corona consessus
vester cinctus est, ut solebat; non usitata frequentia stipati sumus”.
108 Cic. Sest. 115 “sit hoc sane leve, quod non ita est, quoniam optimo cuique impertitur; sed,
si est leve, homini gravi leve est, ei vero qui pendet rebus levissimis, qui rumore et, ut ipsi
loquuntur, favore populi tenetur et ducitur, plausum immortalitatem, sibilum mortem
videri necesse est.”
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3.4.3 Theoretical advice
The best theoretical advice on (negative) interruptions in general is found
in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, which contains an entire chapter109 dealing,
under the keyword of piροκατάληψις, with means of both preventing and re-
acting to interruptions by the audience and (to a lesser extent) by the op-
ponent. Put briefly, the author suggests directly addressing the interrupters
and reproving their behaviour by referring to common rules of decency and
to written and unwritten laws for court and assemblies. This quite extensive
and systematic advice on the problem is not taken up by the later rhetorical
works considered here; in particular Cicero’s rhetorical treatises do not treat
the topic in general. The phenomenon is present there (as will be seen below
p. 167), but there are no practical considerations—other than in Quintilian,
so that it is tempting to assume a major difference in the attitude towards au-
dience reactions between the Republic and the Empire. A noisy audience is
generally considered somewhat more negative by Quintilian110 than by Ci-
cero. When Quintilian gives direct advice on dealing with interruptions, he
takes an evasive line and suggests that the speaker take refuge in a prepared
digressio until the uproar has died away.111 Even when considering that this
advice is placed in a section not on interruptions but on digressio, there is
still a remarkable difference from the position in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum
which insists on directly attacking the interrupters, not evading them. Both
orator and audience apparently tended more towards an attitude of digni-
fied reserve in the Empire than in earlier, more “democratic” eras.
3.4.4 Practice: negative interruptions
Interruptions of a negative type, i.e. directed against the orator’s person,
case, purpose, etc., are usually termed θόρυβος / clamor, although both terms
109 Rhet. Alex. 1432b19–1433a29.
110 Quint. Inst. 4.2.37 “quae quidem virtus [narratio aperta ac dilucida] neglegitur a plurimis,
qui ad clamorem dispositae vel etiam forte circumfusae multitudinis compositi non ferunt
illud intentionis silentium, nec sibi diserti videntur nisi omnia tumultu et vociferatione
concusserint”.
111 Quint. Inst. 4.3.16 “innumerabilia sunt haec, quorum alia sic praeparata adferimus,
quaedam ex occasione vel necessitate ducimus si quid nobis agentibus novi accidit, in-
terpellatio, interventus alicuius, tumultus.”
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can carry negative as well as positive connotations, depending on the con-
text.112
In Athens, especially the ἐκκλησία must have been incredibly noisy, and
expected to be so by everyone. In the Attic Orators we find various ref-
erences to the audience shouting and hindering an orator from speaking,
and most of these references imply that this behaviour was not considered
unusual or indecent (even though unwelcome to the orator concerned).113
Only Aeschines, in an early passage of his speech in the Crown Trial, de-
clares that the normal behaviour in the ἐκκλησία should be so that any orator
is able to speak uninterrupted, but in the current socio-political climate is
not—however, at a later point in the same speech, Aeschines tells how De-
mosthenes was in an ἐκκλησία meeting shouted down for a particular answer
he gave, and seems to approve of this reaction of the crowd.114 The earlier
passage thus seems not to represent a common opinion, not even Aeschines’
general opinion, but an argument used at this specific point in this speech.
Quintilian, too, conveys this general impression in his anecdote about De-
mosthenes’ shouting exercises,115 and modern research confirms that “both
direct and indirect evidence suggest that informal banter between the speak-
ers themselves, interruptions of the speakers by the demos, and vocal debate
between sections of the demos aligned behind opposing politicians were
wholly typical and actually integral features of Assembly debate, and, by
112 Liddell et al. (1940) s.v. θορυβέω “2. shout in token of approbation or the contrary: a. cheer,
applaud [. . . ] b. more freq. raise clamour”. E.g. Dem. or. 8.30 “εὐθέως φατὲ και θορυβεῖθ’
ὡς ὀρθῶς λέγει”. On clamor see the examples from p. 168.
113 Lys. or. 12.73; Dem. or. 2.29, 8.3, 8.23, 8.77, 18.143, 19.35
114 Aischin. Ctes. 2–4 ἐβουλόμην μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Α᾿θηναῖοι, καὶ τὴν βουλὴν τοὺς piεντα-
κοσίους καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας ὑpiὸ τῶν ἐφεστηκότων ὀρθῶς διοικεῖσθαι, καὶ τοὺς νόμους
οὓς ἐνομοθέτησεν ὁ Σόλων piερὶ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων εὐκοσμίας ἰσχύειν, ἵνα ἐξῆν piρῶτον
μὲν τῷ piρεσβυτάτῳ τῶν piολιτῶν, ὥσpiερ οἱ νόμοι piροστάττουσι, σωφρόνως ἐpiὶ τὸ βῆμα
piαρελθόντι ἄνευ θορύβου καὶ ταραχῆς ἐξ ἐμpiειρίας τὰ βέλτιστα τῇ piόλει συμβουλεύειν,
δεύτερον δ’ ἤδη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων piολιτῶν τὸν βουλόμενον καθ’ ἡλικίαν χωρὶς καὶ ἐν μέρει
piερὶ ἑκάστου γνώμην ἀpiοφαίνεσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ ἄν μοι δοκεῖ ἥ τε piόλις ἄριστα διοικεῖσθαι,
αἵ τε κρίσεις ἐλάχισται γίγνεσθαι. ἐpiειδὴ δὲ piάντα τὰ piρότερον ὡμολογημένα καλῶς ἔχειν
νυνὶ καταλέλυται [. . . ]. τῆς δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων ἀκοσμίας οὐκέτι κρατεῖν δύνανται οὔθ’ οἱ
piρυτάνεις οὔθ’ οἱ piρόεδροι οὔθ’ ἡ piροεδρεύουσα φυλή, τὸ δέκατον μέρος τῆς piόλεως., 224
καὶ piερὶ τούτων ἐν ἅpiασιν Α᾿θηναίοις ἐξελεγχθεὶς ὑpi’ ἐμοῦ καὶ κληθεὶς ξενοκτόνος, οὐ τὸ
ἀσέβημα ἠρνήσω, ἀλλ’ ἀpiεκρίνω ἐφ’ ᾧ ἀνεβόησεν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ὅσοι ξένοι piεριέστασαν τὴν
ἐκκλησίαν·
115 Quint. Inst. 10.3.30 “propter quae idem ille tantus amator secreti Demosthenes in litore, in
quo se maximo cum sono fluctus inlideret, meditans consuescebat contionum fremitus non
expavescere.”
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extension, of Athenian democracy.”116 Consequently, “[a]s a vocal response,
the uproar defines the [Athenian] audience as a group of potential speakers
rather than of pure listeners. This may be the reason why Greek orators do
not aim for silent admiration, as Roman orators do.”117
In Athenian courts, (attentive) audience silence was not the norm, either,
but it was more expectable than in the ἐκκλησία. Victor Bers has shown
that both in actual forensic speeches and in their parodies in Old Comedy,
“[s]peakers ask, in varying combinations, for attention, a friendly hearing,
justice—and silence. Since these entreaties are clichés associated with one
another, any one of them might well suggest another.”118 Reports in the
Attic Orators about an orator being shouted down in court (in a real or hy-
pothetical setting) imply that this was not out of the ordinary, but shone a
very bad light on the respective speaker (more so than in the noisy assembly
setting).119 Moreover, the function of the “μὴ θορυβεῖτε” request as a topos (a
type of captatio benevolentiae) is visible from its appearance not only in “real”
speeches,120 but also in Plato’s idealised Apologia121 and the standardised
prooemia by Demosthenes.122
But another finding from evidence in Athenian forensic oratory is that
“[t]he manipulation of thorubos was an element in rhetorical strategy”,123
used in positive and negative connotations: Bers identifies three forms of
inciting θόρυβος in Athenian courts,124 but also states that “[s]peakers never,
to my knowledge, urge the jurymen to shout down their opponents in a
blunderbuss expression of unequivocal outrage. [. . . ] Suggestions of tho-
116 Tacon (2001, p. 177).
117 Montiglio (2000, p. 292); cf. Wohl (2009, p. 165–166) “Cleon’s ideal of a manly and resistant
audience [in Thucydides] had its practical counterpart in the thorubos, the loud uproar
with which audiences often responded to speeches in the Assembly or law courts. This
raucous heckling, as Robert Wallace notes, was itself a form of parrhesia. It was a vocal
demonstration that even when he was only listening, the Athenian was still exercising the
rhetorical freedom of a good citizen.”
118 Bers (1985, p. 7).
119 Dem. or. 45.6; Aischin. Tim. 34, 164, leg. 4, 153
120 E.g. Dem. or. 5.15 “καί μοι μὴ θορυβήσῃ μηδεὶς piρὶν ἀκοῦσαι”, 13.3 “καί μοι μὴ θορυβήσητ’
ἐφ’ ᾧ μέλλω λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἀκούσαντες κρίνατε”.
121 Plat. Apol. 17d, 20e, 21a, 27b, 30c.
122 E.g. Dem. pr. 4.1, 10.1, 21.4, 26.1 (regardless of their authenticity).
123 Bers (1985, p. 8).
124 Bers (1985, p. 9–10).
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rubos attach rather to specific points”, i.e. the audience is asked e.g. not to
allow the opponent to speak off-topic, or to force him to present a certain
law.125 Shouting and noise from the audience (both judges and bystanders)
was thus a common element of Athenian courts, but not as omnipresent as
in the ἐκκλησία.
In the Roman Republic, trials were usually held on or in vicinity of the
Forum and had to deal with the general surrounding noise, from where in-
terruptions could occur without any intention on the interrupter’s side. Gen-
eral noise was so normal that silence in the Forum was worth mentioning,126
and both Cicero and Quintilian count the Forum noise as part of the usual
business of oratory.127
Beyond this, there were trials where the audience was excited from the
outset, because of the crime, the persons involved, the political implications
etc., and vividly participated in the ongoing action,128 especially in alterca-
tiones129 which were more prone to action and reaction anyway than a single
speech. Sensationalism and craving for scandals certainly played a role, as
did the outrage which was induced by interested parties rather than reflect-
ing genuine feeling (notoriously, Clodius’ gangs in the Milo trials, in 56 BC130
and after Clodius’ death in 52 BC131 tried, quite successfully, to instigate the
125 Bers (1985, p. 10–12), cf. Dem. or. 24.193.
126 Asconius ad Pro Milone 41 “tantum silentium toto foro fuit quantum esse in aliquo foro
posset”.
127 Cic. De orat. 1.157 “educenda deinde dictio est ex hac domestica exercitatione et umbratili
medium in agmen, in pulverem, in clamorem, in castra atque in aciem forensem”; Quint. Inst.
12.5.6 (on Trachalus) “certe cum in basilica Iulia diceret primo tribunali, quattuor autem
iudicia, ut moris est, cogerentur atque omnia clamoribus fremerent, et auditum eum et intellec-
tum et, quod agentibus ceteris contumeliosissimum fuit, laudatum quoque ex quattuor
tribunalibus memini.”
128 Cic. Cluent. 108 (about an earlier trial) “neque enim ipse dici patiebatur nec per multi-
tudinem concitatam consistere cuiquam in dicendo licebat”.
129 E.g. Cic. Brut. 164 (on Crassus’ speech against Cn. Domitius) “nulla est enim altercatio
clamoribus umquam habita maioribus”.
130 Cic. ad Q. fr. 2.3.2 “dixit Pompeius sive voluit; nam, ut surrexit, operae Clodianae cla-
morem sustulerunt, idque ei perpetua oratione contigit non modo ut acclamatione sed ut
convicio et maledictis impediretur. qui ut peroravit (nam in eo sane fortis fuit; non est
deterritus; dixit omnia atque interdum etiam silentio, cum auctoritate †peregerat†) sed ut pe-
roravit, surrexit Clodius. ei tantus clamor a nostris (placuerat enim referre gratiam) ut
neque mente nec lingua neque ore consisteret.”
131 Asconius ad Pro Milone 41–42 “Cicero cum inciperet dicere, exceptus est acclamatione Clo-
dianorum, qui se continere ne metu quidem circumstantium militum potuerunt. itaque
non ea qua solitus erat constantia dixit.”
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people). In any case, the audience aims (or at least seems to) at a recognisable
goal, chiefly a particular result of the trial.
While an actual hostile interruption by the audience mostly meant a prob-
lem for the orator that had to be countered,132 reports about such clamores
could be exploited in the argumentation. Cicero uses the point in the Verres
trial, where he underlines the importance of his argument by the emotional
reaction of the audience at earlier occasions.133 In the Pro Milone, Cicero re-
lates the excitement at a contio on the day before and anticipates the clamor
which is to be expected from it, thus admonishing the judges not to let genus
illud hominum influence their decision (at the same time launching a char-
acter attack on his opponents).134 In the Pro Rabirio perduellionis reo, Cicero
was confronted with a clamor which was clearly audible but not loud enough
to prevent him from being understood, and he directly drew from there an
argument in his own favour.135
For the situation of political speeches in Rome, the difference between sen-
ate and contio speeches must be kept in mind, which also accounts for a con-
trast to Athenian circumstances: important political speeches in Athens were
usually given in the ἐκκλησία, which was about as noisy and excited as a Ro-
132 The most famous case is probably (if Asconius is to be believed) Cicero’s ultimate failure
in his defence of Milo, when he was more or less shouted down by Clodius’ gangs, despite
the presence of Pompey’s troops in the Forum (Asconius ad Pro Milone 41–42; a different
view, probably derived from Cicero’s extant speech [which may or may not represent how
the actual mood of orator and audience at the trial had been], in Plut. Cic. 35.4 and Cassius
Dio 40.54.2). Cf. p. 208 on the strategies in the surviving speech.
133 Cic. Verr. 2.2.47 (at a meeting of the Syracusian senate) “verum etiam ipsi illi auctores iniu-
riae et ex aliqua particula socii praedae ac rapinarum clamare coeperunt sibi ut haberet
hereditatem. tantus in curia clamor factus est ut populus concurreret.”; 2.2.127 (at an elec-
tion in Sicily) “fit clamor maximus, cum id universis indignum ac nefarium videretur”;
2.3.80 (at a witness account in the same trial) “itaque cum Philinus Herbitensis, homo
disertus et prudens et domi nobilis, de calamitate aratorum et de fuga et de reliquorum
paucitate publice diceret, animadvertistis, iudices, gemitum populi Romani, cuius fre-
quentia huic causae numquam defuit”. In the last case, Cicero refers to the earlier reaction
of the corona to impress the jury.
134 Cic. Mil. 3 “hesterna etiam contione incitati sunt, ut vobis voce praeirent quid iudicaretis.
quorum clamor si qui forte fuerit, admonere vos debebit, ut eum civem retineatis, qui
semper genus illud hominum clamoresque maximos prae vestra salute neglexit.”
135 Cic. Rab. perd. 18 “nihil me clamor iste commovet sed consolatur, cum indicat esse quos-
dam civis imperitos sed non multos”. The remark stands as an unrelated insertion in the
middle of the argumentation and is clearly not part of the prepared speech but of the
edition after the trial. Since the trial was held before an assembly of the people, and the
actual speech as well as its difficult circumstances were thus widely known, the published
version (published by Cicero among his “consular speeches”) is likely to represent it quite
closely.
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man contio. The majority of Cicero’s political speeches, however, were set in
the senate, which was probably much easier as far as unspecific noise was
concerned, having its assemblies in the Curia or in temples, without a corona
of bystanders inside the building. Furthermore, the rules of procedure gen-
erally ensured that once a senator had been given the floor, he could not be
interrupted,136 and by and large a dignified silence must be assumed to have
been the rule, at least compared to the Forum. Of course, these regulations
were broken, and the senators rose in collective indignation against a speaker
in exceptional situations, as reported in the cases of Piso137 and, probably
the best-known example, Catiline.138 In the De provinciis consularibus, Cicero
mentions an interruption—and immediately draws an argument from it to
justify his position:
at ego idem nunc in provinciis decernendis, qui illas omnes res
egi silentio, interpellor, cum in superioribus causis hominis orna-
menta valuerint, in hac me nihil aliud nisi ratio belli, nisi summa
utilitas rei publicae, moveat.139
Cicero compares earlier political speeches, where he has spoken unhindered
in Caesar’s favour, to the current speech, where he is interrupted while
speaking rather for the res publica than for any single person—this is the
picture he draws in the published version of the speech.140 To the reader
this conveys the impression that Cicero met with resistance exactly when he
argued for a particularly honourable cause, for the state, and that this was
exactly the situation when he would absolutely not back down. This impres-
sion again functions regardless whether the interruption had taken place in
the actual speech or not.
136 Mommsen (1871, vol. 3, p. 939).
137 Cic. Pis. 29 “an tum eratis consules cum, quacumque de re verbum facere coeperatis aut
referre ad senatum, cunctus ordo reclamabat ostendebatque nihil esse vos acturos, nisi
prius de me rettulissetis?”
138 Plut. Cic. 16.3 “ἐνταῦθα καὶ τοῦ Κατιλίνα μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλθόντος ὡς ἀpiολογησομένου,
συγκαθίσαι μὲν οὐδεὶς ὑpiέμεινε τῶν συγκλητικῶν, ἀλλὰ piάντες ἀpiὸ τοῦ βάθρου μετῆλθον.
ἀρξάμενος δὲ λέγειν ἐθορυβεῖτο, καὶ τέλος ἀναστὰς ὁ Κικέρων piροσέταξεν αὐτῷ τῆς
piόλεως ἀpiαλλάττεσθαι”.
139 Cic. Prov. cons. 29.
140 According to Fuhrmann (1970, vol. 6, p. 59), the published version was a political pam-
phlet, based on the actual speech in the senate.
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The Roman contio must be imagined at least as noisy as the Athenian
ἐκκλησία in general; in contrast, however, while everybody could attend, not
everybody was allowed to speak at a contio, but only those invited by the
magistrate who had called the contio. Besides, it was not (as the ἐκκλησία
was) a general meeting of all citizens,141 and there is a tendency that those
who attended a particular contio would usually rather agree with the speak-
ers, and not tend to hostile interruptions:
The nature and purpose of contiones meant that certainly by the
late republic they were useful to a politician only if he could com-
mand a supportive audience. [. . . ] the internal logic of the insti-
tution was to develop into a stage-managed political demonstra-
tion.142
However, “[e]s kam auch vor, dass jemand gezwungen wurde, öffentlich zu
einer konkreten Frage Stellung zu nehmen”, in a contio called by an oppos-
ing party,143 in which case a less favourable audience must be assumed—a
scenario which for lack of sufficient evidence defies closer examination.
Whenever the issue of hostile interruptions by the audience is broached
directly in the Attic Orators’ or Cicero’s speeches, the focus is on its coun-
terpart, the topic of attentive silence. Just as loud audience reactions can be
either positive or negative, so can audience silence, which means that the or-
ator can easily utilise it as he sees fit. In the majority of cases where audience
silence is mentioned, it is connected with an attentive and favourable audi-
ence, which is agreed throughout ancient rhetoric to be a major condition for
the orator’s success.144
References to audience silence in speeches can be sorted into three cat-
egories: occasions of (current or earlier) silence mentioned in the speech;
thanks for silence; and asking for silence.
141 Officially it was, but not actually: Mouritsen (2001, p. 13) “Contiones were highly for-
malised occasions, on which the speakers by definition always addressed the entire Ro-
man people, no matter how small the actual crowd may have been.” Similarly Morstein-
Marx (2004, p. 128); cf. Tan (2008, p. 172–175).
142 Mouritsen (2001, p. 50).
143 Pina Polo (1996, p. 49–50).
144 It is among the most commonly agreed purposes of the prooemium, which are auditorem
benivolum attentum docilem facere (cited e.g. Cic. De orat. 2.80; Quint. Inst. 4.1.5). On the
other hand, causing an inattentive (not necessarily very noisy) audience is a sure sign of a
bad orator (Cic. Brut. 200).
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Occasions of audience silence mentioned in speeches145 can be divided into
addresses to the audience of the current speech who are being silent, and state-
ments of audience silence (which are either reports about audience silence dur-
ing other speeches, i.e. possibly with a different orator, different audience,
or both; or the orator refers to one part of the current audience being silent
while addressing another part, mostly addressing his opponent). The figure
is virtually unknown in the Attic Orators, so examples can only be drawn
from Cicero here. In the case of statements of audience silence, rather neutral
interpretations of this silence as a sign of attention146 are quite likely to be
realistic; more frequent in Cicero’s speeches, however, are presentations of
audience silence as agreement or approval,147 the most notorious of which
is probably the cum tacent, clamant in the first Catilinarian, and it is more
than likely that at least some of these are not realistic descriptions but rather
convenient interpretations, or veri similia, quae causam probabilem reddant.148
This is underlined by the fact that Cicero counts attentive silence either as a
145 Again, we face the problem that we cannot know how far the speech text as we have it
corresponds to the speech as delivered, so statements about actual audience reactions at
a certain occasion are mostly impossible. We can only regard the texts which we have as
plausible examples of actual speeches, and examine how they would have related to the
actual audience (re)action if delivered in this way.
146 Cic. Verr. 2.2.74 “erat hominum conventus maximus, summum silentium, summa exspec-
tatio quonam esset eius cupiditas eruptura”; Cic. Cael. 29 “sed tu [Balbus] mihi videbare
ex communi infamia iuventutis aliquam invidiam Caelio velle conflare; itaque omne illud
silentium, quod est orationi tributum tuae, fuit ob eam causam, quod uno reo proposito
de multorum vitiis cogitabamus.”
147 Cic. Div. in Caec. 23 “nunc tantum id dicam quod tacitus tu mihi adsentiare”; Cic. Catil.
1.20 “quid est, Catilina? ecquid attendis, ecquid animadvertis horum silentium? patiun-
tur, tacent. quid exspectas auctoritatem loquentium, quorum voluntatem tacitorum per-
spicis?”, 1.21 “cum tacent, clamant”; Cic. Sest. 40 “me vero non illius oratio, sed eorum
taciturnitas in quos illa oratio tam improba conferebatur; qui tum, quamquam ob alias
causas tacebant, tamen hominibus omnia timentibus tacendo loqui, non infitiando confi-
teri videbantur.”, 107–108 “[Lentulus] egit causam summa cum gravitate copiaque dicendi
tanto silentio, tanta adprobatione omnium, nihil ut umquam videretur tam populare ad
populi Romani auris accidisse. [. . . ] quo silentio sunt auditi de me ceteri principes civ-
itatis!”; Cic. Planc. 43 “quem iudicem ex illis aut tacitum testem haberes aut vero etiam
excitares?”; Cic. Phil. 7.8 “magna spe ingredior in reliquam orationem, patres conscripti,
quoniam periculosissimum locum silentio sum praetervectus.”
148 Cic. Inv. 1.9 “inventio est excogitatio rerum verarum aut veri similium, quae causam prob-
abilem reddant”.
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weak form of applause,149 or as stronger than loud applause,150 depending
on what best fits his case.
A unique use of the topic of attention is found in the Pro Caelio where
Cicero remarks upon the attention which the jury had (allegedly) paid to
his opponent, the prosecutor Herennius, and verbosely warns against the
rhetorical tricks Herennius had (again, allegedly) employed151—that this ar-
gumentation did not destroy Cicero’s case, even though his own speech was
full of similar tricks, is just another indication that Cicero could expect to win
this case from the beginning.152
The problem is less relevant when Cicero directly addresses the audience
about its own silence (either thanking them for silence or asking for it), as a
gross misinterpretation would be met with immediate protest, leading the si-
lence itself ad absurdum.153 A certain proportion of not incorrect but tenden-
tious interpretations must be assumed nevertheless. This second category,
appreciation of, or offering thanks for attention is a figure again not found in
the Attic Orators, and more frequent in Cicero’s speeches than pure mention
(and interpretation) of positive audience silence. In some cases, it is probably
genuine and is both a means of connecting with the audience and a captatio
benevolentiae; in others it may instead be a confirmation of something which
actually is not there but is wanted or expected, in hope for a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Signs of the latter variant are most clearly discernible in the Pro
Sestio, where Cicero, in the last paragraphs of the speech, is trying hard to
keep his audience’s dwindling attention, combining thanks for listening tam
attente with a promise of brevity;154 and in the unsubtle remark in Pro Clu-
entio where Cicero reminds the jury of their duty to listen silently (while
149 Cic. Sest. 55 “tacentibus dicam? immo vero etiam adprobantibus”.
150 Cic. Deiot. 34 “de plausu autem quid respondeam? qui nec desideratus umquam a te est
et non numquam obstupefactis hominibus ipsa admiratione compressus est et fortasse eo
praetermissus, quia nihil volgare te dignum videri potest.”
151 Cic. Cael. 25 “animadverti enim, iudices, audiri a vobis meum familiarem, L. Herennium,
perattente etc.”
152 See Gotoff (1986) for a fuller analysis of Cicero’s dealing with Herennius’ speech.
153 Again, we cannot deduce anything about actual particular speaking occasions, but it must
have been plausible to use such passages in a speech, and where this happened, it must
have corresponded to actual audience silence.
154 Cic. Sest. 136 “sed ut extremum habeat aliquid oratio mea, et ut ego ante dicendi finem
faciam quam vos me tam attente audiendi, . . . ”. Cf. section 2.5.3 on the topic of “annoying
the audience”.
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ostentatiously appreciating their doing so).155 In the majority of cases, the
validity of the statement is near to impossible to determine.156
Much more frequent again in Cicero’s speeches, and used widely also in
the Attic Orators, is the third category, the figure of asking for attention or
for (attentive) silence.157 Its most frequent form is the generic request for at-
tention,158 actual references to silent attention are found less often (and only
in the Attic Orators, not in Cicero).159 The figure is sometimes combined,
especially by Cicero, with thanks or praise for the attention granted so far,
building a captatio benevolentiae,160 and sometimes it includes a promise of
155 Cic. Cluent. 156 “vos attenditis et auditis silentio sicut facere debetis”.
156 Cic. Cluent. 63 “nam etsi a vobis sic audior ut numquam benignius neque attentius
quemquam auditum putem, tamen vocat me alio iam dudum tacita vestra exspectatio,
quae mihi obloqui videtur: . . . ”, 93 “quid ergo est causae quod nunc nostra defensio au-
diatur tanto silentio, tum Iunio defendendi sui potestas erepta sit?”; Cic. Sest. 31 “etsi me
attentissimis animis summa cum benignitate auditis, iudices”, 115 “facit enim, iudices,
vester iste in me animorum oculorumque coniectus ut mihi iam licere putem remissiore
uti genere dicendi”; Cic. Planc. 36 “neque huic vestro tanto studio audiendi nec vero huic
tantae multitudini, quanta mea memoria numquam ullo in iudicio fuit, deero”; Cic. Phil.
1.38 “cepi fructum, patres conscripti, reversionis meae, quoniam et ea dixi, ut, quicumque
casus consecutus esset, exstaret constantiae meae testimonium, et sum a vobis benigne ac
diligenter auditus.” For further interpretation of the passages from Pro Cluentio see p. 153.
157 It can be connected to, or overlapped with, the figure of piροpiαρασκευή or piροκατασκευή
“when the speaker prepares the audience to attend, in a special way, a course of argument
that he is about to present” (Rowe, 1997, p. 146), which was established in late antique
rhetoric (Hermogenes Inv. 3.2; Fortunatianus Ars rhet. 2.15; Rufinianus De figuris 32; cf.
Lausberg (1990, § 854)).
158 Attic Orators: e.g. Lys. or. 6.11, 10.19, 12.62, 19.11, 21.1, 30.9, 32.19; Dem. or. 18.5, 18.173,
20.74, 20.95, 21.7, 21.24, 21.184, 22.4, 22.38, 23.4, 23.125, 23.194, 24.19, 24.144, 32.3, 35.5;
Aischin. Tim. 39, 116, 192, leg. 1, 22, Ctes. 64; Cicero: Cic. Quinct. 22 “obsecro, C. Aquili
vosque qui adestis in consilio, ut diligenter attendatis, ut singulare genus fraudis et no-
vam rationem insidiarum cognoscere possitis.”; Cic. S. Rosc. 9 “quapropter [i.e. multi-
ple impediments, circumstances, nervousness] vos oro atque obsecro, iudices, ut attente
bonaque cum venia verba mea audiatis.”; Cic. Q. Rosc. 37 “attende, quaeso, Piso”; Cic.
Verr. 2.3.104 “attendite, iudices, diligenter”, 2.3.196 “attendite et, vos quaeso, simul, iu-
dices, aequitatem praetoris attendite.”, 2.4.64 “nunc reliquum, iudices, attendite, de quo
et vos audistis et populus Romanus non nunc primum audiet et in exteris nationibus
usque ad ultimas terras pervagatum est.”; Cic. Leg. agr. 1.12 “audite, audite vos qui amplis-
simo populi senatusque iudicio exercitus habuistis et bella gessistis”; Cic. Sull. 33 “adeste
omnes animis, Quirites, quorum ego frequentia magno opere laetor; erigite mentis au-
risque vestras et me de invidiosis rebus, ut ille putat, dicentem attendite!”; Cic. Phil. 2.10
“alterum peto a vobis, ut me pro me dicentem benigne, alterum ipse efficiam, ut, contra
illum cum dicam, attente audiatis.”
159 E.g. Dem. or. 5.3, 5.15, 13.14; Aischin. leg. 24.
160 Attic Orators: e.g. Aischin. leg. 102; Cicero: Cic. Verr. 2.3.10 “superiore omni oratione
perattentos vestros animos habuimus: id fuit nobis gratum admodum. sed multo erit
gratius si reliqua voletis attendere, propterea quod . . . ”, 2.4.102 “nunc eadem illa, quaeso,
audite et diligenter, sicut adhuc fecistis, attendite.”; Cic. Phil. 1.15 “deinde a vobis, patres
conscripti, peto, ut, etiamsi sequi minus audebitis rationem atque auctoritatem meam,
benigne me tamen, ut adhuc fecistis, audiatis.”, 2.47 “quae peto ut, quamquam multo
notiora vobis quam mihi sunt, tamen ut facitis, attente audiatis. debet enim talibus in
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brevity,161 or an excuse for the length of the speech.162 The last is found in
the speech Pro Cluentio, which shows a remarkable frequency of this specific
feature (not quite as remarkable, maybe, when considering the extraordinary
length of the speech). It has already been discussed above (see p. 153) how
the references to the audience’s behaviour are rhetorically employed with
particular skill in this speech.
Advice on the issue of hostile interruptions and attentive silence is scarce
before Quintilian. The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum has a paragraph on just and
unjust demands an orator might make on the audience, and under the for-
mer classifies “δίκαιον μὲν οὖν ἐστι τό τε piροσέχειν τοῖς λεγομένοις αἰτεῖσθαι
καὶ τὸ μετ’ εὐνοίας ἀκούειν”,163 but without further comment about when and
how to use this. Cicero’s De oratore knows silence as a sign of approval,164
or at least of lenience,165 and shows awareness of the ambiguous nature of
the phenomenon, as both silence and clamor are named as expression of the
same appreciation,166 but Cicero nowhere in his rhetorica indicates how an
orator should aim at such audience reactions, or deal with them.
This changes only with Quintilian; he mentions the figure of asking for
attention twice, and as a means of, or combined with, structuring the
speech.167 This innovation in rhetorical theory seems to be connected to the
rebus excitare animos non cognitio solum rerum, sed etiam recordatio”, 7.9 “peto a vobis,
patres conscripti, ut eadem benignitate, qua soletis, mea verba audiatis”, 13.22 “velim,
patres conscripti, ut adhuc fecistis, me attente audiatis”.
161 Lys. or. 16.9; Cic. Verr. 2.2.108 “tamen paulum etiam attendite”, 2.3.163 “de quo dum certa
et pauca et magna dicam breviter, attendite”, 2.5.42 “haec dum breviter expono, quaeso,
ut fecistis adhuc, diligenter attendite”.
162 Aischin. leg. 44; Cic. Cluent. 160 “atque ut existimetis necessario me de his rebus de quibus
iam dixerim pluribus egisse verbis, attendite reliqua: profecto intellegetis ea quae paucis
demonstrari potuerint brevissime esse defensa”.
163 Rhet. Alex. 1433b19–21.
164 Cic. De orat. 3.33 “[me] verentem, ne, si paulo obsoletior fuerit oratio, non digna exspecta-
tione et silentio fuisse videatur”.
165 Cic. De orat. 3.198 “verum ut in versu vulgus, si est peccatum, videt, sic, si quid in nostra
oratione claudicat, sentit; sed poetae non ignoscit, nobis concedit: taciti tamen omnes non
esse illud, quod diximus, aptum perfectumque cernunt”.
166 Cic. De orat. 3.53 “quem stupefacti dicentem intuentur? in quo exclamant?” A more de-
tailed picture of the ideal behavior of an audience (in court) is given in the Brutus: Cic.
Brut. 290 “cum surgat is qui dicturus sit, significetur a corona silentium, deinde crebrae
assensiones, multae admirationes; risus cum velit, cum velit fletus; ut qui haec procul
videat, etiam si quid agatur nesciat, at placere tamen et in scaena esse Roscium intelle-
gat”.
167 Quint. Inst. 4.1.73–74 “nam iudices et in narratione nonnumquam et in argumentis ut at-
tendant et ut faveant rogamus, quo Prodicus velut dormitantes eos excitari putabat, quale
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change in the circumstances of oratory mentioned above (p. 157), as the or-
ator in the Empire could typically rely much more on his audience being
silent than Cicero could. Furthermore, it corresponds with the observation
that in Athenian courts and assemblies, attentive silence of the audience was
neither the “normal” state nor sought by the orators, so that the figures con-
cerning it are not much used (except the rather general call for attention), nor
discussed in theory.
Quintilian, however, dealing with audience silence as a usual setting, con-
sequently warns his students, especially those not prone to great theatrical-
ity, to rely rather on the audience’s silent deliberation than on show-pieces of
emotion—while Cicero, in the long passage of De oratore dealing with emo-
tions, always focuses on dramatic effects, with only slight restrictions.168 An-
other indication of the changed circumstances is the fact that Quintilian con-
siders the opposite of benevolent attention to be not only hostile clamor but,
as an important problem, a distracted and uninterested audience.169
3.4.5 Practice: positive interruptions
As mentioned above, an audience shouting out may be a sign of approval
as well as disapproval, in Athens170 and in Rome.171 Without context it is
est: [74] ‘tum C. Varenus, qui a familia Anchariana occisus est—hoc quaeso, iudices, dili-
genter attendite.’ utique si multiplex causa est, sua quibusque partibus danda praefatio
est, ut ‘audite nunc reliqua’ et ‘transeo nunc illuc’.”; Quint. Inst. 4.4.9 “‘de his cognoscitis’,
ut sit haec commonitio iudicis, quo se ad quaestionem acrius intendat et velut quodam
tactu excitatus finem esse, narrationis et initium probationis intellegat”.
168 Quint. Inst. 6.1.44 “illud praecipue monendum, ne qui nisi summis ingenii viribus ad
movendas lacrimas adgredi audeat; nam ut est longe vehementissimus hic cum invaluit
adfectus, ita si nil efficit tepet; quem melius infirmus actor tacitis iudicum cogitationibus
reliquisset.”; Cic. De orat. 2.185–215.
169 Quint. Inst. 8.2.23 “nam si neque pauciora quam oportet neque plura neque inordinata aut
indistincta dixerimus, erunt dilucida et neglegenter quoque audientibus aperta: quod et
ipsum in consilio est habendum, non semper tam esse acrem iudicis intentionem ut ob-
scuritatem apud se ipse discutiat et tenebris orationis inferat quoddam intellegentiae suae
lumen, sed multis eum frequenter cogitationibus avocari, nisi tam clara fuerint quae dice-
mus ut in animum eius oratio, ut sol in oculos, etiam si in eam non intendatur incurrat.”
170 Cf. Montiglio (2000, p. 151): “Although in Athens, unlike in Sparta and other parts of
Greece, voting by cheers was not normal practice,[footnote: Cf. Brandis 1905: 2195. On
this way of voting, cf. also Plutarch Life of Lycurgus 26.3–5 and Thucydides 1.87. The
Homeric world, as we have seen, knows of a similar practice.] Athenian audiences spon-
taneously shout to pronounce their immediate judgment.”
171 E.g. Cic. Verr. 1.45 [about Pompeius] “factus est in eo strepitus, et grata contionis admur-
muratio. [. . . ] tum vero non strepitu, sed maximo clamore, suam populus Romanus sig-
nificavit voluntatem.”
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often impossible to distinguish between positive and negative reactions.172
A good orator renders his audience either attentive or excited, according to
Cicero’s Brutus,173 and there are a few instances in Demosthenes’ speeches
where he reports about an earlier occasion where he gained applause, inter-
preting this as a success174—on the other hand, Demosthenes and Aeschines
rebuke the audience for giving out applause too easily (the wish to speak un-
hindered may be another motive here), and Aeschines also turns it against
his opponent, accusing Demosthenes of “fishing for applause”.175 Refer-
ences to applause as it happens are rare in the Attic Orators,176 most proba-
bly as it was too common, in court as well as in the ἐκκλησία, to be mentioned
explicitly. Aeschines relates how an attempt to restrain this custom failed
completely: a speaker on the Areopagus was met first with applause, then
with laughter and shouting, and when another reprimanded the audience
for laughing in the presence of the βουλή, he was dismissed and driven off
the platform.177
Similarly in Cicero’s time, an orator would in general aim at audible ap-
proval rather than silence, for Cicero states that “magnum quoddam est onus
atque munus suscipere atque profiteri se esse, omnibus silentibus, unum
maximis de rebus magno in conventu hominum audiendum”.178 For most
modern speakers it would be even more difficult to speak omnibus loquen-
tibus or clamantibus, but for Cicero and his contemporaries it apparently was
not. Applause was also expected for stylistic and rhythmic feats,179 and in
172 Very clearly in Aischin. leg. 51, where θορυβεῖν is used in both ways, differentiated only by
the further context: “θορυβησάντων δ’ ἐpi’ αὐτῷ τῶν μέν, ὡς δεινός τις εἴη καὶ σύντομος,
τῶν δὲ piλειόνων, ὡς piονηρὸς καὶ φθονερός”.
173 Cic. Brut. 200 “erectos intuentis iudices [. . . ] oratione quasi suspensos teneri aut [. . . ] motu
animi aliquo perturbatos esse”.
174 Dem. or. 6.26, 18.179, 19.195, 21.14.
175 Dem. or. 8.30, 10.44; Aischin. Tim. 78, 174, leg. 130.
176 E.g. (not even directly referring to applause) Lys. or. 16.8.
177 Aischin. Tim. 81–85: ἔνθα δὴ καὶ piαρέρχεται Πύρρανδρος ἐpiιτιμήσων ὑμῖν, καὶ ἤρετο τὸν
δῆμον, εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνοιντο γελῶντες piαρούσης τῆς βουλῆς τῆς ἐξ Α᾿ρείου piάγου. ὑμεῖς δ’
ἐξεβάλλετε αὐτὸν ὑpiολαμβάνοντες· ‘ἴσμεν, ὦ Πύρρανδρε, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ γελᾶν τούτων ἐναντίον·
ἀλλ’ οὕτως ἰσχυρόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ὥστε piάντων ἐpiικρατεῖν τῶν ἀνθρωpiίνων λογισμῶν.’
(84)
178 Cic. De orat. 1.116.
179 Cic. Orat. 168 “contiones saepe exclamare vidi, cum apte verba cecidissent”; 214 “hoc
dichoreo tantus clamor contionis excitatus est, ut admirabile esset”; Quint. Inst. 8.3.3 “an
in causa C. Corneli Cicero consecutus esset docendo iudicem tantum et utiliter demum ac
Latine perspicueque dicendo ut populus Romanus admirationem suam non adclamatione
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the phenomenon of “hired contiones”180, people were obviously paid with
the expectation that they would not only attend but also applaud the orator.
That a very audible approval was the most common audience reaction is
also reflected in the fact that Cicero mentions it quite rarely in his speeches,
much less than attentive silence. Those two instances where Cicero relates
how another speech was met with loud appreciation rather seem like wish-
ful thinking. The first is found in the Pro Balbo (Cicero is speaking about
Pompey’s speech on the previous day):
[hoc] non opinione tacita vestrorum animorum, sed perspicua
admiratione declarari videbatur.181
It is well possible that there was actually some rather approving noise at
Pompey’s speech, which is interpreted by Cicero as a definite and obvious
cheer, thus shaping the audience’s (or even his own) memory of the event.
The case is somewhat ambiguous, however, for Pompey was, at least in Ci-
cero’s opinion, a rather weak orator182 but immensely popular and on some
occasions quite a good public speaker,183 so that loud approval of one of his
speeches was perhaps not exactly a surprise, but worth mentioning (whether
it had happened or not). The second instance is in the De Milone where Ci-
cero speaks about speeches by himself in the senate:
quotiens enim est illa causa a nobis acta in senatu! quibus adsen-
sionibus universi ordinis, quam nec tacitis nec occultis!184
In this case, loud reactions to senate speeches were rare anyway, so that an
outstanding level of applause is not probable, and therefore all the more
worth mentioning if it happened (which must have been the case here, to
a degree, or else the passage would be implausible). On both occasions, Ci-
cero must have felt particularly obliged to mention the applause, since under
normal circumstances it would have contributed nothing to his argument at
all.
tantum sed etiam plausu confiteretur? sublimitas profecto et magnificentia et nitor et
auctoritas expressit illum fragorem.”
180 Cic. Sest. 104 “conductas habent contiones”.
181 Cic. Balb. 2.
182 Cf. Cic. Brut. 239, Cic. Att. 1.14.1.
183 Cf. van der Blom (2011, p. 570).
184 Cic. Mil. 12.
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Furthermore, explicit satisfaction with an audience reaction occurs only in
contio speeches,185 not in court or senate speeches. As a rather benevolent
audience could be usually assumed in contiones, the grateful mentioning of
applause seems to have been a topos specifically of contiones. Possibly a
contio audience expected to be flattered more than others, as attendance was
more voluntary there (or maybe at least orators thought so).
In rhetorical theory, the topic of applause is not discussed in the Greek
treatises.186 In the Roman writers of rhetorical theory, the issue is indeed
treated, and is dominated by a moral ambiguity: applause is a natural aim
of any orator, but the ideal orator is not dependent on audience reactions.
Cicero, who pays tribute to the former aspect in the contio, employs the latter
point as an argument of character in a senate speech;187 this is an attempt
to give the matter a philosophical turn, employing the topos of the orator-
sapiens who is unaffected by applause and other mundane benefits, and to
protect it from the accusation of being a popularis policy.
In his rhetorical treatises, Cicero mentions clamor with a positive meaning
in several passages,188 more than with a negative meaning, but again does
not give any detailed advice on reacting to or on provoking applause.
185 Cic. Manil. 37 “vestra admurmuratio facit, Quirites, ut agnoscere videamini qui haec fe-
cerint; ego autem nomino neminem; qua re irasci mihi nemo poterit nisi qui ante de se
voluerit confiteri.”; Cic. Leg. agr. 2.49 “hic mihi parumper mentis vestras, Quirites, com-
movere videor, dum patefacio vobis etc.”; Cic. Phil. 4.2 “num vero multo sum erectior,
quod vos quoque illum hostem esse tanto consensu tantoque clamore adprobavistis.”, 4.3
“laudo, laudo vos, Quirites, quod gratissimis animis prosequimini nomen clarissimi ad-
ulescentis vel pueri potius . . . ”, 4.5 “praeclare et loco, Quirites, reclamatione vestra factum
pulcherrimum Martialium conprobavistis”, 4.7 “sic arbitrabar, Quirites, vos iudicare, ut
ostenditis.”, 4.11 “reliquum est, Quirites, ut vos in ista sententia, quam prae vobis fertis,
perseveretis”, 6.18 “tantus vester iste consensus”.
186 In a passage of Aristotle it is clear that he uses θόρυβος with the meaning of “applause”,
but in a different context: Aristot. Rhet. 1356b23–25 piιθανοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἧττον οἱ λόγοι οἱ
διὰ τῶν piαραδειγμάτων, θορυβοῦνται δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοί.
187 Cic. Phil. 1.37 “equidem is sum, qui istos plausus, cum popularibus civibus tribuerentur,
semper contempserim; idemque, cum a summis, mediis, infimis, cum denique ab uni-
versis hoc idem fit, cumque ii, qui ante sequi populi consensum solebant, fugiunt, non
plausum illum, sed iudicium puto.”
188 Cic. Orat. 107 “quantis illa clamoribus adulescentuli diximus [de supplicio parricidarum],
quae nequaquam satis defervisse post aliquanto sentire coepimus”, 111 “clamores tamen
tum movet et tum in dicendo plurimum efficit, cum gravitatis locis utitur”, 236 “eloquens
vero, qui non approbationes solum sed admirationes, clamores, plausus, si liceat, movere
debet”; Cic. De orat. 1.152 “haec sunt, quae clamores et admirationes in bonis oratoribus
efficiunt”, 3.53 “quem stupefacti dicentem intuentur? in quo exclamant?”
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Quintilian, however, differs from Cicero on this point as in the matters of
noise and attentive silence. Throughout the Institutio he forcefully warns
against fishing for applause, especially for every single part of the speech,
i.e. even specific words and figures. Even school students ought to refrain
from applause for fellow students,189 according to Quintilian, who continues
with a particular point on prose rhythm190 and comes to the general opinion
that applause should not be asked for191 and should only be valued if given
for an entire speech, rather than its parts.192 Direct advice for reactions to
applause is quite sparse in Quintilian, and mostly negative (i.e. what the
orator ought not to do), but this is more than his predecessors provided (as
far as we know); his general tendency is not to interact too much with the
excited audience, but to wait for it to calm down.193
Disapproving, or even hostile silence is the counterpart to approving clamor,
viz. applause. As loud approval was considered normal, a silent audience
could mean that the orator had failed and should end his attempt, according
to Cicero,194 who also set hostile silence on the same level as hostile inter-
189 Quint. Inst. 2.2.9 “minime vero permittenda pueris, ut fit apud plerosque, adsurgendi
exultandique in laudando licentia: quin etiam iuvenum modicum esse, cum audient, tes-
timonium debet. ita fiet ut ex iudicio praeceptoris discipulus pendeat, atque id se dixisse
recte quod ab eo probabitur credat.”; Quint. Inst. 2.2.11–12 “vultum igitur praeceptoris
intueri tam qui audiunt debent quam ipse qui dicit: ita enim probanda atque improbanda
discernent; sic stilo facultas conprotinget, auditione iudicium. [12] at nunc proni atque
succincti ad omnem clausulam non exsurgunt modo verum etiam excurrunt et cum in-
decora exultatione conclamant. id mutuum est et ibi declamationis fortuna. hinc tumor
et vana de se persuasio usque adeo ut illo condiscipulorum tumultu inflati, si parum a
praeceptore laudentur, ipsi de illo male sentiant.”
190 Quint. Inst. 8.5.14 “turpe autem ac prope nefas ducunt respirare ullo loco qui adclama-
tionem non petierit. inde minuti corruptique sensiculi et extra rem petiti: neque enim
possunt tam multae bonae sententiae esse quam necesse est multae sint clausulae.” Here
again we see an exaggeration in the Empire of a feature rated favourably in the Republic,
cf. Cic. Orat. 214 “hoc dichoreo tantus clamor contionis excitatus est, ut admirabile esset”.
191 Quint. Inst. 10.2.27 “laus ipsa popularis utilitatis gratia adsumpta, quae tum est pulcher-
rima cum sequitur, non cum arcessitur”.
192 Quint. Inst. 12.9.4 “quae omnia non dum fiunt laudantur, sed cum facta sunt, unde etiam
cupidissimis opinionis plus fructus venit. nam cum illa dicendi vitiosa iactatio inter plau-
sores suos detonuit, resurgit verae virtutis fortior fama, nec iudices a quo sint moti dis-
simulant, et doctis creditur, nec est orationis vera laus nisi cum finita est.”
193 Quint. Inst. 11.3.126 “conveniet: iam et ambulatio quaedam propter inmodicas lauda-
tionum moras”, cf. Cic. Orat. 59; Quint. Inst. 11.3.131 “unde moneor ut ne id quidem
transeam, ineptissime fieri cum inter moras laudationum aut in aurem alicuius locuntur
aut cum sodalibus iocantur aut nonnumquam ad librarios suos ita respiciunt ut sportulam
dictare videantur.”
194 Cic. Brut. 192 “[populi aures] si inflatum non recipiunt—aut si auditor omnino tamquam
equus non facit, agitandi finis faciendus est”; similarly (in inverse argumentation) Cic.
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ruptions in the De provinciis consularibus.195 In the oratorical reality it was
apparently rare, or else the orators would have exploited it more often in
their speeches (as they do with hostile interruptions and attentive silence),
not only in an isolated passage in Lysias196 and, for Cicero, in the famous,
but singular incident with Catiline and in two other instances.197 Usually
any resentment in the audience would be voiced, rather than expressed by
silence, as Cicero states in the Divinatio in Caecilium.198
3.4.6 Absent audience
A very radical (and the most negative) variant of audience silence occurs
when the audience, or a significant part of it, is absent. Cicero describes
his irritation when he has to give his defence speech for Deiotaros before
Caesar alone, without the usual corona, so that he is deprived of the noise of
the Forum (a point from which he develops a captatio benevolentiae).199 Total
absence of the audience leaves no room for oratory at all, of course,200 and
this can save the orator from the most embarrassing effect of his efforts at
all, which occurs when he is abandoned by his audience while still speaking.
Brut. 88 “sic illam causam tanta vi tantaque gravitate dixisse Galbam ut nulla fere pars
orationis silentio praeteriretur”.
195 Cic. Prov. cons. 40 “sed non alienum esse arbitror, quo minus saepe aut interpeller a non ullis
aut tacitorum existimatione reprehendar, explicare breviter quae mihi sit ratio et causa cum
Caesare.”
196 Lys. or. 12.75.
197 Cic. Catil. 1.16 “venisti paulo ante in senatum. quis te ex hac tanta frequentia totque tuis
amicis ac necessariis salutavit? si hoc post hominum memoriam contigit nemini, vocis
expectas contumeliam, cum sis gravissimo iudicio taciturnitatis oppressus?”; Cic. Planc.
46 “quid apud hos dices qui abs te taciti requirunt cur sibi hoc oneris imposueris, cur se
potissimum delegeris, cur denique se divinare malueris quam eos qui scirent iudicare?”;
Cic. Phil. 1.14 “non modo voce nemo L. Pisoni consularis, sed ne vultu quidem assensus
est.”
198 Cic. Div. in Caec. 21 “cur nolint, etiamsi taceant, satis dicunt; verum non tacent.”
199 Cic. Deiot. 5–6 “moveor etiam loci ipsius insolentia, quod tantam causam, quanta nulla
umquam in disceptatione versata est, dico intra domesticos parietes, dico extra conven-
tum et eam frequentiam, in qua oratorum studia niti solent: [. . . ] hanc enim, C. Caesar,
causam si in foro dicerem eodem audiente et disceptante te, quantam mihi alacritatem
populi Romani concursus adferret! [. . . ] sic, cum et deorum immortalium et populi Ro-
mani et senatus beneficia in regem Deiotarum recordarer, nullo modo mihi deesse posset
oratio.”
200 Reports about such breakdowns of speaking occasions are: Cic. Phil. 1.6 “nihil per sena-
tum, multa et magna per populum et absente populo et invito”, 1.25–26 “POPULUSQUE
IURE SCIVIT. qui populus? isne, qui exclusus est?”, 5.1 “in senatum non vocabamur”,
7.15 “armis aut opsedit aut exclusit senatum”.
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Cicero relates a few occasions of this event in the Brutus,201 and judging from
the way these incidents are told, there is nothing the orator can do about
them. This kind of audience silence is the ultimate defeat of oratory.
3.4.7 Audience laughter
A special kind of audience reaction, neither positive nor negative by itself,
is laughter. Arousing laughter against someone, i.e. ridiculing them, is a
major aspect in the area of invective202 and thus an aspect of oratory in gen-
eral. Some research has been done on the use of humour and wit by ancient
orators, and especially by Cicero, who was famous for his witticisms;203 un-
fortunately there is not much to be said about actual audience laughter as it
occurred, as it is rarely mentioned in the sources. Besides, while we do find
hints in the extant speeches of the audience reacting to the orator’s jokes
as intended, the most interesting instance for our purpose, i.e. the audience
laughter interrupting the orator in an unfavourable way, is rather unlikely
to leave any trace in the published speeches. We have a few accounts of
orator being laughed at: Aeschines reports the incident in the βουλή men-
tioned above, and how Demosthenes, on the embassy to Philip, was met
with laughter;204 Cicero relates in the Pro Cluentio how one of his opponents
made a fool of himself in an earlier trial,205 and in other contexts reports
dialogue situations in which one orator defeated the other by winning the
201 Cic. Brut. 192 “quid tu, Brute, posses, si te ut Curionem quondam contio reliquisset? ego
vero, inquit ille, ut me tibi indicem, in eis etiam causis, in quibus omnis res nobis cum
iudicibus est, non cum populo, tamen si a corona relictus sim, non queam dicere”; 289 “at
cum isti Attici dicunt, non modo a corona, quod est ipsum miserabile, sed etiam ab advo-
catis relinquuntur”; 305 “erat enim tribunus plebis tum C. Curio, quamquam is quidem
silebat, ut erat semel a contione universa relictus”.
202 Cf. Koster (1980, p. 8–21), Spatharas (2006, p. 379–380).
203 Halliwell (1991), Corbeill (1996), Schneider (2000), Spatharas (2006).
204 Aischin. leg. 112.
205 Cic. Cluent. 58–59 “itaque cum callidissime se dicere putaret [Caepasius pro Fabricio] et
cum illa verba gravissima ex intimo artificio deprompsisset, ‘respicite, iudices, hominum
fortunas, respicite dubios variosque casus, respicite C. Fabrici senectutem’—cum hoc
‘respicite’ ornandae orationis causa saepe dixisset, respexit ipse: at C. Fabricius a sub-
selliis demisso capite discesserat. [59] hic iudices ridere”.
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audience’s laughter,206 but there is nothing to be learned here about how an
orator would react to this challenge.
Neither are the rhetorical treatises very helpful here. The use of jokes and
humour is covered in several of them,207 especially in the quite substantial
sections of Cicero’s De oratore and Quintilian’s Institutio devoted specifically
to jokes,208 but the writers of rhetorical theory concentrate on the topic of
arousing the audience’s laughter for their purposes, and mostly do not treat
strategies to deal with unwanted laughter. Cicero mentions that an orator
is going to be laughed at if he does not use proper Latin,209 but (obviously)
does not offer any advice. The most explicit statement is made by Quintilian,
who (in the context of the figure of exaggeration) declares that (audience)
laughter is regarded as a sign of wit, if caused intentionally by the orator,
but stupidity if otherwise.210 Yet again, he does not give any further advice.
3.4.8 Conclusion
To sum up: approving clamor was the most normal reaction of a speech au-
dience throughout antiquity, and was thus not much commented on. Its di-
rect counterpart, hostile silence, was rare; disapproval was rather expressed
through hostile clamor. On the other hand, approving and attentive silence
206 Cic. Brut. 260 “[C. Rusius] fuit accusator, inquit, vetus, quo accusante C. Hirtilium Sisenna
defendens dixit quaedam eius putatilica esse crimina. tum C. Rusius: circumvenior, in-
quit, iudices, nisi subvenitis. Sisenna quid dicat nescio; metuo insidias; sputatilica, quid
est hoc? sputa quid sit scio, tilica nescio. maximi risus”; Cic. Att. 1.16.10 (about an
exchange with Clodius in the senate) “surgit pulchellus puer, obicit mihi me ad Baias
fuisse. falsum, sed tamen ‘quid? hoc simile est,’ inquam, ‘quasi in operto dicas fuisse?’
‘quid,’ inquit, ‘homini Arpinati cum aquis calidis?’ ‘narra,’ inquam, ‘patrono tuo, qui
Arpinatis aquas concupivit’ (nosti enim Marianas).‘ quousque,’ inquit, ‘hunc regem fer-
emus ?’ ‘regem appellas,’ inquam, ‘cum Rex tui mentionem nullam fecerit?’; ille autem
Regis hereditatem spe devorarat. ‘domum,’ inquit, ‘emisti.’ ‘putes,’ inquam, ‘dicere: iu-
dices emisti.’ ‘iuranti,’ inquit, ‘tibi non crediderunt.’ ‘mihi vero,’ inquam, ‘XXV iudices
crediderunt, XXXI, quoniam nummos ante acceperunt, tibi nihil crediderunt.’ magnis
clamoribus adflictus conticuit et concidit.”
207 Aristot. Rhet. 1419b3–5 “δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σpiουδὴν διαφθείρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι
τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σpiουδῇ, ὀρθῶς λέγων”; Rhet. Alex. 1419b15–27.
208 Cic. De orat. 2.216–290; Quint. Inst. 6.3.
209 Cic. De orat. 3.52 “nemo enim umquam est oratorem, quod Latine loqueretur, admiratus;
si est aliter, inrident neque eum oratorem tantum modo, sed hominem non putant”.
210 Quint. Inst. 8.6.74 “monere satis est mentiri hyperbolen, nec ita ut mendacio facere velit.
quo magis intuendum est quo usque deceat extollere quod nobis non creditur. pervenit
haec res frequentissime ad risum: qui si captatus est, urbanitatis, sin aliter, stultitiae
nomen adsequitur.”
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was generally considered not quite as positive as loud applause, but was also
a common aim of orators.
In rhetorical theory, the importance of all types of audience reactions for
the orator is recognised, though not treated systematically. Specific advice
on provoking audience reactions, or handling them, is scarce. The attitude
towards clamor, silence, and asking for either of these changes markedly with
Quintilian, for whom an atmosphere of loud approval was not as desirable as
for earlier eras; in particular he resents orators who constantly seek applause,
even for words and sentences.
In oratorical practice, it is especially the issue of attentive silence which
provided on the one hand a wide spectrum of possible interpretation, which
could be used as part of an argument, and various ways of asking for it on the
other, thus building various shades of connection with the audience. Here,
the oratorical reality, as shown in the Attic Orators and Cicero’s speeches,
again moves clearly beyond the possibilities recognised by rhetorical theory.
3.5 Conclusion
The phenomena which can lead to pauses in a speech are highly diverse, as
is, consequently, their usage in ancient oratory and their treatment in ancient
rhetoric. Structural pauses are inseparably connected to prose rhythm, a topic
which is treated in ancient rhetorical theory to some extent; however, with
relation to pauses in particular, most observations and advice would have
been exchanged orally and by practical training, so that statements on this
point by the ancient writers of rhetorical theory tend to be rather general.
Longer pauses, on the other hand, made by the orator to allow for dialogi-
cal situations or interruptions, can be observed to play a substantial role both
in the extant speeches and the ancient rhetorical theory. Especially the inter-
ruption by a single person (real or simulated) and the figure of prosopopoeia
are both used in oratorical practice and discussed in rhetorical theory, while
audience reactions (positive and negative clamor, positive and negative si-
lence) are much more exploited in practice than is recognised in the theoret-
ical works.
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4.1 Introduction
Various kinds of failure may cause unintentional silence and omissions on
the orator’s part: mainly voice failure and memory failure, to which may be
added potential failures due to nervousness. In contrast to interruption from
outside, the orator is limited here only by his own incapacity. The main tasks
for the orator and the writer of rhetorical theory to consider here are:
 how to prevent failure beforehand;
 how to deal with failure when it arises; and
 how to use failure rhetorically: by turning it around into an advantage,
or by pretending to suffer from it.
For the first two of these tasks we cannot expect much evidence from orator-
ical practice, especially not from the extant (i.e. edited) speeches. Preventive
measures like voice training or careful memorisation of the speech would
not appear in the text anyway; any mishap during the actual speech, which
might be included in a transcript, would likely be erased in the editing pro-
cess.1 Therefore the evidence that I will be drawing on is mostly consider-
ation and advice given by the writers of rhetorical theory. The third task,
however, offers valuable opportunities for comparison of theory and prac-
tice, as these feats are more likely to be included in the published speeches
whenever they were used in practice.
1 Cf. on a broader scale Wisse (2013, p. 168): “Bad orators can have had little interest in
recording and disseminating their efforts, and if they did, others had few incentives to
preserve them.”
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This chapter is primarily structured by the types of failure, the most impor-
tant of which are failure of voice (section 4.2) and of memory (section 4.3); a
somewhat minor aspect is potential failure due to nervousness (section 4.4).
The remaining two sections add further approaches the topic of oratorical
failure: oratorical incompetence in general, including intellectual shortcom-
ing, is considered under the heading “lack of talent” (section 4.5). Finally
I shall discuss the “topos of incapability” and “topos of the inexpressible”
(section 4.6) as the most genuinely rhetorical feature of failure in ancient or-
atory.
4.2 Voice failure
4.2.1 Introduction
A strong voice and generally strong health is necessary to be heard at all
physically in an assembly of tens or even hundreds of listeners, and to stay
fit throughout a lawsuit of a whole day with speeches of several hours each.2
Therefore a generally or temporarily impaired voice or acute voice failure
(which again can be either due to a generally weak voice, or a momentary
problem) were, and are, problems worth considering for virtually any ora-
tor.3
4.2.2 Weak voice
From a medical point of view, muteness, congenital or acquired, and weak
voices, were treated in antiquity by Galen and other medical writers and
often connected to stupidity (in remarkable contrast to blindness, which was
regarded as rather ambiguous and could be seen as a divine blessing4); in
2 Schulz (2014) discusses the role of the voice in ancient rhetoric in general, as it is treated
in the theoretical treatises; she does not examine any speech texts in extenso, or consider
devices of pretended voice failure etc.
3 A strong voice appears as a kind of cliché of an orator in Aristophanes’ Knights: “τὰ δ’ ἄλλα
σοι piρόσεστι δημαγωγικά, / φωνὴ μιαρά, γέγονας κακῶς, ἀγοραῖος εἶ· / ἔχεις ἅpiαντα piρὸς
piολιτείαν ἃ δεῖ·” (Aristoph. Equ. 217–219); Cicero names it as nature’s gift for an orator:
Cic. De orat. 3.31 “Sulpicius autem fortissimo quodam animi impetu, plenissima et maxima
voce, summa contentione corporis et dignitate motus, verborum quoque ea gravitate et
copia est, ut unus ad dicendum instructissimus a natura esse videatur.”
4 Barasch (2001, p. 10) “The essential characteristic of the blind person’s figure, as it ap-
peared to the ancient mind, is his ambiguity. He is not perceived as either good or bad,
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this context, “[g]enerally speaking defect and absence of voice are signs of
weakness and impotence”.5 In rhetoric, however, a practical view prevailed:
muteness was only relevant insofar as a total loss of voice would end an
orator’s career, and a weak voice was much more a practical problem than
(in the audience’s perception) connected to weakness of mind or character;6
a weak voice or generally weak bodily constitution, even if it did not prevent
the orator from speaking or talking at all, would make it difficult for him to
be heard and understood in a larger audience,7 and/or to deliver a speech
of possibly several hours. (On the other hand, a loud voice was not only a
technical necessity but also used in a particular situation as a sign of honesty,
like in Cicero’s Pro Sulla, where a low voice is associated with secrecy and
dishonesty.8)
The weak voice was thus regarded as an oratorical issue and treated in
rhetorical writings. It could be an absolute impediment, making all edu-
cation and exercise useless, as Cicero and Quintilian agree.9 Cicero in the
trustworthy or suspicious, unfortunate or blessed; he is all that at the same time. On the
one hand, he is the unfortunate person deprived of sight, the most valuable of senses; on
the other, he is often endowed with a mysterious, supernatural ability.”
5 Ciani (1987, p. 159); cf. e.g. Aristot. Pol. 1253a2-4.
6 Demosthenes in his first appearances in the assembly was laughed at primarily due to
his oratorical style, while his shortcomings in voice only made it even worse (Plut. Dem.
6.3). Isocrates and Cicero (see below p. 180) did not find it dishonourable to claim health
problems as reasons for not giving speeches.
7 Large audiences were normal even in small courts of justice, since normally in court the
orator had to speak loud enough also for the crowd to hear him, and the opposite is
announced expressly: Cic. Flacc. 66 “sic submissa voce agam tantum ut iudices audiant”.
According to Cicero, the orator even needs the crows to be actually eloquent: Cic. De orat.
2.338 “habet enim multitudo vim quandam talem, ut, quem ad modum tibicen sine tibiis
canere, sic orator sine multitudine audiente eloquens esse non possit.”
8 Cic. Sull. 30 “qui cum suppressa voce de scelere P. Lentuli, de audacia coniuratorum om-
nium dixisset, tantum modo ut vos qui ea probatis exaudire possetis, de supplicio, de
carcere magna et queribunda voce dicebat.”, 33 “maxima voce ut omnes exaudire possint
dico semperque dicam.”, 34 “atque ut idem omnes exaudiant clarissima voce dicam”; cf.
Cic. Mil. 67 (to Pompey) “te enim iam appello, et ea voce ut me exaudire possis”. On
the other hand, a loud voice is used explicitly as a sign of honesty, e.g. Cic. Verr. 2.3.217
“etenim hoc dico, et magna voce dico”; Cic. Caecin. 92 (in a trial on ejection from property)
“itaque is qui se restituisse dixit magna voce saepe confiteri solet se vi deiecisse, verum
illud addit: [. . . ]”; Cic. Cluent. 134 “[P. Africanus] cum esset censor et in equitum censu C.
Licinius Sacerdos prodisset, clara voce ut omnis contio audire posset dixit se scire illum
verbis conceptis peierasse”; Cic. Lig. 6 “vide quanta lux liberalitatis et sapientiae tuae mihi
apud te dicenti oboriatur: quantum potero voce contendam ut hoc populus Romanus ex-
audiat”; Cic. Dom. 96 “dico igitur, et quam possum maxima voce dico”.
A low voice is thus linked to suppression or omission of adverse arguments, see p. 97.
9 Cic. De orat. 1.115 “sunt quidam aut ita lingua haesitantes aut ita voce absoni aut ita vultu
motuque corporis vasti atque agrestes, ut, etiam si ingeniis atque arte valeant, tamen
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Brutus names weakness of body or voice as a reason (though not the only
one) for M. Piso’s giving up his oratorical career10 and later mentions the
larger audience in criminal courts (subsellia) requiring a strong voice.11
Of course a weak voice could be a welcome reason for interrupting, end-
ing, or not even starting an oratorical career in order to hide other reasons
(or to avoid a discussion about the motives). For instance, Isocrates tells
in his “autobiography” that he did not become an orator due to lack of a
strong voice and of self-confidence12—we will never know which of the two
motives was stronger,13 but if physical problems had indeed made public
speaking impossible to Isocrates, why would he have mentioned a lack of
self-assurance? Cicero’s case for the interruption in his career in 79–78 B.C.
is even more doubtful: he himself rather insists on his health being the rea-
son for his journey to Greece14 while Plutarch suspects fear of Sulla as the
real cause.15 Naturally these manoeuvres, regardless whether the health rea-
sons were real or not, found no echo of advice in rhetorical writings, as these
were concerned with orators who actually wanted to be orators.
in oratorum numerum venire non possint”; Quint. Inst. 1.pr.27 “sunt et alia ingenita
cuique adiumenta, vox, latus patiens laboris, valetudo, constantia, decor, quae si modica
optigerunt, possunt ratione ampliari, sed nonnumquam ita desunt ut bona etiam ingenii
studiique corrumpant”; Quint. Inst. 11.3.12–13 “nam certe bene pronuntiare non poterit
[. . . ] si inemendabilia oris incommoda obstabunt [. . . ] [13] sed ne vox quidem nisi libera
vitiis actionem habere optimam potest. bona enim firmaque ut volumus uti licet [. . . ] sed
nos de eo nunc loquamur cui non frustra praecipitur.”
10 Cic. Brut. 236 “is [M. Piso] laborem forensem diutius non tulit, quod et corpore erat infirmo
et hominum ineptias ac stultitas, quae devorandae nobis sunt, non ferebat iracundiusque
respuebat sive morose, ut putabatur, sive ingenuo liberoque fastidio”.
11 Cic. Brut. 289 “qua re si anguste et exiliter dicere est Atticorum, sint sane Attici; sed in
comitium veniant, ad stantem iudicem dicant: subsellia grandiorem et pleniorem voce
desiderant” (cf. Douglas (1966), Marchese (2011) ad locum); cf. Cic. Brut. 317 “acrem
enim oratorem, et incensum et agentem et canorum concursus hominum forique strepitus
desiderat”.
12 Isocr. Or. 12.10 “οὕτω γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἀμφοτέρων ἐγενόμην τῶν μεγίστην δύναμιν ἐχόντων piαρ’
ἡμῖν, φωνῆς ἱκανῆς καὶ τόλμης, ὡς οὐκ οἶδ’ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν piολιτῶν”; similarly Or. 5.81
and Epist. 8.7.
13 A source like Plut. Vit. dec. 4 is probably based on Isocrates himself and thus no indepen-
dent confirmation.
14 Cic. Brut. 314 “cum censerem remissione et moderatione vocis et commutato genere di-
cendi me et periculum vitare posse et temperatius dicere, ut consuetudinem dicendi mu-
tarem, ea causa mihi in Asiam proficiscendi fuit”.
15 Plut. Cic. 3.2 “εἶθ’ ὁρῶν εἰς στάσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς στάσεως εἰς ἄκρατον ἐμpiίpiτοντα τὰ piράγματα
μοναρχίαν, ἐpiὶ τὸν σχολαστὴν καὶ θεωρητικὸν ἀνελθὼν βίον ῞Ελλησί τε συνῆν φιλολόγοις
καὶ piροσεῖχε τοῖς μαθήμασιν, ἄχρι οὗ Σύλλας ἐκράτησε καὶ κατάστασίν τινα λαμβάνειν
ἔδοξεν ἡ piόλις.”
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Besides, most of the treatises are not concerned at all with physical-medical
conditions on the person of a potential orator; only Cic. De orat. and Quintil-
ian consider the topic at all. Cicero “fordert aber von dem Redner nicht nur
eine besondere geistige, sondern auch körperliche Eignung”:16 “quid de illis
dicam, quae certe cum ipso homine nascuntur, linguae solutio, vocis sonus,
latera, vires, conformatio quaedam et figura totius oris et corporis?”;17 sim-
ilarly, Quintilian takes “vox, latus patiens laboris, valetudo”18 as either in-
nately given or not, but neither of them goes into any detail about how to
decide if someone’s constitution is sufficient for an oratorical career (despite
Cicero’s own, at least alleged, problems on this point).
The same two treatises, Cicero’s De oratore and Quintilian’s Institutio, are
the only ones to propose remedies against a weak voice and means of
strengthening the voice, albeit in very general terms: Cicero acknowledges
both the value of training for the voice (in a list with breath, body, and
tongue)19 and the general importance of the voice for the orator, but sees it
outside the scope of his treatise and thus only gives the unspecific advice of
“crebra mutatio”,20 i.e. variation of exercises;21 he does not differentiate be-
tween “normal” exercises for an untrained, but otherwise healthy voice, and
special treatments for a damaged or naturally weak voice. When he does
mention particular exercises, it is in a completely different context, in the
anecdotes about Demosthenes (who e.g. trained his respiration by declaim-
ing overlong sentences in a single breath, or spoke with pebbles in his mouth,
16 Barwick (1963, p. 8).
17 Cic. De orat. 1.114; similarly De orat. 2.85 “qua re ego tibi oratorem sic iam instituam, si
potuero, ut quid efficere possit ante perspiciam: [. . . ] temptabo quid deceat, quid voce,
quid viribus, quid spiritu, quid lingua efficere possit.”
18 Quint. Inst. 1.pr.27, see above n. 9.
19 Cic. De orat. 1.156 “iam vocis et spiritus et totius corporis et ipsius linguae motus et exerci-
tationes non tam artis indigent quam laboris”.
20 Cic. De orat. 3.224 “de quo illud iam nihil ad hoc praecipiendi genus, quem ad modum voci
serviatur: equidem tamen magno opere censeo serviendum; sed illud videtur ab huius
nostri sermonis officio non abhorrere, quod, ut dixi paulo ante, plurimis in rebus quod
maxime est utile, id nescio quo pacto etiam decet maxime. nam ad vocem obtinendam
nihil est utilius quam crebra mutatio; nihil perniciosius quam effusa sine intermissione
contentio.” Cf. Cic. Off. 1.133.
21 The point is repeated in Orat. 59: “ac vocis quidem bonitas optanda est; non est enim
in nobis, sed tractatio atque usus in nobis. ergo ille princeps variabit et mutabit: omnis
sonorum tum intendens tum remittens persequetur gradus.”
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or while going up a steep hill),22 and there as well Cicero does not recom-
mend the exercises themselves, but draws the general conclusion “hisce [. . . ]
cohortationibus [. . . ] ad studium et ad laborem incitandos iuvenis”.
Quintilian wishes the voice to be cared for from a very young age23 and
later takes up and develops the advice of variatio in exercises, combining it
with the practice of rote-learning.24 Yet again we find no advice regarding
how to treat an impaired voice, although we would expect that Quintilian, as
a teacher of rhetoric for decades, had been confronted with the issue. We are
just given some more details for “normal” students, e.g. to be very careful
with the voice in puberty.25
We can only speculate to what degree a public career was possible with a
generally weak voice. The lowest ranks of the cursus honorum, Quaestor and
Aedile, were almost purely administrative jobs and would not necessarily
require oratorical abilities, neither in the office itself nor in the election cam-
paign which could be conducted without public speeches. Beyond these lev-
els it would have probably become difficult: the office of tribune was closely
connected to the contio, and the praetorship contained military tasks, thus
it is hard to imagine someone being elected to either of these who was un-
able to make himself understood in a crowd. Other posts, outside the strict
cursus (like tresviri and decemviri, censorship, or various priesthoods), were
probably attainable without particular concern.
22 Cic. De orat. 1.260–261 “imiteturque illum, cui sine dubio summa vis dicendi conceditur,
Atheniensem Demosthenem, in quo tantum studium fuisse tantusque labor dicitur, ut pri-
mum impedimenta naturae diligentia industriaque superaret, cumque ita balbus esset, ut
eius ipsius artis, cui studeret, primam litteram non posset dicere, perfecit meditando, ut
nemo planius esse locutus putaretur; [261] deinde cum spiritus eius esset angustior, tan-
tum continenda anima in dicendo est adsecutus, ut una continuatione verborum, id quod
eius scripta declarant, binae ei contentiones vocis et remissiones continerentur; qui etiam,
ut memoriae proditum est, coniectis in os calculis, summa voce versus multos uno spir-
itu pronuntiare consuescebat; neque is consistens in loco, sed inambulans atque ascensu
ingrediens arduo”, cf. Plut. Dem. 11.1–2.
23 Quint. Inst. 1.10.27 “age, non habebit in primis curam vocis orator? quid tam musices
proprium? sed ne haec quidem praesumenda pars est” (in the section about music in
education).
24 Quint. Inst. 11.3.25–26 “ediscere autem quo exercearis erit optimum (nam ex tempore di-
centis avocat a cura vocis ille qui ex rebus ipsis concipitur adfectus), et ediscere quam
maxime varia, quae et clamorem et disputationem et sermonem et flexus habeant, ut simul
in omnia paremur. [26] hoc satis est.”
25 Quint. Inst. 11.3.28 “illud non sine causa est ab omnibus praeceptum, ut parcatur maxime
voci in illo a pueritia in adulescentiam transitu, quia naturaliter impeditur”.
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4.2.3 Acute voice failure
But a generally weak voice is only one side of the problem. Waking up on the
morning of a trial with a sore throat, or having to interrupt a speech because
of acute voice failure were problems that could (and can) happen to the best
orator of all—what, then, is he to do about it?
The Rhetorica ad Herennium spends a paragraph on the issue;26 the Auctor
does not deal with the moment when a pause has already occurred (this is
covered nowhere in the rhetorical writings), but gives detailed advice re-
garding how the orator should use his voice in the different parts of his
speech—e.g. subdued voice at the beginning, variation between louder and
lower passages in the middle part, long periods without breathing pauses
only in the peroratio—in order to keep it strong and steady.
Further search for advice on the topic leads us again to the more “philo-
sophical” treatises, Cicero’s De oratore and Quintilian’s Institutio. Cicero
quite ostentatiously does not talk about voice failure; he mentions the issue
of a hoarse voice, but expressly not as a problem of orators but of actors,27
and in an anecdote presents a patronus malus who has yelled his voice to
pieces during the trial;28 although it is not clear if it is the loss of voice that
makes this advocate a malus patronus, Cicero seemingly does not accept that
even a good orator is sometimes powerless against his own physis.
26 Rhet. Her. 3.21 “firmam ergo maxime poterimus in dicendo vocem conservare, si quam
maxime sedata et depressa voce principia dicemus. nam laeditur arteria, si, antequam
voce leni permulsa est, acri clamore completur. et intervallis longioribus uti convenit:
recreatur enim spiritu vox et arteriae reticendo adquiescunt. et in continuo clamore remit-
tere et ad sermonem transire oportet: commutationes enim faciunt, ut nullo genere vocis
effuso in omni voce integri simus. et acutas vocis exclamationes vitare debemus: ictus
enim fit et vulnus arteriae acuta atque attenuata nimis adclamatione, et qui splendor est
vocis, consumitur uno clamore universus. et uno spiritu continenter multa dicere in ex-
trema convenit oratione: fauces enim calefiunt et arteriae conplentur et vox, quae tractata
varie est, reducitur in quendam sonum aequabilem atque constantem.”
27 Cic. De orat. 1.259 “itaque nos raucos saepe attentissime audiri video; tenet enim res ipsa
atque causa; at Aesopum, si paulum inrauserit, explodi”.
This relates to the concept of artem arte celare, see p. 120.
28 Cic. De orat. 2.282 “huic similis est etiam admonitio in consilio dando familiaris, ut cum
patrono malo, cum vocem in dicendo obtudisset, suadebat Granius, ut mulsum frigidum
biberet, simul ac domum redisset, ‘perdam’ inquit ‘vocem, si id fecero’: ‘melius est’ inquit
‘quam reum.’”
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Quintilian, more lenient, notes that with a generally weak voice it can be
necessary to interrupt the speech, but does not consider any remedies.29
4.2.4 Pretending voice failure
So far I have considered the problem how to handle unintended and unex-
pected voice failure which actually happens to the orator—but beyond this
the orator can utilise failure of voice for his rhetorical purposes by pretend-
ing it.
One variety of “pretended voice failure” is the praeteritio by the topos “vox
me deficit”, used e.g. by Cicero in the Verrines.30 Another species is the topos
in which the orator claims to be overwhelmed by emotion, and thus pre-
vented either from speaking about a particular topic or from carrying on
speaking altogether; the best-known example is probably the peroratio of Ci-
cero’s Pro Milone,31 but by no means the only instance: the figure was a topos
already in Athenian courts,32 and we know of several speeches by Cicero
where the motif produced an impressive closing of the speech,33 in other
cases it was used for a “standard” praeteritio34 or a “praeteritio of the rest”.35
Yet another argumentative step is to be seen, again in the Verrines, when the
orator (i.e. Cicero) expresses the possibility of his voice failing him, and his
29 Quint. Inst. 11.3.13 “ala vel inbecilla et inhibet multa, ut insurgere exclamare, et aliqua
cogit, ut intermittere et deflectere et rasas fauces ac latus fatigatum deformi cantico refi-
cere.”
30 Combined with the topos of time limits: Cic. Verr. 2.2.52 “nam me dies vox latera deficiant,
si hoc nunc vociferari velim, quam miserum indignumque sit istius nomine apud eos diem
festum esse”; combined with a climax: Cic. Verr. 2.4.67 “quae vox, quae latera, quae vires
huius unius criminis querimoniam possunt sustinere?”
31 Cic. Mil. 105 “sed finis sit: neque enim prae lacrimis iam loqui possum, et hic se lacrimis
defendi vetat”; similarly Cic. Rab. Post. 48 “me dolor debilitat intercluditque vocem”
(again in the peroratio).
32 Rosenbloom (2009, p. 195); it is referred to as a well-known topos even by Apuleius (Apul.
Met. 10.7).
33 Cic. Sest. 144 “sed me repente, iudices, de fortissimorum et clarissimorum civium dig-
nitate et gloria dicentem et plura etiam dicere parantem horum aspectus in ipso cursu
orationis repressit”; Cic. Planc. 104 “plura ne dicam tuae me etiam lacrimae impediunt
vestraeque, iudices, non solum meae”.
34 Cic. Dom. 97 “quas idcirco praetereo quod ne nunc quidem sine fletu commemorare pos-
sum”.
35 Cic. Sull. 92 “sed iam impedior egomet, iudices, dolore animi ne de huius miseria plura
dicam”; Cic. Cael. 60 “sed revertor ad crimen; etenim haec facta illius clarissimi ac for-
tissimi viri mentio et vocem meam fletu debilitavit et mentem dolore impedivit” (cf. p.
20).
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hope that it will not do so, in order to emphasise the enormous mass of mate-
rial he is able (or obliged) to deal with.36 While this feature contains a certain
irony (especially since it is used at a point in the speech when Cicero has al-
ready been speaking for hours), the Pro Milone contains a much more serious
non-failure of voice: Milo has refused to stage the usual scenes37 of misery
with ragged clothes, grimaces of despair, tears and, as a consequence, voice
failure (a behaviour recommended e.g. by Rhet. Her.38), so Cicero needs to
justify his client’s steady voice:
“nolite, si in nostro omnium fletu nullam lacrimam aspexistis
Milonis, si voltum semper eundem, si vocem, si orationem sta-
bilem ac non mutatam videtis, hoc minus ei parcere: haud scio
an multo etiam sit adiuvandus magis. Etenim si in gladiatoriis
pugnis et in infimi generis hominum condicione atque fortuna
timidos et supplices et ut vivere liceat obsecrantis etiam odisse
solemus, fortis et animosos et se acriter ipsos morti offerentis
servari cupimus, eorumque nos magis miseret qui nostram mis-
ericordiam non requirunt quam qui illam efflagitant, quanto hoc
magis in fortissimis civibus facere debemus!” 39
Cicero not only justifies Milo’s steadfast appearance, he uses this reversed
topos of voice failure as his starting point for a peroration which is still emo-
tional enough, closing with his own voice failing:
“sed finis sit: neque enim prae lacrimis iam loqui possum, et hic
se lacrimis defendi vetat.”40
None of this is extensively treated in any of the rhetorical treatises, neither
the narrower technical handbooks nor the broader, “philosophical” works
36 Cic. Verr. 2.5.72 “quorum ego de acerbissima morte crudelissimoque cruciatu dicam cum
eum locum tractare coepero, et ita dicam ut, si me in ea querimonia quam sum habiturus
de istius crudelitate et de civium Romanorum indignissima morte non modo vires verum
etiam vita deficiat, id mihi praeclarum et iucundum putem.”
37 Common already in Athens: cf. Dem. or. 21.99, 186; Aischin. leg. 179.
38 Rhet. Her. 2.50 “misericordia commovebitur auditoribus, [. . . ] si supplicabimus et nos
sub eorum, quorum misericordiam captabimus, potestatem subiciemus: si, quid nostris
parentibus, liberis, ceteris necessariis casurum sit propter nostras calamitates, aperiemus,
et simul ostendemus illorum nos sollicitudine et miseria, non nostris incommodis dolere”;
likewise described and justified in Cic. De orat. 2.190, Quint. Inst. 2.15.7–9, 6.1.30, 6.1.33;
criticised in Cic. De orat. 1.228 by the philosopher Rutilius Rufus.
39 Cic. Mil. 92. Cf. the similar argumentation in Plat. Apol. 34d–35a.
40 Cic. Mil. 105, cf. above n. 31.
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by Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. The only instance where the point is
mentioned at all appears in Quintilian, with a quote from the mentioned
peroration of the Pro Milone,41 but under the topic of tone and sound of the
voice, and without any reference to further rhetorical use of this topic of
failure.
Nor is another way of pretended voice failure treated in rhetorical theory:
the case where the orator refuses to speak at all, excusing himself with a sore
throat. It is related by Plutarch42 how Demosthenes used this strategy in
the Harpalus affair in order not to be forced to justify his actions (however
without success). This tactic, too, is not considered in rhetorical theory.
4.2.5 The opponent’s voice failure
Voice failure is also used as a topos of weakness against the opponent.
Demosthenes argues in the Crown Speech that his opponents, especially
Aeschines, owe a great part of their success to their strong and loud voice,
not to a strong and worthy case;43 and that their loud voices are overcome by
his, Demosthenes’, telling the truth, presenting their following voice failure
as a sign of a bad conscience.44 In Cicero’s speeches, voice failure appears
always in a list with other bodily reactions indicating shock or fear: sudden
paleness, trembling, frightened expression of the face, numbness.45 The op-
41 Quint. Inst. 11.3.173 “illa quoque mire facit in peroratione velut deficientis dolore et fati-
gatione confessio, ut pro eodem Milone: ‘sed finis sit, neque enim prae lacrimis iam loqui
possum’: quae similem verbis habere debent etiam pronuntiationem.”
42 Plut. Dem. 25.4 “καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν εὖ καὶ καλῶς ἐρίοις καὶ ταινίαις κατὰ τοῦ τραχήλου καθε-
λιξάμενος εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν piροῆλθε, καὶ κελευόντων ἀνίστασθαι καὶ λέγειν, διένευεν ὡς
ἀpiοκεκομμένης αὐτῷ τῆς φωνῆς.”
43 Dem. or. 19.337–340; cf. 19.216, 19.238, and Schulz (2014, p. 88) “[bei Demosthenes] kann
der Stimmeinsatz als maßlos, d.h. in der Regel als zu laut, zu hoch oder zu variierend,
gekennzeichnet werden. Der Redner erscheint dann als jemand, der die Grenzen des
Schicklichen verletzt.”
44 Dem. or. 19.206–210, esp. 208 “τοῦτο piαραιρεῖται τὴν θρασύτητα τὴν τούτων, τοῦτ’ ἀpiο-
στρέφει τὴν γλῶτταν, ἐμφράττει τὸ στόμα, ἄγχει, σιωpiᾶν piοιεῖ.”.
45 Cic. Verr. 2.2.189 “illum in iure metu conscientiaque peccati mutum atque exanimatum ac
vix vivum”; Cic. Catil. 3.13 “ac mihi quidem, Quirites, cum illa certissima visa sunt ar-
gumenta atque indicia sceleris, tabellae, signa, manus, denique unius cuiusque confessio,
tum multo certiora illa, color, oculi, voltus, taciturnitas”; Cic. Har. 2 “sed vaecors repente
sine suo vultu, sine colore, sine voce constitit”; Cic. Pis. 99 “abiectum, contemptum, de-
spectum a ceteris, a te ipso desperatum et relictum, circumspectantem omnia, quicquid
increpuisset pertimescentem, diffidentem tuis rebus, sine voce, sine libertate, sine auctori-
tate, sine ulla specie consulari, horrentem, trementem, adulantem omnis videre te volui”.
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ponent’s silence is here, together with the other symptoms, again regularly
interpreted as a silent confession.
4.3 Memory failure
Memory failure in the course of a speech has been a dreaded scenario for
orators of all times, mostly in the form of “blackout”,46 or “turbari memo-
ria vel continuandi verba facultate destitui”47 which produces an unwanted
and embarrassing pause;48 but memory failure can also mean the unnoticed
omission of a part of the speech.49 This second situation is not as frighten-
ingly embarrassing and has thus received less attention: it is not mentioned
as a problem deserving treatment in ancient rhetorical theory.50 But even
if not explicitly mentioned, both risks are covered whenever rhetorical the-
ory deals with the fourth officium oratoris, μνήμη / memoria. The major issues
discussed are the means of preventing memory failure: memory training,
mnemotechnics, and training to speak extempore. Less space is devoted
to advice on how to deal with memory failure once it has happened. The
rhetorical use of memory failure (which takes the form of a pretended or
ironically presented failure) is considered, but not covered in all its manifes-
tations which can be observed in oratorical practice.
46 The most prominent instance of a blackout actually happening in antiquity is proba-
bly Demosthenes’ complete failure on the embassy before Philip, reported by Aeschines
(Aischin. leg. 34–35.
47 Quint. Inst. 4.1.61.
48 Described by Quintilian: Inst. 11.2.46 “interruptus actionis impetus et resistens ac sale-
brosa oratio”, 11.2.48 “haesitatio [. . . ] aut etiam silentium”.
49 Much more common is the reverse connection between silence and memory/forgetting:
that silence about someone or something leads to forgetfulness. See e.g. Cic. De orat. 2.7–8;
Cic. Verr. 2.5.138; Cic. Marc. 9; Cic. Phil. 9.10, 13.39, 14.33; also Liv. 28.29.4 and Tac. Hist.
4.9.
50 It is, however, covered in Cicero’s devastating description of the orator and politician
Curio. According to this, Curio was, despite his fine style, largely unsuccessful as an
orator due to his inadequate memory, as he often lost track of his speech or confused
his facts (Cic. Brut. 216–220). Whether or not this description is correct, it shows that
inadequate memory could be used as a point of criticism. Cf. Tatum (1991) and briefly
Wisse (2013, p. 186–187).
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4.3.1 Prevention
The two main methods of preparing against memory failure, as presented
in rhetorical theory, are improving one’s memory by general training, and
special mnemotechnics usable for any particular speech.
Memory training and memory skills in general had a different, and in
some respect much higher, value in antiquity51 than nowadays, not least be-
cause data storage technologies were far less developed.52 The invention of
writing had been a first step away from the memory feats in the age of Oral
Poetry, but also in the classical ages, “[a]ncient schools put great emphasis
on training the memory, and there are numerous examples of Greeks and Ro-
mans with a remarkable verbal memory for poetry, prose, names, and lists
of all kinds.”53 Cicero himself put special pride in his ability to remember
faces and names.54
In the specifically rhetorical education from Cicero’s time onward, the stu-
dents were expected to learn speeches by heart, both older speeches by fa-
mous orators and their own exercise speeches. Learning a speech by heart,
word by word, is in some way a necessary consequence of the second offi-
cium oratoris, the elocutio, if taken most strictly: the specific wording of any
argument, developed in preparation, would be lost in the actio if not remem-
bered word by word55 (as reading from a script was unusual, see below p.
200). However, in practice the exact reproduction of the prepared text was
apparently not considered crucial, and not every deviation would be con-
sidered a substantial damage to the speech as a whole. Cicero mentions in
51 Cf. Cic. De orat. 1.18 “quid dicam de thesauro rerum omnium, memoria? quae nisi custos
inventis cogitatisque rebus et verbis adhibeatur, intellegimus omnia, etiam si praeclaris-
sima fuerint in oratore, peritura.”
52 Small (2007, p. 195–196). The largest decline in the role of rote learning is probably to
be seen in schools and universities. In political oratory, manuscripts are widespread in
modern times (though not ubiquitous). Actors and opera singers have at all times been
required to know their parts by heart in all details, and for most soloist musicians it is not
an obligation but a matter of honour, quite as it was for ancient orators.
53 Kennedy (1994, p. 168).
54 Plut. Cic. 7.1–2.
55 Explicitly stated only by Quintilian: Inst. 11.2.45 “nam si memoria suffragatur, tempus non
defuit, nulla me velim syllaba effugiat (alioqui etiam scribere sit supervacuum)”; the same
thought occurs in Quint. Inst. 3.3.10 where the officia oratoris are discussed in a general and
abstract way.
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the Orator that inconsiderate word choice has an adverse effect,56 but the
more general opinion seems to be what we find in De oratore: “sed verbo-
rum memoria, quae minus est nobis necessaria, maiore imaginum varietate
distinguitur; [. . . ] rerum memoria propria est oratoris”.57 Another, more
ambivalent statement in the same work, deals with figures of words and fig-
ures of thought: “sed inter conformationem verborum et sententiarum hoc
interest, quod verborum tollitur, si verba mutaris, sententiarum permanet,
quibuscumque verbis uti velis”.58 This promotes word-by-word memorisa-
tion to a certain degree, but emphasises the importance for exact reproduc-
tion of special rhetorical figures, not necessarily of the entire speech.
Memorisation seems to have been most relevant within rhetorical educa-
tion as a means of memory training, an exercise to improve the student’s
general memory capacity. This is stated as a common part of an orator’s
training in Cicero’s De oratore:
exercenda est etiam memoria ediscendis ad verbum quam plu-
rimis et nostris scriptis et alienis; atque in ea exercitatione non
sane mihi displicet adhibere, si consueris, etiam istam locorum
simulacrorumque rationem, quae in arte traditur.59
In the last clause, a connection to the mnemotechnics proper is already im-
plied; besides, memorisation served another purpose, as students were to
memorise not arbitrary texts, but works of high quality. Thus the students
would actually be able to use parts of these texts in their own speeches: in
particular, outstanding speeches of earlier orators, as mentioned by Cicero in
the Orator,60 and poetry, as Aeschines relates in the Crown Trial.61 Quintilian
56 Cic. Orat. 150 “quamvis enim suaves gravesque sententiae tamen, si incondite positis ver-
bis efferuntur, offendent auris, quarum est iudicium superbissimum”.
57 Cic. De orat. 2.359.
58 Cic. De orat. 3.200.
59 Cic. De orat. 1.157.
60 Cic. Brut. 127 “exstat eius peroratio, qui epilogus dicitur; qui tanto in honore pueris nobis
erat ut eum etiam edisceremus”; cf. Plato’s Phaedrus, where Phaedrus is about to memorise
a speech by Lysias.
61 Aischin. Ctes. 135 “διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἡμᾶς piαῖδας ὄντας τὰς τῶν piοιητῶν γνώμας
ἐκμανθάνειν, ἵν’ ἄνδρες ὄντες αὐταῖς χρώμεθα.”
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stresses the importance of memory in early education62 and puts even more
emphasis on memorisation as a means of general memory training:
si quis tamen unam maximamque a me artem memoriae quaerat,
exercitatio est et labor: multa ediscere, multa cogitare, et si fieri
potest cotidie, potentissimum est: nihil aeque vel augetur cura
vel neglegentia intercidit.63
Quintilian’s advice on the choice of texts, however, is different from Ci-
cero’s, as he recommends the use of “poetica prius, tum oratorum, novis-
sime etiam solutiora numeris et magis ab usu dicendi remota, qualia sunt
iuris consultorum”64 as a sequence of increasing difficulty, but within these
categories he does not distinguish between texts of different quality.
A major point for both Cicero and Quintilian is the orator’s memory and
knowledge of his own current and past cases,65 as the orator could use these
(and other orator’s speeches66) as a supply of arguments tested in practice.67
A slightly different version of this advice is given already by Aristotle: that
the orator must be able to quote from cases similar to the current one, which
are known to the jury.68
62 Quint. Inst. 1.1.36 “nam et maxime necessaria est oratori, sicut suo loco dicam, memo-
ria; et ea praecipue firmatur atque alitur exercitatione et in his de quibus nunc loquimur
aetatibus, quae nihildum ipsae generare ex se queunt, prope sola est quae iuvari cura
docentium possit.”
63 Quint. Inst. 11.2.40; cf. Quint. Inst. 1.11.14.
Besides, memorisation is recommended as voice training: Quint. Inst. 11.3.25, see above
p. 182.
64 Quint. Inst. 11.2.41.
65 Cic. De orat. 2.355 “itaque soli qui memoria vigent, sciunt quid et quatenus et quo modo
dicturi sint, quid responderint, quid supersit: eidemque multa ex aliis causis aliquando
a se acta, multa ab aliis audita meminerunt”; Quint. Inst. 11.2.2 “sed non firme tantum
continere verum etiam cito percipere multa acturos oportet, nec quae scripseris modo
iterata lectione complecti, sed in cogitatis quoque rerum ac verborum contextum sequi, et
quae sint ab adversa parte dicta meminisse, nec utique eo quo dicta sunt ordine refutare
sed oportunis locis ponere.”
66 Cic. De orat. 1.257 “nam et subitae ad propositas causas exercitationes et accuratae ac med-
itatae commentationes ac stilus ille tuus, quem tu vere dixisti perfectorem dicendi esse ac
magistrum, multi sudoris est; et illa orationis suae cum scriptis alienis comparatio et de
alieno scripto subita vel laudandi vel vituperandi vel comprobandi vel refellendi causa
disputatio non mediocris contentionis est vel ad memoriam vel ad imitandum.” Similarly
Quint. Inst. 2.7 on memorisation in early education.
67 This relates to the “stock of phrases and/or arguments” on which see p. 192.
68 Aristot. Rhet. 1377a5–6 δεῖ δὲ ἔχειν ἐpiαναφέρειν ἐpiὶ τοιαῦτα γεγενημένα piαραδείγματα ἃ
ἴσασιν οἱ κρίνοντες.
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For an orator in practice, i.e. in court or political assembly, it was very rare
to memorise a speech completely beforehand;69 Cicero names Hortensius70
as very exceptional in so far as he reproduced all his speeches (so it is im-
plied) with the very same words with which he had prepared them; but Ci-
cero clearly considers this as something Hortensius would just do, without
much effort, because of his exceptionally good memory,71 and thus some-
thing any orator with the same capacity would do in the same way. Therefore
an exact reproduction in the actio of the text prepared in the step of elocutio
was generally considered an ideal, but one which was not worth every effort
in practice, and for most orators (if not all) it would have taken too much
time in most situations to memorise a speech, possibly of several hours, in
every detail. Quintilian confirms this and mentions another risk:
ex hac ingeniorum diversitate nata dubitatio est, ad verbum sit
ediscendum dicturis, an vim modo rerum atque ordinem com-
plecti satis sit: de quo sine dubio non potest in universum pro-
nuntiari. nam si memoria suffragatur, tempus non defuit, nulla
me velim syllaba effugiat: [. . . ] si vero aut memoria natura du-
rior erit aut non suffragabitur tempus, etiam inutile erit ad om-
nia se verba alligare, cum oblivio unius eorum cuiuslibet aut
deformem haesitationem aut etiam silentium indicat, tutiusque
multo comprehensis animo rebus ipsis libertatem sibi eloquendi
relinquere72
Besides, the orator needs to remember all the details of his case in a flexible
way especially when he is attacked in the altercatio, the direct dispute be-
tween the parties of a trial73 (this leads to the value of extempore speaking,
see below p. 196).
69 However, this feature is often claimed in modern research literature, e.g. Yates (1966, p.
18) “a technique by which the orator could improve his memory, which would enable him
to deliver long speeches from memory with unfailing accuracy”.
70 Cic. Brut. 301 (on Hortensius) “memoria tanta quantam in nullo cognovisse me arbitror, ut
quae secum commentatus esset, ea sine scripto verbis eisdem redderet quibus cogitavis-
set”. It is not implausible that Cicero had considerable insight into Hortensius’ methods,
as they collaborated in at least eight cases from 63 B.C. (Dyck, 2008, p. 155).
71 Cf. Sen. Contr. 1.19.
72 Quint. Inst. 11.2.44–48.
73 Quint. Inst. 6.4.8.
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We may therefore assume that the real solution in most cases was a com-
bination of 1. memorising the general outline of the speech and the ma-
jor lines of thought, and 2. rote-learning some passages, at particularly
important or critical points in the argumentation, and some particularly
beautiful or impressive figurae or sententiae found in the process of elocu-
tio; most of the speech, however, would be clad in words extempore on the
spot.74 This is what Quintilian states as the usual procedure for orators who
have a full agenda, and thus a limited amount of time to spend on each
case: “plerumque autem multa agentibus accidit ut maxime necessaria et
utique initia scribant, cetera, quae domo adferunt, cogitatione complectan-
tur, subitis ex tempore occurrant”.75
For this an orator could prepare to some degree, if he acquired a stock
of useful phrases by rote-learning poetry and sample speeches,76 but a
certain talent was indispensible, the lack of which would lead to just the
same dreaded pauses as a complete “blackout”, even if easier to overcome.
Plutarch reports about Alcibiades that he suffered from exactly this lack of
talent:
εἰ δὲ Θεοφράστῳ piιστεύομεν, ἀνδρὶ φιληκόῳ καὶ ἱστορικῷ piαρ’
ὁντινοῦν τῶν φιλοσόφων, εὑρεῖν μὲν ἦν τὰ δέοντα καὶ νοῆσαι piάντων
ἱκανώτατος ὁ Α᾿λκιβιάδης, ζητῶν δὲ μὴ μόνον ἃ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ
καὶ ὡς δεῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ τοῖς ῥήμασιν, οὐκ εὐpiορῶν δέ, piολλάκις
ἐσφάλλετο καὶ μεταξὺ λέγων ἀpiεσιώpiα καὶ διέλειpiε λέξεως δια-
φυγούσης, αὑτὸν ἀναλαμβάνων καὶ διασκοpiούμενος.77
74 This is most likely to be behind Cicero’s praise for the value of memory for the orator,
where he states that memory allows “omnis fixas esse in animo sententias, omnem de-
scriptum verborum apparatum” (Cic. De orat. 2.355); verborum apparatus is the style and
ornamentation of the speech, and descriptum can mean a fixed elocutio for a particular
speech, but also a well-sorted toolbox of stylistic elements.
75 Quint. Inst. 10.7.30. He adds the advice to not produce a written elocutio for passages the
orator does not intend to memorise word-by-word, as this will hinder the memory during
delivery (Inst. 10.7.32–33).
76 Cf. above p. 190. Another source can be seen in the sententiae on which a major part of pri-
mary education was based and which have survived in “gnomologies”, described e.g. by
Morgan (1998, ch. 4); however, we have no precise information how far these collections
where actually memorised.
77 Plut. Alc. 10.3.
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Apparently Alcibiades’ (mostly military) career did not suffer much from
this deficit; a decidedly oratorical career, however, is hard to imagine under
these circumstances.
Consequently, Cicero recommends building one’s style by imitation78 and
reading poetry,79 but he also gives a piece of advice not found in other writ-
ers’ rhetorical treatises: to assemble a pool not only of words and phrases
but of arguments, and
hoc instrumentum causarum et generum universorum in forum
deferre debemus neque, ut quaeque res delata ad nos erit, tum
denique scrutari locos, ex quibus argumenta eruamus.80
This practice took a turn to exaggeration in the Empire, most likely due
to a more widespread systematic oratorical education, and for this reason
the balance of form and content appreciated by Cicero81 is (in this aspect)
not quite shared by Quintilian: he explicitly warns against a practice exer-
cised by some orators of his time, who wrote and memorised argumenta-
tions about common issues in order to insert them into any court speech.
Quintilian heavily criticises this practice, as this 1. makes the orator less flex-
ible, 2. makes a poor impression if noticed by the audience, 3. nice word-
play is always less important than the matter at hand.82 The first argument,
flexibility, is most important to Quintilian, who is not at all partial against
having a reservoir of topics, thoughts, and lines of argumentation, together
78 Cic. De orat. 2.96 “hanc igitur similitudinem qui imitatione adsequi volet, cum exercita-
tionibus crebris atque magnis tum scribendo maxime persequatur” (after a list of great
Greek orators suitable for imitation).
79 Cic. De orat. 3.39 “sed omnis loquendi elegantia, quamquam expolitur scientia litterarum,
tamen augetur legendis oratoribus et poetis; sunt enim illi veteres, qui ornare nondum
poterant ea, quae dicebant, omnes prope praeclare locuti; quorum sermone adsuefacti qui
erunt, ne cupientes quidem poterunt loqui nisi Latine. neque tamen erit utendum verbis
eis, quibus iam consuetudo nostra non utitur, nisi quando ornandi causa parce, quod
ostendam; sed usitatis ita poterit uti, lectissimis ut utatur, is, qui in veteribus erit scriptis
studiose et multum volutatus.”
80 Cic. De orat. 2.146. The approach which combines stylistic and argumentative elements
is also visible in Cicero’s description of his tirocinium fori: “ego autem a patre ita eram
deductus ad Scaevolam sumpta virili toga, ut, quoad possem et liceret, a senis latere
numquam discederem; itaque multa ab eo prudenter disputata, multa etiam breviter et com-
mode dicta memoriae mandabam fierique studebam eius prudentia doctior” (Cic. Lael. 1).
81 Cf. Cic. De orat. 3.19 “nam cum omnis ex re atque verbis constet oratio, neque verba se-
dem habere possunt, si rem subtraxeris, neque res lumen, si verba semoveris.”; Cic. De
orat. 3.24 “tantum significabo brevi neque verborum ornatum inveniri posse non partis
expressisque sententiis, neque esse ullam sententiam inlustrem sine luce verborum.”
82 Quint. Inst. 2.4.27–32. Cf. Webb (2001, p. 290).
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with words and phrases—he only insists that the orator must never adhere
to any single of them, but always be ready to choose according to what is
most appropriate to the situation.83 In education, Quintilian recommends
the established approach of reading and imitation;84 a minor new point is
the mention of historical exempla as part of the rhetorical stockpile.85
“The whole system [of mnemotechnics] was doubtless used much more in
schools or in public address by a young man making one of his first appear-
ances than by practiced orators”.86 Blum shows that mnemotechnics were
(in 1st c. BC/AD Rome) part of the usual school curriculum, and thus theo-
retically widely known, but not much in use in speaking situations outside
education.87 Likewise, word-by-word memorisation played an important
role only in an orator’s education, and it is even doubtful that memorisation
of complete speeches was common practice in all or most schools. The same
emphasis on training purposes, against actual usability, is made already in
the Rhetorica ad Herennium:
nunc, ne forte verborum memoriam aut nimis difficilem aut
parum utilem arbitrere, rerum ipsarum memoria contentus sis,
quod et utilior sit et plus habeat facultatis, admonendus es, quare
verborum memoriam non inprobemus. nam putamus oportere
eos, qui velint res faciliores sine labore et molestia facere, in re-
bus difficilioribus esse ante exercitatos.88
83 Quint. Inst. 8.pr.28–29 “miser enim et, ut sic dicam, pauper orator est qui nullum verbum
aequo animo perdere potest. sed ne perdet quidem qui rationem loquendi primum cog-
noverit, tum lectione multa et idonea copiosam sibi verborum supellectilem compararit,
huic adhibuerit artem conlocandi, deinde haec omnia exercitatione plurima roborarit, ut
semper in promptu sint et ante oculos: [29] namque ei qui id fecerit sic res cum suis no-
minibus occurrent. sed opus est studio praecedente et adquisita facultate et quasi reposita.
namque ista quaerendi iudicandi comparandi anxietas dum discimus adhibenda est, non
dum dicimus. alioqui sicut qui patrimonium non pararunt, sub diem quaerunt, ita in
oratione qui non satis laboravit”.
84 Quint. Inst. 10.1.19 “repetamus autem et tractemus et, ut cibos mansos ac prope liquefactos
demittimus quo facilius digerantur, ita lectio non cruda sed multa iteratione mollita et
velut confecta memoriae imitationique tradatur.”
85 Quint. Inst. 10.1.34 “est et alius ex historiis usus, et is quidem maximus sed non ad prae-
sentem pertinens locum, ex cognitione rerum exemplorumque, quibus in primis instructus esse
debet orator”.
86 Kennedy (1994, p. 124).
87 Blum (1969, p. 132–134).
88 Rhet. Her. 3.39.
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The other main method of preventing memory failure in advance were
memory systems, or mnemotechnics. Ancient mnemotechnics have fasci-
nated people at all times, but extant useful sources are scarce. Part of the
evidence consists in anecdotes about extraordinary memory feats, like the
stories about Hippias of Elis, Simonides, Hortensius, or Cineas;89 of these
only Simonides is of any importance to the orator, if at all, as he is considered
the inventor of the “ars memoriae”.90 The other part of the evidence are actual
descriptions of the existing mnemotechnics; but most of those descriptions
which were available in antiquity were contained in the rhetorical “manu-
als” of lesser quality which are lost to us.91 Only three extant texts deal with
practical mnemotechnics in a rhetorical-oratorical context: the Rhetorica ad
Herennium, Cicero’s De oratore and Quintilian’s Institutio. All three texts suf-
fer from the fact that mnemotechnics were very common, well known and
much practised at their time in the usual course of education, so they as-
sume their reader to be more or less familiar with the topic. The Auctor ad
Herennium treats the point in some detail, some of which, however, is quite
obscure.92 Cicero passes by the topic as quickly as possible “ne in re nota et
pervulgata multus et insolens sim”.93
Quintilian gives the best available account,94 less detailed than the Rhetor-
ica ad Herennium, but clearer and more consistent, yet far from any full de-
scription of the art as it was taught, even less as it was practised. The system
described by Quintilian is as efficient as it is effective: on the basis of a series
of loca which the orator knows anyway, without any effort (like the rooms
of his own house), the major points of the speech are, in their proper order,
connected to the loca, using visual associations (imagines) as the easiest and
strongest type of link.95
89 Overview in Post (1932, p. 106–107).
90 Cic. De orat. 2.351 “gratiamque habeo Simonidi illi Cio, quem primum ferunt artem memo-
riae protulisse”; Quint. Inst. 11.2.11 “artem autem memoriae primus ostendisse dicitur
Simonides”.
91 Yates (1966, p. 21).
92 Rhet. Her. 3.28–40.
93 Cic. De orat. 2.358.
94 Quint. Inst. 11.2.18–21.
95 Cic. De orat. 2.357 “acerrimum autem ex omnibus nostris sensibus esse sensum videndi;
qua re facillime animo teneri posse ea, quae perciperentur auribus aut cogitatione, si etiam
commendatione oculorum animis traderentur”.
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A major advantage of this approach is the ability of the user (orator) to ac-
cess any marked point of the speech independently from the overall order,96
which makes it the best possible provision for a blackout: if the orator loses
his line of thought, he can get back on track at a later point in his speech,
thereby losing a certain section, but not more than one of his major points—
provided that he has carefully chosen his termini, “stepping stones” (and that
he has not more than a single “blackout”, of course).
Carefully choosing one’s major points and the associated images has been
recognised in antiquity as a crucial part of the technique,97 and even more
important than which points of the speech to choose can be the question how
many points, and thus imagines, constitute the optimal provision for a good
performance. Beside the obvious error of picking too few “stepping stones”
to cover the entire speech, warnings are expressed as well against breaking a
speech up into too many parts98 and especially against the practice of using
imagines for every single word of a speech (which was apparently taught
by some teachers of rhetoric99), as recalling these would take up too much
time during the speech and thus lead to the very same unwanted pauses the
orator was intent to avoid.100
96 Rhet. Her. 3.30 “item putamus oportere ex ordine hos locos habere, ne quando perturba-
tione ordinis inpediamur, quo setius, quoto quoquo loco libebit, vel ab superiore vel ab
inferiore parte imagines sequi et ea, quae mandata locis erunt, edere possimus: nam ut,
si in ordine stantes notos quomplures viderimus, nihil nostra intersit, utrum ab summo
an ab imo an ab medio nomina eorum dicere incipiamus, item in locis ex ordine conlo-
catis eveniet, ut in quamlibebit partem quoque loco lubebit imaginibus commoniti dicere
possimus id, quod locis mandaverimus”; Quint. Inst. 11.2.28 “dandi sunt certi quidam
termini, ut contextum verborum, qui est difficillimus, continua et crebra meditatio, par-
tis deinceps ipsas repetitus ordo coniungat. non est inutile iis quae difficilius haereant
aliquas adponere notas, quarum recordatio commoneat et quasi excitet memoriam”.
97 Quintilian connects it to the partitio of a speech: Quint. Inst. 4.5.3 “alioqui quae tam man-
ifesta et lucida est ratio quam rectae partitionis? sequitur enim naturam ducem adeo ut
memoriae id maximum sit auxilium, via dicendi non decedere.”
98 Quint. Inst. 11.2.27 “si longior complectenda memoria fuerit oratio, proderit per partes
ediscere (laborat enim maxime onere); sed hae partes non sint perexiguae, alioqui rursus
multae erunt et eam distringent atque concident”; cf. Quint. Inst. 4.5.24–25 “vitanda utique
maxime concisa nimium et velut articulosa partitio. [25] nam et auctoritati plurimum
detrahunt minuta illa nec iam membra sed frusta”.
99 Rhet. Her. 3.38 “scio plerosque Graecos, qui de memoria sripserunt, fecisse, ut multorum
verborum imagines conscriberent, uti, qui ediscere vellent, paratas haberent, ne quid in
quaerendo consumerent operae. quorum rationem aliquot de causis inprobamus: pri-
mum, quod in verborum innumerabili multitudine ridiculumst mille verborum imagines
conparare. quantulum enim poterunt haec valere, cum ex infinita verborum copia modo
aliud modo aliud nos verbum meminisse oportebit? etc.”
100 Quint. Inst. 11.2.25–26 “habeamus enim sane, ut qui notis scribunt, certas imagines om-
nium et loca scilicet infinita, per quae verba quot sunt in quinque contra Verrem secundae
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A third way of preventing memory failure is to cultivate an ability to speak
extempore; however, this is hardly treated at all in rhetorical theory. Ci-
cero’s advice to memorise model speeches (see above p. 189) can be seen as a
method of building a repertoire of topics and phrases, and he connects prac-
tice and exercise to speed of delivery in general terms which may include
extempore speaking,101 but does not explicitly make the point. Where he
mentions good extempore speakers, he attributes this more to talent than to
training.102
Quintilian, in contrast, not only states that if a speech cannot be memo-
rised word-by-word (i.e. in most, if not all, “real” speaking situations), a tal-
ent for extempore speaking is indispensable,103 but devotes an entire section
of his Institutio to the topic of extempore speaking (this is the last section,
which comes both as a “last not least” and as a quintessence, of book 10,
which covers all aspects of imitation and exercise).104 In particular, Quin-
tilian discusses the problem of unintentional pauses due to memory failure,
and presents extempore speaking as an antidote.105 In another context, in the
actionis libris explicentur, [ne] meminerimus etiam omnium quasi depositorum: nonne
impediri quoque dicendi cursum necesse est duplici memoriae cura? [26] nam quo modo
poterunt copulata fluere si propter singula verba ad singulas formas respiciendum erit?”
Cf. Cic. De orat. 2.359 “sed verborum memoria, quae minus est nobis necessaria, maiore
imaginum varietate distinguitur; multa enim sunt verba, quae quasi articuli conectunt
membra orationis, quae formari similitudine nulla possunt; eorum fingendae sunt nobis
imagines, quibus semper utamur; rerum memoria propria est oratoris”.
101 Cic. De orat. 1.90 “et quod consuetudo exercitatioque intellegendi prudentiam acueret
atque eloquendi celeritatem incitaret”.
102 Cic. De orat. 2.316 “in quo [i.e. principio orationis] admirari soleo non equidem istos,
qui nullam huic rei operam dederunt, sed hominem in primis disertum atque eruditum,
Philippum, qui ita solet surgere ad dicendum, ut quod primum verbum habiturus sit, nesciat” (Ci-
cero does not state whether he attributes this ability to talent or to exercise, but it seems
that Philippus does not need any opera for this feat, whereas most orators do); Cic. De
orat. 3.129 “isque [i.e. Gorgias] princeps ex omnibus ausus est in conventu poscere qua
de re quisque vellet audire”. Cf. Plutarch’s account of Alcibiades (above p. 192) and of
Demosthenes and Demades (Plut. Dem. 8.5, 9.4, 10.1).
103 Quint. Inst. 11.2.49 “nam et invitus perdit quisque id quod elegerat verbum, nec facile
reponit aliud dum id quod scripserat quaerit. sed ne hoc quidem infirmae memoriae
remedium est nisi in iis qui sibi facultatem aliquam dicendi ex tempore paraverunt.”
Cf. p. 107: Quintilian on how to adjust a speech according to audience reactions while
speaking.
104 Quint. Inst. 10.7 (33 paragraphs), with a lengthy reasoning in Quint. Inst. 10.7.1–4 why the
orator must be able to speak extempore.
105 Quint. Inst. 10.7.10 “longe enim praecedat oportet intentio ac prae se res agat, quantumque
dicendo consumitur, tantum ex ultimo prorogetur, ut, donec perveniamus ad finem, non
minus prospectu procedamus quam gradu, si non intersistentes offensantesque brevia illa
atque concisa singultantium modo eiecturi sumus.”
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section on use of evidence, Quintilian concludes that the orator must, by ex-
perience and exercise in all types of evidence, be able to handle these flexibly
without thinking—which is more or less equal to the capacity of speaking
extempore about an unknown case.106 This is the same value of flexibility
which occurs as well in other areas of the Institutio: in Quintilian’s warning
that the orator, if he wants to refer in his speech to a gesture or condition of
his client, must be prepared to omit the reference if the gesture is not there
when needed,107 and in his advice to gain flexibility by knowledge in other
disciplines (in particular, jurisdiction).108
This is in fact one of the rare topics where Quintilian goes a step further
and notes the value of appearing unprepared without being so, of pretending
to speak extempore:109 he describes how an exordium which refers to the
opponent’s (preceding) speech (and which thus is really and obviously given
extempore) makes also the rest of the speech seem unprepared, and how this
gains both the audience’s confidence in the orator’s abilities and their belief
that they are not going to be deceived by some clever rhetorical manoeuvre
which would need to be prepared beforehand.110
106 Quint. Inst. 5.10.125 “sed hoc exercitatione multa consequendum, ut, quem ad modum
illorum artificum [i.e. citharae], etiam si alio spectant, manus tamen ipsa consuetudine ad
gravis, acutos, mediosque horum sonos fertur, sic oratoris cogitationem nihil moretur haec
varietas argumentorum et copia, sed quasi offerat se et occurrat, et, ut litterae syllabaeque
scribentium cogitationem non exigunt, sic orationem sponte quadam sequantur.”
107 Quint. Inst. 6.1.42 “omnia tamen haec tolerabilia iis quibus actionem mutare facile est: at
qui a stilo non recedunt aut conticescunt ad hos casus aut frequentissime falsa dicunt. inde
est enim ‘tendit ad genua vestra supplices manus’ et ‘haeret in complexu liberorum miser’
et ‘revocat ecce me’ etiam si nihil horum is de quo dicitur faciat.” A special situation may
arise in declamations: Quint. Inst. 6.1.43 “ex scholis haec vitia, in quibus omnia libere
fingimus et inpune, quia pro facto est quidquid voluimus; non admittit hoc idem veritas,
egregieque Cassius dicenti adulescentulo: ‘quid me torvo vultu intueris, Severe?’ ‘non
mehercule’ inquit ‘faciebam, sed sic scripsisti: ecce!’ et quam potuit truculentissime eum
aspexit.”
108 Quint. Inst. 12.3.2 “nam quodam modo mandata perferet, et ea quae sibi a iudice credi
postulaturus est aliena fide dicet, et ipse litigantium auxiliator egebit auxilio. quod ut fieri
nonnumquam minore incommodo possit cum domi praecepta et composita et sicut cetera
quae in causa sunt in discendo cognita ad iudicem perfert: quid fiet in iis quaestionibus
quae subito inter ipsas actiones nasci solent? non deformiter respectet et inter subsellia
minores advocatos interroget?”
109 Batstone (2009, p. 219–221) has shown, for example, how Cicero in Catil. 1 made use of
apparent improvisation.
110 Quint. Inst. 4.1.54 “hoc ipso quod non compositum domi sed ibi atque ex re natum et
facilitate famam ingenii auget et facie simplicis sumptique ex proximo sermonis fidem
quoque adquirit”.
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However, Quintilian does not give any practical advice for improving the
ability of extempore speaking, nor of simulating it (beyond the very general
advice of much exercise). Indeed, he is quite hesitant to allow exercises in
this area in school, and emphasises the precedence of detailed written exer-
cises.111
Cogitatio112 is a method alternative to both written preparation and extem-
pore speaking which occurs only in Quintilian. Here the orator performs
inventio, dispositio and elocutio only mentally, without writing a full text and
even without taking notes. This technique has the advantages that it is less
time-consuming and can be performed anywhere and any time (at least more
so than writing, or dictating), and that it renders the orator much more flex-
ible than a written text (as said before, a point much appreciated by Quintil-
ian); its drawback is the enormous amount of experience it requires, which
is time-consuming on a large scale.
4.3.2 Acute memory failure
What, then, is the orator to do once the “blackout” has occurred? In the an-
cient rhetorical writings we find some advice, here and there, on what not
to do in case of acute memory failure; actual advice on how to deal with
the problem is scarce and can only be deduced indirectly. Advice on how
not to react includes: don’t slow down;113 don’t harrumph, blow your nose,
or walk around;114 don’t look at your script or ask a prompter; and don’t
promise early in the speech to say something which you then forget to men-
111 Quint. Inst. 2.4.15–17 “sed ut eo revertar unde sum egressus: narrationes stilo componi
quanta maxima possit adhibita diligentia volo. [. . . ] ita cum iam formam rectae atque
emendatae orationis accipient, extemporalis garrulitas nec expectata cogitatio et vix sur-
gendi mora circulatoriae vere iactationis est. [. . . ] [17] ille demum in id quod quaerimus
aut ei proximum poterit evadere qui ante discet recte dicere quam cito.” Cf. Inst. 10.3.2
“scribendum ergo quam diligentissime et quam plurimum. [. . . ] nam sine hac quidem
constantia ipsa illa ex tempore dicendi facultas inanem modo loquacitatem dabit et verba
in labris nascentia.”
112 Quint. Inst. 10.6, from which the following is paraphrased.
113 Quint. Inst. 11.3.52 “vitium nimiae tarditatis: nam et difficultatem inveniendi fatetur”.
difficultas inveniendi actually means difficulties to find appropriate words on the spot, but
the same problem would arise with difficulties to remember the next point.
114 Quint. Inst. 11.3.121 (in the section on gestures) “his accedunt vitia non naturae sed trep-
idationis: cum ore concurrente rixari; si memoria fefellerit aut cogitatio non suffragetur,
quasi faucibus aliquid obstiterit insonare; in adversum tergere nares, obambulare sermone
inperfecto, resistere subito et laudem silentio poscere.”
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tion115 (the last point is not necessarily a problem of acute memory failure,
rather located somewhere between preparation and the actual speaking sit-
uation). A more positive piece of advice is the instruction always to think
ahead while speaking, to have in mind both the current and the next topic in
the line. We find it in two places: in Cicero’s Orator116 it is actually aimed at
avoiding bad rhythm, but obviously also suitable to avoid inappropriately
long pauses (which are, in some way, very bad rhythm, see above p. 131);
in Quintilian’s Institutio117 it is given specially for extempore speaking, and
without mention of memory failure or pauses, but clearly with the aim of
avoiding these.
The use of a script, or notes, or a prompter during a speech deserves some
more attention. In the communis opinio, both ancient and modern, the an-
cient orator always speaks without any written support;118 yet this was not
as strict a rule as is sometimes claimed. In general, writing a speech down in
preparation was not only normal practice but considered an essential step:
when Antony had Cicero slain, he wanted to get, besides his head, “καὶ τὰς
χεῖρας [. . . ] αἷς τοὺς Φιλιpipiικοὺς ἔγραψεν”119 as a symbol of his oratorical
deeds. Yet it is likely that the most common case in an orator’s daily prac-
tice was what is related about Demosthenes, “that his speeches were neither
completely written out nor altogether unwritten”.120
115 Quint. Inst. 4.5.2 “rursus quidam periculosum id [partitione uti] oratori arbitrantur du-
abus ex causis: quod nonnumquam et excidere soleant quae promisimus et si qua in par-
tiendo praeterimus occurrere: quod quidem nemini accidet nisi qui plane vel nullo fuerit
ingenio vel ad agendum nihil cogitati praemeditatique detulerit.” Cf. Rhet. Her. 2.43 “item
vitiosum est non omnis res confirmare, quas pollicitus sis in expositione”, here without
reference to memory issues.
116 Cic. Orat. 150 “nam ut in legendo oculus sic animus in dicendo prospiciet quid sequatur,
ne extremorum verborum cum insequentibus primis concursus aut hiulcas voces efficiat
aut asperas”.
117 Quint. Inst. 11.2.3 “quin extemporalis oratio non alio [ac memoria] mihi videtur men-
tis vigore constare. nam dum alia dicimus, quae dicturi sumus intuenda sunt: ita cum
semper cogitatio ultra eat, id quod est longius quaerit, quidquid autem repperit quodam
modo apud memoriam deponit, quod illa quasi media quaedam manus acceptum ab in-
ventione tradit elocutioni”.
118 This opinion has found its way in many modern publications, e.g. Merklin’s edition of
De oratore: “Die Unentbehrlichkeit der Mnemotechnik ergibt sich aus der selbstverständ-
lichen Anforderung an den antiken Redner, frei zu sprechen”. (Merklin, 2001, p. 14)
119 Plut. Cic. 48.4 “τὴν δὲ κεφαλὴν ἀpiέκοψαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς χεῖρας, Α᾿ντωνίου κελεύσαντος,
αἷς τοὺς Φιλιpipiικοὺς ἔγραψεν.”
120 Plut. Dem. 8.4 “[Δημοσθένης] οὔτε γράψας οὔτ’ ἄγραφα κομιδῇ λέγειν ὡμολόγει”.
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In Athens, reading a speech out or using notes was not forbidden; it was re-
garded by some as bad practice (especially if they could use the point against
their adversaries in court).121 In Rome, the use of a script or a prompter
was mostly considered bad practice. However, Quintilian is the first to say
so explicitly,122 and this issue was apparently handled more liberally in the
Republic, as Cicero himself read his speech Post Reditum in Senatu from a
script,123 and where he mentions another orator using a script124 it is not to
reproach him but to exclude the possibility of a mistake. But even though
it may be a question of text transmission, we may notice that both these
examples are from senate speeches, while the only example of Cicero’s de-
riding his opponent for using a prompter comes from a court speech.125 Or-
atorical genres may thus make a greater difference here than historical eras:
it seems plausible that script and prompter were especially condemned in
court, which would also explain Quintilian’s attitude as he not only writes in
the Empire, but “judicial rhetoric is the overwhelming concern” for him.126
However, Quintilian not only regards a script as improper but as practically
dangerous, as it inhibits the flexibility he considers so important.127
121 Rhet. Alex. 1444a18–25 “ἐὰν δὲ διαβάλλωσιν ἡμᾶς, ὡς γεγραμμένους λόγους λέγομεν ἢ
λέγειν μελετῶμεν ἢ ὡς ἐpiὶ μισθῷ τινι συνηγοροῦμεν, χρὴ piρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμόσε βαδίζοντας
εἰρωνεύεσθαι καὶ piερὶ μὲν τῆς γραφῆς λέγειν, μὴ κωλύειν τὸν νόμον ἢ αὐτὸν γεγραμμένα
λέγειν ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἄγραφα· τὸν γὰρ νόμον οὐκ ἐᾶν τοιαῦτα piράττειν, λέγειν δὲ ὅpiως ἄν τις
βούληται συγχωρεῖν.”
122 Quint. Inst. 11.2.45 “ideoque et admoneri et ad libellum respicere vitiosum, quod liber-
tatem neglegentiae facit”; Quint. Inst. 11.3.142 “quod [libellum] non utique captandum
est: videtur enim fateri memoriae diffidentiam et ad multos gestus est impedimento”; cf.
Quint. Inst. 11.3.132–133 (in the section on gestures) “[. . . ] delicatum: sicut palam moneri
excidentis aut legere: [133] namque in his omnibus et vis illa dicendi solvitur et frigescit
adfectus et iudex parum sibi praestari reverentiae credit.”
123 Cic. Planc. 74 “oratio, quae propter rei magnitudinem dicta de scripto est”.
124 Cic. Phil. 10.5 “ita enim dixisti, et quidem de scripto (nam te inopia verbi lapsum putarem)
etc.”
125 Cic. Div. in Caec. 52 “video mihi non te, sed hunc librum esse responsurum, quem monitor
tuus hic tenet”.
126 Kennedy (1994, p. 185).
127 Quint. Inst. 12.9.16–17 “at cum protinus respondendum est, omnia parari non possunt,
adeo ut paulo minus promptis etiam noceat scripsisse, si alia ex diverso quam opinati
fuerint occurrerint. [17] inviti enim recedunt a praeparatis et tota actione respiciunt re-
quiruntque num aliquid ex illis intervelli atque ex tempore dicendis inseri possit: quod
si fiat non cohaeret, nec commissuris modo, ut in opere male iuncto, hiantibus sed ipsa
coloris inaequalitate detegitur.”
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4.3.3 Pretending memory failure
Like in the issue of voice failure, orators are not only concerned with avoid-
ing memory failure but can actually use it for rhetorical purposes by pre-
tending it to happen; here we find rhetorical theory aware of at least some
aspects, even if not systematically.
One figure is to feign memory failure in order not to appear too prepared,
like Cicero’s famous “I am absolutely ignorant of art history” passage in the
Verrines,128 cited ad rem by Quintilian129 with the “paene excidit mihi” for-
mula of anti-praeteritio130 which is so common in Cicero’s speeches that it is
hardly taken as related to actual memory failure any more.
Two more devices are closely related: the figure “. . . or have I forgotten
anything?”131 is mentioned twice by Quintilian (once as a captatio benevolen-
tiae, like paene praeterii,132 once as a form of the recapitulation after the main
part of the speech133). Secondly, Quintilian suggests the technique of leaving
something out by pretended memory failure in order to present it in a more
suitable spot134 (connected to the figure of alio loco135). Another type found
in Cicero’s speeches is not covered by Quintilian, which is actually a variant
of the “praeteritio of the rest”: sometimes in the pure form of “there is more
of this, but I have forgotten”,136 sometimes in connection with the topos of
128 Cic. Verr. 2.4.5 “is dicebatur esse Myronis, ut opinor, et certe.”, “sed earum artificem—
quem? quemnam? recte admones—Polyclitum esse dicebant.”
129 Quint. Inst. 4.5.4 “alia sunt magis propter quae partitione non semper sit utendum: pri-
mum quia pleraque gratiora sunt si inventa subito nec domo allata sed inter dicendum ex
re ipsa nata videantur, unde illa non iniucunda schemata: ‘paene excidit mihi’ et ‘fugerat
me’ et ‘recte admones’; propositis enim probationibus omnis in relicum gratia novitatis
praecerpitur.”
130 See above p. 87.
131 It is used e.g. by Demosthenes, when he pretends to have lost track of the statutes he had
planned to quote in his speech (Dem. or. 23.82).
132 Quint. Inst. 9.2.60–61 “vel cum quaerere nos quid dicamus fingimus: ‘quid relicum est?’
et: ‘num quid omisi?’”
133 Quint. Inst. 6.1.3 “licet et dubitare num quid nos fugerit”.
134 Quint. Inst. 4.2.83 “nam et aliquando nobis excidisse simulamus cum quid utiliore loco
reducimus”.
135 See p. 76.
136 Cic. Phil. 13.11 “sunt alii plures fortasse, sed de mea memoria dilabuntur.”, 13.28 “arbitror
me aliquos praeterisse; de iis tamen, qui occurrebant, tacere non potui.”; similarly Cic.
Phil. 14.31 “quorum de honore utinam mihi plura in mentem venirent!” A similar figure is
used by Aeschines: ἢ piολλοὺς ἑτέρους, ὧν ἑκὼν ἐpiιλανθάνομαι; οὐ γὰρ ἐpiεξελθεῖν αὐτῶν
ἕκαστον κατ’ ὄνομα piικρῶς βούλομαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῶν τοιούτων ἀpiορεῖν ἂν εὐξαίμην ἐν
τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὴν piρὸς τὴν piόλιν εὔνοιαν. (Aischin. Tim. 158–159)
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the inexpressible.137 What Quintilian does mention138 is the ironical touch
this figure can take, when the orator shows his wit by making some stupid
remarks in obvious mockery.139
A more special type of pretended memory failure is the figure of self-
correction,140 which is used several times by the Attic Orators and Cicero
in their speeches, usually in the form “non dico / dicam A, sed B”.141 Cicero
has it once in a rather implicit form,142 sometimes with the correction post-
poned in the form “B, ne dicam A”,143 and twice in a more elaborate form.144
Of course, the phenomenon of failure is present here only in a very abstract
way—no one when using these figures would actually have the audience
believe he has made a slip of memory. Instead, the figure is intended to draw
attention to the point, as a certain effort is simulated to find the appropriate
137 Cic. Verr. 2.4.57 “nullo modo possum omnia istius facta aut memoria consequi aut oratione
complecti”.
See p. 214.
138 Quint. Inst. 6.3.23 “namque eadem quae si inprudentibus excidant stulta sunt, si simula-
mus venusta creduntur.”
139 E.g. Cic. Q. Rosc. 50 “quod cum est veritate falsum, tum ratione quoque est incredibile;
obliviscor enim Roscium et Cluvium viros esse primarios; improbos temporis causa esse
fingo.”
140 It is classified as a figure of thought (ἐpiανόρθωσις) by Rowe (1997, p. 141), and as correctio,
with more detail, in Lausberg (1990, §§ 784–786); most quotations in the latter are from
late ancient sources.
141 Attic Orators: e.g. Dem. or. 9.24, 10.43, 18.297, 19.72, 19.265, 23.153, 24.169, 30.21, 36.39;
Aischin. leg. 5, 148, Ctes. 167; Cicero: Cic. Catil. 1.2 “consul videt; hic tamen vivit. vivit?
immo vero etiam in senatum venit, fit publici consilii particeps, notat et designat oculis ad
caedem unum quemque nostrum.”; Cic. Sull. 72 “ecquod est huius factum aut commis-
sum non dicam audacius, sed quod cuiquam paulo minus consideratum videretur?”; Cic.
Flacc. 4 “quam ob rem nisi hoc loco, nisi apud vos, nisi per vos, iudices, non auctoritatem,
quae amissa est, sed salutem nostram, quae spe exigua extremaque pendet, tenuerimus,
nihil est praeterea quo confugere possimus”; Cic. Marc. 4 “quae non dicam exornare, sed
enarrare”; Cic. Deiot. 2 “crudelem Castorem, ne dicam sceleratum et impium”, 10 “neque
enim ille odio tui progressus, sed errore communi lapsus est”; Cic. Phil. 2.19 “iam illud
cuius est non dico audaciae (cupit enim se audacem), sed, quod minime vult, stultitiae,
qua vincit omnis”, 2.30 “sed stuporem hominis vel dicam pecudis attendite”, 2.38 “tu certe
numquam in hoc ordine vel potius numquam in hac urbe mansisses”, 2.65 “tantus igitur
te stupor oppressit vel, ut verius dicam, tantus furor, ut . . . ”, 2.67 “quae Charybdis tam vo-
rax? Charybdim dico, quae si fuit, animal unum fuit; Oceanus medius fidius vix videtur
tot res tam dissipatas, tam distantibus in locis positas tam cito absorbere potuisse”, 2.104
“o tecta ipsa misera, ‘quam dispari domino’ (quamquam quo modo iste dominus?)—sed
tamen quam ab dispari tenebantur!”, 2.105 “at vero te inquilino (non enim domino)”, 13.18
“hoc archipirata (quid enim dicam tyranno?)”
142 Cic. Flacc. 4.
143 Cic. Deiot. 2, Cic. Phil. 2.105, 13.18.
144 Cic. Phil. 2.67, 2.104.
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term, for something which consequently must be crucial to the case (this is
the underlying line of thought implied by the orator).
There is a peculiar accumulation of the figure in Cicero’s late speeches,
with half of the examples from Cicero in Phil. 2 alone. Furthermore, in the
two examples found in Cicero’s earlier speeches a more intense term is re-
placed by a weaker one, while almost all of the later examples have a cli-
mactic structure (in case of the postpositioned self-corrections—B, ne dicam
A—the replacing term is weaker, so that the climax is preserved in the word
order). Often an already strong term is replaced by an even more intense
one, and this ostentatious struggle for the appropriate term implies that the
orator is driven to the limits of language by the extremity of the facts; a fur-
ther progression on this scale leads the orator beyond the limits of language,
and thus to the “topos of the inexpressible”.145 Apparently, from the dis-
tribution of the figure in his speeches, Cicero believed he had a licence to
explicitly use stronger terms only in the last stage of his career, long after his
recognition as Rome’s first orator.
In rhetorical theory the figure is described in the Rhet. Her.146 with an elab-
orate motivation, but without consideration of a climactic or anticlimactic
structure. Cicero only mentions it in a percursio of rhetorical figures;147 Quin-
tilian quotes this list without comment148 and later mentions correctio very
briefly, without even an example, in a list of figures of his own.149 The figure
145 On this topos see p. 214; this is also related to the explicit omission of (over-)strong or
indecent language, see p. 113.
146 Rhet. Her. 4.36 “correctio est, quae tollit id, quod dictum est, et pro eo id, quod magis
idoneum videtur, reponit, [exempla] commovetur hoc genere animus auditoris. res enim
communi verbo elata * tantummodo dicta videtur; ea post ipsius oratoris correctionem
magis idonea fit pronuntiatione. ‘non igitur satius esset’, dicet aliquis, ‘ab initio, praeser-
tim cum scribas, ad optimum et lectissimum verbum devenire?’ est, cum non est satius, si
commutatio verbi id erit demonstratura, eiusmodi rem esse, ut, cum eam communi verbo
appellaris, levius dixisse videaris, cum ad electius verbum accedas, insigniorem rem fa-
cias. quodsi continuo venisses ad id verbum, nec rei nec verbi gratia animadversa esset.”
A variant is described a little later: Rhet. Her. 4.40 “dubitatio est, cum quaerere videatur
orator, utrum de duobus potius aut quid de pluribus potissimum dicat, hoc modo: ‘offuit
eo tempore plurimum rei publicae consulum sive stultitiam sive malitiam dicere oportet
sive utrumque.’ item: ‘tu istuc ausus es dicere, homo omnium mortalium—quonam te
digno moribus tuis appellem nomine?’”
147 Cic. De orat. 3.203 “tum correctio vel ante vel postquam dixeris vel cum aliquid a te ipso
reicias”.
148 Quint. Inst. 9.1.30.
149 Quint. Inst. 9.3.89 “item correctionis eadem ratio est: nam quod illic dubitat, hic emendat.”
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itself was apparently a very common item in the orator’s toolbox, requiring
no further elaboration.
4.3.4 Conclusion
As a summary: the importance of the memory for the orator, and the preven-
tion of memory failure, are high on the agenda of rhetorical advice: general
memory training, the “stock of phrases” technique, extempore speaking, the
use of a script / notes / prompter, cogitatio, and especially mnemotechnics
are covered with more or less detail (with a remarkable tendency to self-
referentiality within rhetorical theory in the topic of mnemotechnics). Ad-
vice for remedies on the spot, when memory failure has already occured, is
not given, which may express a communis opinio that a “blackout” is some-
thing that simply must not happen to an orator.
More remarkable are the possibilities of using (pretended) memory fail-
ure as found in Cicero’s speeches: in this area, oratorical practice again goes
beyond rhetorical theory, especially in the variants of praeteritio which are
based on pretended memory failure. Rhetorical theory is apparently not in-
terested in this issue; the figure of self-correction described in the Rhetorica ad
Herennium is a singular example of theoretical awareness of the point, but it
is not taken up later with the same emphasis: even Quintilian, who usually
develops what he has found in the rhetorical tradition with great detail and
system, does not pursue this point.
4.4 Potential failure due to nervousness
Another potential obstacle for an orator is his nervousness; insofar as it leads
to actual silence, this can be ascribed to either voice failure or memory fail-
ure, covered above in sections 4.2–4.3; in this section, I am only concerned
with nervousness (actual or pretended) as mentioned by the orator, but with-
out manifest, visible or audible, faults in the speech. Thus, there is no actual
failure, but a potential failure utilised rhetorically by the orator.
In the Attic Orators, the topic is used in two kinds of situation: first, at the
beginning of funeral speeches for citizens who have fallen in war, in connec-
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tion with the “topos of the inexpressible”:150 the orator describes his con-
cerns whether he will be able to honour the deceased and their deeds in an
appropriate way. Second, at the beginning of a speech which is the speak-
ers’s first occasion of speaking in public (i.e. the actual speaker’s, while the
speech may be written by a logographer):151 here the topic is used for a cap-
tatio benevolentiae for the speaker’s inexperience. In both cases the topic of
nervousness is used as a topos,152 with no reference to the specific circum-
stances of the speech. It was, in the Attic Orators, apparently not used as an
argument in itself.
In Cicero’s speeches, on the contrary, the figure is used very rarely and
only with very good reasons, and always resulting from a special case or po-
litical situation. In three instances, the captatio benevolentiae is the dominant
aspect: firstly, the Pro S. Roscio Amerino153 is entirely dominated by an at-
mosphere of high political pressure, under which legal rights are difficult to
achieve; Cicero relates this situation to his own state of being nervous with
a good reason despite having a good case. Secondly, the Pro rege Deiotaro154
stands under political pressure of a quite different kind; Cicero still uses his
nervousness for a captatio benevolentiae, but with a complex web of motives
and references:155 1. the high position of the accused; 2. the low position
of the accusers; 3. Caesar’s clementia (addressed quite directly); and 4. the
150 Lys. or. 2.1; Hyp. or. 6.2. Remarkably, Pericles in his funeral speech (as described by Thucy-
dides, Thuk. 2.35) also uses the “topos of the inexpressible”, but does not claim to be
nervous.
On the “topos of the inexpressible” see p. 214.
151 Lys. or. 12.3, Lys. or. 19.1–3; Dem. or. 27.2, 34.1.
152 This does not mean that it was always used in speeches of this kind. For public fu-
neral speeches, we do not have enough specimens for a sustantiated judgement; for “first
speeches”, we have many examples where the topos was not used.
153 Cic. S. Rosc. 9 “his de rebus tantis tamque atrocibus neque satis me commode dicere neque
satis graviter conqueri neque satis libere vociferari posse intellego. nam commoditati in-
genium, gravitati aetas, libertati tempora sunt impedimento. huc accedit summus timor,
quem mihi natura pudorque meus attribuit, et vestra dignitas et vis adversariorum et Sex.
Rosci pericula. quapropter vos oro atque obsecro, iudices, ut attente bonaque cum venia
verba mea audiatis.”
154 Cic. Deiot. 1 “cum in omnibus causis gravioribus, C. Caesar, initio dicendi commoveri
soleam vehementius, quam videtur vel usus vel aetas mea postulare, tum in hac causa ita
me multa perturbant, ut, quantum mea fides studii mihi adferat ad salutem regis Deiotari
defendendam, tantum facultatis timor detrahat. etc.”
155 While some of these factors should really rather work in Cicero’s favour, they still consti-
tute unfamiliar circumstances and therefore contribute to the orator’s uncertainty of how
to deal with them.
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physical situation in Caesar’s house, which Cicero compares to the usual sit-
uation on the Forum, with reference to the Roman citizens where Caesar’s re-
sponsibility towards the Roman people is implied. Cicero thus uses his own
weakness to confirm Caesar’s power and to derive from there a duty of jus-
tice and clementia. Thirdly, in the seventh Philippica156 Cicero is (according to
his own presentation at least) confronted not with an overall adverse climate
but with a divided senate, and with a political situation outside the ordinary,
where his argumentative foundation are not laws but personal connections,
attitudes, feelings. He needs to turn the mood of at least some senators, in
order to get a majority for his position; therefore he introduces with his con-
fession of nervousness a long, climactic period, an elaborated “please listen!”
that shows respect to the audience and anticipates their protest.
In another three passages Cicero mentions his nervousness within a tac-
tical trick while the captatio benevolentiae is present only in the background:
the Divinatio in Caecilium is a speech in preparation of the Verres trial, where
Cicero argues why he, rather than Caecilius, should act as Verres’ prosecutor.
In this context, the nervousness is used as a sign of agitation and tension, in
contrast to Caecilius, to make him appear disengaged and not committed,
and thus a less suitable prosecutor.157 In the Pro Quinctio,158 the nervous-
ness is part of a dramatic narration: Cicero tells how he was nervous and
unsure earlier, but was then convinced by his client that the case (res ipsa) is
absolutely safe; the implied consequence is that the same facts will have the
same eye-opening effect on the audience now. In the Pro Cluentio, the topic is
part of an unusually complex argumentation involving an earlier trial where
Cluentius and Cicero were on different sides; Cicero claims that his nervous-
156 Cic. Phil. 7.8 “periculose dico; quem ad modum accepturi, patres conscripti, sitis, horreo,
sed pro mea perpetua cupiditate vestrae dignitatis retinendae et augendae quaeso oroque
vos, patres conscripti, ut primo, etsi erit vel acerbum auditu vel incredibile a M. Cicerone
esse dictum, accipiatis sine offensione, quod dixero, neve id, priusquam, quale sit, expli-
caro, repudietis”.
157 Cic. Div. in Caec. 41 “ego qui, sicut omnes sciunt, in foro iudiciisque ita verser ut eiusdem
aetatis aut nemo aut pauci pluris causas defenderint, et qui omne tempus quod mihi ab
amicorum negotiis datur in his studiis laboribusque consumam, quo paratior ad usum
forensem promptiorque esse possim, tamen ita mihi deos velim propitios ut, cum illius
mihi temporis venit in mentem quo die citato reo mihi dicendum sit, non solum com-
moveor animo, sed etiam toto corpore perhorresco”.
158 Cic. Quinct. 77 “diffidebam me hercule, C. Aquili, satis animo certo et confirmato me posse
in hac causa consistere. sic cogitabam, cum contra dicturus esset Hortensius et cum me
esset attente auditurus Philippus, fore uti permultis in rebus timore prolaberer.”
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ness in the earlier trial was only logical “in eius modi causa”,159 i.e. in a case
which was hopeless then, since Cluentius was right, consequently Cluentius
is innocent now; Cicero implies that he knew eight years before that he was
defending a bad case, but he cannot say so openly now.
In other cases Cicero might also have had a reason to mention his nervous-
ness as a captatio benevolentiae, but does not do so as it is not fully justified
by the circumstances. At least Plutarch claims that Cicero was in the trials
against Murena and Milo troubled by anxiety and unsteadiness.160 In the Pro
Murena, there is no mention of nervousness at all, and the case is generally
considered to have been quite a safe one for Cicero.
The Pro Milone is a more special case, and not only because of Plutarch’s
report. The trial itself was held under great public attention and under im-
pression of the unrest caused by Clodius’ gangs.161 Cicero suggests at the
beginning of his speech (as we have it) that a threatening atmosphere is
produced by Pompey’s troops162 (although in fact it was Cicero’s own col-
leagues on the defence team who had asked for the presence of the mili-
tary163). It is possible that the transmitted version of Cicero’s speech differs
significantly from the one he gave in court,164 so we do not know for sure
what the situation and atmosphere really was, and whether and how Cicero
created an argument from it and from his own (real or pretended) feelings
at the time. The rhetorical strategy in the extant text does not draw on the
159 Cic. Cluent. 51.
160 Plut. Cic. 35.3 “Λικιννίῳ δὲ Μουρήνα φεύγοντι δίκην ὑpiὸ Κάτωνος βοηθῶν, καὶ φιλο-
τιμούμενος ῾Ορτήσιον ὑpiερβαλεῖν εὐημερήσαντα, μέρος οὐδὲν ἀνεpiαύσατο τῆς νυκτός, ὡς
ὑpiὸ τοῦ σφόδρα φροντίσαι καὶ διαγρυpiνῆσαι κακωθεὶς ἐνδεέστερος αὐτοῦ φανῆναι”; Plut.
Cic. 35.4 “τότε δ’ οὖν ἐpiὶ τὴν τοῦ Μίλωνος δίκην ἐκ τοῦ φορείου piροελθών, καὶ θεασάμενος
τὸν Πομpiήιον ἄνω καθεζόμενον ὥσpiερ ἐν στρατοpiέδῳ καὶ κύκλῳ τὰ ὅpiλα piεριλάμpiοντα
τὴν ἀγοράν, συνεχύθη καὶ μόλις ἐνήρξατο τοῦ λόγου, κραδαινόμενος τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν
φωνὴν ἐpiεχόμενος.
161 Asconius ad Pro Milone 40.
162 E.g. Cic. Mil. 1 “haec novi iudici nova forma terret oculos”; 2 “non illa praesidia [. . . ] non
adferunt tamen [oratori] aliquid, ut [. . . ] tamen ne non timere quidem sine aliquo timore
possimus”.
163 Asconius ad Pro Milone 40; Cicero later mentions his gratefulness to Pompey in a letter
(Cic. Fam. 3.10.10).
164 This is stated in Cassius Dio 40.54.2–3; Quintilian apparently knew of a written version
of the actual speech (Inst. 4.3.17 “ipsa oratiuncula qua usus est”). In modern research, the
extant speech has been regarded as the speech Cicero had wanted to give (Stroh, 1992, p.
36), more or less the speech he gave (Settle, 1963, p. 280), a forensic display piece (May,
2001), a political statement, rather independent from the trial (Melchior, 2008, p. 285), or a
consolation to Milo in his exile (Clark and Ruebel, 1985).
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topos of nervousness to create a captatio benevolentiae.165 Cicero speaks about
the unusual atmosphere created by the soldiers in the Forum, which might
induce timor (§§ 2, 4), but does not claim that anyone actually is or should
be terrified; all he states is a hypothetical timor which might be justified by
the circumstances, and not even for himself but for the judges (§ 4). In fact,
it is very likely that if anyone was actually nervous at the trial, it was be-
cause of the situation that made the military necessary in the first place, i.e.
Clodius’ gangs roaming the city and responding to Cicero’s speech with up-
roar.166 And this is exactly the point of Cicero’s strategy in the extant text:
he reminds his audience that the soldiers, however threatening their sight
might be in itself, are a promise of safety rather than danger.167 Cicero’s
strategy is not a captatio benevolentiae for himself here; instead he establishes
a connection with the audience based on their common perception of the
circumstances, and builds a captatio malevolentiae against Clodius.
Regardless of the validity of Plutarch’s claim here and on the Pro Murena,
it seems that Cicero would only use the topos of nervousness when he was
actually feeling rather confident; but it is at least equally plausible that he
would omit the topic if it was not strongly motivated by the situation, and
not use it as a pure excuse for a poor performance.
This is not contrary to Cicero’s advice in De oratore always to approach a
speech with caution and respect for the task and thus to cultivate a certain
“stage fright” which includes both nervousness and increased alertness,168
as this need not be related to explicit mention of nervousness. In the Rhetor-
ica ad Herennium, a related point is mentioned, the situation when the orator
has to say something he knows to be disagreeable to the audience; the Auc-
165 This only suggests itself if the text is read together with Plutarch’s and Dio’s accounts that
Cicero was in fact extraordinarily nervous.
166 Asconius ad Pro Milone 41–42 “Cicero cum inciperet dicere, exceptus est acclamatione Clo-
dianorum, qui se continere ne metu quidem circumstantium militum potuerunt. Itaque
non ea qua solitus erat constantia dixit.”
167 Cic. Mil. 3 “quam ob rem illa arma, centuriones, cohortes non periculum nobis, sed prae-
sidium denuntiant”.
168 Cic. De orat. 1.119 “mihi etiam qui optime dicunt quique id facillime atque ornatissime
facere possunt, tamen, nisi timide ad dicendum accedunt et in ordienda oratione per-
turbantur, paene impudentes videntur”; cf. Cic. De orat. 1.121 (Crassus’ own example)
“equidem et in vobis animum advertere soleo et in me ipso saepissime experior, ut et
exalbescam in principiis dicendi et tota mente atque artubus omnibus contremiscam”.
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tor advises to rely expressly on the moral argument of the duty of truth.169
Quintilian has more to say about the (real) problem of nervousness (espe-
cially if it arises from a natural shyness) than the earlier writers of rhetorical
theory,170 as it apparently became more of a problem in the educational sys-
tem of the Empire, where students tended to remain in the secure environ-
ment of school declamations for too long.171 Nevertheless Quintilian agrees
with the traditional opinion that a certain nervousness is useful if it means
not fear but respect for the task, and that if not actually there, it should be
simulated.172
However, none of the writers of rhetorical theory treats nervousness, ac-
tual or feigned, as a potential source of argument.
4.5 Lack of talent
Lack of talent, of a natural skill in oratorical tasks, can of course lead to vari-
ous kinds of oratorical failure. In the absolute case where an oratorical career
is not even attempted (or attempted, but given up soon) due to lack of talent,
it ceases to be an oratorical issue; yet it is a topic in the theoretical discourse,
though not given much space. Its history in ancient rhetoric starts only with
Cicero’s De oratore: in the first book, Cicero quotes his teacher Apollonios
169 Rhet. Her. 4.49–50 “est autem quoddam genus in dicendo licentiae, quod astutiore ratione
conparatur, cum aut ita obiurgamus eos, qui audiunt, quomodo ipsi se cupiunt obiurgari,
aut id, quod scimus facile omnes audituros, dicimus nos timere, quomodo accipiant, sed tamen
veritate commoveri, ut nihilosetius dicamus. [exempla] [50] ergo haec exornatio, cui licentiae
nomen est, sicuti demonstravimus, duplici ratione tractabitur: acrimonia, quae si nimium
fuerit aspera, mitigabitur laude; et adsimulatione, de qua posterius diximus, quae non indiget
mitigationis, propterea quod imitatur licentiam et sua sponte se ad animum auditoris adcommo-
dat.”
170 Quint. Inst. 12.5.3 “sciat autem, si quis haec forte minus adhuc peritus distinguendi vim
cuiusque verbi leget, non probitatem a me reprendi, sed verecundiam, quae est timor
quidam reducens animum ab iis quae facienda sunt: inde confusio et coepti paenitentia et
subitum silentium. quis porro dubitet vitiis adscribere adfectum propter quem facere hon-
este pudet?”
171 Quint. Inst. 12.6.5 “ideoque nonnulli senes in schola facti stupent novitate cum in iudicia
venerunt, et omnia suis exercitationibus similia desiderant. at illic et iudex tacet et ad-
versarius obstrepit et nihil temere dictum perit, et si quid tibi ipse sumas probandum est,
et laboratam congestamque dierum ac noctium studio actionem aqua deficit, et omisso
magna semper flandi tumore in quibusdam causis loquendum est, quod illi diserti min-
ime sciunt.”
172 Quint. Inst. 12.5.4 “neque ego rursus nolo eum qui sit dicturus et sollicitum surgere et
colore mutari et periculum intellegere, quae si non acciderent, etiam simulanda erunt; sed
intellectus hic sit operis, non metus, moveamurque, non concidamus.”
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Molon (of Alabanda) who would not admit a student whom he found not
to have enough talent,173 and while Apollonios was certainly not the first
teacher to follow this principle, Cicero is the first writer of rhetoric to state
it. He repeats the point in the second book, now on his own account.174 In
the Brutus, he applies the point to the historical context, when in a general
statement about the early Republic he reports that many more men wanted
to become orators than could, i.e. that wish and effort are not sufficient.175
This is confirmed later when he mentions T. Manlius Torquatus, who could
have become an orator but did not want to, as an exception to the rule.176
After Cicero the topic is taken up by Quintilian at the beginning of the
Institutio and touched upon again in other passages, with some differences:
Quintilian goes into much more detail about the necessary natural dispo-
sitions (ingenium naturaque) of a student of oratory, of which the student’s
behaviour is a favourable sign, and how a teacher should treat his students
differently according to their character.177 Yet he does not make quite as
harsh a statement as Cicero, that some students are just hopeless: he gets
closest in the clause “non dabit mihi spem bonae indolis, qui . . . ”178 (which
is somewhat watered down), and he concedes only very reluctantly that na-
ture sometimes sets limits even to the best teacher, but emphasises the aim
of making the best of any student.179 He allows for absolute prerequisites
173 Cic. De orat. 1.126 “Alabandensem Apollonium, qui cum mercede doceret, tamen non
patiebatur eos, quos iudicabat non posse oratores evadere, operam apud sese perdere,
dimittebatque et ad quam quemque artem putabat esse aptum, ad eam impellere atque
hortari solebat”; cf. 1.130.
174 Cic. De orat. 2.85 “qua re ego tibi oratorem sic iam instituam, si potuero, ut quid efficere
possit ante perspiciam; [. . . ] sin plane abhorrebit et erit absurdus, ut se contineat aut ad
aliud studium transferat, admonebo”.
175 Cic. Brut. 182 “volo enim sciri in tanta et tam vetere re publica maxumis praemiis eloquen-
tiae propositis omnes cupisse dicere, non plurumos ausos esse, potuisse paucos”; cf. the
same point in Cic. Planc. 62 “quotus enim quisque disertus, quotus quisque iuris peritus
est, ut eos numeres qui volunt esse?”
176 Cic. Brut. 245 “plus facultatis habuit ad dicendum quam voluntatis”.
177 Quint. Inst. 1.3.1–7.
178 Quint. Inst. 1.3.2. Similarly vague are Quint. Inst. 1.pr.26 “illud tamen in primis testandum
est, nihil praecepta atque artes valere nisi adiuvante natura. quapropter ei cui deerit inge-
nium non magis haec scripta sint quam de agrorum cultu sterilibus terris” and Quint. Inst.
7.10.14 “sed haec in oratione praestabit cui omnia adfuerint, natura doctrina studium.”
179 Quint. Inst. 10.2.20–21 “nam is [praeceptor] et adiuvare debet quae in quoque eorum in-
venit bona et quantum fieri potest adicere quae desunt et emendare quaedam et mutare.
rector enim est alienorum ingeniorum atque formator; difficilius est naturam suam fin-
gere. [21] sed ne ille quidem doctor, quamquam omnia quae recta sunt velit esse in suis
auditoribus quam plenissima, in eo tamen cui naturam obstare viderit laborabit.”
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only in special areas: in regards to physical-medical conditions180 and to
memory,181 i.e. in issues not directly connected to the task of persuasion nor
to the moral claim of the vir bonus. Nor does Quintilian explicitly state the
opposite position, that all students can be taught with benefit, at least to a
certain, if modest, degree. This more optimistic attitude shines through in
the recommendation to the newborn’s father which opens the Institutio after
the prooemium: “igitur nato filio pater spem de illo primum quam opti-
mam capiat”;182 yet Quintilian, with his practical experience of decades as
a teacher, apparently decided not to include the pure idealistic view in his
Institutio.
The complementary position, that a mediocre talent need not, and should
not, lead to general silence of an ambitious orator-candidate, is to be found
explicitly in Cicero’s De oratore183 and again in the Orator184 and takes up
an entire section of Quintilian’s Institutio,185 and in some way it naturally
underlies the entire literature of rhetorical theory, which is based on the as-
180 See above p. 180.
181 Quint. Inst. 11.2.49 “sed ne hoc quidem infirmae memoriae remedium est nisi in iis qui
sibi facultatem aliquam dicendi ex tempore paraverunt. quod si cui utrumque defuerit,
huic omittere omnino totum actionum laborem, ac si quid in litteris valet ad scribendum
potius suadebo convertere: sed haec rara infelicitas erit.”
182 Quint. Inst. 1.1.1.
183 Cic. De orat. 1.132 “quae [forma apta et vox plena ac suavis] quibus a natura minora data
sunt, tamen illud adsequi possunt, ut eis, quae habent, modice et scienter utantur et ut ne
dedeceat” and 3.35 “etenim videmus ex eodem quasi ludo [summorum in suo cuiusque
genere artificum et magistrorum] exisse discipulos dissimilis inter se ac tamen laudandos,
cum ad cuiusque naturam institutio doctoris accommodaretur.”; cf. on memory Cic. De orat.
2.357.
184 Cic. Orat. 4 “quod si quem aut natura sua aut illa praestantis ingeni vis forte deficiet
aut minus instructus erit magnarum artium disciplinis, teneat tamen eum cursum quem
poterit; prima enim sequentem honestum est in secundis tertiisque consistere”; similarly
on memory: Cic. De orat. 2.360 “qua re hac exercitatione non eruenda memoria est, si
est nulla naturalis; sed certe, si latet, evocanda est” and Quint. Inst. 11.2.1 “memoriam
quidam naturae modo esse munus existimaverunt, estque in ea non dubie plurimum, sed
ipsa excolendo sicut alia omnia augetur”.
185 Quint. Inst. 2.8, in particular: [1] “virtus praeceptoris haberi solet, nec inmerito, diligenter
in iis quos erudiendos susceperit notare discrimina indiligengeniorum, et quo quemque
natura maxime ferat scire. nam est in hoc incredibilis quaedam varietas, nec pauciores
animorum paene quam corporum formae.”; [12] “inbecillis tamen ingeniis sane sic obse-
quendum sit ut tantum in id quo vocat natura ducantur; ita enim quod solum possunt
melius efficient.”; [13–14] “nam sunt haec duo uitanda prorsus: [14] unum, ne temptes
quod effici non possit, alterum, ne ab eo quod quis optime facit in aliud cui minus est
idoneus transferas.”
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sumption that any level of natural talent can be improved by proper instruc-
tion.186
The more specific question of how an oratorical career should be planned
depending on the level of natural talent is not covered explicitly anywhere in
theory. It is touched indirectly, however, in a passage in De oratore187 which is
concerned with the value of legal knowledge for the orator; here it is said, in
passing, that no one should undertake a big case who fails in smaller ones.
Although this statement does not actually relate to talent, the casual men-
tioning allows to regard as communis opinio that there are minor (easier) and
major (more difficult) cases, and that any orator should stick to what he can
handle. This corresponds to the advice to an orator with limited talent in the
Orator “in secundis tertiisque consistere”.188
The general line of thought which we find in the rhetorical writings, that
some talent is necessary for becoming a (good) orator, but talent alone is not
sufficient, is sometimes also used as an argument in actual speeches. The first
part, that talent is necessary, can be seen in the opening sentence of Cicero’s
Pro Balbo, where he infers ingenium from eloquentia, in order to praise his co-
orators.189 The second part, that talent must be supported by education and
training for the orator to achieve the highest level of competence, is used in
Pro Caelio as an argument for Caelius’ honourable lifestyle, or at least not
186 A curious exception is humour, which according to Cicero depends on talent alone (Cic.
De orat. 2.216).
Much more space is given to the point whether talent alone is sufficient, i.e. whether the-
ory and formal education is necessary to become a “good” orator. Indeed, much of De
orat. 1 deals with this question, and while especially Crassus insists that talent is essential
and that oratory is based on dona naturae (Cic. De orat. 1.113–115), it is conceded that some
theory and exercise is indispensable if the aim is perfection, e.g. Cic. De orat. 1.14 (similarly
Cic. De orat. 1.78–79); similar statements are made by Quintilian (Inst. 2.19 and 11.3.11).
187 Cic. De orat. 1.174–175 “tu mihi cum in circulo decipiare adversari stipulatiuncula et cum
obsignes tabellas clientis tui, quibus in tabellis id sit scriptum, quo ille capiatur, ego tibi
ullam causam maiorem committendam putem? citius hercule is, qui duorum scalmorum
naviculam in portu everterit, in Euxino ponto Argonautarum navem gubernarit. [175]
quid? si ne parvae quidem causae sunt, sed saepe maximae, in quibus certatur de iure
civili, quod tandem os est eius patroni, qui ad eas causas sine ulla scientia iuris audet
accedere?”
188 Cic. Orat. 4, cf. note 184.
189 Cic. Balb. 1 “si ingenia [patronorum in iudiciis valent], ab eloquentissimis [viris L. Corneli
causa defensa est]”.
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an altogether dishonourable lifestyle, as this would be incompatible with
oratorical training.190
4.6 The “topos of incapability” and the “topos of the
inexpressible”
Another, more strictly rhetorical use of the issue of lack of talent is the “topos
of incapability”191 which is decribed precisely in the Rhetorica ad Herennium:
“[principium sumetur] ab eius persona, de quo loquemur, si laudabimus:
vereri nos, ut illius facta verbis consequi possimus”;192 it is later taken up
by Quintilian.193 The figure is a typical captatio benevolentiae, since it asks
for lenience from the audience for the orator’s performance.194 It has almost
always an ironical touch and in that is connected to the praeteritio.195
Curiously, both the Rhetorica ad Herennium and Quintilian cover this figure
in the specific context of the principium, and in case of the Rhet. Her., more
specifically the principium of an epideictic speech; yet we do find it in the At-
tic Orators’ and Cicero’s forensic speeches, and not only in defence speeches
(which bear a certain connection to the genus laudativum) but also in Athenian
190 Cic. Cael. 45–46 “atque in eo non solum ingenium elucere eius videbatis, quod saepe,
etiamsi industria non alitur, valet tamen ipsum suis viribus, sed inerat, nisi me propter
benevolentiam forte fallebat, ratio et bonis artibus instituta et cura et vigiliis elaborata
etc.”
191 This topos has, of course, a long tradition in poetry, starting with Homer’s notorious “Not
even if I had ten tongues. . . ” (Hom. Il. 2.489) and recurring e.g. in Catullus 14b, in the
prooemia of Horace’s Ars poetica and of Vergil’s Georgica, in the Eclogae (Verg. Ecl. 6.1–
12) and the Aeneid (Verg. Aen. 6.625) and in Apuleius (Apul. Met. 11.25). One of its most
famous occurrences in the history of oratory (however fictitious) is the beginning of Peri-
cles’ funeral oration in Thuk. 2.35. Moreover, it is a species of the more general “topos of
modesty” which pervades all literary genres and eras.
192 Rhet. Her. 3.11.
193 Quint. Inst. 4.1.8 “ita quaedam in his quoque commendatio tacita, si nos infirmos, in-
paratos, inpares agentium contra ingeniis dixerimus” (on the prooemium).
194 It is also connected to the topic of artem arte celare (see p. 120), as it implies that the matter
(case) at hand is by itself sufficient, and that a better orator could make a much stronger
argument. (Cf. the similar line of thought by Wisse (2013, p. 170–171): “[the] rhetorical
move of attacking the oratorical abilities of a speaker on the other side is perhaps not
without its dangers. For instead of showing that the opposition’s case is weak, does it not
suggest that, with the right approach, a much stronger case for the opposition could be
constructed?”)
195 Cf. Andersen (2001) on the Bescheidenheitstopos (or “topos of modesty”) in general, and
on the paradox created that the topos is only successful if accepted by the audience, but
as a rhetorical device, i.e. seen through: “the disclaimer of art becomes a display of art”
(Andersen, 2001, p. 6).
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prosecution speeches as well as Cicero’s speeches against Verres, and there
in a decidedly negative argumentation. Besides, the topos is not bound to
the principium of a speech, as the Rhetorica ad Herennium would have it: in
most cases it is used at the opening of the speech, but also in a peroratio by
Aeschines and in later parts of the actio secunda against Verres.196
Related to the “topos of incapability” is another rhetorical topos: the ulti-
mate rhetorical way of using the issue of failure, and also a special kind of
praeteritio (see p. 79), is the “topos of the inexpressible”, the claim that some-
thing is just too big (too good, too bad, etc.) to be expressed in words, let
alone appropriately.197 Indeed, the Auctor ad Herennium, in the passage cited
above, continues: “[principium sumetur] ab eius persona, de quo loquemur,
si laudabimus: vereri nos, ut illius facta verbis consequi possimus; omnes
illius virtutes praedicare oportere; ipsa facta omnium laudatorum eloquentiam
anteire”.198 In this last step, the point of reference of the figure is broadened
from the single orator’s incapacity to the incapacity of every orator and thus
of oratory in general. The focus is thereby shifted from the orator’s person
to the subject of the speech (although the topos of modesty is still present in
the background); its main function is consequently not a captatio benevolentiae
but an emphasis on the topic.
196 Attic Orators: e.g. Lys. or. 17.1; Dem. or. 22.1, 23.5, 29.1; Aischin. Ctes. 260; Cicero: Cic. S.
Rosc. 9 “his de rebus tantis tamque atrocibus neque satis me commode dicere neque satis
graviter conqueri neque satis libere vociferari posse intellego. nam commoditati inge-
nium, gravitati aetas, libertati tempora sunt impedimento”; Cic. Verr. 2.4.87 “non possum
disposite istum [Verrem] accusare, si cupiam: opus est non solum ingenio verum etiam ar-
tificio quodam singulari”, 2.5.158 “nam quid ego de P. Gavio, Consano municipe, dicam,
iudices, aut qua vi vocis, qua gravitate verborum, quo dolore animi dicam? tametsi dolor
me non deficit; ut cetera mihi in dicendo digna re, digna dolore meo, suppetant magis
laborandum est”; Cic. Manil. 3 “dicendum est enim de Cn. Pompei singulari eximiaque
virtute; huius autem orationis difficilius est exitum quam principium invenire. ita mihi
non tam copia quam modus in dicendo quaerendus est”; Cic. Marc. 4 “nullius tantum
flumen est ingeni, nullius dicendi aut scribendi tanta vis, tanta copia, quae non dicam
exornare, sed enarrare, C. Caesar, res tuas gestas possit.”
197 The topic has a place of its own in funeral orations of fifth-century Greece, where, among
other topics, “the speaker should acknowledge that his words will be inadequate to the
occasion”. (Kennedy, 1994, p. 22)
It is related to some aspects of allusion (see p. 81) and to the figure “dies iam me deficiat”
(discussed in the section on time limits, see p. 62).
198 Rhet. Her. 3.11.
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We find the topos in the Attic Orators’ and Cicero’s speeches both in the
general form of “no words can suffice to express . . . ”,199sometimes with an
emphasis on “to express appropriately”,200 and with a focus on the lack of
an appropriate term for a particular quality or behaviour.201 Special forms
of this feature are: offering possible terms and dismissing them;202 “auderet
enim dicere”, implying that something needs courage to say;203 the orator’s
confession of not having enough tears (left) to express his grief;204 the com-
plete surrender on an issue and on the task of conveying it205 (which is close
to a total rhetorical failure); and the claim that something (which happens
to be the subject of the speech) is too important to be said206 (this is heavily
ironical, of course, and plays with the assumed or actual appropriateness to
say something).
199 Attic Orators: e.g. Lys. or. 2.2, 2.54, 12.1, 12.99; Dem. or. 3.16, 9.54, 10.64, 14.1, 18.129; Hyp.
or. 6.2; Cicero: e.g. Cic. Verr. 2.4.1 “ego quo nomine appellem nescio”; Cic. Manil. 29 “iam
vero virtuti Cn. Pompei quae potest oratio par inveniri? quid est quod quisquam aut
illo dignum aut vobis novum aut cuiquam inauditum possit adferre?”; Cic. Mil. 78 “non
potest dici satis, ne cogitari quidem, quantum in illo sceleris, quantum exiti fuerit.”; Cic.
Har. 2 “cuius ego de ecfrenato et praecipiti furore quid dicam? 〈an〉 potest gravioribus a
me verbis vulnerari quam est statim in facto ipso a gravissimo viro, P. Servilio, confectus
ac trucidatus? cuius si iam vim et gravitatem illam singularem ac paene divinam adsequi
possem, tamen non dubito quin ea tela quae coniecerit inimicus quam ea quae conlega
patris emisit leviora atque hebetiora esse videantur.”
200 Attic Orators: e.g. Lys. or. 2.1; Dem. or. 6.11, 19.65, 20.76; Cicero: Cic. Phil. 2.77 “o hominem
nequam! quid enim aliud dicam? magis proprie nihil possum dicere.”
201 Attic Orators: e.g. Dem. or. 18.22, 27.64, 36.44; Cic. Leg. agr. 2.35 “verbum mihi deest,
Quirites, cum ego hanc potestatem regiam appello”; Cic. Har. 5 “itaque eum numquam a
me esse accusandum putavi, non plus quam stipitem illum qui quorum hominum esset
nesciremus, nisi se Ligurem ipse esse diceret.”; Cic. Phil. 2.67 “quae Charybdis tam vorax?
Charybdim dico, quae si fuit, animal unum fuit; Oceanus medius fidius vix videtur tot res
tam dissipatas, tam distantibus in locis positas tam cito absorbere potuisse.”
202 Dem. or. 19.66, 19.220; Cic. Har. 53 “quas ego alias optimatium discordias a dis immortal-
ibus definiri putem? nam hoc quidem verbo neque P. Clodius neque quisquam de gre-
galibus eius aut de consiliariis designatur”; Cic. Scaur. 50 “quo te nunc modo appellem?
ut hominem? at non es inter nos. ut mortuum? at vivis et viges”; Cic. Lig. 17 “scelus
tu illud vocas, Tubero? cur? isto enim nomine illa adhuc causa caruit. alii errorem ap-
pellant, alii timorem; qui durius, spem, cupiditatem, odium, pertinaciam; qui gravissime,
temeritatem; scelus praeter te adhuc nemo.”
203 Cic. Mil. 72.
204 Cic. Phil. 2.64 “miserum me! consumptis enim lacrimis tamen infixus haeret animo do-
lor”; similarly Cic. Phil. 1.9 “atque ego celeriter Veliam devectus Brutum vidi, quanto meo
dolore, non dico.”
205 Cic. Prov. cons. 41 “quam sapienter non disputo; multis enim non probabo”.
206 Cic. Leg. agr. 2.41 “hic ego consul populi Romani non modo nihil iudico sed ne quid sen-
tiam quidem profero. magna enim mihi res non modo ad statuendum sed etiam ad dicen-
dum videtur esse.”
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The figure is not as frequent as others in the Attic Orators’ and Cicero’s
speeches, but still used several times. With exception of the Rhetorica ad
Herennium, it is not treated in rhetorical theory; especially Quintilian, who
mentions the “topos of incapability”, does not consider the shift of focus to-
wards the altogether inexpressible.207
4.7 Conclusion
Various forms of failure, potential and actual, are considered in rhetorical
theory in varying depth: much attention is devoted to techniques of mem-
ory training, especially mnemotechnics; advice on voice training is less de-
tailed and practical as one might expect, but the issue is present as a potential
problem; nervousness is mentioned, though with not much practical advice;
the subject of (lack of) talent vs. (lack of) education is discussed particularly
widely by Cicero.
What is largely missing in the rhetorical theory, however, are the opportu-
nities for the orator to turn an issue of failure into an advantage, to make
rhetorical use of what is originally an obstacle: opportunities to pretend
a failure for various purposes (a pretext for an omission [i.e. praeteritio], a
captatio benevolentiae, to draw special attention to something, or as part of a
larger argumentation). Where these are mentioned in theoretical writings,
not all aspects are covered that are used in practice, not even by Quintilian
who in other topics shows both a thorough knowledge of Cicero’s speeches
and a love for detail and system. This is particularly striking in a case like
the “topos of incapability” which is attributed both by the Rhetorica ad Heren-
nium and Quintilian to the prooemium, but used by the orators in all parts of a
speech: both the Auctor ad Herennium and Quintilian should know better; in-
stead it is conceivable that especially Quintilian mainly adopts what he finds
in earlier theoretical writings (which are not extant), rather than reacting to
actual oratorical practice.
207 In later oratory this topos took yet another turn: “Die Unsagbarkeit einer Sache [. . . ] wird
deshalb oft durch den Gedanken ausgedrückt, daß selbst C[icero] hier verstummen wür-
de” (Becker, 1957, c. 90).
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In my observations regarding many single phenomena in the area of silence
and omission, a common feature has become visible: the extant speeches
by the Attic Orators and Cicero use many aspects of silence or omissions in
strategic ways which are not covered in the rhetorical writings. This would
not be very significant if only isolated points, specific to a particular speech
and its historical circumstances, were concerned, as it lies in the very nature
of rhetorical theory that it treats mostly recurring phenomena and structures,
topics which can be in some way systematised and thus transferred to the
composition and performance of new speeches. But something ubiquitous
has become visible in the speeches which is not treated in theory: a recurring
tendency to use silence and omission, especially explicit silence and omis-
sion, for rhetorical purposes. This usage is similar enough to other areas of
rhetorical strategy which are indeed covered systematically by the ancient
writers of rhetorical theory (in particular by Quintilian in the Institutio, the
most exhaustive rhetorical work from the classical periods of both Athens
and Rome) to render the lack of a systematic treatment significant. This
observation shines new light on the relationship of oratorical practice and
rhetorical theory in classical antiquity.
The ancient writers of rhetorical theory had, of course, opinions them-
selves about the relationship of their writings to the oratorical practice of
their own or earlier times, and an assessment of each of their works must
consider whether it is intended as prescriptive, i.e. mostly stating rules which
an orator should follow in his practice, or descriptive, i.e. mostly presenting
the phenomena of oratorical practice as they are employed in reality. In the
former case, the main influence, as intended by the author, is directed from
theory to practice, in the latter case from practice to theory. Although all
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rhetorical treatises include both aspects, some distinct tendencies can be ob-
served.
A brief overview shall therefore be given. The earliest extant rhetori-
cal treatise, the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, presents rhetorical theory as quite
purely prescriptive, as a means for successful oratorical practice (rather than
reflexion on the contemporaneous oratorical practice). Remarks to this effect
are found in the prooemium1 and at the end of the work.2 In the last chapter,
the author also describes his work as a source of ἀφορμαί, “starting points”,
for speeches as well as for private conversations.3
Aristotle is a somewhat special case as his ῾Ρητορική is not one of the rhetor-
ical “manuals” common in his time (like the Rhet. Alex.) but concerned with a
much broader scope towards logic and rational thinking; as Ueding puts it,
Aristotle treats “Rhetorik als Theorie des Meinungswissens und der wahr-
scheinlichen Schlüsse, der glaubhaften Argumentation und des Überzeu-
gens durch Gefühlsgründe (Psychagogie) [. . . ] seine ‘Ars Rhetorica’ ist so-
mit zugleich eine Wissenschaftstheorie der Rhetorik.”4 Consequently, it has
been noted that Aristotle, too, is not particularly interested in the oratorical
practice of his time; “[i]n fact, Aristotle rarely adduces examples from the
Attic orators and seems much more interested in the language and style of
dramatists and poets from Homer right down to his own time.”5
In the Rhetorica ad Herennium, which is quite explicitly aimed at “rules for
speaking well”,6 the author shows awareness of the limits of such rhetorical
1 Rhet. Alex. 1420a6–17 “ἐpiέστειλάς μοι, ὅτι piολλάκις piολλοὺς piέpiομφας piρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς δια-
λεξομένους ὑpiὲρ τοῦ γραφῆναί σοι τὰς μεθόδους τῶν piολιτικῶν λόγων· [. . . ] ὥσpiερ [. . . ]
ἐσθῆτα σpiουδάζεις τὴν εὐpiρεpiεστάτην τῶν λοιpiῶν ἀνθρώpiων ἔχειν, οὕτω δύναμιν λόγων
λαβεῖν ἐστί σοι piειρατέον τὴν εὐδοξοτάτην. piολὺ γὰρ κάλλιόν ἐστι καὶ βασιλικώτερον τὴν
ψυχὴν ἔχειν εὐγνωμονοῦσαν ἢ τὴν ἕξιν τοῦ σώματος ὁρᾶν εὐειματοῦσαν.”
2 Rhet. Alex. 1446a33–35 “καὶ τοῦτον μὲν τὸν τρόpiον χρὴ τὰ κατὰ τὸν βίον αὑτοῦ piαρα-
σκευάζειν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς piροτέρας συντάξεως piερὶ τοὺς λόγους γυμνάζεσθαι.”
3 Rhet. Alex. 1445b24–30 “δεῖ δὲ καὶ λέγοντας καὶ γράφοντας ὅτι μάλιστα piειρᾶσθαι κατὰ
τὰ piροειρημένα τοὺς λόγους ἀpiοδιδόναι καὶ συνεθίζειν αὑτοὺς τούτοις ἅpiασιν ἐξ ἑτοίμου
χρῆσθαι. καὶ piερὶ μὲν τοῦ λέγειν ἐντέχνως καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ
ἐν ταῖς piρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὁμιλίαις ἐντεῦθεν piλείστας καὶ τεχνικωτάτας ἀφορμὰς ἕξομεν”.
4 Ueding (1995, p. 30–31).
5 Hesk (2009, p. 154).
6 Rhet. Her. 1.1 (prooemium) “nos ea, quae videbantur ad rationem dicendi pertinere, sump-
simus”.
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rules, and of the broader “philosophical” purpose of rhetorical theory,7 yet
this does not actually go beyond the aim of becoming a good orator; it is just
a call for thinking about the rules instead of blindly applying them.8
Cicero breaks out from this tradition of rhetorical theory with a completely
new approach in De Oratore, where he defines insight (on a broader scale,
directed towards philosophy or humanitas) as the most important aim.9 He
does not so much intend to provide rules for application in practice,10 but
rather aims at insight gained from practical experience. This empirical aspect
gives his work something of a “descriptive turn” within ancient rhetoric,
although one has to keep in mind that De Oratore is meant as a rejection of
the traditional rhetorical “textbooks” (among which his De inventione counts)
and as a categorically different project, overturning and surpassing these
7 E.g. Rhet. Her. 1.1 “eo studiosius hoc negotium suscepimus, quod te non sine causa velle
cognoscere rhetoricam intellegebamus; non enim parum in se habet fructus copia dicendi
et commoditas orationis, si recta intellegentia et definita moderatione animi gubernatur.”;
Rhet. Her. 2.50 “haec si, ut conquisite conscripsimus, ita tu diligenter et nobiscum et sine
nobis considerabis, et nos industriae fructus ex tua conscientia capiemus, et tute nostram
diligentiam laudabis, tua perceptione laetabere: tu scientior eris praeceptorum artificii,
nos alacriores ad relicum persolvendum.”
8 Rhet. Her. 3.16 “genera dispositionum sunt duo: unum ab institutione artis profectum,
alterum ad casum temporis adcommodatum. etc.”; Rhet. Her. 4.69 (end of work) “haec
omnia adipiscemur, si rationes praeceptionis diligentia consequemur exercitationis.”
9 Stated explicitly by Cicero himself: Cic. De orat. 1.23 “repetamque non ab incunabulis nos-
trae veteris puerilisque doctrinae quendam ordinem praeceptorum, sed ea, quae quon-
dam accepi in nostrorum hominum eloquentissimorum et omni dignitate principum dis-
putatione esse versata; non quo illa contemnam, quae Graeci dicendi artifices et doctores
reliquerunt, sed cum illa pateant in promptuque sint omnibus, neque ea interpretatione
mea aut ornatius explicari aut planius exprimi possint, dabis hanc veniam, mi frater, ut
opinor, ut eorum, quibus summa dicendi laus a nostris hominibus concessa est, auctori-
tatem Graecis anteponam.” Seen later e.g. by Leeman (1963, p. 114) “[Cicero’s] treatise [De
Oratore] is canonized by post-Aristotelian philosophers and rhetoricians like Theophras-
tus and Hermagoras; it is the same system as that found in the Rhetorica ad Herennium.
What is different is the general approach, the ambitious ideal of the orator and the abhor-
rence from the nugae rhetorum, the artificial technicalities as they were found in Hellenistic
school-rhetoric.”
10 Indeed, he insists that rules must be derived from practice, not practice from the rules
(Cic. De orat. 1.146 “verum ego hanc vim intellego esse in praeceptis omnibus, non ut ea
secuti oratores eloquentiae laudem sint adepti, sed, quae sua sponte homines eloquentes
facerent. ea quosdam observasse atque collegisse; sic esse non eloquentiam ex artificio,
sed artificium ex eloquentia natum”; Cic. De orat. 2.232 “sed ego in his praeceptis hanc vim
et hanc utilitatem esse arbitror, non ut ad reperiendum quod dicamus, arte ducamur sed
ut ea, quae natura, quae studio, quae exercitatione consequimur, aut recta esse confidamus
aut prava intellegamus, cum quo referenda sint didicerimus.”), and reproaches teachers
of rhetoric without practical experience (Cic. De orat. 2.76 “hoc mihi facere omnes isti, qui
de arte dicendi praecipiunt, videntur; quod enim ipsi experti non sunt, id docent ceteros”;
Cic. De orat. 2.81 (on the system of partes orationes) “ne haec quidem reprehendo; sunt enim
concinne distributa, sed tamen, id quod necesse fuit hominibus expertibus veritatis, non
perite”).
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all too technical works.11 In this respect, Cicero coincides with Aristotle,
however with a very different result.
Quintilian in his Institutio employs the prescriptive mode of the earlier
“manuals”, but with a much broader scope and aim, i.e. a thorough edu-
cation beyond rhetorical technicalities.12 Still, like Cicero in De oratore, he
treats rhetorical theory neither as an end in itself nor as a set of rules but as a
means to a higher end, i.e. the perfect orator (who for him is identical with,
or rather a subcategory of, the vir bonus).13 Quintilian repeatedly calls for a
kind of oratory which, while adhering to the rules of rhetoric, does not cling
to them too closely but considers the requirements of the specific case or sit-
uation and acts accordingly.14 In the same vein, he heavily criticises writers
11 Kennedy (1972, p. 209–212, 225–227), Leeman et al. (1981, vol. 1, p. 25), Wisse (2002, pas-
sim), Fantham (2004, p. 21), Mankin (2011, p. 9).
12 Quint. Inst. 1.pr.5 “ego cum existimem nihil arti oratoriae alienum sine quo fieri non posse
oratorem fatendum est, nec ad ullius rei summam nisi praecedentibus initiis perveniri, ad
minora illa, sed quae si neglegas non sit maioribus locus, demittere me non recusabo, nec
aliter quam si mihi tradatur educandus orator studia eius formare ab infantia incipiam.”
13 Quint. Inst. 1.pr.9 “oratorem autem instituimus illum perfectum, qui esse nisi vir bonus
non potest, ideoque non dicendi modo eximiam in eo facultatem sed omnis animi virtutes
exigimus.”
14 Quint. Inst. 3.1.20 “praecipuum vero lumen sicut eloquentiae, ita praeceptis quoque eius
dedit unicum apud nos specimen orandi docendique oratorias artes M. Tullius”; 5.14.32
“non inspiret? non augeat? non mille figuris variet ac verset? ut ea nasci, et ipsa
provenire natura, non manu facta, et arte suspecta, magistrum fateri ubique videantur.
quis umquam sic vicit orator? nonne apud ipsum Demosthenen paucissima huius generis
reperiuntur? quae adprensa Graeci magis (nam hoc solum peius nobis faciunt) in cate-
nas ligant et inexplicabili serie conectunt et indubitata colligunt et probant confessa et se
antiquis per hoc similes vocant, deinde interrogati numquam respondebunt, quem imi-
tentur.”; 9.4.117–118 “quaedam vero tradi arte non possunt. mutandus est casus si durius
is quo coeperamus feratur: num in quem transeamus ex quo praecipi potest? figura labo-
ranti compositioni variata saepe succurrit, quae cum orationis, tum etiam sententiae: num
praescriptum eius rei unum est? occasionibus utendum et cum re praesenti deliberandum
est. [118] iam vero spatia ipsa, quae in hac quidem parte plurimum valent, quod possunt
nisi aurium habere iudicium? cur alia paucioribus verbis satis plena vel nimium, alia
pluribus brevia et abscisa sint? cur in circumductionibus, etiam cum sensus finitus est,
aliquid tamen loci vacare videatur?”; 10.1.15 (on vocabulary) “nam omnium quaecumque
docemus hinc sunt exempla, potentiora etiam ipsis quae traduntur artibus (cum eo qui
discit perductus est ut intellegere ea sine demonstrante et sequi iam suis viribus possit),
quia quae doctor praecepit orator ostendit.”
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of rhetorical theory without practical experience15 and consequently claims
that he has himself derived his advice from practice.16
None of the writers of rhetorical theory explicitly aim at a complete de-
scriptive work about the past or contemporaneous oratorical practice, but
at least Quintilian’s project can be understood in this way, despite its gen-
erally prescriptive approach. It is designed as an exhaustive instruction of
more or less anything that is to be known about becoming a good orator (i.e.
vir bonus), drawing heavily on Quintilian’s own experience as orator and
teacher of orators. This method implies a quite descriptive mode, and this
can indeed be observed in passages of great detail and systematisation, e.g.
on gestures,17 or on enthymeme, epicheireme, syllogism etc.18
Seen in this light, it is significant that for several topics of silence and omis-
sions, which have been shown to be no less systematisable areas, neither
Quintilian nor any of his predecessors employ this descriptive mode.
In modern research on ancient oratory and rhetoric, the relationship be-
tween practice and theory has been continuously examined and discussed.
However, in most cases where comparative analysis of the extant speeches
and rhetorical writings is undertaken, most research concentrates on the
question “how does practical oratory react to the rules and advice from
rhetorical theory?”, while the reverse direction, “how does theoretical sys-
tematisation react to observations in oratorical practice?”, is far less consid-
ered. To cite a few (more or less) recent examples: Kennedy (1994) discusses
how Cicero’s early speeches follow the rhetorical rules rather closely, though
15 Quint. Inst. 5.13.59–60 “ideoque miror inter duos diversarum sectarum velut duces non
mediocri contentione quaesitum, singulisne quaestionibus subiiciendi essent loci, ut
Theodoro placet, an prius docendus iudex quam movendus, ut praecipit Apollodorus,
tanquam perierit haec ratio media, et nihil cum ipsius causae utilitate sit deliberandum.
haec praecipiunt, qui ipsi non dicunt in foro, ut artes a securis otiosisque compositae ipsa
pugnae necessitate turbentur. [60] namque omnes fere, qui legem dicendi quasi quaedam
mysteria tradiderunt, certis non inveniendorum modo argumentorum locis, sed conclu-
dendorum quoque nos praeceptis alligaverunt; de quibus brevissime praelocutus, quid
ipse sentiam, id est quid clarissimos oratores fecisse videam, non tacebo.”, cf. Cic. De orat.
2.5; Quint. Inst. 8.pr.3 “unde existimant accidisse ut qui diligentissimi artium scriptores
extiterint ab eloquentia longissime fuerint”.
16 Quint. Inst. 8.pr.12 “credere modo qui discet velit, certa quaedam via est, et in qua multa
o etiam sine doctrina praestare debeat per se ipsa natura, ut haec de quibus dixi non tam
inventa a praeceptoribus quam cum fierent observata esse videantur.”
17 Quint. Inst. 11.3.65–136.
18 Quint. Inst. 5.14.1–26.
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with adaptations (p. 129ff.), and the later speeches tend to move away from
the usual precepts (e.g. p. 134 on the Catilinarians); he does not consider how
theory may be derived from practice as we know it from the extant speeches
(cf. especially the chapters on Cicero’s De oratore, p. 140–147, and Quintilian,
p. 177–186). Berry and Heath (1997) analyse oratory under the influence of
rhetorical theory,19 but do not cover the converse relationship. Craig (2001)
and May (2001) likewise use Cicero’s rhetorica for analysing his speeches.
Craig (2002) discusses scholarship from about 1970 on Cicero’s rhetorica and
speeches; in the section on Cicero’s rhetorica, no study on the speeches as
sources is mentioned, while the section on the speeches lists several books
and articles which connect Cicero’s oratory to his rhetorical theory. Fantham
(2004) in her chapters “Style and Substance: Cicero’s rethinking of Elocu-
tio” and “Res Pervolgatae: Words and their Manipulation in Standard Rhetor-
ical Theory” examines how Cicero’s theoretical concepts are connected to
Greek sources, but does not include an analysis of Cicero’s own speeches
in her argument. According to John Dugan’s overview of “modern critical
approaches to Roman rhetoric” in the Blackwell Companion to Roman Rhetoric
(Dugan, 2007), recent research on Roman rhetoric has done much to aban-
don the idealised view of the rhetorical system(s) and instead treat rhetoric
“as a cultural construct, something that is embedded within its society”.20
However, Dugan mentions no specific analysis of how ancient rhetoric re-
acts to (contemporaneous or past) oratorical practice. Craig (2007) in the
same volume analyses Cicero’s speeches with repeated references to his rhe-
torica, while May (2007), in his account of Cicero’s rhetorical writings, men-
tions that Cicero writes from experience and uses examples from his own
speeches, but does not himself take the speeches into account for his assess-
ment of the rhetorica, and Fernández López (2007), on Quintilian’s Institutio,
mentions other rhetorical writings to which Quintilian refers and on which
he builds his own work, but does not discuss the relationship between the
19 (Berry and Heath, 1997, p. 393) “however widely its influence spread, rhetoric was devel-
oped in the first place to serve the purposes of oratory, and oratory always remained its
primary raison d’être. Rhetoric is thus of far greater importance for oratory than for any
other genre.”
20 Dugan (2007, p. 16).
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Institutio and Cicero’s, or Quintilian’s own, oratorical practice. Hesk (2009)
in the Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rhetoric claims that
[t]he second aim of this chapter, then, is to elaborate upon that
inevitable gap between an analytical theory based on neat, gen-
eralized typologies and the synthetic practice of composing and
performing real speeches for particular debates, cases, and occa-
sions21
and observes, like many before, that
[a]lthough the analytic theory and synthetic practice of ‘deliber-
ative’ oratory do overlap considerably in the fourth century, the
practical material is not slavishly following the theory and the
practical oratory, like the theory, has its own agendas.22
Once again, we see that analysis and typology fail to encompass
the specific strategies and circumstances of a single speech23
but does not attempt to determine systematic discrepancies in the relation-
ship, or “avoidable gaps” in rhetorical theory.
It seems to me worthwhile to pursue this particular relationship between
theory and practice further, since in my analysis I have found a significant
number of phenomena of silence, omission etc. used in practice (speeches)
but not—or not fully—covered in rhetorical theory: (omission of) the super-
fluous and the figure of praeteritio, with its most common forms (see p. 26),
(omission of) the known and obvious (see p. 44), (avoidance of) speaking
off-topic (see p. 52), time limits (see p. 66), brevitas (see p. 75), some more
special forms of praeteritio (see p. 95), the “omitted alternative” (see p. 109),
(avoidance of) indecent language (see p. 115), (avoidance of) self-praise (see
p. 119); dialogue with the audience (see p. 142) and with the opponent (see
p. 147); (pretended) voice failure (see p. 185), (pretended) memory failure
(see p. 205), (pretended) nervousness (see p. 210), and the “topos of the inex-
pressible” (see p. 216).
21 Hesk (2009, p. 146–147).
22 Hesk (2009, p. 149–150).
23 Hesk (2009, p. 158). This discrepancy is most obvious for Aristotle: see Hesk (2009, p.
155–156).
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In a few cases rhetorical theory does describe the techniques used in ora-
tory, but not before Quintilian: the “alio loco” figure (see p. 78), and the fig-
ures of asking for (or otherwise aiming at) attention (see p. 167) and asking
for (or otherwise aiming at) applause (see p. 171). The “topos of incapabil-
ity” is described by writers of rhetorical theory, but unnecessarily restricted
(see p. 214). Only in the “praeteritio of name”, or allusion (see p. 83), and
the figure of prosopopoeia (see p. 148) have I found an adequate treatment
of the practical application in the theoretical works. Discrepancies like this
have very rarely been observed in research literature; one instance is Kirby
(1997).24
One further significant observation can be made for most of these cases:
while the phenomenon of omission, silence, pause, interruption etc. itself is
often actually covered in rhetorical theory (whether systematically or not), it
is mostly regarded as some kind of problem that needs to be solved, compen-
sated, or avoided; the oratorical practice, in contrast, often reaches beyond
theory in one of two ways. On one hand, the omission etc. is often made
explicit, forming some kind of praeteritio. This figure was in antiquity widely
used in practice but quite underrated in theory, and it is not the only but the
most prominent example of ancient oratory making use of its limits. Alterna-
tively, the orator pretends that some kind of unwanted interruption, omission
etc. has happened (or has almost happened, or is about to happen, etc.). The
“problem” is thus again turned into an opportunity. Especially in the area of
failure, the rhetorical writings provide some instruction (though not in any
systematic way) for prevention and remedies, while on the practical side
(where actual failures are, of course, rarely documented, while prevented
failures are invisible anyway), we find a range of ways in which orators not
only avoided or handled possible failures, but transformed the issue into a
rhetorical device, employable to their advantage.
The difference between practice and theory is therefore not to be found in
a general awareness of the phenomena of omission and silence, but rather
24 (Kirby, 1997, p. 18) “in Cicero’s published orations we are able to discern aspects of his
rhetorical strategies and tactics that (for whatever reason) he never discusses in the theo-
retical works”; Kirby goes on to analyse the Pro Milone to prove this point, but does not
connect it directly to Cicero’s rhetorica.
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in the possibilities of employing them, as rhetorical “tools”, for a specific
purpose.25
The discrepancy between practice and theory which I have shown in the
areas of omission and silence may be specific to these, or it may exist as
well in other fields of ancient oratory and rhetoric; further research would
be necessary to reach a decision here. In any case, I would like to suggest
that this discrepancy can, at least partly, be explained by the historical de-
velopment of rhetoric as a τέχνη and ars. From its very beginning, rhetoric
was concerned with the question of whether it is a τέχνη, or ars, especially
in its struggle against its constant competitor, philosophy.26 This may have
caused a development where rhetoric, from quite early on, was more occu-
pied with its internal discussions (e.g. the competition between Plato and
Isocrates, or later the Atticism/Asianism debate) and its defence against at-
tacks from outside, than with the oratorical reality on which it was originally
built.27 Consequently, the previous rhetorical tradition would have served
as the most important source for rhetorical theory.28 Cicero and Quintilian
25 A further line of possible research opens up here: since we can assume that large parts
of the audience of an orator were more or less familiar themselves with the teachings
of rhetoric, they would recognise many of the typical techniques and figures employed
by the orator. Taking into account the fact that many of the rhetorical devices related to
silence were apparently not universally taught could shed more light on the mechanisms
of persuading and influencing the audience in the extant speeches.
26 As sketched by Cicero: De orat. 3.122 “atque etiam aut inridentes oratorem, ut ille in
Gorgia Socrates, cavillantur aut aliquid de oratoris arte paucis praecipiunt libellis eosque
rhetoricos inscribunt, quasi non illa sint propria rhetorum, quae ab eisdem de iustitia, de
officio, de civitatibus instituendis et regendis, de omni vivendi denique etiam de naturae
ratione dicuntur.”
27 As observed e.g. by Wisse (1989, p. 314).
28 It is generally accepted that Cicero, in rhetorical writing, adapted his Greek models for
a Roman audience: e.g. (Kirby, 1997, p. 13), Corbeill (2002, p. 38). On the other hand, it
has been often observed that continuous developments can be found within the history
of ancient oratorical practice, aside from the influence of rhetorical theory; especially the
relationship between Demosthenes and Cicero has attracted attention from Plutarch on to
modern research, e.g., Stroh (1982), Stroh (1983), Tempest (2007).
Dietrich Mack has suggested this explanation for another, related phenomenon: that al-
though political speeches are so important a part of Cicero’s oratorical oeuvre, he devotes
very little space to the genus deliberativum in his rhetorica: Mack (1937, p. 15–16) “Wenn
man bedenkt, eine wie entscheidende Rolle die politischen Reden vor Senat und Volk im
Rom der republikanischen Zeit gespielt haben, wenn man ferner bedenkt, daß uns von Ci-
cero 6 Parallelreden aus Senat und Contio überliefert sind, so muß man sich wundern, wie
selten und kurz Cicero in seinen rhetorischen Schriften auf das Verhältnis dieser beiden
Redetypen zueinander zu sprechen gekommen ist. Ein Grund dafür wird in der starken
Abhängigkeit der ciceronischen von der griechischen Redetheorie zu suchen sein. Denn
die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Sr. zu Vr. ist ein spezifisch römisches Problem, das in
der Theorie nur der Mann wirklich hätte lösen können, der eine außergewöhnliche im
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seem to acknowledge this view.29 This would add even more weight to J.
Powell’s observation that “[s]cholars may be tempted to use the prescrip-
tions of rhetorical theorists as evidence for what Roman oratory was like,
but it is not always easy to bridge the gap between theory and practice.”30
More detailed work on the inner dependencies of the ancient rhetorical
writings, and their relationship both to various cultural influences and to
the previous and contemporaneous oratorical practice, would be needed to
confirm or refute this explanation in general. With regard to the observa-
tions made on the oratorical use of limits of speech, however, we see in the
theoretical discussion some limits of rhetoric as well.
politischen Kampf vor Senat und Volk gewonnene Erfahrung in die Wagschale zu wer-
fen vermochte. Cicero wäre dieser Mann gewesen. Aber nur in den Beispielen, die Cicero
namentlich in de oratore, Brutus und Orator herbeizieht, kommt die römische Praxis voll
zu ihrem Recht. Das entscheidende ist, daß nie aus diesen Beispielen theoretische Forde-
rungen für Sr. und Vr. abstrahiert werden. Gerade darin aber zeigt sich, wie eng Cicero in den
theoretischen Schriften an seinen griechischen Vorlagen haftet. Und wenn in all diesen Schriften
die Gerichtsrede eine ungleich größere Rolle als die beratende Beredsamkeit spielt, obwohl doch in
Rom die politische bestimmt nicht hinter der gerichtlichen Rede an Bedeutung zurückgestanden
hat, so ist auch das nur mit der starken Abhängigkeit Ciceros von den griechischen Rhetoren zu
erklären.”
29 Heath (2009, p. 68) “That Cicero found it worth keeping up with such highly technical
developments puts his critique of theory in proportion; he must have thought that get-
ting the theory right had some value.”; Quint. Inst. 3.1.22 “non tamen post tot ac tantos
auctores pigebit meam quibusdam locis posuisse sententiam. neque enim me cuiusquam
sectae velut quadam superstitione inbutus addixi, et electuris quae volent facienda copia
fuit, sicut ipse plurium in unum confero inventa, ubicumque ingenio non erit locus curae
testimonium meruisse contentus.”
30 Powell (2011, p. 385).
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